SQ006 final report out 26/4/02
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Er......don't think so
Hardly a semantics issue is it SQ6? Semantics is about using different words to mean the same thing, not about using the same words to mean different things, as is the case here with "Dead Reckoning".
Many professional aviators on this thread have tried, quite politely, to explain that, in aviation the term Dead Reckoning has a specific and incontrovertible meaning and should not be confused or misappropriated to mean anything else - somehow these explanations have fallen on deaf ears, (even Mole's who is an aviator?).
The blame cannot and will not be placed solely at the feet of Capt. Foong and crew and "My Learned Friends" won't allow it, since it would be tantamount to admitting total and exclusive liability which the airline insurers won't buy, the airline insurers will be looking to make certain that all contibuting factors to the accident are placed at the correct doors and that the owners of these factors, (or their insurers), collect their fair share of the bill.
Many professional aviators on this thread have tried, quite politely, to explain that, in aviation the term Dead Reckoning has a specific and incontrovertible meaning and should not be confused or misappropriated to mean anything else - somehow these explanations have fallen on deaf ears, (even Mole's who is an aviator?).
The blame cannot and will not be placed solely at the feet of Capt. Foong and crew and "My Learned Friends" won't allow it, since it would be tantamount to admitting total and exclusive liability which the airline insurers won't buy, the airline insurers will be looking to make certain that all contibuting factors to the accident are placed at the correct doors and that the owners of these factors, (or their insurers), collect their fair share of the bill.
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G Khan,
Semantics - Is the branch of the science of linguistics that is concerned with the meaning of words.
Now what did you say above?
I don't think any lawyer will quibble about the OED definition of dead reckoning, if we aviators only think of it as the calculation of position without celestial observations then so be it. In a wider context it surely means guessing position without reference to other navigational tools such as a localizer or Jepp charts. I really didn't want to get into this sort of argument but you are forcing the issue. Please tell us why you think the captain on this terrible night did not use the localizer to establish that he was correctly positioned on the threshold of runway 05L.
Semantics - Is the branch of the science of linguistics that is concerned with the meaning of words.
Now what did you say above?
I don't think any lawyer will quibble about the OED definition of dead reckoning, if we aviators only think of it as the calculation of position without celestial observations then so be it. In a wider context it surely means guessing position without reference to other navigational tools such as a localizer or Jepp charts. I really didn't want to get into this sort of argument but you are forcing the issue. Please tell us why you think the captain on this terrible night did not use the localizer to establish that he was correctly positioned on the threshold of runway 05L.
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G.Khan
I don't give a rats ass how pilots use the term dead reckoning. I'm trying to point out here that Captain Foong DID NOT NAVIGATE to the runway and GUESSED his position. Why don't you address the issue instead of trying to divert attention away to some ridiculous semantic side issue.
(And I suggest YOU get your facts right: semantic, relating to meaning in language or logic; semantics, branch of linguistics and logic concerned with meaning....analysis of word meanings and relations between them.... OED.)
I'm sure the poor bastards who burn't to death that night, and their families reading this thread, deserve a better response from a professional pilot than "My Learned Friends won't allow it".
Perhaps you should remind yourself of another word, 'INTEGRITY, the quality of being honest and having strong moral principles'. Who cares what the insurers and lawyers think, anyone with an ounce of integrity will tell you that the thing to do if you screw-up is admit your mistake and take measures to ensure that you don't make it again (and do everything in your power to make sure nobody else does either). Everybody makes mistakes, and I'm sure Foong is a man of integrity who will do the right thing when the time comes. If he looses his job and can't fly again, then these are the consequences he will have to accept for his mistake. But if he is sent to jail for admitting his mistake, I will be the first to shout up. Thinking about the 83 men, women and children, who died as a result of that mistake is punishment enough for any man.
(And I suggest YOU get your facts right: semantic, relating to meaning in language or logic; semantics, branch of linguistics and logic concerned with meaning....analysis of word meanings and relations between them.... OED.)
I'm sure the poor bastards who burn't to death that night, and their families reading this thread, deserve a better response from a professional pilot than "My Learned Friends won't allow it".
Perhaps you should remind yourself of another word, 'INTEGRITY, the quality of being honest and having strong moral principles'. Who cares what the insurers and lawyers think, anyone with an ounce of integrity will tell you that the thing to do if you screw-up is admit your mistake and take measures to ensure that you don't make it again (and do everything in your power to make sure nobody else does either). Everybody makes mistakes, and I'm sure Foong is a man of integrity who will do the right thing when the time comes. If he looses his job and can't fly again, then these are the consequences he will have to accept for his mistake. But if he is sent to jail for admitting his mistake, I will be the first to shout up. Thinking about the 83 men, women and children, who died as a result of that mistake is punishment enough for any man.
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On Top of That Rickety Pyramid
Semantics and pedantry aside, I think that the discussion on taxiing DRnav and the responsibility for getting to the right runway is missing the point by a country mile.
1. If Capt Foong had requested a "Follow Me" truck because of the reduced visibility, he may well have been within his rights to do so - albeit that it would have been a very very unusual request in my experience. But to take that a bit further, if Capt Foong had blindly followed the "Follow Me" truck and ended up (along with it) in a ditch (because the FM
truck-driver was an irresponsible idiot or himself lost), well we'd probably not have been too harshly critical of Capt Foong.
But let's say that it was that self-same idiot that painted the "Follow Me" taxiway markings (and installed the deceptive lights and signage) on the path that Foong followed to 05R - well, is it really all that different? A come-on "sucker trap" by any other name will always be a garden path that one in ten (or more) will be able to be led up - like lambs to the slaughter. If that sucker trap is also so immaculately designed that there are no active alerts (such as a lit obstacle or strobe-lit hazard sign) to the erroneous path (once entered), then we are obviously well along an exculpatory path for the aircrew. And therefore we should be rounding up those who created that trap..... and mindlessly left it there in place for many years - just awaiting the right conditions.
These miscreants might include:
a. Other pilots who themselves nearly "fell for it" in similar conditions - yet said/did nothing.
b. ATC operators and Ops staff at CKS who are very familiar with the airfield, its deficiencies and should have been daily on the qui vive for such errors....and the traps that might lead to them.
c. ATC Supervisors at CKS who should have been ensuring that their airfield was properly marked or NOTAMED as NOT being so (ICAO signatory status notwithstanding).
d. Construction supervisors for the 05R Works in Progress who might have thought it all through to a worst case, risk management / hazard elimination responsible decision not to abide by any such possibilities.
e. ICAO Safety Inspectors and Audit Teams who never really "look" at what they are inspecting for its potentials - and write glowing politically acceptable reports (ever see the one Ansett maint got from them just before it was twice grounded for shonky maint practices and failings?).
f. SIA OPS Management and Safety Staff who should have had a safety team flying the routes and looking out for the pitfalls and taking them up with airport management; but in the interim, briefing their crews on them.
So perhaps Capt Foong and his two yea-sayers upfront were insufficiently alert - but then again, to understand how that process works, look again at my earlier posts on this thread (pgs 3,4 & 7). I guess you could say (with the benefit of hindsight) that a most excellent captain would have had a standard pre-start mini-brief and said to his two understudies. "Well what do you think boys? What are the tricks and traps that we've got to look out for on this trip?". A little militaristic I guess, yet captains do have the responsibility of properly indoctrinating tomorrow's captains..... and that's a good way of doing it. It also lets the two F/O's know that you have a high regard for your own fallibility.
All very Utopian, I know.... but the only worthwhile aviation safety programs are the pro-active ones. One of the best flight safety programs that I ever ran with had crews doing just that (actively seeking the potential pitfalls) - and regularly writing down and anonymously submitting their opinions on "where the next accident was coming from". It all stemmed from a horrendous run of fatalities, so I guess it wasn't really pro-active. But I never went to another funeral whilst on that type a/c.
In fact the only non-guilty parties are the passengers. They just get to wear the outcome of the ongoing litany of half-truths that masquerade as airline industry aviation safety programs.
2. The ability to easily set up these types of multi-contributor errors is brought home best by examination of these next two incidents and the linked documents (at b & c).
a. In January 2000 an American Airlines [AMR] B777 took off on a closed runway at Chicago’s O’Hare airport.
b. the (524kb Word Document) record of the NTSB investigation into UPS 896 (B757) take-off on a closed runway at Denver International on September 25, 2001. They missed the well-lit construction equipment in the darknesss by an observed three (3) feet - yet knew nothing about it until the next day. The litany of errors that brought it about is in my commentary at
c. this link (html file)
SQ006 in Microcosm: Systemic Failings Across a Broad Spectrum
It’s convenient to blame the captain when it was really
the support structure that failed him. Some of those
factors involved the inattention of Singapore Airlines (SIA)
to low visibility procedures (and para-visual device
training), slackness of the Chiang Kai-Sheck airport
authority, the urgency predicated by an approaching
typhoon, the decision to use Runway 05L instead of the
more familiar Runway 06, and damning discrepancies
such as the crosswind threatening to exceed
contaminated runway limits. Nothing was “broken,” just
systemic failings across a broad spectrum. Capt. Foong
was simply sitting at the apex of that rickety pyramid.
1. If Capt Foong had requested a "Follow Me" truck because of the reduced visibility, he may well have been within his rights to do so - albeit that it would have been a very very unusual request in my experience. But to take that a bit further, if Capt Foong had blindly followed the "Follow Me" truck and ended up (along with it) in a ditch (because the FM
truck-driver was an irresponsible idiot or himself lost), well we'd probably not have been too harshly critical of Capt Foong.
But let's say that it was that self-same idiot that painted the "Follow Me" taxiway markings (and installed the deceptive lights and signage) on the path that Foong followed to 05R - well, is it really all that different? A come-on "sucker trap" by any other name will always be a garden path that one in ten (or more) will be able to be led up - like lambs to the slaughter. If that sucker trap is also so immaculately designed that there are no active alerts (such as a lit obstacle or strobe-lit hazard sign) to the erroneous path (once entered), then we are obviously well along an exculpatory path for the aircrew. And therefore we should be rounding up those who created that trap..... and mindlessly left it there in place for many years - just awaiting the right conditions.
These miscreants might include:
a. Other pilots who themselves nearly "fell for it" in similar conditions - yet said/did nothing.
b. ATC operators and Ops staff at CKS who are very familiar with the airfield, its deficiencies and should have been daily on the qui vive for such errors....and the traps that might lead to them.
c. ATC Supervisors at CKS who should have been ensuring that their airfield was properly marked or NOTAMED as NOT being so (ICAO signatory status notwithstanding).
d. Construction supervisors for the 05R Works in Progress who might have thought it all through to a worst case, risk management / hazard elimination responsible decision not to abide by any such possibilities.
e. ICAO Safety Inspectors and Audit Teams who never really "look" at what they are inspecting for its potentials - and write glowing politically acceptable reports (ever see the one Ansett maint got from them just before it was twice grounded for shonky maint practices and failings?).
f. SIA OPS Management and Safety Staff who should have had a safety team flying the routes and looking out for the pitfalls and taking them up with airport management; but in the interim, briefing their crews on them.
So perhaps Capt Foong and his two yea-sayers upfront were insufficiently alert - but then again, to understand how that process works, look again at my earlier posts on this thread (pgs 3,4 & 7). I guess you could say (with the benefit of hindsight) that a most excellent captain would have had a standard pre-start mini-brief and said to his two understudies. "Well what do you think boys? What are the tricks and traps that we've got to look out for on this trip?". A little militaristic I guess, yet captains do have the responsibility of properly indoctrinating tomorrow's captains..... and that's a good way of doing it. It also lets the two F/O's know that you have a high regard for your own fallibility.
All very Utopian, I know.... but the only worthwhile aviation safety programs are the pro-active ones. One of the best flight safety programs that I ever ran with had crews doing just that (actively seeking the potential pitfalls) - and regularly writing down and anonymously submitting their opinions on "where the next accident was coming from". It all stemmed from a horrendous run of fatalities, so I guess it wasn't really pro-active. But I never went to another funeral whilst on that type a/c.
In fact the only non-guilty parties are the passengers. They just get to wear the outcome of the ongoing litany of half-truths that masquerade as airline industry aviation safety programs.
2. The ability to easily set up these types of multi-contributor errors is brought home best by examination of these next two incidents and the linked documents (at b & c).
a. In January 2000 an American Airlines [AMR] B777 took off on a closed runway at Chicago’s O’Hare airport.
b. the (524kb Word Document) record of the NTSB investigation into UPS 896 (B757) take-off on a closed runway at Denver International on September 25, 2001. They missed the well-lit construction equipment in the darknesss by an observed three (3) feet - yet knew nothing about it until the next day. The litany of errors that brought it about is in my commentary at
c. this link (html file)
SQ006 in Microcosm: Systemic Failings Across a Broad Spectrum
It’s convenient to blame the captain when it was really
the support structure that failed him. Some of those
factors involved the inattention of Singapore Airlines (SIA)
to low visibility procedures (and para-visual device
training), slackness of the Chiang Kai-Sheck airport
authority, the urgency predicated by an approaching
typhoon, the decision to use Runway 05L instead of the
more familiar Runway 06, and damning discrepancies
such as the crosswind threatening to exceed
contaminated runway limits. Nothing was “broken,” just
systemic failings across a broad spectrum. Capt. Foong
was simply sitting at the apex of that rickety pyramid.
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I really dont want to detract from Belgique's excellent post. it stands in a league of it's own.
SQ6 I appreciate that as a survivor of an horrific accident, caused by your fellow man, you feel you have been violated in a terrible way, I don't know of many people who would not sympathise with you totally. Myself particularly, some of the other posters here and collegues I have spoken with are under the impression that you are using your own web-site and this aviation BB to gather as much relevant information as you can prior to going to court ? If that assumption is wrong then I apologise immediately.
Should you go to court you will find that there will be a positive attempt to discredit you and your evidence, the lawyers involved in major claims are a hard nosed bunch with no apparent humanity at all, money is their sole consideration. Should you use any aviation expressions in evidence it would be to your advantage that they are used in a context that agrees with the lawyers own interpretation. The lawyers will be hand picked and well versed in most matters aviation.
My references in my previous post to lawyers and insurance were simply to illustrate that there will be a fight to ensure that all parties deemed in any way guilty will pay their proportionate share, nothing more. Having lived and worked in Singapore for over ten years I believe Capt. Foong and his two first officers are men of integrity who will never forget or cease to regret the dreadful accident of Flight SQ6.
All professional aviators, world wide, cannot help but feel an element of guilt that our profession has let you and the other passengers down, very badly.
The intention of my post was actually to help by providing background for an expression used in aviation and at the same time explain how the blame is likely to be shared out, regardless of sentiment. If you do not plan to go to court and your motives are purely altruistic then, once again, I apologise unreservedly and withdraw.
Best wishes for the future. GK.
SQ6 I appreciate that as a survivor of an horrific accident, caused by your fellow man, you feel you have been violated in a terrible way, I don't know of many people who would not sympathise with you totally. Myself particularly, some of the other posters here and collegues I have spoken with are under the impression that you are using your own web-site and this aviation BB to gather as much relevant information as you can prior to going to court ? If that assumption is wrong then I apologise immediately.
Should you go to court you will find that there will be a positive attempt to discredit you and your evidence, the lawyers involved in major claims are a hard nosed bunch with no apparent humanity at all, money is their sole consideration. Should you use any aviation expressions in evidence it would be to your advantage that they are used in a context that agrees with the lawyers own interpretation. The lawyers will be hand picked and well versed in most matters aviation.
My references in my previous post to lawyers and insurance were simply to illustrate that there will be a fight to ensure that all parties deemed in any way guilty will pay their proportionate share, nothing more. Having lived and worked in Singapore for over ten years I believe Capt. Foong and his two first officers are men of integrity who will never forget or cease to regret the dreadful accident of Flight SQ6.
All professional aviators, world wide, cannot help but feel an element of guilt that our profession has let you and the other passengers down, very badly.
The intention of my post was actually to help by providing background for an expression used in aviation and at the same time explain how the blame is likely to be shared out, regardless of sentiment. If you do not plan to go to court and your motives are purely altruistic then, once again, I apologise unreservedly and withdraw.
Best wishes for the future. GK.
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SQ survivor,
Red = SQ Survivor, Blue = Hawkeye18
"I find your comments poetic considering that two posts back you hadn't a clue what dead reckoning was! So, before we start again, lets look at that definition and others that you'll need to follow what I am going to say: "
Yes ! I had goofed in making that initial statement, confusing visual navigation with Dead Reckoning, and I had subsequently apologised and corrected for the mistake, but in no way will that mistake of mine makes your dead reckoning defination more correct.
On your web site you stated:
"Our hope in providing these analyses is that all 96 survivors including the crew will read this report and provide feedback so that it can be as accurate as possible and represent our collective experience.
Disgusted by the inconclusive and politically-influenced outcome of these reports, we present here our own investigation into the cause of the SQ-006 disaster. We used our own eyewitness accounts ..... Our qualifications are that we were there and know what happened, and that many of us are research scientists trained to look at evidence and judge the validity of claims and conclusions made from it. "
Disgusted,Used own witness,our own investigation + vested interests !!! And dun even have the courtousy of acknowledging email feedback to your site ( was trying to help), On reflection ,-----your actual intention of the site is to harness supports to your "expert"' conclusion rather then asking for objective feedbacks!!
Your present here is more to sell your conclusion then objectively discussing what actually led to the accident to help yourself and other survivors in their legal cause!
As to following your defination of Dead Reckoning ......may I ask, what is your background in aviation to have the galls to dictate to the forum here to adhere to your defination of Dead Reckoning in this discussion!! Get real Doctor!
Dead Reckoning: determining one's position... by guessing the direction and distance travelled rather than by using landmarks, [maps compass bearings etc.] ....Oxford English Dictionary.
Go ahead SQ Survivor, use your defination of using Dead Reckoning from the the oxford dictionary, with an ancient defination of the terms...... and Good luck in court !
I know this is a difficult pill for you to swallow, so I will sugar-coat it this time: Evidence that Foong was using dead reckoning to get to the runway include:
1. He made a 180 degree turn when none was called for. A quick glance at the Jeppesen would have told him that there was a good 200 m between r/w 05R and 05L. If he had used this map and not tried to GUESS his position he would have realized he only needed to make a 90 degree turn at the end of t/w NP and then travel 200 m before turning 90 degrees into 05L. The fact that he screwed up and turned into 05R PROOVES HE WAS GUESSING and NOT NAVIGATING using map and compass heading.
2. he failed to confirm his position using t/w signs, or r/w markings because either he could not see them due to bad viz, or he was hubristicly assuming he knew where he was...ie GUESSING! (...do you remember...guessing and not confirming your position using landmarks = dead reckoning)
I have no hangup nor any vested interest in the case except the learning of the chain of mistakes/discrepencies on that faithful nite that culminated to the tragedy....unlike you and the survivors of the tragic accident which have personal vested interest. May I suggest that your conclusions are naturally biased.
Let me state it again Doctor, in case u have difficulty understanding or reading:
the following were my reply to your following ASSERTION:
"the fundamental failing was that, when the going got tough the Crews 'training' failed them and they made a BASIC navigational error. "
The pilot of SQ 006 failed and there's no denying that.....that is the subjective conclusion specific to Cpt Fong, the inference that crew training (fleetwide) failed needs substantiation.
This is a case of navigational error induced by poor weather condition, wrong/deficient runway,taxiway, signage/markings and lighting. Basic navigational training, be it on the ground or in the air are based on the assumption that all corect signages ,aids , visual features are in place. .....
What I am more interested in, is what led the crew of SQ006 to make those silly mistakes. To just concentrate on the pilots' actions without consideration or regards to what the visual picture presented by the weather and singnage (or lack of it ) to the pilots, would be falling into the provebial trap of "aiming for the tree and missing the wood" .
"guessing and not confirming your position using landmarks = dead reckoning"
If you have , as you claimed to have read thru and analysed the evidences, surely you would not have missed the argurment of the deficient/wrong taxiway marking lighting etc that disorentated and misled the pilots onto 05R...or you just refused to see it as it was!!!
Hence, your statement above is just putting forth what you want forumers to agree ... instead of objectively assessing what the crew were doing in reaction to what they saw. .....I think you are doing more "dead Reckoning"( your defination of gussing and....) in that conclusion then the crews of SQ006!!.
Because, if you have read and analysed the evidences, they also point out clearly that the crews was Navigating using the deficient runway marking and lightings and ended up on the wrong runway.
PRRuNe is not a kangaroo court ....so let's leave it to the aviation experts, the lawyers of both side and the judge to earn their dues , to figure out the defination, final aportioning of blames and liabilities when it reach the civil court.
3. His jocular comments with the crew about first right, next right etc shows his method of getting to the r/w involved the same technique as if he was casually taking directions from a passer by on how to get to a new store...first right at this junction and right again at the next etc. THIS IS NOT NAVIGATING, IT'S DEAD RECKONING.
I think it's pretty clear, even to a non-pilot such as myself, that Foong was guessing instead "accurately ascertaining one's position and planning and following a route" using map, compass bearing, distance travelled, signage and other landmarks. IF OTHER PILOTS THINK I'M OUT TO LUNCH HERE, PLEASE, FEEL FREE TO STEP IN ANY TIME....I'M ASSUMING THE SILENCE SO FAR IS A SIGN OF AGREEMENT?
Good luck to u again! IF U USE THE ABOVE arguement in the COURT OF LAW, as it was pointed out the lawyer will have ur ass for lunch......ever heard of expert witness and opinions in the court of law, Doctor??!!
[B}Hawkeye18, if you want to argue further with me on this, FIRST address each one of the points above and then I will consider any other arguments you make (if you can call them that).
[B] Doctor Blanchon , dun make urself too important, I am not here to argur with you, merely sharing my perspective of what caused the accident.
The feeling is mutual in as far as far as"FIRST address each one of the points above and then I will consider any other arguments you make (if you can call them that)." is concerned . Hope u too , live up to ur own standard !!
I had tried to provide objective answers to your assertion, but on second thoughts .... I am wasting my time in trying to help a closed mind!
You are on my ignore list as far as reasoning on the causes of the accident is corncened.
Your attempt to be an aviation expert , investigator, and a lawyer is both laudable and laughable, and unfortunately a dis-service to the rest of the survivors for their cause. You are totally unqualified to do so, other than your unfortunate present in SQ006. !
As to your comments:And since you have 'discovered' who I am (...tremendous bit of sleuthing there old chap...), perhaps you can enlighten us all on your qualifications.
[B]DR Paul Blanchon , you really gave me too much credit for your own pompous and all-knowing approach, and the relentless promotion your own conclusion.... which will not stand up to scrutiny in my humble opinion.[B]
Let me quote your goodself:
"Just so you know who you are talking to, Murrelet is also an SQ6 survivor and contributed significantly to the web site. Hence, there was no plagerism."
"A summary of our argument and the ASC and MOT reports can be found on the SQ6 Survivor's web site: "
"As you will see on the SQ6-Survivors web site, I HAVE read the findings and arguments from BOTH reports and even summarized them in an objective and unbiased fashion. I ignored the pathetic face-saving and biased way in which the MOT tried to distort the ASC findings and divert attention from SIA failings, AND I duly noted the way in which the ASC side-lined the unsafe conditions at CKS. But the conclusion was obvious and, with the risk of boring the rest of you, I repeat, the fundamental failing was that, when the going got tough the Crews 'training' failed them and they made a BASIC navigational error. "
Well I am an aviator for more than 30 years , in both military and civil aviation , have some accident investigation experience,and I am still learning what causes accidents.
Take care Doctor! My heartfelt sympathies to the victims and survivors of SQ006, and good luck in court!
Hawkeye
Red = SQ Survivor, Blue = Hawkeye18
"I find your comments poetic considering that two posts back you hadn't a clue what dead reckoning was! So, before we start again, lets look at that definition and others that you'll need to follow what I am going to say: "
Yes ! I had goofed in making that initial statement, confusing visual navigation with Dead Reckoning, and I had subsequently apologised and corrected for the mistake, but in no way will that mistake of mine makes your dead reckoning defination more correct.
On your web site you stated:
"Our hope in providing these analyses is that all 96 survivors including the crew will read this report and provide feedback so that it can be as accurate as possible and represent our collective experience.
Disgusted by the inconclusive and politically-influenced outcome of these reports, we present here our own investigation into the cause of the SQ-006 disaster. We used our own eyewitness accounts ..... Our qualifications are that we were there and know what happened, and that many of us are research scientists trained to look at evidence and judge the validity of claims and conclusions made from it. "
Disgusted,Used own witness,our own investigation + vested interests !!! And dun even have the courtousy of acknowledging email feedback to your site ( was trying to help), On reflection ,-----your actual intention of the site is to harness supports to your "expert"' conclusion rather then asking for objective feedbacks!!
Your present here is more to sell your conclusion then objectively discussing what actually led to the accident to help yourself and other survivors in their legal cause!
As to following your defination of Dead Reckoning ......may I ask, what is your background in aviation to have the galls to dictate to the forum here to adhere to your defination of Dead Reckoning in this discussion!! Get real Doctor!
Dead Reckoning: determining one's position... by guessing the direction and distance travelled rather than by using landmarks, [maps compass bearings etc.] ....Oxford English Dictionary.
Go ahead SQ Survivor, use your defination of using Dead Reckoning from the the oxford dictionary, with an ancient defination of the terms...... and Good luck in court !
I know this is a difficult pill for you to swallow, so I will sugar-coat it this time: Evidence that Foong was using dead reckoning to get to the runway include:
1. He made a 180 degree turn when none was called for. A quick glance at the Jeppesen would have told him that there was a good 200 m between r/w 05R and 05L. If he had used this map and not tried to GUESS his position he would have realized he only needed to make a 90 degree turn at the end of t/w NP and then travel 200 m before turning 90 degrees into 05L. The fact that he screwed up and turned into 05R PROOVES HE WAS GUESSING and NOT NAVIGATING using map and compass heading.
2. he failed to confirm his position using t/w signs, or r/w markings because either he could not see them due to bad viz, or he was hubristicly assuming he knew where he was...ie GUESSING! (...do you remember...guessing and not confirming your position using landmarks = dead reckoning)
I have no hangup nor any vested interest in the case except the learning of the chain of mistakes/discrepencies on that faithful nite that culminated to the tragedy....unlike you and the survivors of the tragic accident which have personal vested interest. May I suggest that your conclusions are naturally biased.
Let me state it again Doctor, in case u have difficulty understanding or reading:
the following were my reply to your following ASSERTION:
"the fundamental failing was that, when the going got tough the Crews 'training' failed them and they made a BASIC navigational error. "
The pilot of SQ 006 failed and there's no denying that.....that is the subjective conclusion specific to Cpt Fong, the inference that crew training (fleetwide) failed needs substantiation.
This is a case of navigational error induced by poor weather condition, wrong/deficient runway,taxiway, signage/markings and lighting. Basic navigational training, be it on the ground or in the air are based on the assumption that all corect signages ,aids , visual features are in place. .....
What I am more interested in, is what led the crew of SQ006 to make those silly mistakes. To just concentrate on the pilots' actions without consideration or regards to what the visual picture presented by the weather and singnage (or lack of it ) to the pilots, would be falling into the provebial trap of "aiming for the tree and missing the wood" .
"guessing and not confirming your position using landmarks = dead reckoning"
If you have , as you claimed to have read thru and analysed the evidences, surely you would not have missed the argurment of the deficient/wrong taxiway marking lighting etc that disorentated and misled the pilots onto 05R...or you just refused to see it as it was!!!
Hence, your statement above is just putting forth what you want forumers to agree ... instead of objectively assessing what the crew were doing in reaction to what they saw. .....I think you are doing more "dead Reckoning"( your defination of gussing and....) in that conclusion then the crews of SQ006!!.
Because, if you have read and analysed the evidences, they also point out clearly that the crews was Navigating using the deficient runway marking and lightings and ended up on the wrong runway.
PRRuNe is not a kangaroo court ....so let's leave it to the aviation experts, the lawyers of both side and the judge to earn their dues , to figure out the defination, final aportioning of blames and liabilities when it reach the civil court.
3. His jocular comments with the crew about first right, next right etc shows his method of getting to the r/w involved the same technique as if he was casually taking directions from a passer by on how to get to a new store...first right at this junction and right again at the next etc. THIS IS NOT NAVIGATING, IT'S DEAD RECKONING.
I think it's pretty clear, even to a non-pilot such as myself, that Foong was guessing instead "accurately ascertaining one's position and planning and following a route" using map, compass bearing, distance travelled, signage and other landmarks. IF OTHER PILOTS THINK I'M OUT TO LUNCH HERE, PLEASE, FEEL FREE TO STEP IN ANY TIME....I'M ASSUMING THE SILENCE SO FAR IS A SIGN OF AGREEMENT?
Good luck to u again! IF U USE THE ABOVE arguement in the COURT OF LAW, as it was pointed out the lawyer will have ur ass for lunch......ever heard of expert witness and opinions in the court of law, Doctor??!!
[B}Hawkeye18, if you want to argue further with me on this, FIRST address each one of the points above and then I will consider any other arguments you make (if you can call them that).
[B] Doctor Blanchon , dun make urself too important, I am not here to argur with you, merely sharing my perspective of what caused the accident.
The feeling is mutual in as far as far as"FIRST address each one of the points above and then I will consider any other arguments you make (if you can call them that)." is concerned . Hope u too , live up to ur own standard !!
I had tried to provide objective answers to your assertion, but on second thoughts .... I am wasting my time in trying to help a closed mind!
You are on my ignore list as far as reasoning on the causes of the accident is corncened.
Your attempt to be an aviation expert , investigator, and a lawyer is both laudable and laughable, and unfortunately a dis-service to the rest of the survivors for their cause. You are totally unqualified to do so, other than your unfortunate present in SQ006. !
As to your comments:And since you have 'discovered' who I am (...tremendous bit of sleuthing there old chap...), perhaps you can enlighten us all on your qualifications.
[B]DR Paul Blanchon , you really gave me too much credit for your own pompous and all-knowing approach, and the relentless promotion your own conclusion.... which will not stand up to scrutiny in my humble opinion.[B]
Let me quote your goodself:
"Just so you know who you are talking to, Murrelet is also an SQ6 survivor and contributed significantly to the web site. Hence, there was no plagerism."
"A summary of our argument and the ASC and MOT reports can be found on the SQ6 Survivor's web site: "
"As you will see on the SQ6-Survivors web site, I HAVE read the findings and arguments from BOTH reports and even summarized them in an objective and unbiased fashion. I ignored the pathetic face-saving and biased way in which the MOT tried to distort the ASC findings and divert attention from SIA failings, AND I duly noted the way in which the ASC side-lined the unsafe conditions at CKS. But the conclusion was obvious and, with the risk of boring the rest of you, I repeat, the fundamental failing was that, when the going got tough the Crews 'training' failed them and they made a BASIC navigational error. "
Well I am an aviator for more than 30 years , in both military and civil aviation , have some accident investigation experience,and I am still learning what causes accidents.
Take care Doctor! My heartfelt sympathies to the victims and survivors of SQ006, and good luck in court!
Hawkeye
Last edited by hawkeye18; 10th Jun 2002 at 14:32.
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MOLE
MOLE Your question was, I thought, a rhetorical one, given that you are a pilot, (professional?).
It is possible that the crew elected to ignore the PVD display because having, so they thought turned onto the correct runway they then may have assumed that the PVD was giving out duff information and chosen to discount it. I have no idea what the serviceability state of the aircraft was, nor its recent history with respect to its ancillery systems and in particular the PVD system.
That is only my opinion and I have no doubt that Capt Foong will be giving his reasons in due course. It helps not at all for you or I to simply guess.
As an aviator I reasonably expected you to:
a). draw your own conclusions about the PVD and
b). appreciate that whatever conclusion you come to it is, (just as it is as to whether or not SQ6 Suvivor is interested in my opinion)
TOTALLY IRRELEVANT.
It is possible that the crew elected to ignore the PVD display because having, so they thought turned onto the correct runway they then may have assumed that the PVD was giving out duff information and chosen to discount it. I have no idea what the serviceability state of the aircraft was, nor its recent history with respect to its ancillery systems and in particular the PVD system.
That is only my opinion and I have no doubt that Capt Foong will be giving his reasons in due course. It helps not at all for you or I to simply guess.
As an aviator I reasonably expected you to:
a). draw your own conclusions about the PVD and
b). appreciate that whatever conclusion you come to it is, (just as it is as to whether or not SQ6 Suvivor is interested in my opinion)
TOTALLY IRRELEVANT.
The Reverend
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SQ006 CVR transcript Pt.I
Legenda
RDO - Radio transmission from accident aircraft
CAM - Cockpit Area Microphone sound or source
-1 - Voice identified as Captain (left seat)
-2 - Voice identified as First Officer (right seat)
-3 - Voice identified as Observer/Relief pilot
TWR - Taipei Tower
time source content
23:08:27 CAM-3 Hongkong closed ah
23:08:27 CAM-1 That's what he said not accepting any
23:08:29 CAM-2 I see
23:08:30 CAM-1 I think some people might have diverted there lah I think
23:08:40 CAM-2 Ok column coming back
23:08:47 CAM-1 If the RVR five left was two hundred right just now we checked
23:08:50 CAM-3 RVR yah two hundred
23:08:50 CAM-1 Correct, yah two hundred meters ah, ok lah
23:08:54 CAM (Sound similar to that of seat motor)
23:08:55 CAM-1 Ok man before takeoff checklist
23:08:56 CAM-2 Roger sir
23:08:58 CAM-2 Before takeoff checks, flaps
23:09:02 CAM-1 Twenty green
23:09:03 CAM-2 Twenty green
23:09:06 CAM-2 Flight control
23:09:07 CAM-1 Check
23:09:07 CAM-2 Check
23:09:08 CAM-2 EPR and speeds
23:09:09 CAM-1 Ok, EPR one point five two ah, Vee one, one forty two, Vee R one five six and Vee two, one six nine set
23:09:15 CAM-2 EPR one point five two ah, Vee one, one forty two, rotate one five six and Vee two, one six nine
23:09:19 CX 2043 (Cathay two zero four three conversation with ground control)- -
23:09:22 CAM-2 Speed set
23:09:24 CAM-2 Departure routing
23:09:25 CAM-1 Ok ah Taipei runway zero six left huh
23:09:27 CAM-2 Zero five left
23:09:28 GND (Ground control conversation with Cathay two zero four three)
23:09:29 CAM-1 Zero five left
23:09:29 CAM-3 Zero five left
23:09:31 CAM-1 And er we got Anpu three departure Kikit transition huh
23:09:32 CX 2043 (Cathay 2043 conversation with ground control)
23:09:34 GND (Ground control conversation with Cathay 2043)
23:09:35 CX 2043 (Cathay 2043 conversation with ground control)
23:09:38 CAM-1 Looks like I got to go
23:09:40 CAM-2 Next one got to go right is it
23:09:41 CAM-1 Yah, go right turn right here, all the way to West Cross lah right turn here
23:09:46 CAM-2 Runway is zero five left. Kikit transition initially two hundred ah level alpha one squawk two six five seven, will be two nine zero by Bulan
23:09:58 CAM-1 A lot of rudder work man here... really ah
23:10:01 CAM-3 Cross wind ah
23:10:02 CAM-1 Yah
23:10:03 CAM-2 Transponder TA RA, set, checks down to the line
23:10:06 CAM-1 Ok, thanks.
23:10:08 CAM-2 West Cross correct, Sierra Sierra West Cross
23:10:14 CAM-1 Everybody waiting for each other for takeoff you see haha
23:10:18 CAM-1 The ****** heard us ... er going... that fellow also
23:10:21 CAM-3 Yah, it is coming in ah, the longer they delay the worse it is lah
23:10:23 CAM-1 Yah, worse if we are going to get out, if don't take off ah .going to go very slow here, ok, because you going get skid
23:10:24 CAM-2 Ok nine knots
23:10:33 CAM-3 Ok, to catch the wind
23:10:35 CAM-2 That's all the moisture
23:10:41 CAM-2 Turning left skidding er turning right err skidding left two seven zero
23:10:42 CAM-3 The weather radar will be all red ha ha
23:10:43 CAM-1 Ok, passing ah two eight zero now, ah needles tracking and turn right skidding left now ah, past heading of about two.. three hundred now ah
23:10:45 CAM-2 Yah that's right ah
23:10:56 CAM (Sound of clicks)
23:11:00 CAM-2 My speed excursion is more than the left side, because the wind is coming from here
23:11:03 CAM-1 Ah, yah
23:11:03 CAM-3 Your pitot on the other side ah ... just pick up
23:11:10 CAM-2 Roger that
23:11:12 CAM-1 For the takeoff use autopilot better
23:11:22 CAM-1 Typhoon man, ok tomorrow the guys coming in will be "terok" (terrible) man
23:11:28 CAM-3 Yah, tomorrow morning Singapore five
23:11:29 GND (Ground control conversation with Cathay two zero four three)
23:11:36 CX 2043 (Cathay two zero four three conversation with ground control)
23:11:38 GND (Ground control conversation with Cathay two zero four three)
23:11:42 CX 2043 (Cathay two zero four three conversation with ground control)
23:11:47 CX 2043 (Cathay two zero four three conversation with ground control)
23:11:49 CAM-1 The five left also imp... imp... improve already the visibility to five hundred fifty meters
23:11:52 GND (Ground control conversation with Cathay two zero four three)
23:11:54 CX 2043 (Cathay two zero four three conversation with ground control)
23:11:55 CAM-3 Five left... wait ah
23:11:56 CAM-1 Ya, the guys said improved already went up
23:11:59 CAM-3 Now is four fifty
23:12:00 CAM-1 Just now the guys ask him over the tower
23:12:01 CAM-2 Yah
23:12:02 ATIS Taipei Chiang Kai Shek International Airport information uniform one five zero zero zulu runway zero six for departure only runway zero five left for category two approach and departure wind zero two zero at three six gust five six visibility six hundred meters runway zero five RVR four hundred fifty meters downward runway zero six RVR five hundred fifty meters downward with heavy rain cloud broken two hundred feet overcast five hundred feet temperature two one dew point two zero QNH one zero zero one Hectopascal
23:12:06 CAM-2 Coming up er... November Papa eh
23:12:07 CAM-1 Ok, all the way down left turn all the way down
23:12:10 CAM-2 Left ah
23:12:10 CAM-1 Yah
23:12:17 CAM-2 One two five one departure
23:12:20 GND (Ground control conversation with Cathay 2043)
23:12:21 CAM (Sound similar to that of radio frequency selection)
23:12:22 CAM-1 Ok, first left
23:12:23 CX 2043 (Cathay 2043 conversation with ground control)
23:12:23 CAM-2 Affirm first left
23:12:24 CAM-1 Left
23:12:25 CAM-2 Left
23:12:26 GND (Ground control conversation with Cathay 2043)
23:12:33 CAM (Sound similar to that of seat motor)
23:12:38 CX 2043 (Cathay 2043 conversation with ground control)
23:12:41 CAM (Sound similar to that of nose gear scrubbing)
23:12:47 CAM (Sound similar to that of nose gear scrubbing)
23:12:47 GND (Ground control conversation with Cathay 2043)
23:12:56 CAM-3 The latest QNH is one zero zero one
23:12:56 CAM-2 Clearing that huh
23:12:58 GND Singapore six contact tower one two nine point three, good day.
23:13:02 RDO-2 One two nine point three good day sir, Singapore six.
23:13:13 CAM-2 One zero zero one one two nine point one two nine point three ah ... ok ah
23:13:25 RDO-2 Taipei Tower, good evening, Singapore six.
23:13:28 TWR Singapore six, good evening, Taipei Tower hold short runway zero five left.
23:13:33 RDO-2 Hold short runway zero five left, Singapore six.
23:13:38 TWR Singapore six, for information now surface wind zero two zero at two four, gust four three, say intention.
23:13:44 CAM-1 Gusting four three ah
23:13:46 RDO-2 Thank you sir, Singapore six.
23:13:47 CAM-1 Ok, ok better less
23:13:48 CAM-3 Less, less gust already
23:13:54 CAM-1 Zero two zero it's from left lah
23:13:56 CAM-3 Two four gust four three
23:14:05 CAM-2 Zero two zero
23:14:08 CAM-1 Ok this one will be here ah
23:14:18 CAM-1 Zero two zero
23:14:20 CAM-3 Ya, left lah
23:14:21 CAM-1 Go right to the end of the runway, end of the runway then turn, ok.
23:14:31 CAM-3 Quite a bit of aileron for the takeoff
23:14:35 CAM-2 OK
23:14:40 CAM-2 The next one
23:14:41 CAM-2 Next one is November one
23:14:42 CAM-1 Ok second right
23:14:44 CAM-2 Second right, that's right
23:14:47 CAM-1 In Australia, to them, next one is this, first one you know
23:14:50 CAM-2 Next one this one
23:14:51 CAM-1 Yah ha ha
23:14:52 CAM-1 Australian
23:14:53 CAM-1 I think the best is to say second right ah first right second right ah
23:14:55 CAM-2 Clearing that Satvoice
23:14:58 CAM-1 Tell them we are ready lah
23:15:02 RDO-2 Singapore six ready.
23:15:04 TWR Singapore six roger, runway zero five left, taxi into position and hold.
23:15:08 RDO-2 Taxi into position and hold, Singapore six
23:15:12 CAM-2 I get them seated ah
23:15:12 CAM-1 Ok below the line please
23:15:15 CAM-2 Cabin crew to your takeoff station thanks
23:15:20 CAM (Sound similar to that of door closing)
23:15:21 CAM (Sound of chime)
23:15:22 TWR Singapore six, runway zero five left, wind zero two zero at two eight, gust to five zero, cleared for takeoff.
23:15:30 RDO-2 Cleared for takeoff, Runway zero five left Singapore six.
23:15:31 CAM-1 OK man
23:15:34 CAM-2 OK checks below the line, cabin announcement complete
23:15:39 CAM-2 Norm
23:15:40 CAM-2 Strobes on, landing lights all on
23:15:44 CAM-2 Takeoff clearance
23:15:45 CAM-1 Obtained hah
23:15:46 CAM-2 Obtained sir
23:15:47 CAM-1 OK thanks
23:15:48 CAM-2 Before takeoff checklist completed
23:15:50 CAM (Sound of click)
23:15:50 CAM-2 OK green lights are here
23:15:52 CAM-1 It going to be very slippery I am going to slow down a bit, slow turn here
23:15:53 CAM-2 Turning that
23:16:07 CAM-2 And the PVD hasn't lined up ah
23:16:10 CAM-1 Yeah we gotta line up first
23:16:12 CAM-3 We need forty five degrees
23:16:15 CAM-2 I see, excellent man
23:16:16 CAM-1 Yah
23:16:23 CAM-1 Not on yet er PVD huh never mind we can see the runway, not so bad. Ok, I am going to put it to high first. OK ready eh, so zero one zero is from the left lah Ok
23:16:27 CAM-2 Ok
23:16:30 CAM (Sound similar to that of wipers going to high speed)
23:16:31 CAM-2 Ready sir zero two zero check ok
23:16:33 CAM-1 Left wing into aileron, left aileron into wind. Huh OK Cabin reported eh
23:16:37 CAM-3 Yah cabin is ready.
Legenda
RDO - Radio transmission from accident aircraft
CAM - Cockpit Area Microphone sound or source
-1 - Voice identified as Captain (left seat)
-2 - Voice identified as First Officer (right seat)
-3 - Voice identified as Observer/Relief pilot
TWR - Taipei Tower
time source content
23:08:27 CAM-3 Hongkong closed ah
23:08:27 CAM-1 That's what he said not accepting any
23:08:29 CAM-2 I see
23:08:30 CAM-1 I think some people might have diverted there lah I think
23:08:40 CAM-2 Ok column coming back
23:08:47 CAM-1 If the RVR five left was two hundred right just now we checked
23:08:50 CAM-3 RVR yah two hundred
23:08:50 CAM-1 Correct, yah two hundred meters ah, ok lah
23:08:54 CAM (Sound similar to that of seat motor)
23:08:55 CAM-1 Ok man before takeoff checklist
23:08:56 CAM-2 Roger sir
23:08:58 CAM-2 Before takeoff checks, flaps
23:09:02 CAM-1 Twenty green
23:09:03 CAM-2 Twenty green
23:09:06 CAM-2 Flight control
23:09:07 CAM-1 Check
23:09:07 CAM-2 Check
23:09:08 CAM-2 EPR and speeds
23:09:09 CAM-1 Ok, EPR one point five two ah, Vee one, one forty two, Vee R one five six and Vee two, one six nine set
23:09:15 CAM-2 EPR one point five two ah, Vee one, one forty two, rotate one five six and Vee two, one six nine
23:09:19 CX 2043 (Cathay two zero four three conversation with ground control)- -
23:09:22 CAM-2 Speed set
23:09:24 CAM-2 Departure routing
23:09:25 CAM-1 Ok ah Taipei runway zero six left huh
23:09:27 CAM-2 Zero five left
23:09:28 GND (Ground control conversation with Cathay two zero four three)
23:09:29 CAM-1 Zero five left
23:09:29 CAM-3 Zero five left
23:09:31 CAM-1 And er we got Anpu three departure Kikit transition huh
23:09:32 CX 2043 (Cathay 2043 conversation with ground control)
23:09:34 GND (Ground control conversation with Cathay 2043)
23:09:35 CX 2043 (Cathay 2043 conversation with ground control)
23:09:38 CAM-1 Looks like I got to go
23:09:40 CAM-2 Next one got to go right is it
23:09:41 CAM-1 Yah, go right turn right here, all the way to West Cross lah right turn here
23:09:46 CAM-2 Runway is zero five left. Kikit transition initially two hundred ah level alpha one squawk two six five seven, will be two nine zero by Bulan
23:09:58 CAM-1 A lot of rudder work man here... really ah
23:10:01 CAM-3 Cross wind ah
23:10:02 CAM-1 Yah
23:10:03 CAM-2 Transponder TA RA, set, checks down to the line
23:10:06 CAM-1 Ok, thanks.
23:10:08 CAM-2 West Cross correct, Sierra Sierra West Cross
23:10:14 CAM-1 Everybody waiting for each other for takeoff you see haha
23:10:18 CAM-1 The ****** heard us ... er going... that fellow also
23:10:21 CAM-3 Yah, it is coming in ah, the longer they delay the worse it is lah
23:10:23 CAM-1 Yah, worse if we are going to get out, if don't take off ah .going to go very slow here, ok, because you going get skid
23:10:24 CAM-2 Ok nine knots
23:10:33 CAM-3 Ok, to catch the wind
23:10:35 CAM-2 That's all the moisture
23:10:41 CAM-2 Turning left skidding er turning right err skidding left two seven zero
23:10:42 CAM-3 The weather radar will be all red ha ha
23:10:43 CAM-1 Ok, passing ah two eight zero now, ah needles tracking and turn right skidding left now ah, past heading of about two.. three hundred now ah
23:10:45 CAM-2 Yah that's right ah
23:10:56 CAM (Sound of clicks)
23:11:00 CAM-2 My speed excursion is more than the left side, because the wind is coming from here
23:11:03 CAM-1 Ah, yah
23:11:03 CAM-3 Your pitot on the other side ah ... just pick up
23:11:10 CAM-2 Roger that
23:11:12 CAM-1 For the takeoff use autopilot better
23:11:22 CAM-1 Typhoon man, ok tomorrow the guys coming in will be "terok" (terrible) man
23:11:28 CAM-3 Yah, tomorrow morning Singapore five
23:11:29 GND (Ground control conversation with Cathay two zero four three)
23:11:36 CX 2043 (Cathay two zero four three conversation with ground control)
23:11:38 GND (Ground control conversation with Cathay two zero four three)
23:11:42 CX 2043 (Cathay two zero four three conversation with ground control)
23:11:47 CX 2043 (Cathay two zero four three conversation with ground control)
23:11:49 CAM-1 The five left also imp... imp... improve already the visibility to five hundred fifty meters
23:11:52 GND (Ground control conversation with Cathay two zero four three)
23:11:54 CX 2043 (Cathay two zero four three conversation with ground control)
23:11:55 CAM-3 Five left... wait ah
23:11:56 CAM-1 Ya, the guys said improved already went up
23:11:59 CAM-3 Now is four fifty
23:12:00 CAM-1 Just now the guys ask him over the tower
23:12:01 CAM-2 Yah
23:12:02 ATIS Taipei Chiang Kai Shek International Airport information uniform one five zero zero zulu runway zero six for departure only runway zero five left for category two approach and departure wind zero two zero at three six gust five six visibility six hundred meters runway zero five RVR four hundred fifty meters downward runway zero six RVR five hundred fifty meters downward with heavy rain cloud broken two hundred feet overcast five hundred feet temperature two one dew point two zero QNH one zero zero one Hectopascal
23:12:06 CAM-2 Coming up er... November Papa eh
23:12:07 CAM-1 Ok, all the way down left turn all the way down
23:12:10 CAM-2 Left ah
23:12:10 CAM-1 Yah
23:12:17 CAM-2 One two five one departure
23:12:20 GND (Ground control conversation with Cathay 2043)
23:12:21 CAM (Sound similar to that of radio frequency selection)
23:12:22 CAM-1 Ok, first left
23:12:23 CX 2043 (Cathay 2043 conversation with ground control)
23:12:23 CAM-2 Affirm first left
23:12:24 CAM-1 Left
23:12:25 CAM-2 Left
23:12:26 GND (Ground control conversation with Cathay 2043)
23:12:33 CAM (Sound similar to that of seat motor)
23:12:38 CX 2043 (Cathay 2043 conversation with ground control)
23:12:41 CAM (Sound similar to that of nose gear scrubbing)
23:12:47 CAM (Sound similar to that of nose gear scrubbing)
23:12:47 GND (Ground control conversation with Cathay 2043)
23:12:56 CAM-3 The latest QNH is one zero zero one
23:12:56 CAM-2 Clearing that huh
23:12:58 GND Singapore six contact tower one two nine point three, good day.
23:13:02 RDO-2 One two nine point three good day sir, Singapore six.
23:13:13 CAM-2 One zero zero one one two nine point one two nine point three ah ... ok ah
23:13:25 RDO-2 Taipei Tower, good evening, Singapore six.
23:13:28 TWR Singapore six, good evening, Taipei Tower hold short runway zero five left.
23:13:33 RDO-2 Hold short runway zero five left, Singapore six.
23:13:38 TWR Singapore six, for information now surface wind zero two zero at two four, gust four three, say intention.
23:13:44 CAM-1 Gusting four three ah
23:13:46 RDO-2 Thank you sir, Singapore six.
23:13:47 CAM-1 Ok, ok better less
23:13:48 CAM-3 Less, less gust already
23:13:54 CAM-1 Zero two zero it's from left lah
23:13:56 CAM-3 Two four gust four three
23:14:05 CAM-2 Zero two zero
23:14:08 CAM-1 Ok this one will be here ah
23:14:18 CAM-1 Zero two zero
23:14:20 CAM-3 Ya, left lah
23:14:21 CAM-1 Go right to the end of the runway, end of the runway then turn, ok.
23:14:31 CAM-3 Quite a bit of aileron for the takeoff
23:14:35 CAM-2 OK
23:14:40 CAM-2 The next one
23:14:41 CAM-2 Next one is November one
23:14:42 CAM-1 Ok second right
23:14:44 CAM-2 Second right, that's right
23:14:47 CAM-1 In Australia, to them, next one is this, first one you know
23:14:50 CAM-2 Next one this one
23:14:51 CAM-1 Yah ha ha
23:14:52 CAM-1 Australian
23:14:53 CAM-1 I think the best is to say second right ah first right second right ah
23:14:55 CAM-2 Clearing that Satvoice
23:14:58 CAM-1 Tell them we are ready lah
23:15:02 RDO-2 Singapore six ready.
23:15:04 TWR Singapore six roger, runway zero five left, taxi into position and hold.
23:15:08 RDO-2 Taxi into position and hold, Singapore six
23:15:12 CAM-2 I get them seated ah
23:15:12 CAM-1 Ok below the line please
23:15:15 CAM-2 Cabin crew to your takeoff station thanks
23:15:20 CAM (Sound similar to that of door closing)
23:15:21 CAM (Sound of chime)
23:15:22 TWR Singapore six, runway zero five left, wind zero two zero at two eight, gust to five zero, cleared for takeoff.
23:15:30 RDO-2 Cleared for takeoff, Runway zero five left Singapore six.
23:15:31 CAM-1 OK man
23:15:34 CAM-2 OK checks below the line, cabin announcement complete
23:15:39 CAM-2 Norm
23:15:40 CAM-2 Strobes on, landing lights all on
23:15:44 CAM-2 Takeoff clearance
23:15:45 CAM-1 Obtained hah
23:15:46 CAM-2 Obtained sir
23:15:47 CAM-1 OK thanks
23:15:48 CAM-2 Before takeoff checklist completed
23:15:50 CAM (Sound of click)
23:15:50 CAM-2 OK green lights are here
23:15:52 CAM-1 It going to be very slippery I am going to slow down a bit, slow turn here
23:15:53 CAM-2 Turning that
23:16:07 CAM-2 And the PVD hasn't lined up ah
23:16:10 CAM-1 Yeah we gotta line up first
23:16:12 CAM-3 We need forty five degrees
23:16:15 CAM-2 I see, excellent man
23:16:16 CAM-1 Yah
23:16:23 CAM-1 Not on yet er PVD huh never mind we can see the runway, not so bad. Ok, I am going to put it to high first. OK ready eh, so zero one zero is from the left lah Ok
23:16:27 CAM-2 Ok
23:16:30 CAM (Sound similar to that of wipers going to high speed)
23:16:31 CAM-2 Ready sir zero two zero check ok
23:16:33 CAM-1 Left wing into aileron, left aileron into wind. Huh OK Cabin reported eh
23:16:37 CAM-3 Yah cabin is ready.
The Reverend
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SQ006 CVR transcript Pt.2
23:16:37 CAM-1 Ok thanks
23:16:37 CAM-2 Yup thanks
23:16:43 CAM-3 Ok -thrust ref toga toga
23:16:43 CAM-2 Thrust ref toga toga
23:16:44 CAM-1 Ok -thrust ref toga toga
23:16:44 CAM (Sound similar to that of engines spooling up)
23:16:54 CAM-3 Hold
23:16:54 CAM-2 Hold
23:16:54 CAM-1 Roger
23:16:55 CAM-3 Eighty knots
23:16:55 CAM-2 Eighty knots
23:16:56 CAM-1 Ok my control
23:17:13 CAM-2 Vee one
23:17:13 CAM-3 Vee one
23:17:16 CAM-1 **** something there
23:17:17 CAM Sound of the first impact
23:17:18 CAM ****waaah****
23:17:18 CAM Sound of a series of impacts
23:17:22 End of Recording
[disclaimer]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Copyright © 1996-2002 Harro Ranter / Fabian Lujan
Aviation Safety Network; 04 May 2002
23:16:37 CAM-1 Ok thanks
23:16:37 CAM-2 Yup thanks
23:16:43 CAM-3 Ok -thrust ref toga toga
23:16:43 CAM-2 Thrust ref toga toga
23:16:44 CAM-1 Ok -thrust ref toga toga
23:16:44 CAM (Sound similar to that of engines spooling up)
23:16:54 CAM-3 Hold
23:16:54 CAM-2 Hold
23:16:54 CAM-1 Roger
23:16:55 CAM-3 Eighty knots
23:16:55 CAM-2 Eighty knots
23:16:56 CAM-1 Ok my control
23:17:13 CAM-2 Vee one
23:17:13 CAM-3 Vee one
23:17:16 CAM-1 **** something there
23:17:17 CAM Sound of the first impact
23:17:18 CAM ****waaah****
23:17:18 CAM Sound of a series of impacts
23:17:22 End of Recording
[disclaimer]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Copyright © 1996-2002 Harro Ranter / Fabian Lujan
Aviation Safety Network; 04 May 2002
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G Khan
I repeat the question below:
"Can someone familiar with the SQ low viz taxi technique (pertaining to use of the LOC) let us know the procedure used prior to this accident and that currently in use now?"
I may have wrongly assumed that you are involved with SQ but the nature of your postings do suggest this. In my company tuning of the localizer is a requirement for all low viz departures. Could you tell us if this was/is a requirement in SQ. I also asked how the PVD is armed, is it by runway selection in the FMS or manual tuning of the localizer. If the latter then there would have been raw data localizer presented on the PFD in addition to the PVD remaining unshuttered. One final question if I may? The above CVR transcript indicates they were using 1.52 EPR for T/O perhaps fortunate on this occassion as they would have been slower at impact; but isn't this rather a low T/O power in such weather conditions? On a R/R the EPR for a situation like this would be around 1.72 I believe (ATIS 020 deg 36 gusting 56)
I do not understand how you could think my questions were rhetorical. Perhaps semantics raising its head again!
Sorry another final question. How do you conclude that any discussion of localizer use in these conditions is irrelevant? Surely use of the localizer to establish correct runway centreline will stop this sort of accident ever happening again.
I repeat the question below:
"Can someone familiar with the SQ low viz taxi technique (pertaining to use of the LOC) let us know the procedure used prior to this accident and that currently in use now?"
I may have wrongly assumed that you are involved with SQ but the nature of your postings do suggest this. In my company tuning of the localizer is a requirement for all low viz departures. Could you tell us if this was/is a requirement in SQ. I also asked how the PVD is armed, is it by runway selection in the FMS or manual tuning of the localizer. If the latter then there would have been raw data localizer presented on the PFD in addition to the PVD remaining unshuttered. One final question if I may? The above CVR transcript indicates they were using 1.52 EPR for T/O perhaps fortunate on this occassion as they would have been slower at impact; but isn't this rather a low T/O power in such weather conditions? On a R/R the EPR for a situation like this would be around 1.72 I believe (ATIS 020 deg 36 gusting 56)
I do not understand how you could think my questions were rhetorical. Perhaps semantics raising its head again!
Sorry another final question. How do you conclude that any discussion of localizer use in these conditions is irrelevant? Surely use of the localizer to establish correct runway centreline will stop this sort of accident ever happening again.
Last edited by mole; 11th Jun 2002 at 01:00.
The Reverend
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23:16:07 CAM-2 "And the PVD hasn't lined up."
23:16:23 CAM-1 "Not on yet er PVD, huh never mind we can see the runway, not so Bad".
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Hello Hot Dog,
Unfortunately you are probably right. The point surely though is that which SQ Survivor is trying to make and for which he has been very rudely shot down. I am disappointed that the two gentleman from Singapore have arrogantly dismissed him rather than discuss his views affably. Even non aviators can hold valid points of view Hawkeye and Mr Khan! The point is that until it becomes SOP for every operator to insist on the use of all the tools available in bad viz then accidents like this will happen again. On every line up there should be a call of "localizer moving" or something similar.
I am extremely surprised that SQ have PVR fitted and yet apparently do not require them to be serviceable and used in CAT 2 conditions (ATIS)(G Khan says they might have thought it was inoperative)
How can any pilot be convinced he is on the correct parallel runway in bad visibility without either positively identifying the runway from the numbers or by use of the localizer? Complacency may have been an issue and certainly the pressures of operating in those conditions would have been a significant one. These factors form the pyramid or as it used to be called in the RAF the duck syndrome (enough ducks nibbling at you will eventually sink you) But at the end of the day there has to be a mechanism for stopping all the pressures/errors ending up as an accident. Hence it boils down in this case to either SQ not having effective procedures for LWMO taxi-ing or they did have procedures which this crew decided to ignore (unlikely I would think) SQ Survivor is certainly entitled to know which of the two scenarios actually applied in this case.
Unfortunately you are probably right. The point surely though is that which SQ Survivor is trying to make and for which he has been very rudely shot down. I am disappointed that the two gentleman from Singapore have arrogantly dismissed him rather than discuss his views affably. Even non aviators can hold valid points of view Hawkeye and Mr Khan! The point is that until it becomes SOP for every operator to insist on the use of all the tools available in bad viz then accidents like this will happen again. On every line up there should be a call of "localizer moving" or something similar.
I am extremely surprised that SQ have PVR fitted and yet apparently do not require them to be serviceable and used in CAT 2 conditions (ATIS)(G Khan says they might have thought it was inoperative)
How can any pilot be convinced he is on the correct parallel runway in bad visibility without either positively identifying the runway from the numbers or by use of the localizer? Complacency may have been an issue and certainly the pressures of operating in those conditions would have been a significant one. These factors form the pyramid or as it used to be called in the RAF the duck syndrome (enough ducks nibbling at you will eventually sink you) But at the end of the day there has to be a mechanism for stopping all the pressures/errors ending up as an accident. Hence it boils down in this case to either SQ not having effective procedures for LWMO taxi-ing or they did have procedures which this crew decided to ignore (unlikely I would think) SQ Survivor is certainly entitled to know which of the two scenarios actually applied in this case.
Last edited by mole; 11th Jun 2002 at 03:20.
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In order for the PVD to work you have to manually enter the localizer frequency into the box.
It is armed by selecting PVD (push of a button), once within a certain number of degrees of the runway (usually having entered the runway and about to line up) the PVD window (on the glareshield) will automatically open up.
In order to make a PVD takeoff, the airport and the intended runway has to be PVD approved, otherwise the PVD becomes a backup tool only.
The use of the localizer works just as good in keeping the centerline, except you can execute an RTO in zero zero by using the PVD.
PVD is a nice tool to have but FAA never certified it. I have no idea why.
It is obvious that SQ006 crew had utilized this tool as a back up but ignored the indications. The F/O was correct to point out that PVD was not lined up, the Captain was obviously experiencing anxiety due to the conditions and let the final hole of the swiss cheese line up.
This brings us back to CRM or lack of it. If the F/O sees something he or she does not like, it is time to say,
"Captain I am not comfortable with this, can we please first discuss it."
The ATC system can wait for as long as it takes. Airlines should look into their CRM culture. Asian carriers often miss the CRM point altogether, the above statement of an assertive F/O at SIA would be almost a 'no no' causing the Captain to lose face.
Our briefings go something like this,
"if you see something you don't like please let me know as loud as possible and I will do the same for you, please let's help keep each other out of the chief pilot's office and CNN".
It is armed by selecting PVD (push of a button), once within a certain number of degrees of the runway (usually having entered the runway and about to line up) the PVD window (on the glareshield) will automatically open up.
In order to make a PVD takeoff, the airport and the intended runway has to be PVD approved, otherwise the PVD becomes a backup tool only.
The use of the localizer works just as good in keeping the centerline, except you can execute an RTO in zero zero by using the PVD.
PVD is a nice tool to have but FAA never certified it. I have no idea why.
It is obvious that SQ006 crew had utilized this tool as a back up but ignored the indications. The F/O was correct to point out that PVD was not lined up, the Captain was obviously experiencing anxiety due to the conditions and let the final hole of the swiss cheese line up.
This brings us back to CRM or lack of it. If the F/O sees something he or she does not like, it is time to say,
"Captain I am not comfortable with this, can we please first discuss it."
The ATC system can wait for as long as it takes. Airlines should look into their CRM culture. Asian carriers often miss the CRM point altogether, the above statement of an assertive F/O at SIA would be almost a 'no no' causing the Captain to lose face.
Our briefings go something like this,
"if you see something you don't like please let me know as loud as possible and I will do the same for you, please let's help keep each other out of the chief pilot's office and CNN".
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Mole
Just to set the record straight!
Sorry to disappoint you I am not from Singapore neither is GKhan ( as I came to understand).
I am not trying to shot down anyone, SQ6 is more than welcome to voice his assertion, and discuss rationally based on facts and not mere conjectures. If one cannot stand up to scrutiny in a public forum then it speaks volume of his homework .
If you feel that his defination of DR and assertion : that the crew of SQ006 was utilising Dead Rekoning in navigating was correct, or for that matter any other points he mentioned, you are most welcome to assit in subtantiating his assertion /conclusion.
If you follow the exchanges, you would have noticed that, while every effort was made to answer him point-to-pont, he refuses to acknowledge counter points to his assertion and conclusion.
In a discussion, when one put forth a points for discussion it is obvious that one is prepared to defend his opinion ( irregardless of his background). As one would have been convinced that his point/conclusion is correctly based on facts. And he is testing its robustness by inviting counter points or supporting infor for further enhancement.
Unless one is abstaining from commenting, it will be either one agree or disagree on the point(s) raised , if so one would rationalise his mis-giving/support and state the precise reasons why he had chosen to agree/disagree. Only then will there be a fruitful exchange of ideas.
Without refuting most (if not all ) of my counter-points and out of the blue came the following arrogant statement of SQ6 Survivor:
"Hawkeye18, if you want to argue further with me on this, FIRST address each one of the points above and then I will consider any other arguments you make (if you can call them that). "
I would have thought HE was the arrogant one and trying to shut me up! I guess you are disorientated and pointing in the wrong direction as far as who is being arrogant !!
I have replied him point by point again on all his querries ! If he chooses not to refute them , that is his decision for not replying ....but not anyone of us shutting him down..... that must be clear!
If he came in rattling off his flawed conclusion again without answering my points , that would prove my point that he is not interested in listening nor discussing, but only promoting his own flawed "expert" conclusion.
Cheers!
Hawkeye
Just to set the record straight!
Sorry to disappoint you I am not from Singapore neither is GKhan ( as I came to understand).
I am not trying to shot down anyone, SQ6 is more than welcome to voice his assertion, and discuss rationally based on facts and not mere conjectures. If one cannot stand up to scrutiny in a public forum then it speaks volume of his homework .
If you feel that his defination of DR and assertion : that the crew of SQ006 was utilising Dead Rekoning in navigating was correct, or for that matter any other points he mentioned, you are most welcome to assit in subtantiating his assertion /conclusion.
If you follow the exchanges, you would have noticed that, while every effort was made to answer him point-to-pont, he refuses to acknowledge counter points to his assertion and conclusion.
In a discussion, when one put forth a points for discussion it is obvious that one is prepared to defend his opinion ( irregardless of his background). As one would have been convinced that his point/conclusion is correctly based on facts. And he is testing its robustness by inviting counter points or supporting infor for further enhancement.
Unless one is abstaining from commenting, it will be either one agree or disagree on the point(s) raised , if so one would rationalise his mis-giving/support and state the precise reasons why he had chosen to agree/disagree. Only then will there be a fruitful exchange of ideas.
Without refuting most (if not all ) of my counter-points and out of the blue came the following arrogant statement of SQ6 Survivor:
"Hawkeye18, if you want to argue further with me on this, FIRST address each one of the points above and then I will consider any other arguments you make (if you can call them that). "
I would have thought HE was the arrogant one and trying to shut me up! I guess you are disorientated and pointing in the wrong direction as far as who is being arrogant !!
I have replied him point by point again on all his querries ! If he chooses not to refute them , that is his decision for not replying ....but not anyone of us shutting him down..... that must be clear!
If he came in rattling off his flawed conclusion again without answering my points , that would prove my point that he is not interested in listening nor discussing, but only promoting his own flawed "expert" conclusion.
Cheers!
Hawkeye
Last edited by hawkeye18; 11th Jun 2002 at 14:26.
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Mole
The PVD is not a mandatory instrument, and is not designed for runway identification.
It is designed and certified to aid runway centreline steering and is only to be used for takeoff on a Cat III runway.
It is not supported by the manufacturer as a runway indentifier as it is outside the scope of its design specifications. Hence FAA would not approved it.
That is the reason for it to be delegated as revertionary rather than a primary tool in lining up. Most airline do not use it that is what I came to undertand. Agreed that it could be utilised to supplement the crews' visual cues in low vis line up.
The PVD will un-shutter anywhere along the runway within the capture zone of the ILS localizer. It will therefore operate at any point along the runway.
At the point of the transcript as posted (i f I rememberit correctly) the aircraft was effecting a turn onto 05R and still outside the capture zone.
The primary means for runway identification are the pilots’ normal visual cues, hence the crew thinking they have the correct runway in sight continue to maintain the primary visual cues of the (wrong) runway and disregarded the shuttled PVD
Personally , I felt that the implementation of the Boeing’s GPS based “Take-off Runway Disagree Alerting Function” device and moving map display system to assist the flight crew would be much welcome by pilots and provided another layer of defence to old "Murphy's Law"
Nonetheless, the responsibilities of utilising these devices still rest with a well co-ordinated crew and hence I agreed with Gladiator that CRM training is vital onboard any aircraft.
The NTSB investigation into UPS 896 (B757) take-off on a closed runway at Denver International on September 25, 2001, and an American Airlines [AMR] B777 took off on a closed runway at Chicago’s O’Hare airport in January 2000 , clearly illustrated that CRM weakness is a world wide shortcoming and not neccessarily a regional or airline specific concern.
Cheers!
Hawkeye
The PVD is not a mandatory instrument, and is not designed for runway identification.
It is designed and certified to aid runway centreline steering and is only to be used for takeoff on a Cat III runway.
It is not supported by the manufacturer as a runway indentifier as it is outside the scope of its design specifications. Hence FAA would not approved it.
That is the reason for it to be delegated as revertionary rather than a primary tool in lining up. Most airline do not use it that is what I came to undertand. Agreed that it could be utilised to supplement the crews' visual cues in low vis line up.
The PVD will un-shutter anywhere along the runway within the capture zone of the ILS localizer. It will therefore operate at any point along the runway.
At the point of the transcript as posted (i f I rememberit correctly) the aircraft was effecting a turn onto 05R and still outside the capture zone.
The primary means for runway identification are the pilots’ normal visual cues, hence the crew thinking they have the correct runway in sight continue to maintain the primary visual cues of the (wrong) runway and disregarded the shuttled PVD
Personally , I felt that the implementation of the Boeing’s GPS based “Take-off Runway Disagree Alerting Function” device and moving map display system to assist the flight crew would be much welcome by pilots and provided another layer of defence to old "Murphy's Law"
Nonetheless, the responsibilities of utilising these devices still rest with a well co-ordinated crew and hence I agreed with Gladiator that CRM training is vital onboard any aircraft.
The NTSB investigation into UPS 896 (B757) take-off on a closed runway at Denver International on September 25, 2001, and an American Airlines [AMR] B777 took off on a closed runway at Chicago’s O’Hare airport in January 2000 , clearly illustrated that CRM weakness is a world wide shortcoming and not neccessarily a regional or airline specific concern.
Cheers!
Hawkeye
Last edited by hawkeye18; 11th Jun 2002 at 09:38.
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It is interesting to speculate how different the two reports would be if the accident had happened at Changi.
I guess this is a real strretch as accidents don't happen on Fantasy Island.
I guess this is a real strretch as accidents don't happen on Fantasy Island.
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Traffic ,
what did ur insurance comapny tell you??!! If and when u get into a motor accident ?
For that matters what if it happened in New York, London, Bangkok , LA etc. And what would be the reports like?
That is the reason for the ICAO Standard Format on Accident Investigation and Reporting. Hoping that it will enhance/focus on truthful fact finding, to prevent similar accident, instead of degenerating into blame apportioning.
The possibility of air accident is always present as long as there are aircraft flying , no imaginary dreamlands or Fantasy Islands are immuned .... dun let ur imagination run wild!
Hawkeye
what did ur insurance comapny tell you??!! If and when u get into a motor accident ?
For that matters what if it happened in New York, London, Bangkok , LA etc. And what would be the reports like?
That is the reason for the ICAO Standard Format on Accident Investigation and Reporting. Hoping that it will enhance/focus on truthful fact finding, to prevent similar accident, instead of degenerating into blame apportioning.
The possibility of air accident is always present as long as there are aircraft flying , no imaginary dreamlands or Fantasy Islands are immuned .... dun let ur imagination run wild!
Hawkeye
Last edited by hawkeye18; 11th Jun 2002 at 07:51.
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Mole
I was SIA but not for quite a while.
Gladiator has given a precise description of the operation of the PVD.
If 05L at Taipei is not a Cat III runway then PVD can only be advisory as the indications will not have been calibrated.
The SIA Ops. manual that I have access to is now out of date but does state:
"A Takeoff using PVD is not permitted:
When the cross wind exceeds 10kts." -
the crew were well within their remit to ignore it, whether the crew used it or not is irrelevant, it was not a requirement, the weather was outside limits.
I don't think I have been rude to SQ6 Survivor at all - please re-read.
Can't remember the EPR settings now but they would have been doing a full PW4056 take-off with no derate in those wx conditions. They were relatively light.
I was SIA but not for quite a while.
Gladiator has given a precise description of the operation of the PVD.
If 05L at Taipei is not a Cat III runway then PVD can only be advisory as the indications will not have been calibrated.
The SIA Ops. manual that I have access to is now out of date but does state:
"A Takeoff using PVD is not permitted:
When the cross wind exceeds 10kts." -
the crew were well within their remit to ignore it, whether the crew used it or not is irrelevant, it was not a requirement, the weather was outside limits.
I don't think I have been rude to SQ6 Survivor at all - please re-read.
Can't remember the EPR settings now but they would have been doing a full PW4056 take-off with no derate in those wx conditions. They were relatively light.