Asiana flight crash at San Francisco
I do, every six months.
You are kidding, right?
You are kidding, right?
And no, I am not kidding. It would be easy to develop a meaningful sim training program to maintain basic flying currency. Where there's a will there's a way.
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Caber:
That's a fair point, I should clarify that I am really talking about a visual approach without aids involving some sort of base turn to finals.
Actually, I think the pilots in question should not have been particularly challenged by this approach, after all they had a long final and probably had a VNAV reference as you say.
In my opinion it all went south in a matter of seconds when they failed to notice the autothrottle abnormality (or unusual mode) when increasing pitch to intercept the correct profile.
Thus visual approach skills are a bit of a red herring in this case (although it was untidy).
The problem is more failure to monitor and detect an undesirable aircraft state.
Bloggs:
Hey, I don't write the syllabus! I take your point although I don't think every 6 months in the sim gives you anywhere near the proficiency a regional pilot gets. Yet ATC in the States tend to treat us the same.
That's a fair point, I should clarify that I am really talking about a visual approach without aids involving some sort of base turn to finals.
Actually, I think the pilots in question should not have been particularly challenged by this approach, after all they had a long final and probably had a VNAV reference as you say.
In my opinion it all went south in a matter of seconds when they failed to notice the autothrottle abnormality (or unusual mode) when increasing pitch to intercept the correct profile.
Thus visual approach skills are a bit of a red herring in this case (although it was untidy).
The problem is more failure to monitor and detect an undesirable aircraft state.
Bloggs:
Hey, I don't write the syllabus! I take your point although I don't think every 6 months in the sim gives you anywhere near the proficiency a regional pilot gets. Yet ATC in the States tend to treat us the same.
Last edited by HPSOV L; 13th Jul 2013 at 12:40.
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Actions...no excuses.
The crew has no excuses to me.
on final, with full automations or not, on small or big plane, with 3 or 1 pilot, you check speed. Simple...
no need a checkride every 6 months to check speed and knowing to go around when it's necessary.
The crew has no excuses to me.
on final, with full automations or not, on small or big plane, with 3 or 1 pilot, you check speed. Simple...
no need a checkride every 6 months to check speed and knowing to go around when it's necessary.
Last edited by Greenlights; 13th Jul 2013 at 12:55.
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NEW YEAR:
Three crew were ejected during the crash and a further two trapped under slides that inflated inside the a/c. That left only five to conduct the evacuation.
The passenger possibly run over was lying in the debri field (reportedly obscured by fire-fighting foam), and apparently hit by one of the arriving trucks while the evacuation was in it's early stages.
Three crew were ejected during the crash and a further two trapped under slides that inflated inside the a/c. That left only five to conduct the evacuation.
The passenger possibly run over was lying in the debri field (reportedly obscured by fire-fighting foam), and apparently hit by one of the arriving trucks while the evacuation was in it's early stages.
Last edited by HPSOV L; 13th Jul 2013 at 13:12.
Originally Posted by HPSOV
Thus visual approach skills are a bit of a red herring in this case (although it was untidy).
The problem is more failure to monitor and detect an undesirable aircraft state.
The problem is more failure to monitor and detect an undesirable aircraft state.
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HPSOV L:
You are bang on. The visual approach is neither here nor there. As has been mentioned, they achieved Vref (-3) at 500ft, yet failed to notice the speed decreasing and lack of ATHR response. One of the (apparent) issues was a lack of mode awareness. As with the Turkish 737 crash, you don't need to be on a visual for that to bite.
Thus visual approach skills are a bit of a red herring in this case (although it was untidy).
The problem is more failure to monitor and detect an undesirable aircraft state.
The problem is more failure to monitor and detect an undesirable aircraft state.
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(The cabin crew should have done better?)
No full blown emergency is ever going to be text book!
I think the cabin crew did fantastic....I think there were only 5 able to assist in the evacuation of which they had zero warning or time to prepare for an evacuation of 300 people. I think they did as well as any other cabin crew in the world would have.
No full blown emergency is ever going to be text book!
I think the cabin crew did fantastic....I think there were only 5 able to assist in the evacuation of which they had zero warning or time to prepare for an evacuation of 300 people. I think they did as well as any other cabin crew in the world would have.
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As an active "heavy" jet pilot and having been subjected to SFO's QUIET BRIDGE visual and 8000' overhead SFO VOR visual approaches onto 28L/R with and without the 180 to 5 requirement regularly for a five year period.
I have noticed in this debate that those deriding the ATC instruction of 180kts to 5 miles have not considered this........
It is acceptable and assumed by ATC that a "heavy" can COMMENCE speed reduction two miles from the speed constraint point - in this case 5 miles.
This is what is called and energy management and what is required to loose, in this case, approximately 40kts and be "stable".
I have noticed in this debate that those deriding the ATC instruction of 180kts to 5 miles have not considered this........
It is acceptable and assumed by ATC that a "heavy" can COMMENCE speed reduction two miles from the speed constraint point - in this case 5 miles.
This is what is called and energy management and what is required to loose, in this case, approximately 40kts and be "stable".
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It is acceptable and assumed by ATC that a "heavy" can COMMENCE speed reduction two miles from the speed constraint point - in this case 5 miles.
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Where Angels Fear to Tread, Part 1
OK, I am an absolute non-pilot, and until now have been careful to avoid matters of piloting skills / techniques / etc.
To my mind, most of the Highly Categorical posts about flying approaches fall into two camps:
A) Every pilot MUST be proficient enough to handle a visual approach with reduced or no navaids on a nice day, within adequate margins of safety. There is absolutely no excuse for not being able to do this. Obviously, some emergency scenarios would be far more demanding than that, and a flight crew lacking such proficiency could never save the aircraft.
B) Given the realities of airline operations, fatigue at the end of long hauls, the gap between opportunities for hand-flown approaches and the frequency needed to keep skills sharp, ATC aggravations, distractions, and the need for the system to function with the actual population of ATPs (as opposed to who we think they should be), even quite decent and well motivated flight crew may occasionally be stressed near their limits of performance when conducting such a (seemingly) elementary maneuver.
It seems to me that those in the (A) camp have been rather more passionate, and the (B) folks more measured
Of course, (A) and (B) are not mutually exclusive. They both make sense to me. Things SHOULD be better. And at the same time, things are what they are, and it would require Very Serious Industry Investment to shift them.
If it were up to me (speaking as an ignoramus who has never landed a plane), ATPs would have recurrent training on recovery from approach-to-stall and full-stall conditions, even though these are "never" supposed to happen.
I'm such an extremist about skills development, I would even prefer training in recovery from gross upsets, even though these are never, never supposed to happen.
With a life-long interest in aviation safety, I'm aware of a number of crisis situations where all would very likely have been lost, had the people manipulating the controls not possessed exceptional stick-and-rudder skills (for example, flying sailplanes as a hobby). Such situations are rare, and growing rarer (but see the "miracle on the Hudson"). Still, hundreds of passengers have been saved over the years because the flying skills of the people at the pointy end of their aircraft were much more acute, than the licensing authorities and industry standards required.
So, having fantasized about my ideal world of air carrier training... it Ain't Never Gonna Happen. What about the real world?
To my mind, most of the Highly Categorical posts about flying approaches fall into two camps:
A) Every pilot MUST be proficient enough to handle a visual approach with reduced or no navaids on a nice day, within adequate margins of safety. There is absolutely no excuse for not being able to do this. Obviously, some emergency scenarios would be far more demanding than that, and a flight crew lacking such proficiency could never save the aircraft.
B) Given the realities of airline operations, fatigue at the end of long hauls, the gap between opportunities for hand-flown approaches and the frequency needed to keep skills sharp, ATC aggravations, distractions, and the need for the system to function with the actual population of ATPs (as opposed to who we think they should be), even quite decent and well motivated flight crew may occasionally be stressed near their limits of performance when conducting such a (seemingly) elementary maneuver.
It seems to me that those in the (A) camp have been rather more passionate, and the (B) folks more measured
Of course, (A) and (B) are not mutually exclusive. They both make sense to me. Things SHOULD be better. And at the same time, things are what they are, and it would require Very Serious Industry Investment to shift them.
If it were up to me (speaking as an ignoramus who has never landed a plane), ATPs would have recurrent training on recovery from approach-to-stall and full-stall conditions, even though these are "never" supposed to happen.
I'm such an extremist about skills development, I would even prefer training in recovery from gross upsets, even though these are never, never supposed to happen.
With a life-long interest in aviation safety, I'm aware of a number of crisis situations where all would very likely have been lost, had the people manipulating the controls not possessed exceptional stick-and-rudder skills (for example, flying sailplanes as a hobby). Such situations are rare, and growing rarer (but see the "miracle on the Hudson"). Still, hundreds of passengers have been saved over the years because the flying skills of the people at the pointy end of their aircraft were much more acute, than the licensing authorities and industry standards required.
So, having fantasized about my ideal world of air carrier training... it Ain't Never Gonna Happen. What about the real world?
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... Despite having a relatively long throw on their foam they drove up very close to the aircraft.
... This photo shows a good idea of the fire truck tire tracks. Sadly, if you look to the left front corner of the truck near the wing the yellow tarp might also show something else.
... I find it very hard to believe they sprayed foam on this young girl without seeing her. And if they did and she was run over in the foam - then that seems equally problematic.
The discussion about firefighters performance is necessary and better placed on YouTube than here.
Update:
The tarp indeed covers the body of a victim.
In this Saturday, July 6, 2013 aerial photo, a firefighter, right, stands by a tarpaulin sheet covering the body of a Chinese teen struck by a fire truck during the emergency response to the crash ... The girl was hit by a fire truck while covered with firefighting foam, authorities said Friday, July 12, revealing a startling detail that suggested she could have survived the crash only to die in its chaotic aftermath.
Credits: Marcio Jose Sanchez, AP and The Sacramento Bee
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Where Angels Fear to Tread, Part 2
I'd be delighted, to read what you air carrier flight crew on this forum think of a safety-support concept. If you will, imagine that:
1. Imbedded somewhere in the cockpit instrumentation, is a continous assessment of stabilized approach criteria.
2. Attention-getting (but not highly distracting) indication when an approach is nearing the limits of stabilized approach.
3. Loud and annoying (but not too persistent) audible "Go Around! Go Around!" when (for example) the approach has deteriorated to the extent that recovery of the flight path would come too close to the aircraft's performance limits, or other criteria based on the company's stabilized approach procedures.
4. Company policies requiring flight crews to obey a "Go Around!" alert, unless fuel emergency or other extreme situation should override.
Some thoughts about this concept:
1. Imbedded somewhere in the cockpit instrumentation, is a continous assessment of stabilized approach criteria.
2. Attention-getting (but not highly distracting) indication when an approach is nearing the limits of stabilized approach.
3. Loud and annoying (but not too persistent) audible "Go Around! Go Around!" when (for example) the approach has deteriorated to the extent that recovery of the flight path would come too close to the aircraft's performance limits, or other criteria based on the company's stabilized approach procedures.
4. Company policies requiring flight crews to obey a "Go Around!" alert, unless fuel emergency or other extreme situation should override.
Some thoughts about this concept:
- It could help, in situations where monitoring and situational awareness are inadequate due to whatever factors.
- Some of the folks writing here have identified a reluctance to say "Go Around!" even when the situation calls for it. In the literature of aviation safety, such psychological factors have long been studied because of their frequent role in accidents. I can imagine that in a long-haul landing with the relief crew in jumpseats, one dynamic that could occur might be "none of the other guys are objecting, who am I to speak up?" Whatever the causes of this "psychological barrier" to acknowledging that things aren't as they should be -- having "the robot" make the call could bypass this.
- In modern-era ships (that is, most of today's fleet), all of the resources to do this are already present, and the addition of such an alerting system would probably be a matter of software upgrade.
- Although it would be highly desirable for such a system to be reliable, it is not strictly necessary -- for example, negative failure rate (not alerting when it should) of .1% would hardly reduce its safety benefit, and positive failure rate (alerting when it should not) as poor as .01% might be tolerable -- I'm just making these up, and it should be possible to make it more reliable than that; my point is, it doesn't have to be perfect to be useful, and doesn't have to meet the standards of perfection required of other flight systems.
- To those who will quite reasonably object that a Real Pilot shouldn't need such a gadget: did you know that many skydivers use Automatic Opening Devices, that deploy their parachutes should they fail to by a certain altitude? Of course, any idiot will pull the rip cord before it's too late ... except that sometimes, people don't, hence the AOD.
Last edited by Etud_lAvia; 13th Jul 2013 at 15:26.
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Non-mutinous Sounding or Ego-threatening CRM
In the case of the SFO Asiana crash, the pilot flying either forgot, that he put the engines in idle, when he needed to drop down quickly, to make an approach, and when he realized he was going too slow, instead of thinking, "Wait, let me think ... Oh yeah, I forgot that I turned the engines to idle a few minutes ago, to drop down, since I was too high, so I'll turn them back up", or he thought they automatically came back on, after being turned down, in which case he should have thought "Well my speed is too slow, maybe I was wrong about the throttle going back to automatic, automatically, and need to push them forward myself". Instead he doesn't think. He just continues to go in for an all but dead stick landing, after his speed was siphoned off from coming in low and flat at the end of his approach. I've studied how people think my entire life, and there's two kinds of people. The ones, who actively think most of the time (unless they are very tired), and people who only think when called upon to think. These pilots were the latter. In order for them to think, someone has to ask them a question. Maybe that's the answer for culturally challenged CRM. Instead of the telling the pilot flying to increase thrust, ask him "Are the throttles still at idle?" or for a little less thinking, the more immediate "Do you think we should push the throttles forward?". It's the Socratic method, where the teacher asks the students questions to make them think, and come to their own conclusions, but using it for non-ego-threatening or non-mutinous sounding CRM. Now that I think about it, this should be incorporated in training at risk for culturally challenged CRM crews.
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Visual Approaches
I agree with comments by RAT 5 and others concerning training for Visual Approaches.
Most training programs I have seen use the Visual Circuit/Visual Traffic Pattern and call it training for a Visual Approach.
While the Visual Circuit/Visual Traffic Pattern may be useful for local aircraft training, it has little in common with Visual Approaches used at major airports.
The Visual Circuit/Visual Traffic Pattern is a fixed track, starting downwind at pattern altitude. The use of automation and navigation aids is discouraged.
Some Visual Approaches show defined tracks and recommended altitudes, but most do not. The Visual Approach may start at varying distances, altitudes and positions relative to the airport. Automation may be used up to a point, and available navigation aids should be used. The pilot must maneuver and configure the aircraft to achieve the desired track and vertical path.
Training should not only be for operating the aircraft and its systems, but also to prepare the pilot for operations at destination airports.
Most training programs I have seen use the Visual Circuit/Visual Traffic Pattern and call it training for a Visual Approach.
While the Visual Circuit/Visual Traffic Pattern may be useful for local aircraft training, it has little in common with Visual Approaches used at major airports.
The Visual Circuit/Visual Traffic Pattern is a fixed track, starting downwind at pattern altitude. The use of automation and navigation aids is discouraged.
Some Visual Approaches show defined tracks and recommended altitudes, but most do not. The Visual Approach may start at varying distances, altitudes and positions relative to the airport. Automation may be used up to a point, and available navigation aids should be used. The pilot must maneuver and configure the aircraft to achieve the desired track and vertical path.
Training should not only be for operating the aircraft and its systems, but also to prepare the pilot for operations at destination airports.
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cant believe I went thru the registration process just to make this observation, but I couldn't help myself:
deterioration of flying skills due to computer ascendancy is (imo)a valid and worthwhile concern, but I think it has not as much to do with this crash as a couple of other factors.
the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the instructor/check airman to do his job.
it surely can be anticipated that the pilot who has never flown a 777 into sfo might well screw up the approach. that is why the check airman is there.
He failed. It was his responsibility, not the upgrading line pilot's.
the upgrading line pilot was not certified to make that approach. the instructor was certified to monitor it and intervene if needed. He did not.
i understand that it was the check pilots first check assignment.
The institutional failure was certifying the instructor to do a job he failed at in his first try.
imo,
the airline has a instructor certification problem. this contributed to the crash more than anything else.
deterioration of flying skills due to computer ascendancy is (imo)a valid and worthwhile concern, but I think it has not as much to do with this crash as a couple of other factors.
the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the instructor/check airman to do his job.
it surely can be anticipated that the pilot who has never flown a 777 into sfo might well screw up the approach. that is why the check airman is there.
He failed. It was his responsibility, not the upgrading line pilot's.
the upgrading line pilot was not certified to make that approach. the instructor was certified to monitor it and intervene if needed. He did not.
i understand that it was the check pilots first check assignment.
The institutional failure was certifying the instructor to do a job he failed at in his first try.
imo,
the airline has a instructor certification problem. this contributed to the crash more than anything else.
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Originally Posted by BOAC
- if your 'D' means DME, I think that should be D8?
So to put my thought to precision: start slowing from 180 at TDZ minus 7 NM, when constraint called for '180 at 5'.
This is what I understand FO Cokebottle wants to do.