Incident at Heathrow

[bvcu]

A pilots walkround check on the average airliner at a station where engineers do the check shouldnt have anything to find. Should have all been found by the the guy certifying the job as done. Crews do find things , and i for one am glad that another set of eyes is having a look as we are all human and can miss things ! So i disagree with those putting the blame on the crew walkaround as these cowls are very difficult to see unlatched unlike most other types. How many JT9D core cowls got left on runways a few years ago !

[Piltdown Man]

Blame, cause whatever you want to call it will come back to maintenance (again)

Blame will fix nothing. The solution is to determine what failed (design, system, procedure, training... or whatever) and address those. And then we have the actions of the flight crew, before during and after. Personally, I think they did well but I'm sure, if asked, they could suggest improvements. And given 20-20 hindsight, others may also be able to suggest where, given similar circumstances, an even better job could be done.

Blame, punishment, reprimands, sacking, compo claims etc. do nothing to improve safety.

[A and C]

Bvcu

I wondered when the BLAME culture would rear its ugly head, thank you for being the one to the standard bearer for the "hang em high" brigade. Between those with your attitude and the ambulance chasing lawers we should be able to drive flight safety back into the dark ages.

[BOAC]

.....err - you did read the post, didn't you?

[Ye Olde Pilot]

Uplinker
What is mind boggling is given the state of the aircraft they even considered flying back over central London.
I shouldn't really, but: The state of the aircraft ??

As far as the pilots knew, they had lost some panels but one engine was working normally. They had lost one of three hydraulic systems, and were having to fly with manual thrust.

So that's OK then? The initial track suggests they were still heading for destination.

The right engine only developed a fire on finals. No great drama then for a professional flight crew, who practice such events every 6 months in the SIM.

I recall many years ago sitting in the right seat of a 747 at Cranebank. A seasoned training captain of 30 years asked me to give him any problem and he would sort it out. I pulled both r/h fans on a fully loaded sim and he was on the ground in seconds.
So the r/hand engine only developed the fire on finals. What would you have done 15 miles out?

So tell me; why would they have needed to land at Brize? What was the urgency? Brize is a military airbase; do they have steps for an A319? What is the landing distance required for an overweight A319 with no yellow hydraulics? How long is Brize's runway? Was the wind at Brize within limits for landing? Would they have all their braking, antiskid, reversers, flaps and spoilers available? (I know the answers, but do you?)

If you have been flying for more than just a few years you'll know Brize can handle anything. As for steps for an A319 are you having a laugh? Was that the reason the crew returned to Heathrow? If so the steps were not used.

Or they could have landed at EGSS, but again; where was the urgency? If they had gone there, would there be a stand available for them? Would BA staff have been there to assist? Where would the passengers have gone and who would have looked after them? Are any BA engineers based at EGSS?

Now I know you are trolling.

Had there been an uncontained fire, of course they would have landed at the nearest suitable runway. But there wasn't. So they didn't.

Nice to know these sim events are so well organised. Perhaps you can tell me where you would have popped in for a cup of tea with both engines gone?

Most of the "why did they fly over London" brigade seem to be thinking of an engine failure in a Cessna 152. In that instance, you MUST find a field and land in it - you would not dream of doing anything else, and certainly would not attempt to cross a large city, (and it would be physically impossible anyway). However, modern jets with single hydraulic problems and perhaps an engine fire do not fall out of the sky. There are so many more factors a professional flight crew in charge of a modern commercial jet take into account.

I suggest you look at Kegworth or the Air France incidence.

Another question is why they aircraft was cleared for an approach given its problems over a heavily congested area such as central London where the loss of life given a total engine failure could have been considerable.

[gazumped]

Keg worth is worth a good look. The crew incorrectly identified an engine fire, and shut down the good engine. The only remaining engine. Performed ok at flight idle on descent, but was unable to provide sufficient thrust when spin up was required after configured for landing.
AF447 , failed to carry out the UAS check list(on my type is extremely complicated.......... 3 items ....... From memory), and then failed to recognise a stall, .....a deep stall.

Mate not only are you not comparing apples with apples, you are attempting to compare apples with a skungy spat out orange pip!

As for your hero who got a fully laden B747 back on the ground in seconds with a double right hand side engine failure, did he do it single pilot? How did he actually confirm the problem that he actually had, and then work out a course of action in that time. From another era of a man and his dog perhaps?

Kegworth was caused (largely) by rushing to judgement, they would have done a much better job if they had sat on their hands for a little while an examined very closely exactly what the problem was.

[Ye Olde Pilot]

If you can't recognise a stall you should not be flying. I take it you have never flown helicopters where the collective is your friend when things can go wrong very quickly.

In the case of AF447 three pilots could not read the information in front of them and must take the blame.

I say again to take a passenger aircraft with major problem on an approach over
central London begs a lot of questions on strategy via regulation and procedures for future incidents.

[BARKINGMAD]

HALFMAN. Good posting, dragging the discussion back to where it belongs!

Obviously we wait til the report is out and then watch fascinated as the bosses responsible duck and weave and make sure none of their clique are named, shamed and possibly charged under HSE or other legislation?

May I suggest we as PROFESSIONALS in aviation raise the profile of the background to this near-disaster with our elected representatives in the UK and EU Parliaments and try to shake them out of the complacent torpor which afflicts them, even as the awful EASA FTL proposals grind their way into law.

The lawmakers are hand in glove with big business, but is there a chance that the prospect of a major legal action after the disaster, against those whose responsibility it was to ADEQUATELY SUPERVISE AND REGULATE the industry, might stir them to listen to the obvious failures highlighted in such programs as CHIRPand take EFFECTIVE action?

CHIRP has demonstrated the concerns of both pilots and engineers on the topics of overstretch, fatigue, distractions and delays due to "security" etc, and downgrading of engineering practices, supervision and manning levels.

The management and regulators may try to claim that they didn't know how bad the situation was before the inevitable fatal accident, but I hope the prospect of having collars felt, handcuffs applied and public trials with jail sentences for corporate negligence may work where all else has failed to move their attention from balance sheets to the prospect of bent metal and blood.

This incident/accident serves as a wakeup call to all of us to try harder, but after too many years in aviation I suspect the the attitude/practices change will not occur in the areas where it is most needed viz THE VERY TOP!

P S. With EASA, why do we have an expensive CAA in this country, with no apparent powers and unable to tell me whether my licence is valid? But they are very good at charging pilots and engineers loadsa money for bits of paper/e-mails delivered late or not at all?

[woptb]

If you can't recognise a stall you should not be flying. I take it you have never flown helicopters where the collective is your friend when things can go wrong very quickly.

In the case of AF447 three pilots could not read the information in front of them and must take the blame.

Have you never made an error or not followed SOP's,because of things outside your control or perhaps a belief it was the right thing to do given the circumstances ? Why they were in that position,why they made those errors, in the case of the AF or BA crews is the single most important issue.

Whether it's design,systemic,time pressure,fatigue,culture or automation,it must be the aim of ANY accident/incident investigation to find out why & mitigate against it happening again,rather than look for people to blame.Anything else is a complete waste of time/energy & is both practically & ethically unsound;Most importantly does little advance safety.

[Ye Olde Pilot]

I'm not having a go at the crew on this one although on a short sector out of LHR they should have spotted the problem on the ground and as it was morning they had no doubt been feeling fairly fresh on a short first sector.

However the greater safety issue is that they were allowed to return to Heathrow over central London not knowing if the aircraft could make it.
The view from the ground said it all and a quick walk through the cabin during the orbit over Chelmsford would have told them they were flying with both engines damaged.

How sensible is it for clearance to be given for a return over a heavily built up area in these circumstances?

In this case they got away with it.

[gazumped]

The regulators main job appears to keep public servants in jobs, and has little to with safety. Safety is up to us.

Unfortunately the "system" has at least two bunnies to hang this event on, and will gladly get back to lavish lunches and wasted talk.

Ok call me a cynic!

[FullWings]

As for your hero who got a fully laden B747 back on the ground in seconds with a double right hand side engine failure

It was probably upside-down, though.

For those who are not professional pilots, the crew in question appear to have followed standard procedure, which is to find out what has happened / is happening to their aircraft then take the appropriate action. They ended up shutting down one engine, which on a twin means landing at what most pilots call the "nearest suitable airfield".

Considering they had a hydraulic problem as well, the 3,900m of 27R at LHR (the UKs longest runway) would have seemed quite suitable, plus they would be familiar with the approach and have all the charts to hand. From the position they were in when the decision to land was made, in terms of distance to fly, taking the circuit pattern into account, LHR was likely the nearest in time and distance too.

It is not standard procedure to worry about what's underneath you during a single-engined approach. For one thing, pilots have no information about the population density under their flightpath, so unless they could see an endless urban sprawl, they couldn't avoid it. Also, this type of aircraft is certified (and the pilots trained) to be able to take off, suffer an engine failure and either continue to destination, divert to an alternate or return back to the airfield of origin. The rules and regulations are written around this capability.

If you had the luxury of a choice of airfields that were all "suitable" in terms of safety, then most crews would rather go where they had a stand, engineering, company support, passenger transfer facilities, etc. rather than an empty aerodrome or a military field with all the attendant difficulties. Also, somewhere that is aware of your problem(s) and has briefed the emergency services about them would be attractive as well.

So, I'm pretty sure that although the possibility of landing elsewhere was discussed, for some of the above reasons they chose to land back where they came from.

[4468]

'A walk through the cabin', on a flight of 20 minutes? Hilarious!!

I'm afraid I can't continue with this thread any longer. I guess I'll just wait for the official report.

I'm outta here, as so many people posting don't seem to inhabit the world in which I have plied my trade for the last 35 years!

I just want to tell you both good luck. We're all counting on you.

[Ye Olde Pilot]

Fullwings I take your point but we live in a 'risk assessment' culture where even a toilet floor that has been cleaned has to have a wet floor sign.

It's OK to say the crew got away with it but another time that might not work.
I'm sure there is company pressure to get back to base but look at the outcome.
Bad publicity and major problems for Heathrow for days.

I'd say a kid of seven would tell you it's not a good idea to take a fully loaded passenger aircraft with serious problems back over central London.

The flight crew must have been aware of the serious damage but they could not know what other nasties could occur when they did the approach?

I ask you to look again at this picture and tell me it's OK to fly a crippled aircraft over central London looking like this?

[rottenray]

However the greater safety issue is that they were allowed to return to Heathrow over central London not knowing if the aircraft could make it.

One of the most ass-backwards things I've ever read on Pprune, and that's saying quite a lot.

It would be a great safety issue if they were allowed to return to LHR knowing the plane wouldn't make it.

As far as "knowing it would make it," do you ever really know?


On this subject:

I can't see a diversion to a military airstrip being a good thing, unless it's the closest place to land and you have to land immediately.

You have to consider logistics, like ambulance access and the ability to deal with perhaps hundreds of injured pax.

Commercial fields are well versed in this, military fields are not - they don't serve the human factor in those numbers.

Finally, I've had the pleasure of calling 6 airline pilots and 11 private pilots "friend" - and with the exception of one black sheep, they were all EXTREMELY SERIOUS and considered the safety of those on the ground just as much as their passengers. None of them would consider doing anything that might harm a passenger or an innocent bystander.

I truly believe that (at least in the Western world) most if not all commercial pilots feel this same way.

All this ranting about flying over London is just what someone has previously described it as - twaddle.

As if they're sitting there betting they can make it without making a smoking hole out of a school for seriously handicapped but oh-so-cute children who were unfortunately clustered outside at just the point of impact.


Cheers!

[Uplinker]

The initial track suggests they were still heading for destination.

Er, no, the initial track suggests that they were following the SID, which is very sensible, given the high concentration of traffic in the London TMA.

The view from the ground said it all and a quick walk through the cabin during the orbit over Chelmsford would have told them they were flying with both engines damaged.

Says who? Are YOU having a laugh? The indications available to the pilots in the cockpit told them that both engines were running. One appeared normal, the other had some issues.

So the r/hand engine only developed the fire on finals. What would you have done 15 miles out?

Landed at Heathrow.

I ask you to look again at this picture and tell me it's OK to fly a crippled aircraft over central London looking like this?

Who says it was "crippled"? Do you know how many systems and back-up systems are built in to modern jets? I've looked again at your picture and, Yep, I still say that the indications to the crew in the cockpit were that one engine was running normally and the other engine was also running but with some issues. It's just the cowls that are missing or mashed up. Would your car engine fail utterly if the bonnet detached on the motorway? No. You have been watching too many films.

What may look to you like a total disaster was actually a yellow hydraulic issue, an auto thrust problem and a fuel leak. Professional crews are trained to fault-find calmly and not to panic as you seem to be doing.

However the greater safety issue is that they were allowed to return to Heathrow over central London not knowing if the aircraft could make it.

Oh good grief. Do you seriously think they would have turned away from EGSS and headed for EGLL if they thought for one minute that they would not make it???? We are talking about a BA crew flying a modern Airbus here.

Please, change the record, it is getting very boring. And by the way I take great offence at being accused of 'Trolling' and ask you to retract that sir.

Good night from me, and good night from him. (I hope).

[Ornis]

It boils down to what is best for the people on board versus what is best for the people on the ground (which is obvious).

The crew made a judgement and they were right. This time. Generally, when a cowl departs the aircraft there is no fuel leak or fire, so there are statistics to back their decision. (Known at the time?)

Apart from the obvious questions this particular incident raises about engineering and walk-arounds, the big question remains unanswered: How much risk is acceptable to the people of London?

Because some time it might be more serious and the controllers might need to consider refusing Heathrow. How would they know (and what happens then)? Convenience of passengers and presence of an engineering base may influence the crew to underestimate the problem. (Not to mention other problems: Royal Air Maroc B734 at Amsterdam on Jun 6th 2010.)

What happens if any aircraft nearby needs to land in an emergency? Is Heathrow available regardless? Passengers must trust pilots but must city dwellers?

There are competing interests here; that explains the divergence of opinions.

[lomapaseo]

It boils down to what is best for the people on board versus what is best for the people on the ground (which is obvious).

The crew made a judgement and they were right. This time. Generally, when a cowl departs the aircraft there is no fuel leak or fire, so there are statistics to back their decision. (Known at the time?)

Apart from the obvious questions this particular incident raises about engineering and walk-arounds, the big question remains unanswered: How much risk is acceptable to the people of London?

Because some time it might be more serious and the controllers might need to consider refusing Heathrow. How would they know (and what happens then)? Convenience of passengers and presence of an engineering base may influence the crew to underestimate the problem. (Not to mention other problems: Royal Air Maroc B734 at Amsterdam on Jun 6th 2010.)

What happens if any aircraft nearby needs to land in an emergency? Is Heathrow available regardless? Passengers must trust pilots but must city dwellers?

There are competing interests here; that explains the divergence of opinions.

This flight-diversion argument is like robbing peter to pay paul. How does one plan a route vs the likelihood of parts dropping vs the likelihood of hitting something important vs the likelihood of extending the risk to the aircrafts flight itself by not saving the aircraft first?

Some legal arguments might indicate the surprise increase in risk to the people along the intended route need be warned at the time. Does one set of air-raid sirens?

This kind of extension of safety goes way beyond the control of the aviation sector and doesn't need to be discussed here (Jet Blast maybe)

[FullWings]

I'd say a kid of seven would tell you it's not a good idea to take a fully loaded passenger aircraft with serious problems back over central London.

Luckily for you and the rest of the travelling public, the airlines, the CAA, ATC, et al. don't allow seven year-old kids to formulate policy or give advice to aircraft in flight.

If an aircraft had failures that made landing short a real possibility *and* it overflew suitable airfields and open countryside in order to make it to LHR for convenience, then that might be an issue. The flight in question started in a highly populated area and stayed mostly over it because that was the standard departure. By the time the problem(s) had been diagnosed to the best of their ability, they were in a good position for a near straight in approach to LHR. As I understand it, one of the engines functioned normally for the whole flight, so they only declared a full emergency (mayday) when the damaged engine gave a fire warning shortly before landing.

Once airborne, this scenario was handled in what the vast majority of airline pilots would call a textbook manner. They had multiple failures but the aircraft was still flying and controllable, so they elected to land on the nearest, longest runway after actioning necessary drills and discussing options. It doesn't matter what the aircraft looked like, it is how it was performing that matters and the pilots were the only true judges of that.

[SLFandProud]

Hmmm

Ye Olde Pilot wrote...

I ask you to look again at this picture and tell me it's OK to fly a crippled aircraft over central London looking like this?

...I believe you've discovered a previously overlooked and far more important safety issue, here.

If the PF could see that and still decided to fly over central London, then he should have been on the bloody flight deck instead of sitting on the ground looking up.