U.S. pilots will not be armed... (merged)
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Amen to every word that Mr Greeneberg wrote, and thanks for posting it.
I worry a whole hell of a lot more about some religious fanatic sitting next to me with a sharpened ball-point pen in his pocket and black murder in his heart, than I do about the average airline pilot packing heat. In fact, I'd worry a whole lot less about the former if there were a whole lot more of the latter.
llater,
llamas
I worry a whole hell of a lot more about some religious fanatic sitting next to me with a sharpened ball-point pen in his pocket and black murder in his heart, than I do about the average airline pilot packing heat. In fact, I'd worry a whole lot less about the former if there were a whole lot more of the latter.
llater,
llamas
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The answer is F-teens...
By JANE ARMSTRONG
From Wednesday's Globe and Mail
A U.S. Navy aircraft packed with people pretending to be hijacked landed at Vancouver International Airport Tuesday in a drill designed to test the ability of the U.S. and Canada to respond to a crisis.
Vancouver — The C-9 aircraft, the military version of the McDonnell Douglas DC-9, took off from Whidbey Island Naval Air Station at Oak Harbour, Wash., Tuesday morning. Less than an hour later, two U.S. fighter jets were streaming over Vancouver.
The C-9 was one of two planes involved in the mock hijackings.
Another, a Delta Air Lines Boeing 757, flew from Salt Lake City to Elmendorf Air Force Base in Anchorage, Alaska. Each plane was simulating a hijacking of a commercial airliner and each was packed with police and military personnel pretending to be civilians. The training exercise was planned before the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States in which hijacked commercial airliners plowed into the World Trade Centre, the Pentagon and a field outside Pittsburgh.
About 1,500 personnel were involved in the exercise, which included 200 to 300 Mounties, said RCMP Sergeant Grant Learned.
In the drill, fighter jets — first in the United States, then in Canada — responded to the emergency and were instructed to run through several exercises, including firing on the planes.
"We use a graduated response, which begins with simply intercepting and identifying the aircraft, and could include the use of lethal force and shooting down the aircraft," said Major Mike Snyder of the North American Aerospace Defence Command.
By Tuesday afternoon, each plane had landed safely in Vancouver and Anchorage. The ground exercises, involving mainly police personnel, extended into the evening. Also participating in the drill were U.S. officials from the Transportation Security Administration, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Delta Airlines and the Federal Aviation Administration.
Major Snyder said the simulation was designed to see how fast the North American Aerospace Defence command could respond to a hijacking report.
"Time is of the essence, especially when it comes to NORAD," Major Snyder said from NORAD headquarters in Colorado Springs, Colo. "Generally, we're only as good as the intelligence and the warning that we receive."
Fighter planes were launched on Sept. 11, 2001, in an attempt to intercept the terrorist-hijacked airliners, but none reached their targets in time, he noted.
"How quickly will NORAD respond? That's what being tested, really."
Tuesday afternoon, the U.S. Navy aircraft sat parked on a tarmac at Vancouver Airport, surrounded by at least seven tactical-police vehicles. Nearby, a sniper crouched on a moveable staircase. At one point, an aircraft door opened and someone waved.
There was no live fire, Major Snyder said, and at no time was there danger to civilians.
Since the terrorist attacks, NORAD has flown 22,000 sorties to watch the skies for hijackers and other threats, and fighter jets have responded to more than 300 incidents of planes raising suspicions — in many cases because the aircraft were off course or did not identify themselves.
Full Story
From Wednesday's Globe and Mail
A U.S. Navy aircraft packed with people pretending to be hijacked landed at Vancouver International Airport Tuesday in a drill designed to test the ability of the U.S. and Canada to respond to a crisis.
Vancouver — The C-9 aircraft, the military version of the McDonnell Douglas DC-9, took off from Whidbey Island Naval Air Station at Oak Harbour, Wash., Tuesday morning. Less than an hour later, two U.S. fighter jets were streaming over Vancouver.
The C-9 was one of two planes involved in the mock hijackings.
Another, a Delta Air Lines Boeing 757, flew from Salt Lake City to Elmendorf Air Force Base in Anchorage, Alaska. Each plane was simulating a hijacking of a commercial airliner and each was packed with police and military personnel pretending to be civilians. The training exercise was planned before the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States in which hijacked commercial airliners plowed into the World Trade Centre, the Pentagon and a field outside Pittsburgh.
About 1,500 personnel were involved in the exercise, which included 200 to 300 Mounties, said RCMP Sergeant Grant Learned.
In the drill, fighter jets — first in the United States, then in Canada — responded to the emergency and were instructed to run through several exercises, including firing on the planes.
"We use a graduated response, which begins with simply intercepting and identifying the aircraft, and could include the use of lethal force and shooting down the aircraft," said Major Mike Snyder of the North American Aerospace Defence Command.
By Tuesday afternoon, each plane had landed safely in Vancouver and Anchorage. The ground exercises, involving mainly police personnel, extended into the evening. Also participating in the drill were U.S. officials from the Transportation Security Administration, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Delta Airlines and the Federal Aviation Administration.
Major Snyder said the simulation was designed to see how fast the North American Aerospace Defence command could respond to a hijacking report.
"Time is of the essence, especially when it comes to NORAD," Major Snyder said from NORAD headquarters in Colorado Springs, Colo. "Generally, we're only as good as the intelligence and the warning that we receive."
Fighter planes were launched on Sept. 11, 2001, in an attempt to intercept the terrorist-hijacked airliners, but none reached their targets in time, he noted.
"How quickly will NORAD respond? That's what being tested, really."
Tuesday afternoon, the U.S. Navy aircraft sat parked on a tarmac at Vancouver Airport, surrounded by at least seven tactical-police vehicles. Nearby, a sniper crouched on a moveable staircase. At one point, an aircraft door opened and someone waved.
There was no live fire, Major Snyder said, and at no time was there danger to civilians.
Since the terrorist attacks, NORAD has flown 22,000 sorties to watch the skies for hijackers and other threats, and fighter jets have responded to more than 300 incidents of planes raising suspicions — in many cases because the aircraft were off course or did not identify themselves.
Full Story
Last edited by Orca strait; 5th Jun 2002 at 16:05.
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To Arm or not to arm.......
I think that putting a valuable wepon into the aircraft cabin makes it that much easier for a hijacker to get past security on the ground. If his wepon of choice is already on-board, half of his trouble is over. All he now has to do is get the cockpit door open.
It has to start on the ground before the engines start. It has to start at the time a passenger books a ticket. How they pay. Where did they purchase. What is their criminal background. This may start to encroach on peoples civil liberties, but the only ones that have to worry are those that have something to hide.
Passeners boarding aircraft need to be scrutinized before being given a ticket. And I think that an airline has every right to refuse a passenger for any reason. We cannot and should not have to rely on the flight attendants and pilots for aircraft security. If they have to deal with a dangerous situation caused by a passenger while in flight, it's too late. They are ultimately the last line of defense. Let them do the job they are trained for, fly the aircraft.
Less problem solving,
More problem prevention.
It has to start on the ground before the engines start. It has to start at the time a passenger books a ticket. How they pay. Where did they purchase. What is their criminal background. This may start to encroach on peoples civil liberties, but the only ones that have to worry are those that have something to hide.
Passeners boarding aircraft need to be scrutinized before being given a ticket. And I think that an airline has every right to refuse a passenger for any reason. We cannot and should not have to rely on the flight attendants and pilots for aircraft security. If they have to deal with a dangerous situation caused by a passenger while in flight, it's too late. They are ultimately the last line of defense. Let them do the job they are trained for, fly the aircraft.
Less problem solving,
More problem prevention.
Been gone six days and see some agreeable posts from Tri-power and Orca.
But where are all the viable solutions as a LAST line of defense for the cockpit?
Train us and arm us now before another tragedy occurs!
But where are all the viable solutions as a LAST line of defense for the cockpit?
Train us and arm us now before another tragedy occurs!
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Violation of property rights by government hardly raises objections. If it did, the appropriate reaction to the banning by John Magaw of firearms in the cockpit would be: "Whose property is it anyway?"
U.S. airlines are, ostensibly, privately owned. Why, then, is the transportation secretary's minion not allowing rightful owners to defend their property? The dangers for commercial aviation of such a prohibition, arguably, have a lot to do with turning ownership – in this case airline ownership – into conditional tenure.
If things were as they ought to be, we wouldn't chafe about whether pilots should carry guns or not. Any tension would revolve around passengers choosing the airline that optimizes their peace of mind. Passenger X's reasons for taking airline A to his destination might be because the carrier's pilots are armed. Mrs. Y's overriding priority is to ensure her young daughters are not subjected to the mandatory pat downs – she chooses airline B, because its security personnel profile passengers.
In a word, true competition would arise, and the consumer would be in a position to shape the delivery of security through his buying or his abstention from buying. This indeed would be possible if airlines were not merely nominally private, as they are now, but instead were in a position to freely fine-tune their responses to consumer demand without interference from Congress and the regulators. It stands to reason that the stronger the proprietor's rights in his property, the better he is able to respond to the consumer.
Since regulation replaces consumer preferences with bureaucratic decision-making, it invariably instates the wrong standards or, simply, settles on lower standards than those of the consumer. While business will pay a steep price in the free market for misreading the consumer, a government-granted reprieve is always on hand in a regulated industry, especially one that is considered an essential part of the national infrastructure, as civil aviation is. On the heels of 9-11, government handed the airline industry a multi-billion-dollar bailout, as well as immunity from lawsuits. Thus were the airlines released from responsibility for the security of their passengers.
Government-run airports were – and still are – responsible for further vitiating passenger safety. As explained by economist Robert Murphy in an article entitled "The Source of Air-Travel Insecurity":
…the federal government had established minimum security guidelines and then forced the airlines to chip in their share to pay for them. Whatever their airline, passengers were funneled through a common security checkpoint, staffed by a third-party company. In such an environment, it would have been silly for an individual airline to spend millions of dollars to exceed the government's minimum standards by providing expert security personnel.
Because of the setup of [government-run] airports, every other airline would have benefited too from this arrangement, so it is doubtful that such an expenditure would have been rewarded by increased consumer patronage. Further, because the public naively believes the government when it "guarantees" air safety, even if an individual airline could have realistically offered better security measures than its competitors, consumers would still have felt that rival carriers were "safe."
Only when an airline can undertake "curb-to-curb" handling of its passengers will it stand to both reap the benefits that arise from providing superior service, as well as incur full liability for forsaking passenger safety. This is possible only in a privatized airport, where freedom of association and freedom of contract aren't overridden or blurred by government, and where responsibility isn't collectivized.
Alas, the recent federalizing of airport security has removed even the tenuous involvement the airlines had in the protection of their passengers. Civil servants-cum-political appointees continue to oversee the industry, leaving no doubts about the political commitment of this administration to full socialization of airline security.
Granting airlines the right to arm employees – and the freedom to privately contract with on-board security providers – rather than be compelled to stand in line for a federal marshal, will obviate somewhat the inevitable security pitfalls of a nationalized airport.
Closer to home – and equally ominous – is the manner in which the Fair Housing Act erodes property rights, and, with them, the right to safeguard our homes.
According to the Act, a property owner cannot "discriminate" against any person … in the sale or rental of a dwelling … because of race, color, religion … or national origin."
An essential attribute of ownership is the right to exclude, a right that could come in very handy considering that apartment building owners have been warned by the FBI (for what it's worth) about the possibility that al-Qaida operatives may rent suites and plant explosives in them.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
By Ilana Mercer whose work has appeared in the Calgary Herald, Insight Magazine, the Ottawa Citizen, the Financial Post, the Colorado Gazette, Report News Magazine, LewRockwell.com and other publications.
U.S. airlines are, ostensibly, privately owned. Why, then, is the transportation secretary's minion not allowing rightful owners to defend their property? The dangers for commercial aviation of such a prohibition, arguably, have a lot to do with turning ownership – in this case airline ownership – into conditional tenure.
If things were as they ought to be, we wouldn't chafe about whether pilots should carry guns or not. Any tension would revolve around passengers choosing the airline that optimizes their peace of mind. Passenger X's reasons for taking airline A to his destination might be because the carrier's pilots are armed. Mrs. Y's overriding priority is to ensure her young daughters are not subjected to the mandatory pat downs – she chooses airline B, because its security personnel profile passengers.
In a word, true competition would arise, and the consumer would be in a position to shape the delivery of security through his buying or his abstention from buying. This indeed would be possible if airlines were not merely nominally private, as they are now, but instead were in a position to freely fine-tune their responses to consumer demand without interference from Congress and the regulators. It stands to reason that the stronger the proprietor's rights in his property, the better he is able to respond to the consumer.
Since regulation replaces consumer preferences with bureaucratic decision-making, it invariably instates the wrong standards or, simply, settles on lower standards than those of the consumer. While business will pay a steep price in the free market for misreading the consumer, a government-granted reprieve is always on hand in a regulated industry, especially one that is considered an essential part of the national infrastructure, as civil aviation is. On the heels of 9-11, government handed the airline industry a multi-billion-dollar bailout, as well as immunity from lawsuits. Thus were the airlines released from responsibility for the security of their passengers.
Government-run airports were – and still are – responsible for further vitiating passenger safety. As explained by economist Robert Murphy in an article entitled "The Source of Air-Travel Insecurity":
…the federal government had established minimum security guidelines and then forced the airlines to chip in their share to pay for them. Whatever their airline, passengers were funneled through a common security checkpoint, staffed by a third-party company. In such an environment, it would have been silly for an individual airline to spend millions of dollars to exceed the government's minimum standards by providing expert security personnel.
Because of the setup of [government-run] airports, every other airline would have benefited too from this arrangement, so it is doubtful that such an expenditure would have been rewarded by increased consumer patronage. Further, because the public naively believes the government when it "guarantees" air safety, even if an individual airline could have realistically offered better security measures than its competitors, consumers would still have felt that rival carriers were "safe."
Only when an airline can undertake "curb-to-curb" handling of its passengers will it stand to both reap the benefits that arise from providing superior service, as well as incur full liability for forsaking passenger safety. This is possible only in a privatized airport, where freedom of association and freedom of contract aren't overridden or blurred by government, and where responsibility isn't collectivized.
Alas, the recent federalizing of airport security has removed even the tenuous involvement the airlines had in the protection of their passengers. Civil servants-cum-political appointees continue to oversee the industry, leaving no doubts about the political commitment of this administration to full socialization of airline security.
Granting airlines the right to arm employees – and the freedom to privately contract with on-board security providers – rather than be compelled to stand in line for a federal marshal, will obviate somewhat the inevitable security pitfalls of a nationalized airport.
Closer to home – and equally ominous – is the manner in which the Fair Housing Act erodes property rights, and, with them, the right to safeguard our homes.
According to the Act, a property owner cannot "discriminate" against any person … in the sale or rental of a dwelling … because of race, color, religion … or national origin."
An essential attribute of ownership is the right to exclude, a right that could come in very handy considering that apartment building owners have been warned by the FBI (for what it's worth) about the possibility that al-Qaida operatives may rent suites and plant explosives in them.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
By Ilana Mercer whose work has appeared in the Calgary Herald, Insight Magazine, the Ottawa Citizen, the Financial Post, the Colorado Gazette, Report News Magazine, LewRockwell.com and other publications.
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Passenger X's reasons for taking airline A to his destination might be because the carrier's pilots are armed. Mrs. Y's overriding priority is to ensure her young daughters are not subjected to the mandatory pat downs she chooses airline B, because its security personnel profile passengers.
Surely you're not suggesting that all regulations should be determined by market forces alone?
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I hear you brother. Such ideas as you have highlighted best illustrate the need for mandatory regulated improvements to US security issues for airlines. Please note though, the above article written by a journalist (not me) is posted here for the purpose of showing the direction of SOME of the public debate and inform as to SOME of the current journalistic comment. No more no less. If you are still in the States I am sure you will see more of it than I do.
Last edited by Wizard; 6th Jun 2002 at 22:11.
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Here's another commentary from a US Journalist Joseph Farah that he entitled "Making the air safe for terrorists"
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Forgive me. For a little while, after Sept. 11, I actually believed our government might respond to the terrorist attacks with some common-sense, self-defense measures and policies.
Boy, was I a dope.
Despite the fact that polls of even gun-control advocates show 77 percent favor arming airline pilots to avoid hijackings, the Bush administration refuses to heed the call.
As WorldNetDaily has reported, the Federal Aviation Administration put the final nail in the coffin of firearms in the cockpit just two months before Sept. 11. In other words, even while reports were circulating about the imminent threat posed by al-Qaida to the safety of airliners nationwide, the government was doing everything in its power to make the air safe for terrorists.
Office of Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge has been unequivocal in his objection to armed pilots ever since. Transportation Secretary Norm Mineta has openly opposed the idea. And, last week, John "No-Draw" Magaw, the former director of President Clinton's scandal-plagued Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and now Transportation Security Administration director, told the U.S. Senate the concept was out of the question.
Imagine that. These high government officials – people who wouldn't think of flying on an airplane themselves that was not protected by armed guards – are deciding that airline pilots, most of them military trained, can be trusted to fly a $200 million airplane, but not with a loaded gun on board.
But I've got good news for you.
This is one battle we can win. And, if we win this battle with the ruling elite, who knows where it might lead. It might result in the biggest outbreak of common sense since 1776.
Here's why we can win.
The pilots are with us. This is our ace in the hole. Ultimately, if the government continues to flout the will of the people and the will of the pilots, air travel could be crippled.
There are rumblings – if ever so slight at this point – that some pilots just might decide some day they won't fly without the ability to protect themselves, their crew and their passengers, not to mention innocent civilians on the ground.
I'm not advocating a strike. But just the hint of such an action might be enough to get Congress off the dime. Legislation has been introduced in both houses not only to permit guns in the cockpits of America's airliners, but to mandate them.
What will George Bush do if such a bill lands on his desk?
My bet is he will sign it in a heartbeat. So far, Bush has listened to his top advisers on the issue. But his mother did not raise any stupid politicians. Bush knows where the votes are. If that bill makes it to the White House, it becomes law.
It's too bad we even have to fight over such a basic, fundamental principle. It should be a non-issue. Ordinary Americans should not be left defenseless while Ridge, Mineta, Magaw and Bush are surrounded by armed guards at all times – on land, sea and in the air.
But maybe it's better if we view this as an opportunity to slap these arrogant politicians down, hand them a stunning political defeat and let them know we're entering a new age of accountability.
Viewed that way, this might not be a waste of time, energy and resources. Instead, it could be the next shot heard 'round the world.
Maybe once we convince the political class we're not going to be left defenseless in the skies, we let them know we won't be left defenseless on the ground, either. Maybe it will be time to roll back all those unconstitutional federal restrictions on possession of firearms that have been passed in recent years.
Maybe, after that, we let them know we won't be left defenseless by their open-borders policies.
Maybe, after that, we let them know it's time to start rebuilding a civil-defense infrastructure in this country again.
And, maybe – just maybe – after that the political momentum will have shifted toward the common-sense will of the American people that we can take back our country from these fools once and for all.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Forgive me. For a little while, after Sept. 11, I actually believed our government might respond to the terrorist attacks with some common-sense, self-defense measures and policies.
Boy, was I a dope.
Despite the fact that polls of even gun-control advocates show 77 percent favor arming airline pilots to avoid hijackings, the Bush administration refuses to heed the call.
As WorldNetDaily has reported, the Federal Aviation Administration put the final nail in the coffin of firearms in the cockpit just two months before Sept. 11. In other words, even while reports were circulating about the imminent threat posed by al-Qaida to the safety of airliners nationwide, the government was doing everything in its power to make the air safe for terrorists.
Office of Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge has been unequivocal in his objection to armed pilots ever since. Transportation Secretary Norm Mineta has openly opposed the idea. And, last week, John "No-Draw" Magaw, the former director of President Clinton's scandal-plagued Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and now Transportation Security Administration director, told the U.S. Senate the concept was out of the question.
Imagine that. These high government officials – people who wouldn't think of flying on an airplane themselves that was not protected by armed guards – are deciding that airline pilots, most of them military trained, can be trusted to fly a $200 million airplane, but not with a loaded gun on board.
But I've got good news for you.
This is one battle we can win. And, if we win this battle with the ruling elite, who knows where it might lead. It might result in the biggest outbreak of common sense since 1776.
Here's why we can win.
The pilots are with us. This is our ace in the hole. Ultimately, if the government continues to flout the will of the people and the will of the pilots, air travel could be crippled.
There are rumblings – if ever so slight at this point – that some pilots just might decide some day they won't fly without the ability to protect themselves, their crew and their passengers, not to mention innocent civilians on the ground.
I'm not advocating a strike. But just the hint of such an action might be enough to get Congress off the dime. Legislation has been introduced in both houses not only to permit guns in the cockpits of America's airliners, but to mandate them.
What will George Bush do if such a bill lands on his desk?
My bet is he will sign it in a heartbeat. So far, Bush has listened to his top advisers on the issue. But his mother did not raise any stupid politicians. Bush knows where the votes are. If that bill makes it to the White House, it becomes law.
It's too bad we even have to fight over such a basic, fundamental principle. It should be a non-issue. Ordinary Americans should not be left defenseless while Ridge, Mineta, Magaw and Bush are surrounded by armed guards at all times – on land, sea and in the air.
But maybe it's better if we view this as an opportunity to slap these arrogant politicians down, hand them a stunning political defeat and let them know we're entering a new age of accountability.
Viewed that way, this might not be a waste of time, energy and resources. Instead, it could be the next shot heard 'round the world.
Maybe once we convince the political class we're not going to be left defenseless in the skies, we let them know we won't be left defenseless on the ground, either. Maybe it will be time to roll back all those unconstitutional federal restrictions on possession of firearms that have been passed in recent years.
Maybe, after that, we let them know we won't be left defenseless by their open-borders policies.
Maybe, after that, we let them know it's time to start rebuilding a civil-defense infrastructure in this country again.
And, maybe – just maybe – after that the political momentum will have shifted toward the common-sense will of the American people that we can take back our country from these fools once and for all.
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Is this the same Joseph Farah who believed that the "Y2K bug" was part of a global conspiracy to destabilise the US (by taking their precious guns away, I imagine!) and establish a New World Order?
If so, he's hardly an impartial disinterested commentator, is he?
If so, he's hardly an impartial disinterested commentator, is he?
Not Manchester
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Food for thought...
By George F. Will
Thursday, June 6, 2002; Page A31
The next perpetrators of terrorism in America probably are already here, perhaps planning more hijackings. Post-Sept. 11 airport security measures may have made hijackings slightly more difficult, but the fact that these are America's most visible anti-terrorist measures vastly increases the terrorists' payoff in proving the measures incapable of keeping terrorists off airplanes.
Recently this column presented, without endorsement, the views of three commercial airline pilots who oppose guns in cockpits. Today's column presents, and endorses, the views of three other commercial airline pilots -- two trained as fighter pilots, one civilian-trained -- who refute the other pilots' principal contentions, which were:
Proper policy regarding suicidal hijackers is to land as quickly as possible, which can be as quick as 10 minutes. So priority should be given to making cockpits impenetrable. Armed pilots might be tempted to imprudent bravery -- particularly "renegade" pilots with fighter-pilot mentalities, who would leave the cockpit to battle terrorists in the main cabin. And arming pilots serves the pilots' union objective of requiring a third pilot in each cockpit.
The three pilots who favor allowing pilots to choose whether to carry guns respond:
Passengers already entrust their lives to pilots' judgments. Landing a hijacked plane is indeed the first priority, but pilots need to be alive to do that. A cockpit impenetrably sealed from terrorists is an impossibility, in part because planes cannot be landed as quickly as the other three pilots say. An ignoble fear -- of lawyers, of liability -- explains why the airlines oppose arming pilots. But legislation could immunize airlines from liability resulting from harms suffered by passengers as a result of pilots' resisting terrorists.
Landing a plane from 30,000 feet requires at least 20 minutes, never just 10. A training flight, simulating a fire emergency on a flight just 4,000 feet up and 15 miles from Philadelphia's airport, takes about 12 minutes to land when done perfectly. Transatlantic flights can be three hours from a suitable airport. Such airports are not abundant west of Iowa. Which means on most flights, terrorists would have time to penetrate the cockpit.
Bulletproof doors are not the answer: The Sept. 11 terrorists had no bullets. Well-trained terrorists can blow even a much-reinforced cockpit door off its hinges using a thin thread of malleable explosive that can pass undetected through passenger screening procedures when carried on a person rather than in luggage. Here is what else can be undetected by security screeners busy confiscating grandmothers' knitting needles:
The knife with the six-inch serrated blade that a passenger found, in a post-Sept. 11 flight, secreted under her seat. Two semiautomatic pistols that recently passed unnoticed through metal detectors and were discovered only when the owner's bags were selected for a random search at the gate. A mostly plastic .22-caliber gun that looks like a cell phone. An entirely plastic and razor-sharp knife. A "bloodsucker" -- it looks like a fountain pen but has a cylindrical blade that can inflict a neck wound that will not stop bleeding.
The idea that arming pilots is a means of justifying a third pilot is derisory: Reengineering cockpits for that would be impossibly complex. Equally implausible is the idea that a Taser (electric stun gun) is a satisfactory aid when locked in a plane, seven miles up, with a team of trained terrorists.
A pilot's gun would never leave the cockpit because the pilot never would. And shooting a terrorist standing in the cockpit door frame would not require a sniper's skill. The powerful pressurization controls, as well as the location and redundancy of aircraft electronic, hydraulic and other systems, vastly reduce the probability that even multiple wayward gun shots -- even of bullets that are not frangible -- would cripple an aircraft.
About fear of "fighter pilot mentality": The military assiduously schools and screens pilot candidates to eliminate unstable or undisciplined candidates. Airlines, too, administer severe selection procedures for pilots, who are constantly scrutinized. Captains have two physical examinations a year (first officers, one) with psychological components. Everything said in the cockpit is recorded.
Besides, many passengers fly armed -- county sheriffs, FBI and Secret Service agents, postal inspectors, foreign bodyguards of foreign dignitaries. Why, then, must the people on whom all passengers' lives depend -- pilots -- be unarmed? Especially considering that the prudent law enforcement doctrine is that lethal force is warranted when menaced by more than one trained and armed opponent.
To thicken the layers of deterrence and security, in the air as well as on the ground, Congress should promptly enact legislation to empower pilots to choose to carry guns. Time flies. So do hijackers. And the next ones probably are already among us.
By George F. Will
Thursday, June 6, 2002; Page A31
The next perpetrators of terrorism in America probably are already here, perhaps planning more hijackings. Post-Sept. 11 airport security measures may have made hijackings slightly more difficult, but the fact that these are America's most visible anti-terrorist measures vastly increases the terrorists' payoff in proving the measures incapable of keeping terrorists off airplanes.
Recently this column presented, without endorsement, the views of three commercial airline pilots who oppose guns in cockpits. Today's column presents, and endorses, the views of three other commercial airline pilots -- two trained as fighter pilots, one civilian-trained -- who refute the other pilots' principal contentions, which were:
Proper policy regarding suicidal hijackers is to land as quickly as possible, which can be as quick as 10 minutes. So priority should be given to making cockpits impenetrable. Armed pilots might be tempted to imprudent bravery -- particularly "renegade" pilots with fighter-pilot mentalities, who would leave the cockpit to battle terrorists in the main cabin. And arming pilots serves the pilots' union objective of requiring a third pilot in each cockpit.
The three pilots who favor allowing pilots to choose whether to carry guns respond:
Passengers already entrust their lives to pilots' judgments. Landing a hijacked plane is indeed the first priority, but pilots need to be alive to do that. A cockpit impenetrably sealed from terrorists is an impossibility, in part because planes cannot be landed as quickly as the other three pilots say. An ignoble fear -- of lawyers, of liability -- explains why the airlines oppose arming pilots. But legislation could immunize airlines from liability resulting from harms suffered by passengers as a result of pilots' resisting terrorists.
Landing a plane from 30,000 feet requires at least 20 minutes, never just 10. A training flight, simulating a fire emergency on a flight just 4,000 feet up and 15 miles from Philadelphia's airport, takes about 12 minutes to land when done perfectly. Transatlantic flights can be three hours from a suitable airport. Such airports are not abundant west of Iowa. Which means on most flights, terrorists would have time to penetrate the cockpit.
Bulletproof doors are not the answer: The Sept. 11 terrorists had no bullets. Well-trained terrorists can blow even a much-reinforced cockpit door off its hinges using a thin thread of malleable explosive that can pass undetected through passenger screening procedures when carried on a person rather than in luggage. Here is what else can be undetected by security screeners busy confiscating grandmothers' knitting needles:
The knife with the six-inch serrated blade that a passenger found, in a post-Sept. 11 flight, secreted under her seat. Two semiautomatic pistols that recently passed unnoticed through metal detectors and were discovered only when the owner's bags were selected for a random search at the gate. A mostly plastic .22-caliber gun that looks like a cell phone. An entirely plastic and razor-sharp knife. A "bloodsucker" -- it looks like a fountain pen but has a cylindrical blade that can inflict a neck wound that will not stop bleeding.
The idea that arming pilots is a means of justifying a third pilot is derisory: Reengineering cockpits for that would be impossibly complex. Equally implausible is the idea that a Taser (electric stun gun) is a satisfactory aid when locked in a plane, seven miles up, with a team of trained terrorists.
A pilot's gun would never leave the cockpit because the pilot never would. And shooting a terrorist standing in the cockpit door frame would not require a sniper's skill. The powerful pressurization controls, as well as the location and redundancy of aircraft electronic, hydraulic and other systems, vastly reduce the probability that even multiple wayward gun shots -- even of bullets that are not frangible -- would cripple an aircraft.
About fear of "fighter pilot mentality": The military assiduously schools and screens pilot candidates to eliminate unstable or undisciplined candidates. Airlines, too, administer severe selection procedures for pilots, who are constantly scrutinized. Captains have two physical examinations a year (first officers, one) with psychological components. Everything said in the cockpit is recorded.
Besides, many passengers fly armed -- county sheriffs, FBI and Secret Service agents, postal inspectors, foreign bodyguards of foreign dignitaries. Why, then, must the people on whom all passengers' lives depend -- pilots -- be unarmed? Especially considering that the prudent law enforcement doctrine is that lethal force is warranted when menaced by more than one trained and armed opponent.
To thicken the layers of deterrence and security, in the air as well as on the ground, Congress should promptly enact legislation to empower pilots to choose to carry guns. Time flies. So do hijackers. And the next ones probably are already among us.
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Dumb.
Less-than-lethal devices, like TASER, Pepperballs, beanbag shotgun loads, stun guns, pepper spray etc. have genuine law-enforcement and security applications; cockpit defense, however, is not one of them. Homeland Security Chief Tom Ridge has come out and stated that arming pilots with firearms: "doesn’t make a lot of sense to me." Considering the alternatives to arming pilots, leaving flight crews defenseless or giving them an ineffective non-lethal defensive tool, the only thing that doesn’t make sense is Tom Ridge’s position on this matter.
The TASER naturally appeals to some folks because it’s less-than-lethal and therefore not as fearsome or politically incorrect as a pistol. For these very reasons, it is not nearly as effective as a good handgun either. To use the TASER, a person attaches a cartridge to the front of the device that contains wire coils and two spiked electrical leads that enter the body of the target. The rear of the unit looks a lot like a pistol. Once the trigger is pressed the twin spikes fly out, each attached to a thin, 21-foot long wires, and imbed themselves in the skin of the target and deliver an electric jolt, which will generally incapacitate the average person for several seconds. Additional jolts can be given by pressing the trigger.
Sounds effective, right? Wrong. Unfortunately, this design has several inherent flaws. First, in order to be effective, the leads must enter the skin. Therefore, if the hijacker is wearing an appropriately thick shirt or jacket, the leads will not contact the skin, and the TASER is going to be minimally effective. Second, if two hijackers bust down the cockpit door, the TASER is useless. Theoretically, the pilot could zap one, do a quick cartridge change and zap the second intruder; of course, once the cartridge attached to the first intruder is removed from the unit, he can no longer be zapped. So, by the time the second intruder has been zapped, the first has fully recovered and is therefore free to begin slashing the pilots’ throats while his buddy recovers. With only one TASER against two intruders, the pilot would almost do better to zap the one and then beat the second intruder with the TASER unit itself, not something a pilot should have to deal with in a cramped cockpit. Furthermore, even if only one intruder breaks into a cockpit and is successfully subdued by the TASER, what then? Someone has to jump on him before he recovers and handcuff him. Who’s job is that going to be? Please don’t say the other pilot; he’s flying the plane.
The only viable way to protect the cockpit of a jumbo jet using a TASER would be to have several of the units in each cockpit, each fully charged with at least one spare cartridge per TASER. This is a rather expensive and silly solution to the problem of cockpit security.
A vastly more effective solution is a pistol, preferably one chambered for a no-nonsense cartridge like .45 ACP, .40 S&W or .357 Magnum.
If I were in position to recommend what to equip pilots with, given my background as an NRA-certified personal protection instructor, I’d suggest a .45 ACP Glock model 36 Slimline fitted with a suppresser and accessory rail-mounted tactical laser (with a pressure switch on the grip) with magazines full of Glasser Safety Slugs, Mag-safes or similar fragmenting bullets. Such a pistol is the right tool for the job and as my eighth-grade wood shop teacher insisted on saying: "A tool for every job, a job for every tool." Indeed. Using a TASER to defend a cockpit is akin to using a monkey wrench to drive a nail, sure, it’ll kind of maybe work, but it really isn’t the best tool.
The above-described Glock, however, is the right tool for the job, regardless of what Ridge and other opponents of arming pilots might think. The Glock truly is perfect for this role, it has earned a reputation since its introduction to US markets in the late 80s as a reliable, incredibly durable, simple-to-operate pistol that works well. Glock pistols in a variety of models and calibers are now safely stored in the holsters of many a police officer across the nation. They’re a work-a-day pistol that lacks an external safety toggle, instead relying on a trigger-mounted safety lever that compliments internal inertia safeties, which Glock calls its "Safe Action" system. The only controls on a Glock are the trigger, slide catch, magazine release and ‘takedown’ buttons, very straight forward and easy for a non-gun savvy individual to use in a crisis situation. I’d suggest the Glock 36 Slimline over the standard .45 caliber model 21 because the 36 is the first Glock to get away from double column magazines and features a slim grip that users with a variety of hand sizes will find comfortable. Since these guns will likely go a long time between cleanings, Glock’s reliable design and corrosion-resistant construction will guarantee they work when called on, even if they haven’t seen a drop of G96 Complete Gun Treatment in years.
The .45 ACP cartridge has proven itself in countless shootings, and when topped with fast, frangible bullets, will not puncture the fuselage of an airliner. Upon striking the center-mass of a would-be hijacker, the incapacitating effect of a .45 ACP Glasser will last a lot longer than would that of a TASER, i.e. permanently as opposed to five seconds. Furthermore, the .45 ACP doesn’t care what the hijacker wears, as long as it’s not Kevlar, it’s going in to disrupt a few vital organs.
I would also suggest a suppresser be attached. .45s are loud in general, but in the confines of a cockpit the noise would be deafening. The discharge of a suppressed .45 ACP in a cockpit would still be noisy, but the suppresser will protect the pilots from temporary near-deafness. The laser sight will help the user aim quickly and nothing takes the fight out of someone like seeing that glowing red dot hone in on their heart. With the Glock 36’s 6+1 ammo capacity, seven separate hijackers could be dispatched quickly and if more shooting was necessary, a few spare, loaded magazines can be kept handy. Because of the suppresser, these pistols couldn’t be the issued directly to pilots (without them having to contend with mountains of permits and paperwork anyway, unless F-troop makes an exception for them), but rather to each individual plane. One member of the flight team—copilot, navigator, whoever—could be designated as the person who wears the pistol in a shoulder rig and then returns it to a small gun safe in the cockpit after the passengers have deplaned. Issuing them to the plane instead of the pilot would help ensure that only frangible bullets were kept anywhere near the firearm.
Another very good alternative to the Glock 36 is a Glock 23. It’s a pistol of roughly the same size, and it holds 10+1 rounds (in post-ban magazines, that is) of .40 S&W, a potent cartridge that surpasses the .45 ACP in the Fuller Index (a system that predicts one-shot-stops) when using conventional hollow points.
With frangible bullets in the firearm, the plane’s passengers could be protected by the installation of a thin wooden door a few feet outside the cockpit door, or even a set of heavy curtains made of Kevlar or similarly strong artificial fabric. Frangible bullets break apart upon contact with anything, shedding weight and velocity rapidly. When they hit a solid object like a wall, they shatter harmlessly. Upon striking a soft target like a person’s chest, they penetrate as they fragment, depositing all of their considerable energy into a shallow wound cavity that causes massive tissue damage.
Naturally, the problem with my recommendation is that it makes sense and therefore will not be heeded. Instead, United will sally forth and equip their pilots with TASERS. With Tom Ridge’s endorsement of such silly measures, other airlines will likely follow suit. Now, I’m not suggesting TASERS and other less-than-lethal weapons are useless or have no place in law-enforcement or security. Quite the contrary, I’m actually a fan of some less-than-lethal instruments, especially Jaycor Tactical System’s Pepperball Launcher (essentially a Tippman Pneumatics paintgun that fires balls filled with powdered pepper spray instead of paint). However, the Pepperball Launcher is as inappropriate for use in cockpit security as the TASER, but for different reasons.
The cockpit of commercial airliners needs to be viewed as a castle, a fortress that must be secure. Beefier doors are a good start, but any door, regardless of how sturdy, can be overcome by a determined enough individual or group. Should that door be broken down, the pilots need to be able to permanently defeat the intruder or intruders. Incapacitating (hopefully) them for a few seconds isn’t enough. The simplest, most obvious choice is a pistol, particularly one very like the Glock I described above. Again, we get into the whole political correctness issue; sure, it’s nicer and kinder and gentler to temporarily incapacitate a cockpit intruder than it is to shred his vital organs. Thing is, we’re talking about a cockpit intruder here, not a drunk that got tossed out of a bar and is giving the cops a hard time.
Anyone with the wherewithal to get on a plane today probably hasn’t been living under a mushroom for the last six months and is, therefore, aware that pilots don’t want anyone visiting them in the cockpit. The way I figure it, if someone does break down a cockpit door, they can’t be up to any good and have forfeited their rights and life by doing so. Simply put, today, if you break down a cockpit door, you deserve to be shot in the chest. Twice. By a .45. If that doesn’t make sense to the guy charged with operating the Office of Homeland Security, then he’s as ill suited for his job as the TASERs are for cockpit defense.
Kyle Lohmeier
Dumb.
Less-than-lethal devices, like TASER, Pepperballs, beanbag shotgun loads, stun guns, pepper spray etc. have genuine law-enforcement and security applications; cockpit defense, however, is not one of them. Homeland Security Chief Tom Ridge has come out and stated that arming pilots with firearms: "doesn’t make a lot of sense to me." Considering the alternatives to arming pilots, leaving flight crews defenseless or giving them an ineffective non-lethal defensive tool, the only thing that doesn’t make sense is Tom Ridge’s position on this matter.
The TASER naturally appeals to some folks because it’s less-than-lethal and therefore not as fearsome or politically incorrect as a pistol. For these very reasons, it is not nearly as effective as a good handgun either. To use the TASER, a person attaches a cartridge to the front of the device that contains wire coils and two spiked electrical leads that enter the body of the target. The rear of the unit looks a lot like a pistol. Once the trigger is pressed the twin spikes fly out, each attached to a thin, 21-foot long wires, and imbed themselves in the skin of the target and deliver an electric jolt, which will generally incapacitate the average person for several seconds. Additional jolts can be given by pressing the trigger.
Sounds effective, right? Wrong. Unfortunately, this design has several inherent flaws. First, in order to be effective, the leads must enter the skin. Therefore, if the hijacker is wearing an appropriately thick shirt or jacket, the leads will not contact the skin, and the TASER is going to be minimally effective. Second, if two hijackers bust down the cockpit door, the TASER is useless. Theoretically, the pilot could zap one, do a quick cartridge change and zap the second intruder; of course, once the cartridge attached to the first intruder is removed from the unit, he can no longer be zapped. So, by the time the second intruder has been zapped, the first has fully recovered and is therefore free to begin slashing the pilots’ throats while his buddy recovers. With only one TASER against two intruders, the pilot would almost do better to zap the one and then beat the second intruder with the TASER unit itself, not something a pilot should have to deal with in a cramped cockpit. Furthermore, even if only one intruder breaks into a cockpit and is successfully subdued by the TASER, what then? Someone has to jump on him before he recovers and handcuff him. Who’s job is that going to be? Please don’t say the other pilot; he’s flying the plane.
The only viable way to protect the cockpit of a jumbo jet using a TASER would be to have several of the units in each cockpit, each fully charged with at least one spare cartridge per TASER. This is a rather expensive and silly solution to the problem of cockpit security.
A vastly more effective solution is a pistol, preferably one chambered for a no-nonsense cartridge like .45 ACP, .40 S&W or .357 Magnum.
If I were in position to recommend what to equip pilots with, given my background as an NRA-certified personal protection instructor, I’d suggest a .45 ACP Glock model 36 Slimline fitted with a suppresser and accessory rail-mounted tactical laser (with a pressure switch on the grip) with magazines full of Glasser Safety Slugs, Mag-safes or similar fragmenting bullets. Such a pistol is the right tool for the job and as my eighth-grade wood shop teacher insisted on saying: "A tool for every job, a job for every tool." Indeed. Using a TASER to defend a cockpit is akin to using a monkey wrench to drive a nail, sure, it’ll kind of maybe work, but it really isn’t the best tool.
The above-described Glock, however, is the right tool for the job, regardless of what Ridge and other opponents of arming pilots might think. The Glock truly is perfect for this role, it has earned a reputation since its introduction to US markets in the late 80s as a reliable, incredibly durable, simple-to-operate pistol that works well. Glock pistols in a variety of models and calibers are now safely stored in the holsters of many a police officer across the nation. They’re a work-a-day pistol that lacks an external safety toggle, instead relying on a trigger-mounted safety lever that compliments internal inertia safeties, which Glock calls its "Safe Action" system. The only controls on a Glock are the trigger, slide catch, magazine release and ‘takedown’ buttons, very straight forward and easy for a non-gun savvy individual to use in a crisis situation. I’d suggest the Glock 36 Slimline over the standard .45 caliber model 21 because the 36 is the first Glock to get away from double column magazines and features a slim grip that users with a variety of hand sizes will find comfortable. Since these guns will likely go a long time between cleanings, Glock’s reliable design and corrosion-resistant construction will guarantee they work when called on, even if they haven’t seen a drop of G96 Complete Gun Treatment in years.
The .45 ACP cartridge has proven itself in countless shootings, and when topped with fast, frangible bullets, will not puncture the fuselage of an airliner. Upon striking the center-mass of a would-be hijacker, the incapacitating effect of a .45 ACP Glasser will last a lot longer than would that of a TASER, i.e. permanently as opposed to five seconds. Furthermore, the .45 ACP doesn’t care what the hijacker wears, as long as it’s not Kevlar, it’s going in to disrupt a few vital organs.
I would also suggest a suppresser be attached. .45s are loud in general, but in the confines of a cockpit the noise would be deafening. The discharge of a suppressed .45 ACP in a cockpit would still be noisy, but the suppresser will protect the pilots from temporary near-deafness. The laser sight will help the user aim quickly and nothing takes the fight out of someone like seeing that glowing red dot hone in on their heart. With the Glock 36’s 6+1 ammo capacity, seven separate hijackers could be dispatched quickly and if more shooting was necessary, a few spare, loaded magazines can be kept handy. Because of the suppresser, these pistols couldn’t be the issued directly to pilots (without them having to contend with mountains of permits and paperwork anyway, unless F-troop makes an exception for them), but rather to each individual plane. One member of the flight team—copilot, navigator, whoever—could be designated as the person who wears the pistol in a shoulder rig and then returns it to a small gun safe in the cockpit after the passengers have deplaned. Issuing them to the plane instead of the pilot would help ensure that only frangible bullets were kept anywhere near the firearm.
Another very good alternative to the Glock 36 is a Glock 23. It’s a pistol of roughly the same size, and it holds 10+1 rounds (in post-ban magazines, that is) of .40 S&W, a potent cartridge that surpasses the .45 ACP in the Fuller Index (a system that predicts one-shot-stops) when using conventional hollow points.
With frangible bullets in the firearm, the plane’s passengers could be protected by the installation of a thin wooden door a few feet outside the cockpit door, or even a set of heavy curtains made of Kevlar or similarly strong artificial fabric. Frangible bullets break apart upon contact with anything, shedding weight and velocity rapidly. When they hit a solid object like a wall, they shatter harmlessly. Upon striking a soft target like a person’s chest, they penetrate as they fragment, depositing all of their considerable energy into a shallow wound cavity that causes massive tissue damage.
Naturally, the problem with my recommendation is that it makes sense and therefore will not be heeded. Instead, United will sally forth and equip their pilots with TASERS. With Tom Ridge’s endorsement of such silly measures, other airlines will likely follow suit. Now, I’m not suggesting TASERS and other less-than-lethal weapons are useless or have no place in law-enforcement or security. Quite the contrary, I’m actually a fan of some less-than-lethal instruments, especially Jaycor Tactical System’s Pepperball Launcher (essentially a Tippman Pneumatics paintgun that fires balls filled with powdered pepper spray instead of paint). However, the Pepperball Launcher is as inappropriate for use in cockpit security as the TASER, but for different reasons.
The cockpit of commercial airliners needs to be viewed as a castle, a fortress that must be secure. Beefier doors are a good start, but any door, regardless of how sturdy, can be overcome by a determined enough individual or group. Should that door be broken down, the pilots need to be able to permanently defeat the intruder or intruders. Incapacitating (hopefully) them for a few seconds isn’t enough. The simplest, most obvious choice is a pistol, particularly one very like the Glock I described above. Again, we get into the whole political correctness issue; sure, it’s nicer and kinder and gentler to temporarily incapacitate a cockpit intruder than it is to shred his vital organs. Thing is, we’re talking about a cockpit intruder here, not a drunk that got tossed out of a bar and is giving the cops a hard time.
Anyone with the wherewithal to get on a plane today probably hasn’t been living under a mushroom for the last six months and is, therefore, aware that pilots don’t want anyone visiting them in the cockpit. The way I figure it, if someone does break down a cockpit door, they can’t be up to any good and have forfeited their rights and life by doing so. Simply put, today, if you break down a cockpit door, you deserve to be shot in the chest. Twice. By a .45. If that doesn’t make sense to the guy charged with operating the Office of Homeland Security, then he’s as ill suited for his job as the TASERs are for cockpit defense.
Kyle Lohmeier
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That's "Glaser Safety Slug". Not "Glasser". It's a little hard to take a voluminous screed like this seriously when the trade name of a recommended product is repeatedly mis-spelled.
Having carried a handgun, both open and concealed, for years, most of what appears above is, IMHO, much overblown and based in competing fireside theories instead of actual practice. A laser targetting system, for example, is a stone waste of time on a handgun required for quick and effective use. The batteries are always flat or the switch always malfunctions. Pilots have good eyesight, give them rugged open sights and have done with it. Same for a suppressor (silencer).
Similarly, the extended discussion of the competing virtues of different frangible bullet types, &c, &c, &c, is mostly a bunch of abstract theory and ignores the fact that it really doesn't matter if a bullet punctures the fuselage of an airplane. Trust me, the plane will not explode if it does, and no passengers will be sucked out, James Bond films notwithstanding.
The Glock is a fine weapon in the hands of a well-trained officer. It suffers, however, from the lack of a secure and reliable deactivating device (a 'safety') and is therefore always hot when loaded - which may explain the number of A/D's which the Glock has suffered - including not a few bathroom incidents.
Breathless talk about big manly calibers like the 45 ACP and suchlike ignores the fact that most people cannot shoot this antique caliber well because of the severe muzzle blast and recoil.
If flight-deck crew are to have the option to be armed (and I think they should) give them Smith and Wesson revolvers with open sights, 38-Spl caliber, with a two- or - three inch barrel and leave it at that. It works, it's simple and safe, it's more than adequate for the purpose required, and just about anyone can shoot it. Leave the incredibly finely-detailed discussion of the handgun that is the absolute ne plus ultra of self-defense to the pages of magazines and the back rooms of ranges, where it belongs.
Me shootin straight
With my thirty-eight
Beats all his jive
With his forty-five.
llater,
llamas
Having carried a handgun, both open and concealed, for years, most of what appears above is, IMHO, much overblown and based in competing fireside theories instead of actual practice. A laser targetting system, for example, is a stone waste of time on a handgun required for quick and effective use. The batteries are always flat or the switch always malfunctions. Pilots have good eyesight, give them rugged open sights and have done with it. Same for a suppressor (silencer).
Similarly, the extended discussion of the competing virtues of different frangible bullet types, &c, &c, &c, is mostly a bunch of abstract theory and ignores the fact that it really doesn't matter if a bullet punctures the fuselage of an airplane. Trust me, the plane will not explode if it does, and no passengers will be sucked out, James Bond films notwithstanding.
The Glock is a fine weapon in the hands of a well-trained officer. It suffers, however, from the lack of a secure and reliable deactivating device (a 'safety') and is therefore always hot when loaded - which may explain the number of A/D's which the Glock has suffered - including not a few bathroom incidents.
Breathless talk about big manly calibers like the 45 ACP and suchlike ignores the fact that most people cannot shoot this antique caliber well because of the severe muzzle blast and recoil.
If flight-deck crew are to have the option to be armed (and I think they should) give them Smith and Wesson revolvers with open sights, 38-Spl caliber, with a two- or - three inch barrel and leave it at that. It works, it's simple and safe, it's more than adequate for the purpose required, and just about anyone can shoot it. Leave the incredibly finely-detailed discussion of the handgun that is the absolute ne plus ultra of self-defense to the pages of magazines and the back rooms of ranges, where it belongs.
Me shootin straight
With my thirty-eight
Beats all his jive
With his forty-five.
llater,
llamas
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Armed Flight Deck
Orca strait
You're right.
Listening to the fatuous statements coming from the rear echelon
bureaucrats in recent months I can only come to the conclusion
that the aviation industry is ruled by "imbeciles who really mean it".
That's the way to bet anyway
You're right.
Listening to the fatuous statements coming from the rear echelon
bureaucrats in recent months I can only come to the conclusion
that the aviation industry is ruled by "imbeciles who really mean it".
That's the way to bet anyway
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Weapon of choice
llamas
I've sat on my hands while the discussion of suitable weapons has been going on as I'm no expert in this field.
My military training was to proficiency standard with the S&W 38 a long time back, & I feel that from the point of view of reliability & simplicity your suggestion has my vote.
A lot of talk has gone on about recurrent training to maintain proficiency if pilots are armed ! For weapons professionals ,viz., law enforcement agents ,I have no doubt this is the case. But to be able to hit the center of mass of a hijacker at a few feet I doubt this is necessary.
If you can handle the weapon safely & hit a bull in the ass with a bucket of wheat that's all the accuracy you need to deter hijack attempts.
I've sat on my hands while the discussion of suitable weapons has been going on as I'm no expert in this field.
My military training was to proficiency standard with the S&W 38 a long time back, & I feel that from the point of view of reliability & simplicity your suggestion has my vote.
A lot of talk has gone on about recurrent training to maintain proficiency if pilots are armed ! For weapons professionals ,viz., law enforcement agents ,I have no doubt this is the case. But to be able to hit the center of mass of a hijacker at a few feet I doubt this is necessary.
If you can handle the weapon safely & hit a bull in the ass with a bucket of wheat that's all the accuracy you need to deter hijack attempts.
Last edited by Capt. Crosswind; 9th Jun 2002 at 10:46.
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Two hijackers shot in Ethiopia
Two young people who tried to hijack a plane of the interior lines of Ethiopian Airlines were killed Sunday by agents of the national Security installed on board, announced the radio Ethiopian main road (official). One of the two stewards of the plane was slightly wounded in the attempt. The two hijackers, 20 and 22 years old, tried to hijack a plane which had taken off of Bahir Dar (north-eastern) for local Addis Ababa at 16h40 (13h40 GMT).