SQ006 final report out 26/4/02
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SQ6 survivor's excellent web-site mentions Taiwan's non-membership of ICAO, the "real" China having the seat.
It's a toothless watchdog if ever there was one, but are there concrete examples of this making an important safety difference in Taiwan, in relation to this or any other crashes? Do the authorities there take advantage of this in any way, or do they behave "as if" they belonged?
It's a toothless watchdog if ever there was one, but are there concrete examples of this making an important safety difference in Taiwan, in relation to this or any other crashes? Do the authorities there take advantage of this in any way, or do they behave "as if" they belonged?
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Anotherpost
The observation that some pilots stop and ask for help when lost misses the point: Foong knew where to turn (the crew even joked about it), and he thought he knew where he was. And yet he still screwed up. Even if he was racing a typhoon, evidence indicates he had no low-viz taxi training and, worse still, there is no procedure or training requirement in SIA Ops for low-viz taxi (according to the ASC). Does this mean that all SIA pilots are still running around out there with the same low-viz taxi deficiencies? Safest airline my ass! This problem, and the general one of poor SA on the ground, can be addressed by simple proficiency testing: why not include a low-viz taxi routine in a simulator and test skills there?
Frangible
Your question is a little obtuse but I think I understand your point: does Taiwan fall through the cracks in terms of ICAO standards? Lacking any hard data, I can only speculate that, given their non-membership since 1971 (when they lost their seat to China), CKS is presently still in a standards time warp. It maybe some consolation that they've finally decided, in their infinate wisdom, to apply for "official observer" status, whatever that really means. So in answer to your question, I would guess that China's membership in ICAO means didley squat for Taiwan.
The observation that some pilots stop and ask for help when lost misses the point: Foong knew where to turn (the crew even joked about it), and he thought he knew where he was. And yet he still screwed up. Even if he was racing a typhoon, evidence indicates he had no low-viz taxi training and, worse still, there is no procedure or training requirement in SIA Ops for low-viz taxi (according to the ASC). Does this mean that all SIA pilots are still running around out there with the same low-viz taxi deficiencies? Safest airline my ass! This problem, and the general one of poor SA on the ground, can be addressed by simple proficiency testing: why not include a low-viz taxi routine in a simulator and test skills there?
Frangible
Your question is a little obtuse but I think I understand your point: does Taiwan fall through the cracks in terms of ICAO standards? Lacking any hard data, I can only speculate that, given their non-membership since 1971 (when they lost their seat to China), CKS is presently still in a standards time warp. It maybe some consolation that they've finally decided, in their infinate wisdom, to apply for "official observer" status, whatever that really means. So in answer to your question, I would guess that China's membership in ICAO means didley squat for Taiwan.
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I am not sure membership to ICAO requires a seat. However Taiwan is recognized as a seperate state by the FAA and therefore most probably also considered a contracting state by ICAO.
Certainly Taiwanese aircraft have their own registration and recognized by other ICAO contracting states.
Certainly Taiwanese aircraft have their own registration and recognized by other ICAO contracting states.
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SQ6 Survivor
Your question is; "Does this mean that all SIA pilots are still running around out there with the same low-viz deficiencies? Safest airline my ass!"
I'm afraid that the above is still the case and there seems to be no move to alter the situation. Your supplementary expression of feeling does seem to be valid.
Your question is; "Does this mean that all SIA pilots are still running around out there with the same low-viz deficiencies? Safest airline my ass!"
I'm afraid that the above is still the case and there seems to be no move to alter the situation. Your supplementary expression of feeling does seem to be valid.
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SQ6 Survivor
I'm not too sure that I have missed the point.
Quote: "Foong knew where to turn (the crew even joked about it), and he thought he knew where he was. And yet he still screwed up."
At some stage, therefore, he must have been lost, surely, as he went from a situation of jocular confidence to completely losing the plot and turning onto the wrong "runway".
The point that I was making pre-supposes that pilots know where they are on the ground at all times (I think I do and if I don't, I damn well stop and then figure it out from there).
I would think that something distracted Foong at the time and he was probably vaguely aware that all wasn't correct with his nav (ie. lost) but he pressed on anyway, for reasons already postulated in this and other threads.
I'm not too sure that I have missed the point.
Quote: "Foong knew where to turn (the crew even joked about it), and he thought he knew where he was. And yet he still screwed up."
At some stage, therefore, he must have been lost, surely, as he went from a situation of jocular confidence to completely losing the plot and turning onto the wrong "runway".
The point that I was making pre-supposes that pilots know where they are on the ground at all times (I think I do and if I don't, I damn well stop and then figure it out from there).
I would think that something distracted Foong at the time and he was probably vaguely aware that all wasn't correct with his nav (ie. lost) but he pressed on anyway, for reasons already postulated in this and other threads.
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SQ Survivor and JimJam,
In oder to come to a balance view, please do read both sides of the official documents prior to coming to conclusion.
Failure to read both ASC and SIA/MOT document is as good as learning half the stories , and is no excuse for coming to the wrong conclusion !
[B]SQ survivor said:
"worse still, there is no procedure or training requirement in SIA Ops for low-viz taxi (according to the ASC). Does this mean that all SIA pilots are still running around out there with the same low-viz taxi deficiencies? Safest airline my ass! This problem, and the general one of poor SA on the ground, can be addressed by simple proficiency testing: why not include a low-viz taxi routine in a simulator and test skills there? "
JimJam said:
"Your question is; "Does this mean that all SIA pilots are still running around out there with the same low-viz deficiencies? Safest airline my ass!"
I'm afraid that the above is still the case and there seems to be no move to alter the situation. Your supplementary expression of feeling does seem to be valid."
SIA /MOT Singapore said
Prior to SQ006
"
Guidance information on low visibility taxi operations is provided in the SIA Flight Crew Training Manual, which is a part of the SIA B747-400 Operations Manual.
A captain who is qualified and current in Cat III operations would have received training in low visibility taxiing techniques as part of his training package. Taxiing the aircraft in low visibility is part and parcel of the overall training package for low visibility operations.
Regarding training in low visibility taxiing, as noted in MOT’s earlier response to the ASC’s preliminary draft report, MOT has explained that there is no specific formal training for taxiing in low visibility. Taxiing is part of basic airmanship. Throughout their career, flight crews undergo various training courses and taxiing is part and parcel of such training. Taxiing skills are further reinforced in the course of their flying experience when they operate to different airports in all sorts of weather conditions. There are no International Civil Aviation Organisation Standards and Recommended Practices (ICAO SARPs) or internationally agreed norms on the level and amount of flight crew training in low visibility taxi procedures and practices.
However, taxiing in low visibility conditions was, and continues to be, a normal part of an SIA pilot’s introduction to training in low visibility operations." [B]
Remedial actions taken after SQ006:
The Flight Crew Training Manual has been amended to formally document procedures, instructions and the training curriculum for ground operations in poor visibility conditions."
Boeing’s GPS based “Take-off Runway Disagree Alerting Function” has been accepted by the company for installation on B777 and B747-400 aircraft.
An Electronic Moving Map system which provides a pictorial depiction of airport movement areas is being evaluated for installation in SIA aircraft.
The FAA Advisory Circular on Runway Safety (FAA AC 120-74) has been reviewed with the objective of identifying useful points for incorporation in the SIA low visibility operations, training and procedures.
http://www.sq006.gov.sg/final_draft/fr_final_draft.htm:
The above are self-explanatory.
Gladiators
Perhaps you can help to sustantiate with your personal low vis taxying training whilst You were with SIA.
Cheers!!!
Hawkeye 18
In oder to come to a balance view, please do read both sides of the official documents prior to coming to conclusion.
Failure to read both ASC and SIA/MOT document is as good as learning half the stories , and is no excuse for coming to the wrong conclusion !
[B]SQ survivor said:
"worse still, there is no procedure or training requirement in SIA Ops for low-viz taxi (according to the ASC). Does this mean that all SIA pilots are still running around out there with the same low-viz taxi deficiencies? Safest airline my ass! This problem, and the general one of poor SA on the ground, can be addressed by simple proficiency testing: why not include a low-viz taxi routine in a simulator and test skills there? "
JimJam said:
"Your question is; "Does this mean that all SIA pilots are still running around out there with the same low-viz deficiencies? Safest airline my ass!"
I'm afraid that the above is still the case and there seems to be no move to alter the situation. Your supplementary expression of feeling does seem to be valid."
SIA /MOT Singapore said
Prior to SQ006
"
Guidance information on low visibility taxi operations is provided in the SIA Flight Crew Training Manual, which is a part of the SIA B747-400 Operations Manual.
A captain who is qualified and current in Cat III operations would have received training in low visibility taxiing techniques as part of his training package. Taxiing the aircraft in low visibility is part and parcel of the overall training package for low visibility operations.
Regarding training in low visibility taxiing, as noted in MOT’s earlier response to the ASC’s preliminary draft report, MOT has explained that there is no specific formal training for taxiing in low visibility. Taxiing is part of basic airmanship. Throughout their career, flight crews undergo various training courses and taxiing is part and parcel of such training. Taxiing skills are further reinforced in the course of their flying experience when they operate to different airports in all sorts of weather conditions. There are no International Civil Aviation Organisation Standards and Recommended Practices (ICAO SARPs) or internationally agreed norms on the level and amount of flight crew training in low visibility taxi procedures and practices.
However, taxiing in low visibility conditions was, and continues to be, a normal part of an SIA pilot’s introduction to training in low visibility operations." [B]
Remedial actions taken after SQ006:
The Flight Crew Training Manual has been amended to formally document procedures, instructions and the training curriculum for ground operations in poor visibility conditions."
Boeing’s GPS based “Take-off Runway Disagree Alerting Function” has been accepted by the company for installation on B777 and B747-400 aircraft.
An Electronic Moving Map system which provides a pictorial depiction of airport movement areas is being evaluated for installation in SIA aircraft.
The FAA Advisory Circular on Runway Safety (FAA AC 120-74) has been reviewed with the objective of identifying useful points for incorporation in the SIA low visibility operations, training and procedures.
http://www.sq006.gov.sg/final_draft/fr_final_draft.htm:
The above are self-explanatory.
Gladiators
Perhaps you can help to sustantiate with your personal low vis taxying training whilst You were with SIA.
Cheers!!!
Hawkeye 18
Last edited by hawkeye18; 2nd Jun 2002 at 17:35.
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I can only speak for dates until end of 1997. SIA's training did not include low visibility taxi procedures. The CAT III training was conducted with the simulator set up on final approach at approx 1,500 AGL.
Here in the US we use a special dedicated chart for low visibility taxi. However the bottom line is when the WX gets nasty we grab a latte (vanilla) and call it a 'NO GO'.
True that taxiing is part of airmanship but not when the visibility is so bad you cannot see your own hand.
Here in the US we use a special dedicated chart for low visibility taxi. However the bottom line is when the WX gets nasty we grab a latte (vanilla) and call it a 'NO GO'.
True that taxiing is part of airmanship but not when the visibility is so bad you cannot see your own hand.
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Hawkeye 18
Your colors show through loud and clear. And your attempt to switch topics after Gladiators confirmation of SIA's lack of low-viz training is particularly telling.
As you will see on the SQ6-Survivors web site, I HAVE read the findings and arguments from BOTH reports and even summarized them in an objective and unbiased fashion. I ignored the pathetic face-saving and biased way in which the MOT tried to distort the ASC findings and divert attention from SIA failings, AND I duly noted the way in which the ASC side-lined the unsafe conditions at CKS. But the conclusion was obvious and, with the risk of boring the rest of you, I repeat, the fundamental failing was that, when the going got tough the Crews 'training' failed them and they made a BASIC navigational error.
I certainly didn’t do these analyses for my health, nor to castigate SIA or CKS. I did it so that the FUNDAMENTAL FAILING can be identified and the DEFICIENCY addressed.
Your MOT 'quotations' to the effect that SIA does give low-viz taxi guidence in their OPS manual but do not require training because it's ‘part of basic airmanship', does NOT reassure me in any way whatsoever. Indeed, it makes me feel even worse about SIA pilots because it implies that their basic airmanship must be deficient too.
Obviously, I know (hope) that this is not the case, and that the basic airmanship of SIA pilots compares with other companies. To remove any trace of subjectivity therefore I will re-phrased my question:
Are there other pilots running around out there with the same low-viz taxi deficiencies as Captain Foong?
Does the lack of low-viz taxi training at most airlines mean that other crews are destined to repeat history or add further to the r/w incursion stats?
How many of you pilots can say that when weather conditions are marginal that you NAVIGATE to the r/w, rather then depending on dead reckoning?
As you will see on the SQ6-Survivors web site, I HAVE read the findings and arguments from BOTH reports and even summarized them in an objective and unbiased fashion. I ignored the pathetic face-saving and biased way in which the MOT tried to distort the ASC findings and divert attention from SIA failings, AND I duly noted the way in which the ASC side-lined the unsafe conditions at CKS. But the conclusion was obvious and, with the risk of boring the rest of you, I repeat, the fundamental failing was that, when the going got tough the Crews 'training' failed them and they made a BASIC navigational error.
I certainly didn’t do these analyses for my health, nor to castigate SIA or CKS. I did it so that the FUNDAMENTAL FAILING can be identified and the DEFICIENCY addressed.
Your MOT 'quotations' to the effect that SIA does give low-viz taxi guidence in their OPS manual but do not require training because it's ‘part of basic airmanship', does NOT reassure me in any way whatsoever. Indeed, it makes me feel even worse about SIA pilots because it implies that their basic airmanship must be deficient too.
Obviously, I know (hope) that this is not the case, and that the basic airmanship of SIA pilots compares with other companies. To remove any trace of subjectivity therefore I will re-phrased my question:
Are there other pilots running around out there with the same low-viz taxi deficiencies as Captain Foong?
Does the lack of low-viz taxi training at most airlines mean that other crews are destined to repeat history or add further to the r/w incursion stats?
How many of you pilots can say that when weather conditions are marginal that you NAVIGATE to the r/w, rather then depending on dead reckoning?
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SQ Survivor,
No intention at all to distract with the ATC posting ,it was related to Gladiator's comments:
" True that taxiing is part of airmanship but not when the visibility is so bad you cannot see your own hand "
So as not to confuse you ,it has been moved to later section.
............................................................ ............................................
My comments on your last posting are:
Please read carefully what Gladiator has posted.... when he was last with SIA ,captain or first officers not elaborated, was 1997 ....
"the fundamental failing was that, when the going got tough the Crews 'training' failed them and they made a BASIC navigational error. "
The pilot of SQ 006 failed and there's no denying that.....that is the subjective conclusion specific to Cpt Fong, the inference that crew training (fleetwide) failed needs substantiation.
This is a case of navigational error induced by poor weather condition, wrong/deficient runway,taxiway, signage/markings and lighting. Basic navigational training, be it on the ground or in the air are based on the assumption that all corect signages ,aids , visual features are in place. Name me an airline with low-vis taxy training with intentional wrong markings of runway and lighting, to train pilot to preclude such an accident. .....from what I known..none
"Your MOT 'quotations' to the effect that SIA does give low-viz taxi guidence in their OPS manual but do not require training because it's ‘part of basic airmanship', does NOT reassure me in any way whatsoever. "
Guidance in Ops manual and Training Syllybus are two different things, what ASC said is it is not in the ops manual and NOT they do not train .... and from what I have found out , they do such low vis taxying training prior to SQ006 as stated and is still continuing to have such low vis taxy training... ..( I have just checked with a current pilot of the comapny).
They have since amended their Ops manual to include low vis taxy as a procedures in their 747 Ops manual instead of just guidance.
The only point of contention is how much more of such training is required .... as there are no international norms nor standard estalished by ICAO, unlike those of airfield markings and procedures. And whether such training will be effective in preventing another such an accident from happening around the globe.
On a more positive note , the implementation of Wrong Runway warning devices and GPS based ground navigation system in their fleet of aircraft , to aid pilot in navigating is seem as a positive approach to prevent such future accident.
"Indeed, it makes me feel even worse about SIA pilots because it implies that their basic airmanship must be deficient too. "
Other major airlines have had accidents indentified or associated with airmanship too . Can we also safely say these accidents also "implies that THEIR basic airmanship MUST be deficient too"??
I think to come to such an inference is rather presumptuous !!!
Pilot tranining syllybus the world over are tailored to cover ICAO /FAA proficiency /airmanship requirement in the air transportation industry..... Pilots' are either FAA or ICAO qualified and are regularly checked and renew.
By extension, you inference also implies that under the present guidlines set out by both authorities, these are not sufficiently stringent to preclude airmanship error. As these Qualification requirements are applicable airline wide. My suggestion to you is take other means of transport other than air just to be safe.
"Are there other pilots running around out there with the same low-viz taxi deficiencies as Captain Foong? "
Specific to the deficient conditions at CKS airport and your definition of " low vis taxying dificiencies as a captain" , yes there are , me included , and there were others that were suckered into taxying into that 05R as well, under less severe weather conditions.
"Does the lack of low-viz taxi training at most airlines mean that other crews are destined to repeat history or add further to the r/w incursion stats"
Yes there will be!! No amount of Training in low vis taxying will TOTALLY negate the possibility of it happening again,.. ...when all the other factors converged.
"How many of you pilots can say that when weather conditions are marginal that you NAVIGATE to the r/w, rather then depending on dead reckoning?"
DR is the basis of visual Navigation.... the cross-refering of visual objects to what is tabulated in maps or chart form, to establish your actual position.
Cheers!
Hawkeye18
note: I have no vested interest either as an employee or shareholder.
Apologies for the amendment ....my English and typing suck!!
No intention at all to distract with the ATC posting ,it was related to Gladiator's comments:
" True that taxiing is part of airmanship but not when the visibility is so bad you cannot see your own hand "
So as not to confuse you ,it has been moved to later section.
............................................................ ............................................
My comments on your last posting are:
Please read carefully what Gladiator has posted.... when he was last with SIA ,captain or first officers not elaborated, was 1997 ....
"the fundamental failing was that, when the going got tough the Crews 'training' failed them and they made a BASIC navigational error. "
The pilot of SQ 006 failed and there's no denying that.....that is the subjective conclusion specific to Cpt Fong, the inference that crew training (fleetwide) failed needs substantiation.
This is a case of navigational error induced by poor weather condition, wrong/deficient runway,taxiway, signage/markings and lighting. Basic navigational training, be it on the ground or in the air are based on the assumption that all corect signages ,aids , visual features are in place. Name me an airline with low-vis taxy training with intentional wrong markings of runway and lighting, to train pilot to preclude such an accident. .....from what I known..none
"Your MOT 'quotations' to the effect that SIA does give low-viz taxi guidence in their OPS manual but do not require training because it's ‘part of basic airmanship', does NOT reassure me in any way whatsoever. "
Guidance in Ops manual and Training Syllybus are two different things, what ASC said is it is not in the ops manual and NOT they do not train .... and from what I have found out , they do such low vis taxying training prior to SQ006 as stated and is still continuing to have such low vis taxy training... ..( I have just checked with a current pilot of the comapny).
They have since amended their Ops manual to include low vis taxy as a procedures in their 747 Ops manual instead of just guidance.
The only point of contention is how much more of such training is required .... as there are no international norms nor standard estalished by ICAO, unlike those of airfield markings and procedures. And whether such training will be effective in preventing another such an accident from happening around the globe.
On a more positive note , the implementation of Wrong Runway warning devices and GPS based ground navigation system in their fleet of aircraft , to aid pilot in navigating is seem as a positive approach to prevent such future accident.
"Indeed, it makes me feel even worse about SIA pilots because it implies that their basic airmanship must be deficient too. "
Other major airlines have had accidents indentified or associated with airmanship too . Can we also safely say these accidents also "implies that THEIR basic airmanship MUST be deficient too"??
I think to come to such an inference is rather presumptuous !!!
Pilot tranining syllybus the world over are tailored to cover ICAO /FAA proficiency /airmanship requirement in the air transportation industry..... Pilots' are either FAA or ICAO qualified and are regularly checked and renew.
By extension, you inference also implies that under the present guidlines set out by both authorities, these are not sufficiently stringent to preclude airmanship error. As these Qualification requirements are applicable airline wide. My suggestion to you is take other means of transport other than air just to be safe.
"Are there other pilots running around out there with the same low-viz taxi deficiencies as Captain Foong? "
Specific to the deficient conditions at CKS airport and your definition of " low vis taxying dificiencies as a captain" , yes there are , me included , and there were others that were suckered into taxying into that 05R as well, under less severe weather conditions.
"Does the lack of low-viz taxi training at most airlines mean that other crews are destined to repeat history or add further to the r/w incursion stats"
Yes there will be!! No amount of Training in low vis taxying will TOTALLY negate the possibility of it happening again,.. ...when all the other factors converged.
"How many of you pilots can say that when weather conditions are marginal that you NAVIGATE to the r/w, rather then depending on dead reckoning?"
DR is the basis of visual Navigation.... the cross-refering of visual objects to what is tabulated in maps or chart form, to establish your actual position.
Cheers!
Hawkeye18
note: I have no vested interest either as an employee or shareholder.
Apologies for the amendment ....my English and typing suck!!
Last edited by hawkeye18; 4th Jun 2002 at 06:48.
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Air Traffic Controller /Aircrew
Anyone has view on the following post.
Thanks!
posted 6th May 2002 04:10
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
From the the event logs of the accident, no mention was make whether the duty air traffic controller had SQ 006 in sight when he/she issued the takeoff clearance.
Taking into consideration a distance of close to 1 nm from the Air Traffic Tower to the threshold of 05R ,with prevaling visibilty of 400-450 meters (my assumption , actual vis believe was lesser at the time). It was doubtful that the duty air traffic controller had visual contact with SQ 006 as it approched 05R.
Isn't it a requirement for ATC to ascertain aircraft requesting for takeoff clearance is on the correct platformm prior to issue of takeoff clearance??
Especially so on a non- ASD airport under inclement weather , It should have been mandatory for ATC to visually confirmed aircraft is lineup on the correct runway prior to issuing takeoff clearance under such circumstances.
This could be the reason for the Singaporean MOT raising the issue under Safety Recommendation to ASC :
"4.CKS Airport should ensure that its Air Traffic Controllers adhere to their Standard Operating Procedures. In particular, when aircraft cannot be seen from the control tower, controllers should advise pilots of this situation, and that they should taxi with caution. "
Infering that the tower controller violated its standing SOPs in takeoff clearance under adverse weather.... not having visual contact with SQ006.
If that is so then it leads to another question , is the airport takeoff minimum comensurate with its controllers' ability in visually acquiring aircraft on the operating platform of the non-ASD airport??? eek:
Are all takeoff clearances in CKS " blind " clearances from the Tower under adverse weather when visibility falls below 600 meters !!!??
Your comments will be most appreciated.
Cheers!
Hawkeye:
[Last edited by hawkeye18 on 6th May 2002 at 05:04]
Anyone has view on the following post.
Thanks!
posted 6th May 2002 04:10
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
From the the event logs of the accident, no mention was make whether the duty air traffic controller had SQ 006 in sight when he/she issued the takeoff clearance.
Taking into consideration a distance of close to 1 nm from the Air Traffic Tower to the threshold of 05R ,with prevaling visibilty of 400-450 meters (my assumption , actual vis believe was lesser at the time). It was doubtful that the duty air traffic controller had visual contact with SQ 006 as it approched 05R.
Isn't it a requirement for ATC to ascertain aircraft requesting for takeoff clearance is on the correct platformm prior to issue of takeoff clearance??
Especially so on a non- ASD airport under inclement weather , It should have been mandatory for ATC to visually confirmed aircraft is lineup on the correct runway prior to issuing takeoff clearance under such circumstances.
This could be the reason for the Singaporean MOT raising the issue under Safety Recommendation to ASC :
"4.CKS Airport should ensure that its Air Traffic Controllers adhere to their Standard Operating Procedures. In particular, when aircraft cannot be seen from the control tower, controllers should advise pilots of this situation, and that they should taxi with caution. "
Infering that the tower controller violated its standing SOPs in takeoff clearance under adverse weather.... not having visual contact with SQ006.
If that is so then it leads to another question , is the airport takeoff minimum comensurate with its controllers' ability in visually acquiring aircraft on the operating platform of the non-ASD airport??? eek:
Are all takeoff clearances in CKS " blind " clearances from the Tower under adverse weather when visibility falls below 600 meters !!!??
Your comments will be most appreciated.
Cheers!
Hawkeye:
[Last edited by hawkeye18 on 6th May 2002 at 05:04]
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Hawkeye18
You said: "DR [dead reckoning] is the basis of visual Navigation.... the cross-refering of visual objects to what is tabulated in maps or chart form, to establish your actual position."
Dead Reckoning: the process of determining one's position, especially at sea, by guessing the direction and distance travelled rather than by using landmarks and astronomical observations. Oxford English Dictionary.
You just failed basic airmanship! Lets hope to god you are not flying a commercial airliner.
Dead Reckoning: the process of determining one's position, especially at sea, by guessing the direction and distance travelled rather than by using landmarks and astronomical observations. Oxford English Dictionary.
You just failed basic airmanship! Lets hope to god you are not flying a commercial airliner.
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SQ Survivor,
"Dead Reckoning: the process of determining one's position, especially at sea, by guessing the direction and distance travelled rather than by using landmarks and astronomical observations. Oxford English Dictionary. "
Apollogies!!! My mistakes! You are right!!:o :o :o :o
The setence:
"DR is the basis of visual Navigation.... the cross-refering of visual objects to what is tabulated in maps or chart form, to establish your actual position. "
Should had been:
either:
DR is the basis of visual ground Navigation??? ..... ground taxy involved the cross-refering of visual objects to what is tabulated in maps or chart form, to establish your actual position. "
or
The basic techniques on Ground taxy is..... the cross-refering of visual objects to what is tabulated in maps or chart form, to establish your actual position. "
So what lead u to conclude that SQ006 was using DR (by guessing the direction and distance travelled rather than by using landmarks ) on the Taxying to Ruway 05??
Were they??!!!
Cheers!
Hawkeye
PS : Please check feedback email on SQ006 Survival site.
"Dead Reckoning: the process of determining one's position, especially at sea, by guessing the direction and distance travelled rather than by using landmarks and astronomical observations. Oxford English Dictionary. "
Apollogies!!! My mistakes! You are right!!:o :o :o :o
The setence:
"DR is the basis of visual Navigation.... the cross-refering of visual objects to what is tabulated in maps or chart form, to establish your actual position. "
Should had been:
either:
DR is the basis of visual ground Navigation??? ..... ground taxy involved the cross-refering of visual objects to what is tabulated in maps or chart form, to establish your actual position. "
or
The basic techniques on Ground taxy is..... the cross-refering of visual objects to what is tabulated in maps or chart form, to establish your actual position. "
So what lead u to conclude that SQ006 was using DR (by guessing the direction and distance travelled rather than by using landmarks ) on the Taxying to Ruway 05??
Were they??!!!
Cheers!
Hawkeye
PS : Please check feedback email on SQ006 Survival site.
Last edited by hawkeye18; 5th Jun 2002 at 06:47.
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Hawkeye18, this news article should answer your Q. re Foongs use of DR
Taipei Times: Op-Ed, May 23, 2002.
Re: Crash of SIA SQ-006, 31st Oct. 2000
Dear Sir or Madam,
In the mistaken belief that apportioning blame serves no purpose, both the ASC and the MOT failed to reach any clear or objective conclusion about the crash of SQ-006 at Chiang Kai Shek International Airport on October 31st 2000. We believe that failure was a result of political interference. To set the record straight, and provide some closure for the victims of this accident, we have closely studied the evidence and claims in the ASC and MOT reports, and have reached several conclusions about the cause of the crash and who was to blame.
First, it is clear from the factual evidence that the pilots did not use all the resources available to them in navigating to the runway that night when conditions clearly required it. In fact, they failed the basic requirement of any kind of navigation task—to follow a compass heading and estimate distance. That deficiency led them to make a continuous 180 degree turn onto runway 5-Right when they should have only made a 90 degree turn, continued for 200 m, and then made a final 90 degree turn onto runway 5-Left. At no stage did the taxi require a continuous 180 degree turn. Although this navigation failure was identified by the ASC, it was not adequately highlighted as the main cause of the crash. By contrast the MOT report concentrated on all the correct actions that the crew made during the taxi but conveniently ignored the action that led to the mistake. In fact, when the crew were questioned about what information they should use for taxi navigation, only the relief-pilot stated that it should include the compass to confirm the correct heading. Unfortunately, the relief-pilot played no part in navigation that night because he was preoccupied with estimating the cross-wind component.
Second, claims by the MOT that the pilots could not see signs, or that Air Traffic Control misled them, or that the taxi lights led them onto the runway and presented no other option, are bogus because navigation skills are a fundamental component of basic airmanship. If a captain of a 747 can’t follow a compass heading to the correct runway then he has no business being in the cockpit. Furthermore, the crew must have known that Chiang Kai Shek airport was rundown, low tech, poorly maintained, and badly managed because they all flew out of there on a regular basis. Why then did they expect that such an inadequate system would lead them to an unfamiliar runway, at night, and under such poor visibility conditions? In our view, highly-trained pilots such as these have no excuse for failing these basic rules of navigation.
Third, evidence indicates that the principle factor compounding the pilots’ navigational mistake was that runway 5-Right looked like a normal runway and not like a partially-closed runway strewn with construction equipment. In their interviews, all of the pilots stated that the runway looked ‘operational’. And yet both the ASC and MOT reports spent considerable effort arguing if the runway edge-lights were on or off, since this would signify an active runway. But the fact is that 3 experienced pilots, with thousands of hours of commercial flying, should be able to recognize an active runway when they see it. Therefore, it is highly likely that runway 5-Right did look like an active runway that night -- and also on other occasions -- but not like the taxiing runway that it was.
From the sum of this evidence, we can only conclude that blame for this accident lies squarely at the feet of the pilots of SQ-006 because if their navigation skills were fully employed that night they would have realized that, at no point did the taxi require a 180 degree turn. By knowing that simple fact, they would have passed runway 5-Right, and perhaps been surprised that it was lit up, but carried on to runway 5-Left nonetheless. The bad taxiway lights and lack of markings would have made no difference whatsoever. Indeed, the fact that another plane took off 16 minutes prior to SQ-006 under identical conditions indicates that good navigation was employed by other crew and they were not drawn into 5-Right. But for all those pilots who got into the bad habit of navigating to runways using dead reckoning, the trap provided by runway 5-Right constituted an accident waiting to happen ‘one dark and stormy night’.
SQ006 Survivors
Re: Crash of SIA SQ-006, 31st Oct. 2000
Dear Sir or Madam,
In the mistaken belief that apportioning blame serves no purpose, both the ASC and the MOT failed to reach any clear or objective conclusion about the crash of SQ-006 at Chiang Kai Shek International Airport on October 31st 2000. We believe that failure was a result of political interference. To set the record straight, and provide some closure for the victims of this accident, we have closely studied the evidence and claims in the ASC and MOT reports, and have reached several conclusions about the cause of the crash and who was to blame.
First, it is clear from the factual evidence that the pilots did not use all the resources available to them in navigating to the runway that night when conditions clearly required it. In fact, they failed the basic requirement of any kind of navigation task—to follow a compass heading and estimate distance. That deficiency led them to make a continuous 180 degree turn onto runway 5-Right when they should have only made a 90 degree turn, continued for 200 m, and then made a final 90 degree turn onto runway 5-Left. At no stage did the taxi require a continuous 180 degree turn. Although this navigation failure was identified by the ASC, it was not adequately highlighted as the main cause of the crash. By contrast the MOT report concentrated on all the correct actions that the crew made during the taxi but conveniently ignored the action that led to the mistake. In fact, when the crew were questioned about what information they should use for taxi navigation, only the relief-pilot stated that it should include the compass to confirm the correct heading. Unfortunately, the relief-pilot played no part in navigation that night because he was preoccupied with estimating the cross-wind component.
Second, claims by the MOT that the pilots could not see signs, or that Air Traffic Control misled them, or that the taxi lights led them onto the runway and presented no other option, are bogus because navigation skills are a fundamental component of basic airmanship. If a captain of a 747 can’t follow a compass heading to the correct runway then he has no business being in the cockpit. Furthermore, the crew must have known that Chiang Kai Shek airport was rundown, low tech, poorly maintained, and badly managed because they all flew out of there on a regular basis. Why then did they expect that such an inadequate system would lead them to an unfamiliar runway, at night, and under such poor visibility conditions? In our view, highly-trained pilots such as these have no excuse for failing these basic rules of navigation.
Third, evidence indicates that the principle factor compounding the pilots’ navigational mistake was that runway 5-Right looked like a normal runway and not like a partially-closed runway strewn with construction equipment. In their interviews, all of the pilots stated that the runway looked ‘operational’. And yet both the ASC and MOT reports spent considerable effort arguing if the runway edge-lights were on or off, since this would signify an active runway. But the fact is that 3 experienced pilots, with thousands of hours of commercial flying, should be able to recognize an active runway when they see it. Therefore, it is highly likely that runway 5-Right did look like an active runway that night -- and also on other occasions -- but not like the taxiing runway that it was.
From the sum of this evidence, we can only conclude that blame for this accident lies squarely at the feet of the pilots of SQ-006 because if their navigation skills were fully employed that night they would have realized that, at no point did the taxi require a 180 degree turn. By knowing that simple fact, they would have passed runway 5-Right, and perhaps been surprised that it was lit up, but carried on to runway 5-Left nonetheless. The bad taxiway lights and lack of markings would have made no difference whatsoever. Indeed, the fact that another plane took off 16 minutes prior to SQ-006 under identical conditions indicates that good navigation was employed by other crew and they were not drawn into 5-Right. But for all those pilots who got into the bad habit of navigating to runways using dead reckoning, the trap provided by runway 5-Right constituted an accident waiting to happen ‘one dark and stormy night’.
SQ006 Survivors
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DR Paul Blanchon (Ph.D)/ SQ survivor
With reference to this Summary under: "Cause of the crash: Survivors speak out" on your web site.
""Summary
We conclude therefore that the blame for this accident lies squarely at the feet of the pilots of SQ-006 because if their navigation skills were fully employed that night they would have realized that all they needed to do was make a 90 degree turn when they reached the end of taxiway NP. At no point did the taxi require a continuous 180 degree turn. By knowing this simple fact, they would have passed 05R, and perhaps been surprised that it was lit up, but carried on to 05L nonetheless. The bad runway lights and lack of markings would have made no difference whatsoever. Indeed, the fact that another plane took off 16 minutes prior to SQ-006 under identical conditions indicates that good navigation was employed by other crew and they were not drawn into 05R. But for all those pilots who got into the bad habit of navigating to runways using dead reckoning, the visual trap provided by 05R constituted an accident waiting to happen ‘one dark and stormy night’. "
I have provided feedback on your web site with reference to the term DEAD REKONING in the highlighted paragraph.
As I mentioned in the email , I feel that the term DEAD RECKONING used in the ground taxying context is inappropriate and wrong.
Dead rekoning is a simple method of determining the position of a ship or aircraft by charting its course , speed and elapsed time (distance travelled)from a previously known position.
It is mainly an AIR navigational technique used before the advent of modern navigational aids like DME,INS and GPS based navigation systems. Such technique is not use on the ground for aircraft taxy.
In ground taxying , the whole process is conducted visually usin g airport terminal ground charts, visual cues such as singnages, markings , lightings to guide the pilot from point to point . Pilots do not use Dead Reckoning ( heading, speed and elasped time) to arrived/derive at their intented position during ground taxying.
In fact this is the first time I heard the term being use in the ground taxying context.
I concurred with your comment that :" , the visual trap provided by 05R constituted an accident waiting to happen ‘one dark and stormy night’ "
As to your other comments /conclusions under the summary , it is easy for any armchair critics or non- pilot to arrive at such conclusions. .... as such I would leave it to the more experienced amongst the pilots' community here to decide whether it deserve their further feedbacks / comments.
Regards!
Hawkeye
With reference to this Summary under: "Cause of the crash: Survivors speak out" on your web site.
""Summary
We conclude therefore that the blame for this accident lies squarely at the feet of the pilots of SQ-006 because if their navigation skills were fully employed that night they would have realized that all they needed to do was make a 90 degree turn when they reached the end of taxiway NP. At no point did the taxi require a continuous 180 degree turn. By knowing this simple fact, they would have passed 05R, and perhaps been surprised that it was lit up, but carried on to 05L nonetheless. The bad runway lights and lack of markings would have made no difference whatsoever. Indeed, the fact that another plane took off 16 minutes prior to SQ-006 under identical conditions indicates that good navigation was employed by other crew and they were not drawn into 05R. But for all those pilots who got into the bad habit of navigating to runways using dead reckoning, the visual trap provided by 05R constituted an accident waiting to happen ‘one dark and stormy night’. "
I have provided feedback on your web site with reference to the term DEAD REKONING in the highlighted paragraph.
As I mentioned in the email , I feel that the term DEAD RECKONING used in the ground taxying context is inappropriate and wrong.
Dead rekoning is a simple method of determining the position of a ship or aircraft by charting its course , speed and elapsed time (distance travelled)from a previously known position.
It is mainly an AIR navigational technique used before the advent of modern navigational aids like DME,INS and GPS based navigation systems. Such technique is not use on the ground for aircraft taxy.
In ground taxying , the whole process is conducted visually usin g airport terminal ground charts, visual cues such as singnages, markings , lightings to guide the pilot from point to point . Pilots do not use Dead Reckoning ( heading, speed and elasped time) to arrived/derive at their intented position during ground taxying.
In fact this is the first time I heard the term being use in the ground taxying context.
I concurred with your comment that :" , the visual trap provided by 05R constituted an accident waiting to happen ‘one dark and stormy night’ "
As to your other comments /conclusions under the summary , it is easy for any armchair critics or non- pilot to arrive at such conclusions. .... as such I would leave it to the more experienced amongst the pilots' community here to decide whether it deserve their further feedbacks / comments.
Regards!
Hawkeye
Last edited by hawkeye18; 5th Jun 2002 at 19:28.
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Hawkeye18
I find your comments poetic considering that two posts back you hadn't a clue what dead reckoning was! So, before we start again, lets look at that definition and others that you'll need to follow what I am going to say:
Dead Reckoning: determining one's position... by guessing the direction and distance travelled rather than by using landmarks, [maps compass bearings etc.]
Navigate: plan or direct the route or course...using instruments or maps
Navigation: process or activity of accurately ascertaining one's position and planning and following a route. Oxford English Dictionary.
I know this is a difficult pill for you to swallow, so I will sugar-coat it this time: Evidence that Foong was using dead reckoning to get to the runway include:
1. He made a 180 degree turn when none was called for. A quick glance at the Jeppesen would have told him that there was a good 200 m between r/w 05R and 05L. If he had used this map and not tried to GUESS his position he would have realized he only needed to make a 90 degree turn at the end of t/w NP and then travel 200 m before turning 90 degrees into 05L. The fact that he screwed up and turned into 05R PROOVES HE WAS GUESSING and NOT NAVIGATING using map and compass heading.
2. he failed to confirm his position using t/w signs, or r/w markings because either he could not see them due to bad viz, or he was hubristicly assuming he knew where he was...ie GUESSING! (...do you remember...guessing and not confirming your position using landmarks = dead reckoning)
3. His jocular comments with the crew about first right, next right etc shows his method of getting to the r/w involved the same technique as if he was casually taking directions from a passer by on how to get to a new store...first right at this junction and right again at the next etc. THIS IS NOT NAVIGATING, IT'S DEAD RECKONING.
I think it's pretty clear, even to a non-pilot such as myself, that Foong was guessing instead "accurately ascertaining one's position and planning and following a route" using map, compass bearing, distance travelled, signage and other landmarks. IF OTHER PILOTS THINK I'M OUT TO LUNCH HERE, PLEASE, FEEL FREE TO STEP IN ANY TIME....I'M ASSUMING THE SILENCE SO FAR IS A SIGN OF AGREEMENT?
Hawkeye18, if you want to argue further with me on this, FIRST address each one of the points above and then I will consider any other arguments you make (if you can call them that). And since you have 'discovered' who I am (...tremendous bit of sleuthing there old chap...), perhaps you can enlighten us all on your qualifications.
Dead Reckoning: determining one's position... by guessing the direction and distance travelled rather than by using landmarks, [maps compass bearings etc.]
Navigate: plan or direct the route or course...using instruments or maps
Navigation: process or activity of accurately ascertaining one's position and planning and following a route. Oxford English Dictionary.
I know this is a difficult pill for you to swallow, so I will sugar-coat it this time: Evidence that Foong was using dead reckoning to get to the runway include:
1. He made a 180 degree turn when none was called for. A quick glance at the Jeppesen would have told him that there was a good 200 m between r/w 05R and 05L. If he had used this map and not tried to GUESS his position he would have realized he only needed to make a 90 degree turn at the end of t/w NP and then travel 200 m before turning 90 degrees into 05L. The fact that he screwed up and turned into 05R PROOVES HE WAS GUESSING and NOT NAVIGATING using map and compass heading.
2. he failed to confirm his position using t/w signs, or r/w markings because either he could not see them due to bad viz, or he was hubristicly assuming he knew where he was...ie GUESSING! (...do you remember...guessing and not confirming your position using landmarks = dead reckoning)
3. His jocular comments with the crew about first right, next right etc shows his method of getting to the r/w involved the same technique as if he was casually taking directions from a passer by on how to get to a new store...first right at this junction and right again at the next etc. THIS IS NOT NAVIGATING, IT'S DEAD RECKONING.
I think it's pretty clear, even to a non-pilot such as myself, that Foong was guessing instead "accurately ascertaining one's position and planning and following a route" using map, compass bearing, distance travelled, signage and other landmarks. IF OTHER PILOTS THINK I'M OUT TO LUNCH HERE, PLEASE, FEEL FREE TO STEP IN ANY TIME....I'M ASSUMING THE SILENCE SO FAR IS A SIGN OF AGREEMENT?
Hawkeye18, if you want to argue further with me on this, FIRST address each one of the points above and then I will consider any other arguments you make (if you can call them that). And since you have 'discovered' who I am (...tremendous bit of sleuthing there old chap...), perhaps you can enlighten us all on your qualifications.
Last edited by SQ6 Survivor; 7th Jun 2002 at 18:38.
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Sorry, SQ6, but I disagree quite strongly with many of your assertions.
And that is not a valid way to go about ensuring this sort of accident does not reoccur.
- Pilots quite often "lose the plot". When they carry on, not realising they have done so, it is not hubris. It is, quite simply, a mistake.
- You clearly have no idea of how difficult it is to taxy a large aircraft, particularly in low visibility conditions. Apart from anything else, you have very little idea at all of your speed over the ground, so your idea about "dead reckoning" is totally invalid.
- In low visibility you rely very heavily upon the lines and lights. As has been shown already, all these cues were directing SQ006 away from the active runway and onto the blocked one.
- You are drawing invalid conclusions from his actions - "He was guessing" - that are not proven by the evidence.
- "Second right then first left" etc. is a perfectly acceptable way for two pilots to refer to taxying directions. It's done all the time. If you have difficulty handling this concept, then you've never spent any time whatsoever on a flight deck, and your criticisms are therefore ill-judged. Furthermore, it still doesn't make it DR.
- Particularly in low-visibility conditions, it is vitally important that the HP maintains a lookout. In the conditions at the time of this accident, it would have been even more important. When much of the signage, landmarks etc. are all obliterated by the visibility, he (unfortunately) used the visual clues available to him. These led him to the wrong runway.
And that is not a valid way to go about ensuring this sort of accident does not reoccur.
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Hug Monster,
I believe you may not have fully understood the point that SQ6 is making. He does not fully blame the Captain and does accept that the signage was a contributory cause. The point that I receive loud and clear from him is that an accident like this WILL happen again if pilots continue to taxi in low viz in the same way that this unfortunate captain did. If there is WIP and/or confusing signals around then the pilot must be particularly cautious in low viz and use all tools available to him. On this occassion surely the most important tool available was the 05L localizer. If he had concentrated on this and ignored everything else then the accident could not have happened.
The reference to him using DR only may have some merit, clearly he wasn't using the localizer, he wasn't using the Jepp chart effectively either, so what was he using? Please don't reply and say the signage because you would be ignoring fundamental airmanship principles.
I don't wish to heap blame on any particular individual as there are so many other factors that come into play. I just thought your criticism of SQ6 survivor was uncalled for. Just about all the points you raised are exactly why extreme caution was needed on that dreadful night. I hope I never have to deal with conditions like those.
I believe you may not have fully understood the point that SQ6 is making. He does not fully blame the Captain and does accept that the signage was a contributory cause. The point that I receive loud and clear from him is that an accident like this WILL happen again if pilots continue to taxi in low viz in the same way that this unfortunate captain did. If there is WIP and/or confusing signals around then the pilot must be particularly cautious in low viz and use all tools available to him. On this occassion surely the most important tool available was the 05L localizer. If he had concentrated on this and ignored everything else then the accident could not have happened.
The reference to him using DR only may have some merit, clearly he wasn't using the localizer, he wasn't using the Jepp chart effectively either, so what was he using? Please don't reply and say the signage because you would be ignoring fundamental airmanship principles.
I don't wish to heap blame on any particular individual as there are so many other factors that come into play. I just thought your criticism of SQ6 survivor was uncalled for. Just about all the points you raised are exactly why extreme caution was needed on that dreadful night. I hope I never have to deal with conditions like those.
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It wasn't "Dead Reckoning" or "DR".
SQ6 Survivor, sorry but you are guilty of a little learning being a dangerous thing.
In aviation DR navigation ONLY refers to navigation in the air, an accurate definition of which is given above in Hawkeye18's post. It is carried out using speed, compass headings and a stop watch and is in no way relevant to taxying an aircraft on the ground.
Taxying at an airfield is carried out in accordance with ATC instructions/directions, reference to an airfield chart AND by following the signs, lights and markings pertinent to the route required - in the case of SQ6 the lights, signs and ground markings were incorrect for the operations in progress and therefore a contibutory factor to the accident.
CKS airport will naturally want to minimise the amount that their failure is deemed to have contributed to the accident as this will also minimise the extent of their Underwriters liability to pay out under their airport insurance, ( an insurance that the Taiwanese authorities may have elected to underwrite themselves rather than go to the international aviation insurance market).
If you are planning on going to court I strongly suggest you should delete any reference to "Dead Reckoning" or "DR" as a sharp lawyer will tear you to bits.
In aviation DR navigation ONLY refers to navigation in the air, an accurate definition of which is given above in Hawkeye18's post. It is carried out using speed, compass headings and a stop watch and is in no way relevant to taxying an aircraft on the ground.
Taxying at an airfield is carried out in accordance with ATC instructions/directions, reference to an airfield chart AND by following the signs, lights and markings pertinent to the route required - in the case of SQ6 the lights, signs and ground markings were incorrect for the operations in progress and therefore a contibutory factor to the accident.
CKS airport will naturally want to minimise the amount that their failure is deemed to have contributed to the accident as this will also minimise the extent of their Underwriters liability to pay out under their airport insurance, ( an insurance that the Taiwanese authorities may have elected to underwrite themselves rather than go to the international aviation insurance market).
If you are planning on going to court I strongly suggest you should delete any reference to "Dead Reckoning" or "DR" as a sharp lawyer will tear you to bits.
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G Khan,
You are arguing semantics nothing more. If SQ6 wishes to call the taxi technique on that fatefull night DR then he is possibly correct in doing so. The OED definition certainly would support his view. The tools available to the crew were not fully utilised viz a viz the 05L localizer and the Jepp charts. SQ6 has obviously looked at the charts and has seen that the turn onto 05L requires a 90 degree right a straight bit and then another 90 degree right turn. It does not show a continuous 180 turn from the taxi way to 05L. The co-pilot did mention the PVD had not unshuttered and that should have meant something don't you agree? I am unfamiliar with the PVD fitted to SQ aircraft but I would assume that the ILS has to be tuned in order for it to work. Therefore a raw data display of localizer deflection should also have been available. If the PVD is armed by selection of the runway in the FMS and does not require manual tuning on the NAV RAD page then perhaps the SQ procedures should be changed to require manual tuning of the ILS for low viz procedures. Can someone familiar with the SQ low viz taxi technique (pertaining to use of the LOC) let us know the procedure used prior to this accident and that currently in use now?
You are arguing semantics nothing more. If SQ6 wishes to call the taxi technique on that fatefull night DR then he is possibly correct in doing so. The OED definition certainly would support his view. The tools available to the crew were not fully utilised viz a viz the 05L localizer and the Jepp charts. SQ6 has obviously looked at the charts and has seen that the turn onto 05L requires a 90 degree right a straight bit and then another 90 degree right turn. It does not show a continuous 180 turn from the taxi way to 05L. The co-pilot did mention the PVD had not unshuttered and that should have meant something don't you agree? I am unfamiliar with the PVD fitted to SQ aircraft but I would assume that the ILS has to be tuned in order for it to work. Therefore a raw data display of localizer deflection should also have been available. If the PVD is armed by selection of the runway in the FMS and does not require manual tuning on the NAV RAD page then perhaps the SQ procedures should be changed to require manual tuning of the ILS for low viz procedures. Can someone familiar with the SQ low viz taxi technique (pertaining to use of the LOC) let us know the procedure used prior to this accident and that currently in use now?