BA245 - Insufficient fuel to divert

[Admiral346]

Wirbelsturm

1 LH flight, no company restrictions on loaded fuel, just a minor niggle of max operating aircraft limits, 13+ hours at max endurance to an airfield the other side of the world with an acceptable TAF both for the destination and the diversion resulting in a declared fuel Mayday due to the weather forecast being inadequate/inaccurate? = GOOD decision (by the crew).

No,

a fishy TAF on the other end of the world, and only 10 min Poss Extra, and taking it, is a really bad decision.

It is the decision of taking the wishfully thought up flightplan from a profit maximising company.
How about leaving some cargo behind? Might that not give you some time (=fuel) to find a better solution down there?

And, your analysis of the weather phenomena at EZE is quite correct - so why leave FRA with only 10 min extra?

You knew better...

[bubbers44]

Of course landing at minimum fuel at the alternate decisions have to be made before descent in case the alternate also goes down as I said in a previous post landing in Colombia ending up in another country. Having minimum fuel at an airport with an NDB approach as an alternate with below minimums wx doesn't get it. Go someplace that is safe.

[Wirbelsturm]

No,

a fishy TAF on the other end of the world, and only 10 min Poss Extra, and taking it, is a really bad decision.

It is the decision of taking the wishfully thought up flightplan from a profit maximising company.
How about leaving some cargo behind? Might that not give you some time (=fuel) to find a better solution down there?

And, your analysis of the weather phenomena at EZE is quite correct - so why leave FRA with only 10 min extra?

You knew better...

Not really.

There was nothing in the forecast that necessitated offloading either passengers or cargo. The primary aim of any airline is to make profit. Both the briefed forecast and the later forecast for both destination and diversion had full acceptable limits for the CAT III approach with an improving picture and acceptable forecast time window limits for CAT II.

Where would be the justification for reducing revenue be? Certainly the 'splash and dash' option would have been an interesting sell to the management as a fuel dump would be required to achieve MLW into GIG!

The company wants the aircraft at a ton or so below max landing weight if it could. The fuel burn wouldn't allow for the carriage of large diversion fuel if the booked revenue load is carried. The difficulties of trailing a heavy 777 into South American airfields are enormous. Cordoba is too far away and Montevideo has the same weather. It's a brave decision to ditch payload based upon a possibility when statistical evidence shows that the chance of the posted event happening is extremely slim. Don't forget it's a daily service.

Start the approach, get and RVR of >200m and then don't ask/request/receive any below 1000' and the approach is fine. We are paid to make decisions and calculate risk. The decisions, in this case, were correct based upon the information presented to the crew (not me by the way). They were also correct for two other companies aircraft from two other continents. What they got when they got there was unforecast and thus, in respect to the local forecaster, unexpected.

We, as a company, operate to masses of airports around the globe and whilst the route information manual is good it doesn't contain every piece of local knowledge on the fleet otherwise it would be the size of the encyclopedia Brittanica. All pilots can't be expected to know the nuances of every airport as they may not have been there before therefore you brief and decide on what you know.

There was no fundamental error in any decisions made by the crew. They just had to deal with an uncomfortable situation when they got there brought about by inadequate met forecasting.

[Wellington Bomber]

Now I am not rated to cat3, only cat 2 but there are so many things that can screw up even a cat2. Namely weather limits, aircraft working properly and also the destinations equipment, somebody even mentioned about the reliability of EZE and not mentionining equipment out status.

But somebody was driven down a blind alley, and eventually it has come out.

You would not have a job if you did this, because management would not like it, so what. Easy sat flying a desk, its my arse up there not yours.

Somebody mentioned 3 other airlines made the same decision, Yes, but 1 at least was from a different part of the world and coming in a different direction. Just because they all made the same decision does not make it the right decision, and how many times Have I sat in the hold somewhere with upto 8 other aircraft,going round in circles for ages, when eventually somebody pipes up I am diverting, all of a sudden everybody does the same they just have not got the bottle to go first.

[Bengerman]

Admiral346,

It is the decision of taking the wishfully thought up flightplan from a profit maximising company.
How about leaving some cargo behind? Might that not give you some time (=fuel) to find a better solution down there?

That's a good idea.........or is it?

Just so that you have the right scenario, the purpose of an airline is, first and foremost, to make money for the shareholders.......now that may seem a radical idea in an industry where profits are something of a rarity, (even in a "profit maximising company") but that is the truth.

And as to leaving sme cargo behind, another top scheme! Why not leave it all behind and get lots more gas on, hey, lets dump some passengers too so that we can fill the tanks to bursting......great. Now we can land with fuel for diversion, hold for 2 hours and fly the trip at FL60, brilliant!

What do you mean? I'm unemployed? The airline's gone bust????

Get bloody real!!

[Admiral346]

I believe that the thinking of the CPTs obviously is drifting more and more towards the max profit scheme of the management, and that seems to be so at many airlines.

What does a forecast of prob30 tempo fog mean? It means that there might be fog or not. Now I have seen these forecasts turn towards the ugly many times, and I always carry fuel for an out then. Even at my homebase, and especially at the "I am not so sure" fields like EZE. During early spring/ late winter time close to a river.

And the "If you don't ask me no questions I'll tell you no lies" like the "what wind do you need?" in Italy is a trick to slip into a field, but it is not what I would like to base my fuel load on. You can make it work that way, but it is not the statistical 10 to the -8th power we are supposed to work with at LH.

I'd still leave some cargo and take fuel, as I have seen done during my time on the long haul flights as an FO.

So what Wirbelsturm described is legal, but it still looks like a gringo mistake to me. Just like the BA. Not intentionally miscalculated, but something that can easily be avoided by a set of balls.

[BOAC]

As said frequently here, many of our posters have no knowledge of airline ops or sometimes even of flying.

It appears that here, just like RY/MAD/VLC/MAYDAY- that the well-known 'Rule 1', sh!t happens' - well, happened.

No airline can operate successfully if, every trip, Captains are putting on 'extra fuel' in case the met man screws up and both dest and any alternates go 'out' or a LAN declares a Mayday ahead of you on diversion. Then of course, there is the 'unforeseen' emergency that I might have which would require another 20 minutes to run the QRH etc - better add that 'in case'?

As I said at the start, we do NOT know what happened in EZE - eg we have no met for alternates. I suspect that if BA's airfield brief does NOT contain this possibility it soon will.

[Admiral346]

Well, BOAC, then I better just shut up.

[FERetd]

Profit or Safety

Wirbelsturm Quote:- "The primary aim of any airline is to make profit."

You are right, of course.

Although most airlines quote "Safety" as being their number one priority.

Safety margins are being gradually eroded in the search for profit - FTLs for example.

[andrasz]

Safety margins are being gradually eroded in the search for profit ...

This sounds like a great headline, however if you look at the safety statistics, on the whole quite the contrary is happening. SOPs, technlogy, automation and safety audits have made aviation much safer since deregulation, despite all the financial pressures bought about by free for all competition. Safety and push for profits are actually complementary - as someone famously said "if you think prevention is expensive, try having an accident". Lower life forms like MOL know this very well - you can abuse your customers all you like as long as tickets are dirt cheap and safety is not compromised. You can bash FR for a number of reasons, but their safety stats are no worse than any other european mainline operator. You may be right in assuming that all management cares about is profits, but any half-competent airline management will know that nothing hurts profits more than a well publicised accident.

The bad news for the profession is that SOPs+automation+shorter training is actually cheaper and safer than 40+ years hand flying experience.

[Wirbelsturm]

Airlines AIM:

Maximise profitability and return for the investors.

Airlines Priority:

Safe,expedicious transport of paying public to their destination.

We aren't in this business for free and, like all businesses, there is an element of risk. If we had the managers making all the decisions instead of the Captains then the job would be paid alot less. One minor incident in thousands of perfectly normal, safe flights is not going to cause anyone with clout to bat an eyelid. To be honest calling a 'mayday' in South America, India, China etc. when you have a problem is a good way of getting the attention of ATC. Remember that you can always downgrade a Mayday, you just have to follow it up with the relevant paperwork.

I don't see any comeback from this incident apart from a minor update in the Rim, a line on the airfield brief and a rebrief of the EZE met services. The crews took the fuel and payload adequate to complete the flight within the strictures laid down by the companies fuel policy. 4 pilots agreed at the briefing that this fuel was acceptable. They took what extra they could on a full flight without sacrificing revenue, there is little margin for extra fuel on this flight apart from that needed for the destination diversion (acceptable weather at time of briefing). Unforecast weather deterioration screwed them over.

So what Wirbelsturm described is legal, but it still looks like a gringo mistake to me. Just like the BA. Not intentionally miscalculated, but something that can easily be avoided by a set of balls.

It's perfectly legal.

What 'gringo' mistake? The airfield was forecasting acceptable weather limits for both a CAT IIIa approach and a CAT II, possibly, for the landing block, a CAT I visual. The diversion at Montevideo was forecasting exactly the same.

Perhaps blaming the pilots from three companies for not 'epecting the unexpected' and not knowing the local weather effects could have been mitigated by the local weather forecasters, who live there for crying out loud, knowing their own area and acting accordingly on the TAF's.

I am certain (and I certainly would) that revenue payload would have been reduced if the TAF's had accurately reflected what the weather actually was. They didn't. The fuel decision can only be made on the information that the Captain and crew receives, not on if's, but's and maybes.

No 'balls' needed, our company managers stand by the Captains decision IF the situation warrents it. The only 'Gringo' mistake was from an inadequate forecaster who couldn't get a basic forecast right. Perhaps they should be the ones answering the questions?

As to the FTL's, time will tell but for the foreseeable future there will be no change to the crewing levels on our LH services. (EZE 4 crew 2 Capt, 2 Fo) after which I will, hopefully, be retired.

[BOAC]

Admiral - my post was not aimed at you, and yours in fact was not there when I composed mine, but having read your post......................

Let me test your 'knowledge' as a 'long-haul FO'

1) What is the met definition of fog?
2) What problems do you (regularly?) foresee at a CATIIIa field with a CATIIIa a/c with a prob30 Tempo 900m and CATI forecasts at dest and alt?
3) If this bothers you, have you thought of a different profession?
4) For the benefit of those of us who have the knowledge and experience, that we might perhaps learn more, what exactly do you consider was "the gringo mistake"?
5) How much extra (%) over FP do you regularly uplift 'in case' (or, of course, ask for as an FO)?

[DOVES]

Splash and go

wiggy
Quote:
I would much rather stop en-route for a splash and dash than have my sphincter twitching overhead a beacon, put it that way

OK can I ask given the route where do you suggest this splash and go is performed? GIG/GRU are the obvious candidates but given the limiting weights on the 777-200 it's not impossible you'd be abeam or even south of GIG before you're down to Max landing weight (unless you're going to dump fuel)

If over GIG you have not yet reached MLW why not to establish a decision point somewhere between GIG and EZE on which, based on consumption and weather conditions, to decide whether to continue to destination or to do the 'splash and go' back in GIG. We all know that the weather in Buenos Aires is similar if not the same as in the planned alternate Montevideo, and then when conditions become critical it’s as you have no alternate.
Just my two cents.

[Wirbelsturm]

Doves,

There was only one actual:

SAEZ 311030Z 00000KT 0100 R11/0175 FG FEW007 07/07 Q1017


that put the airfield out of limits for the planned approach. The surface actual prior was 200m for the CAT III approach and the actual after was:

SAEZ 311127Z 00000KT 0800 R11/1100N FG NSC 08/07 Q1018


1100m to the north of the field. After that the weather rapidly improved.

My point is that the weather was only out of limits for the planned approach for a very short window. It unfortunately happend to be the window that 3 LH aircraft arrived at possibly exacerbating the situation!

There doesn't seem to be a need to plot the PNR between GIG and EZE. Operationally it is an acceptable risk. EZE needs to get it's forecasting in gear.

[FERetd]

The Real Deal

andraz Quote:- "The bad news for the profession is that SOPs+automation+shorter training is actually cheaper and safer than 40+ years hand flying experience."

Thirty two years (the last twenty with a Legacy carrier) and 16,000 hours as a Flight Engineer tends to make me stick by my statement.

So shorter training is safer? It is certainly cheaper! Shorter training tends to be aimed at getting students to pass the exams, not particularly to understand the topic. Computer Based Training - where you are on your own until an instructor arrives later in the day to see if you have any questions - if you can remember them.

And what about non fully type rated Second Officers? Are they safer? They are certainly cheaper!

You mention Safety Audits. We could discuss these forewarned exercises at length. I am an auditor. We could talk about the annual morning visits to the Operators by the Regulators. If the regulators were doing their job properly, my job would be a lot easier. (Note, not all Regulators).

As for your comments on automation you might want to discuss that with Air France. Automation is good, but so is 40 years of hand flying experience - which I note you do not have. This topic has been discussed at length in a previous forum.

And you make no mention of FTLs. I can tell you from experience that lip service is paid to circadian rythyms and adequate rest periods (e.g. "rest periods of between 12 hours and 30 hours should be avoided whenever possible.") Certainly the OMA states that these "should" be taken into account, but never "shall" be taken into account and seldom are.

Certainly, equipment has improved immensely, TCAS, GPWS, FMS etc. and engines are extremely reliable, all of which I agree has improved safety. But a lot of today's equipment is required to be fitted to aircraft and is reflected in the M.E.L. This cannot be manipulated by Management.

I do not think that 25 minute turn arounds are conducive to enhancing safety. One person doing the walk round and fuel while the other does the weather and flight plan does not make for good CRM, in my book. There should be more to it than "Fuel's on and weather's good". - I have seen it happen.

If you have not experienced any of the above in you career, count yourself lucky. It is only going to get worse.

[fmgc]

My goodness there is some crap talked about here and a lot of it by supposedly experienced pilots (retired or not).

Those of you that weren't there and think this crew screwed up just SHUT THE UP! YOU ARE IGNORANT PEASANTS!

Black & Brown, you really are a fool with your 250 hours A319 time and no idea of what a command decision is!!

[Yaw String]

Here here!!!

(from the back of the stalls, thus ducking the rotten tomatoes!)

[DOVES]

Splash and go

If we consider that:
1) Buenos Aires has multiple runways but not independent one each other,
2) The usually planned alternate: Montevideo is so close that the weather conditions are the same all over:
It can be said without fear of contradiction that EZE is an isolated aerodrome and so the following Articles shall apply:
Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 1.375
In-flight fuel management(b) In-flight fuel management.
(1) If, as a result of an in-flight fuel check, the expected fuel remaining on arrival at the destination is less than the required alternate fuel plus final reserve fuel, the commander must take into account the traffic and the operational conditions prevailing at the destination aerodrome, along the diversion route to an alternate aerodrome and at the destination alternate aerodrome, when deciding whether to proceed to the destination aerodrome or to divert, so as to land with not less than final reserve fuel.
(2) On a flight to an isolated aerodrome:
The last possible point of diversion to any available en-route alternate aerodrome shall be determined. Before reaching this point, the commander shall assess the fuel expected to remain overhead the isolated aerodrome, the weather conditions, and the traffic and operational conditions prevailing at the isolated aerodrome and at any of the en-route aerodromes before deciding whether to proceed to the isolated aerodrome or to divert to an en-route aerodrome.
(See AMC to Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 1.375(b)(2))]
AMC to Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 1.375(b)(2)
Flight to an isolated aerodrome
When approaching the last possible point of diversion to an available en-route aerodrome, unless the fuel expected to remain overhead the isolated aerodrome is at least equal to the Additional Fuel calculated as being required for the flight, or unless two separate runways are available at the isolated aerodrome and the expected weather conditions at that aerodrome comply with those specified for planning in JAR-OPS 1.297(b)(2) [...], the commander should not proceed to the isolated aerodrome. In such circumstances, the commander should instead proceed to the en-route alternate unless according to information he has at that time, such a diversion appears inadvisable.

[ETOPS]

I've just read our colleagues report on this which has been published internally. As I suspected, the "reporting" was wide of the mark and thus the majority of the discussions here equally flawed.

I would have handled this situation in an identical fashion and fully support the decisions this crew took on the day.

[BOAC]

I've just read our colleagues report on this which has been published internally. As I suspected, the "reporting" was wide of the mark and thus the majority of the discussions here equally flawed.

- as predicted. We need also to remember that the same may well apply to the Ryanair MAD/VLC incidents. We just do not have the facts in both cases.