Accident in LIN involving a SAS aircraft.
Another in a long series of low visibility collisions on the runway with many more to come (and there was also the accident in Taiwan where an a/c began a low vis takeoff on a runway closed for construction and collided with construction items).
Yes, TCAS sounds like it could be a backstop. Does it pick up every active transponder including small a/c and will the antennae be effective on the ground? I'm no TCAS expert; so I don't know if it can do the whole job.
Best of all would be a ground traffic display superimposed on the airport chart showing all a/c (including those on final) and vehicles.
If govt. bureaucracy cannot be relied upon to maintain a functional ground radar, a box could broadcast current and projected GPS position at intervals determined in a manner analogous to Bluetooth protocol to eliminate transmission conflicts. A cockpit display could then integrate the position updates along with velocity and display them. The crew could then see the current and projected position of other traffic. Takeoff and landing would be obvious times to check the display for conflicting traffic. Likely the display would have the smarts to identify potential conflicts. Closed runways could be identified by parking vehicle units at each end and the middle if necessary.
Yes, TCAS sounds like it could be a backstop. Does it pick up every active transponder including small a/c and will the antennae be effective on the ground? I'm no TCAS expert; so I don't know if it can do the whole job.
Best of all would be a ground traffic display superimposed on the airport chart showing all a/c (including those on final) and vehicles.
If govt. bureaucracy cannot be relied upon to maintain a functional ground radar, a box could broadcast current and projected GPS position at intervals determined in a manner analogous to Bluetooth protocol to eliminate transmission conflicts. A cockpit display could then integrate the position updates along with velocity and display them. The crew could then see the current and projected position of other traffic. Takeoff and landing would be obvious times to check the display for conflicting traffic. Likely the display would have the smarts to identify potential conflicts. Closed runways could be identified by parking vehicle units at each end and the middle if necessary.
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Totally agree with Mr Saab Driver.My experience of Italian ATC is the same. Non standard clearances, non standard RT and a general feeling that you are on your own.
With the Po Valley weather typified by fog and strong CB activity these guys frankly just are not up to the job. Will be interesting to see what comes out of this tragedy. Let's hope at least more professionalism from Italian ATC generally.
With the Po Valley weather typified by fog and strong CB activity these guys frankly just are not up to the job. Will be interesting to see what comes out of this tragedy. Let's hope at least more professionalism from Italian ATC generally.
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re TCAS on the ground, certainly on my mount, the transponder is inhibited by the squat switches, so we would be invisible on other peoples TCAS. The weather radar may be of use, (eg tilt up and look for a/c like returns), but it would be tricky to decline a take off clearance due to what is probably ground clutter. A definate safeguard during LVPs is to always confirm the r/w with the ILS for that r/w selected on one nav display, and keep a cynical listen out.
[ 08 October 2001: Message edited by: Sick ]
[ 08 October 2001: Message edited by: Sick ]
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hey.. i'm not a pilot, but as far as i know - while acft is on the ground - transponder is not working, so you are invisible for others, who looking on their TSAC display... to be exactly - acft can appear on TCAS displays only after undercarrige is airborn.
i had one bad experience - i was riding on jumpseat of a300 freighter, on short final at CPH. just few seconds before touchdown, TCAS alerted "TRAFFIC, TRAFFIC.."... crew replied with "**** , **** , **** ..." - anyway it was too late and we landed... the reason for TCAS traffic alert was Malasyian (?) 747 with mode-s transponder activated on taxiway due to corresponding contact plate failure...
i had one bad experience - i was riding on jumpseat of a300 freighter, on short final at CPH. just few seconds before touchdown, TCAS alerted "TRAFFIC, TRAFFIC.."... crew replied with "**** , **** , **** ..." - anyway it was too late and we landed... the reason for TCAS traffic alert was Malasyian (?) 747 with mode-s transponder activated on taxiway due to corresponding contact plate failure...
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Our transponders and TCAS are working on the ground. The TA/RA function is inhibited below 500ft AGL. Some airlines turn their transponders on during taxi out. We turn ours on when we are cleared onto the runway. No squat switch.
A few months ago I took part as a volunteer pilot in a DERA (Defence Establishment Research Agency) testing program involving HUD's and ground movements.
Using a simulator I was able to taxi a generic large jet around an unfamiliar airfield in LVP's with ease and confidence. So there certainly are people out there looking at technology and LVP's...
But even so - if ATC clear you for take off and the runway isn't clear... no amount of technology will help. Perhaps a HUD image coupled to a IR camera to detect heat would be universally useful?
Jaguar Cars Ltd have such a system available to the general public...
Safe flying,
WWW
Using a simulator I was able to taxi a generic large jet around an unfamiliar airfield in LVP's with ease and confidence. So there certainly are people out there looking at technology and LVP's...
But even so - if ATC clear you for take off and the runway isn't clear... no amount of technology will help. Perhaps a HUD image coupled to a IR camera to detect heat would be universally useful?
Jaguar Cars Ltd have such a system available to the general public...
Safe flying,
WWW
I am a figment of my own imagination
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The smaller a/c was a Citationjet.
To those whose unfortunate experiences with Italian controllers have left them so upset. I have been in and out of Linate Malpensa Genoa Nice as well as Zurich Brussels London and Athens frequently in the last month. The contolling I have recieved in Italy has been well up to the standard of any of the other FIRs, and no I am not Italian
I frequently use airports that do not have ground radar in low vis. Yes it would be nice to have, and yes it is understood that most large airports are working towards as safe an environment as possible, but in the real world as opposed to a perfect world we deal with what we have and the various contraints bugetry or otherwise.
Accidents do occur sadly and no most of us don't want to die, but sometimes these things do happen no matter how hard we try. Thats life.I am not trying to excuse it, just deal with it.
To those whose unfortunate experiences with Italian controllers have left them so upset. I have been in and out of Linate Malpensa Genoa Nice as well as Zurich Brussels London and Athens frequently in the last month. The contolling I have recieved in Italy has been well up to the standard of any of the other FIRs, and no I am not Italian
I frequently use airports that do not have ground radar in low vis. Yes it would be nice to have, and yes it is understood that most large airports are working towards as safe an environment as possible, but in the real world as opposed to a perfect world we deal with what we have and the various contraints bugetry or otherwise.
Accidents do occur sadly and no most of us don't want to die, but sometimes these things do happen no matter how hard we try. Thats life.I am not trying to excuse it, just deal with it.
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According to a report carried by the BBC http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/wor...00/1587991.stm
the Italian CAA is blaming Pilot Error already.
Condolences to all the families.
the Italian CAA is blaming Pilot Error already.
Condolences to all the families.
ENTREPPRUNEUR
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Obviously I don't make mistakes so I never associate myself with accidents.
Except this one. It is really quite difficult negotiating your way around a strange international airport.
Don't you just get that It could have been me killing all those people?
I do...
Except this one. It is really quite difficult negotiating your way around a strange international airport.
Don't you just get that It could have been me killing all those people?
I do...
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Peterbrat
a couple of months ago an Air Europe 777 had to abort T/O in MXP because an Egyptair AC made an incursion on the runway.
Italian pilots have been aware of the problem, and reported it.
It is nothing new, nothing that couldn't be avoided (such as human error).
In both cases the ground radar was not working.
If we can't avoid human error all the efforts must be orientated in order to use all the available means to avoid such accidents: ground radar, crew training and checking on the runway signals.
But some of the managers in this country have managing positions because of political support and not because of their technical competence.
Those managers worry more about the balance sheet than the safety.
Tragically, in Milan we can't say we had no warnings of the management incompetence and inefficiency: it started with the XMas closing down of MXP for 10 cm of snow, went on with the Egyptair near collision, then here we go with this tragedy.
After all they always have a pilot to blame handy, who's not ther to defend himself.
a couple of months ago an Air Europe 777 had to abort T/O in MXP because an Egyptair AC made an incursion on the runway.
Italian pilots have been aware of the problem, and reported it.
It is nothing new, nothing that couldn't be avoided (such as human error).
In both cases the ground radar was not working.
If we can't avoid human error all the efforts must be orientated in order to use all the available means to avoid such accidents: ground radar, crew training and checking on the runway signals.
But some of the managers in this country have managing positions because of political support and not because of their technical competence.
Those managers worry more about the balance sheet than the safety.
Tragically, in Milan we can't say we had no warnings of the management incompetence and inefficiency: it started with the XMas closing down of MXP for 10 cm of snow, went on with the Egyptair near collision, then here we go with this tragedy.
After all they always have a pilot to blame handy, who's not ther to defend himself.
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For a while now on the MXP ATIS 121.62 there is this patronising addition at the end "Please use standard phraseology".
Who the hell are they aiming that one at??????
[ 09 October 2001: Message edited by: Fool's Hole ]
Who the hell are they aiming that one at??????
[ 09 October 2001: Message edited by: Fool's Hole ]
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Paterbrat-
If we should all have an attitude like yours, then how are we ever going to be able to make progress and continously enhance safety...?
My condolences and my deepest sympathy for all involved.
SAS will have a minute of silence at 1100GMT. I know that I any many of you out there will honour it in memory of what has happend.
Thats life.I am not trying to excuse it, just deal with it.
My condolences and my deepest sympathy for all involved.
SAS will have a minute of silence at 1100GMT. I know that I any many of you out there will honour it in memory of what has happend.
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What do we have to do now, to avoid this?? Should I challenge ATC after I have obtained my take-off clearance by asking if he can give me a 100% guarantee that the runway is clear???? And if he does not provide me with that guarantee, should I go back to the gate?
It is a pity that this avoidable accident should happen...
Safety is no accident!
It is a pity that this avoidable accident should happen...
Safety is no accident!
Delay? What delay?
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Does anyone have any experience at airports using Honeywell Airport Systems A-SMGCS system (Surface Movement Ground Control System)? And if so do you think that it might help in situations where pilots may be unfamiliar with airfield layout in reduced visibility? I'm not suggesting that this might have averted yesterdays tragedy, but I do think that there should be systems available to minimise the risks at airports.
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Food for thought.
LIML main RWY is 36R/18L. There is a small parralel 36L/18R (600M).
RWY 36R, in use, has 4 exit/entry points, R1 R2 R3 R4, where R2 connects with TWY R6 to go to the west apron by crossing 36R.
Now, when LVP is in use at LIML I quote Jeppesen LIML Airport 20-9A.
Quote, Low visibility procedures cat II/III
operations RWY 36R.
General. Pilots will be informed when Low Visibility Procedures are in operation by ATC. Aircraft taxiing to/from GA west apron will be stopped at R6 by a stop signal. Aircraft taxiing to RWY head 36R will be stopped by a stop bar. TWY R2 and R3 are not authorized. Unquote.
Now, if the citation left apron north(main)to depart, it would be taxiing on the paralel
all the way to R4, as, see above, R2 and R3 are not authorized.
As by then the MD is on it's t/o roll it would reach V1 at around R2.
If this is where they hit, one wonders what the citation was doing there, t/o from the intersection, going to connect to R6 to go to the GA terminal and thus crossing the active??
In either case, as R2 and R3 are not authorized under LVP, who gave them clearence to use R2 and or subsequently cross the active??
Inadvertently on R2? I doubt it as it is the first intersection after leaving the apron.
If they were coming from R6, west apron, they were stopped by the stop signal and hat to get approval crossing or line up the active. In both scenarios, would they have cleared them selves??
As for ground radar, in both scenarios it would only take a few seconds to go from R2/R6 onto the active so I doubt if even a sharp and awake ground controller would have had the time to raise hell.
All above IMHO.
Any takers?.
AV.
LIML main RWY is 36R/18L. There is a small parralel 36L/18R (600M).
RWY 36R, in use, has 4 exit/entry points, R1 R2 R3 R4, where R2 connects with TWY R6 to go to the west apron by crossing 36R.
Now, when LVP is in use at LIML I quote Jeppesen LIML Airport 20-9A.
Quote, Low visibility procedures cat II/III
operations RWY 36R.
General. Pilots will be informed when Low Visibility Procedures are in operation by ATC. Aircraft taxiing to/from GA west apron will be stopped at R6 by a stop signal. Aircraft taxiing to RWY head 36R will be stopped by a stop bar. TWY R2 and R3 are not authorized. Unquote.
Now, if the citation left apron north(main)to depart, it would be taxiing on the paralel
all the way to R4, as, see above, R2 and R3 are not authorized.
As by then the MD is on it's t/o roll it would reach V1 at around R2.
If this is where they hit, one wonders what the citation was doing there, t/o from the intersection, going to connect to R6 to go to the GA terminal and thus crossing the active??
In either case, as R2 and R3 are not authorized under LVP, who gave them clearence to use R2 and or subsequently cross the active??
Inadvertently on R2? I doubt it as it is the first intersection after leaving the apron.
If they were coming from R6, west apron, they were stopped by the stop signal and hat to get approval crossing or line up the active. In both scenarios, would they have cleared them selves??
As for ground radar, in both scenarios it would only take a few seconds to go from R2/R6 onto the active so I doubt if even a sharp and awake ground controller would have had the time to raise hell.
All above IMHO.
Any takers?.
AV.
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Someone was asking about the positioning of the building.
If you look at http://www.airliners.net/open.file?id=018759 you can see the building at the far end of the runway on the righthand side(long low & pinkish). The picture forshortens the distance a bit but it is approx 450m from the far end of the runway to the building.
You can also see where the taxiway from the GA area joins the runway on the lefthand side.
Notice also where the parking stands are. This could have been much worse.
RIP.
[ 09 October 2001: Message edited by: Flap40 ]
If you look at http://www.airliners.net/open.file?id=018759 you can see the building at the far end of the runway on the righthand side(long low & pinkish). The picture forshortens the distance a bit but it is approx 450m from the far end of the runway to the building.
You can also see where the taxiway from the GA area joins the runway on the lefthand side.
Notice also where the parking stands are. This could have been much worse.
RIP.
[ 09 October 2001: Message edited by: Flap40 ]
