11 miles out @ 530 feet AGL
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BOAC, I couldn't agree more, the Radalt provides another layer of SA that is often missed. It is only useful if it is adequately briefed beforehand. I seem to remember that many high energy approaches stem from those approaches flown over high ground descending to the runway. (ILS 19L+R into Oslo?)
Sadly, in this case, the obvious SA cues were missed. There are those who have done it and those that are going to!
Sadly, in this case, the obvious SA cues were missed. There are those who have done it and those that are going to!
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FlightPathOBN:
What box?
In any case, Jeppesen charts don't show obstacle clearance. The parenthetical altitudes are height above the charted runway elevation of 1,675, msl.
I can only speak to TERPs, but initial approach segments in designated mountainous areas (DMAs) require a minimum of 1,000 feet of ROC, not 2,000. Feeder routes and airways in DMAs generally require a minimum ROC of 2,000.
The initial approach segments are governed by the STAR charts for UIII, which state "MEA under radar control."
Just curious, but at the IF, the box should have a min 1000'ROC...and if considered mountainous, a 2000' ROC
In any case, Jeppesen charts don't show obstacle clearance. The parenthetical altitudes are height above the charted runway elevation of 1,675, msl.
I can only speak to TERPs, but initial approach segments in designated mountainous areas (DMAs) require a minimum of 1,000 feet of ROC, not 2,000. Feeder routes and airways in DMAs generally require a minimum ROC of 2,000.
The initial approach segments are governed by the STAR charts for UIII, which state "MEA under radar control."
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Originally Posted by FPOBN
Just curious, but at the IF, the box should have a min 1000'ROC...and if considered mountainous, a 2000' ROC
What's the point? I am as courteous with our special-friend "BOAC", as he was with "Wirbelsturm". Yes, I missed the fact, that the VOR/DME is slightly past the threshold, so DME 8.7 is in fact 7.7 NM from the runway - not a big difference! 8 * 330 = 2640ft + 1670ft = 4310ft. That is pretty close and good enough for a rough cross-check. I was hoping that you are doing that as well for each and every approach in IMC!
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Well..the box would be the FMC, I really think that the question, did it give prox warnings should have been a clue...
You are killing me here... The required obstacle clearance is 1000 feet in non-mountainous terrain and 2000 feet in designated mountainous areas.
http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/...50d_signed.pdf
The box, okay the FMC, has the segment ROC programmed in...its min segment altitudes...
what do you think the prox warnings are based on?
There is the foundation of the regulations, and the flight management systems on the aircraft.
There is also the precipitous terrain prediction within the FMC that must be accounted for in the procedure design, perhaps that is for another day...
You are killing me here... The required obstacle clearance is 1000 feet in non-mountainous terrain and 2000 feet in designated mountainous areas.
http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/...50d_signed.pdf
what do you think the prox warnings are based on?
There is the foundation of the regulations, and the flight management systems on the aircraft.
There is also the precipitous terrain prediction within the FMC that must be accounted for in the procedure design, perhaps that is for another day...
Last edited by FlightPathOBN; 21st Jul 2012 at 20:02.
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FlightPathOBN:
You are showing en route low-altitude airway criteria. I thought we were speaking of the segments of an instrument approach procedure.
You are killing me here... The required obstacle clearance is 1000 feet in non-mountainous terrain and 2000 feet in designated mountainous areas.
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These are the segments of an approach procedure...
final approach ROC tapers from 200 min to 500' ROC at the FAF, Correct?
Havent you ever wondered in the calculations what sets the location of the FAF?
Its when the ROC taper hits 500' for the next segment...NOW you know.
Intermediate segments are 500' ROC, and Initial segments are 1000' ROC unless mountainous, then 2000' ROC...
Correct?
Now try to explain, the precipitous terrain algorithm...
final approach ROC tapers from 200 min to 500' ROC at the FAF, Correct?
Havent you ever wondered in the calculations what sets the location of the FAF?
Its when the ROC taper hits 500' for the next segment...NOW you know.
Intermediate segments are 500' ROC, and Initial segments are 1000' ROC unless mountainous, then 2000' ROC...
Correct?
Now try to explain, the precipitous terrain algorithm...
Last edited by FlightPathOBN; 21st Jul 2012 at 23:54.
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FBO:
Correct as to intermediates. Not correct as to initial approach segments.
Intermediate segments are 500' ROC, and Initial segments are 1000' ROC unless mountainous, then 2000' ROC...
Correct?
Correct?
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BOAC:
The intermediate and initial approach segments of all approaches have the same obstacle clearance, whether ILS, VOR, RNAV, or other.
The STARs and ILS at UIII are in the RNAV database and can be flown with LNAV except for the final approach segment.
The STARs at UIII take the place of the initial approach segments for the ILSes.
In any case, I can only assume FPOBN thinks this was an RNAV procedure and not an ILS?
The STARs and ILS at UIII are in the RNAV database and can be flown with LNAV except for the final approach segment.
The STARs at UIII take the place of the initial approach segments for the ILSes.
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Yes, but why do we appear to think they would be using any vertical profile in 'the box' - might they not just be 'flying' it, and thus a million 'segments' would be irrelevant? The only JEPP plates I have, 2010, do not even have a whiff of any RNAV waypoints. Does the Dec 11 set have?
Discussion of RNAV 'criteria' is all well and good if relevant. What about an approach NOT using the 'box'? Do we know? What then? Good old 'airmanship', eh?
Discussion of RNAV 'criteria' is all well and good if relevant. What about an approach NOT using the 'box'? Do we know? What then? Good old 'airmanship', eh?
BOAC;
Just checked - no, there are no RNAV charts for UIII in the Dec/11 charts. There is the note that LOC-Only approaches are NOT AUTHORIZED for 12/30, though the restriction likely doesn't apply in this incident.
Just checked - no, there are no RNAV charts for UIII in the Dec/11 charts. There is the note that LOC-Only approaches are NOT AUTHORIZED for 12/30, though the restriction likely doesn't apply in this incident.
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BOAC:
There are no RNAV procedures per se for the airport.
The ILS IAP in question (Runway 30) can be flown using LNAV from the en route environment, through the applicable STAR, to the FAF, at which point the ILS must be used. "New airmanship" requires RNAV (LNAV) be used in this manner with a modern AB or Boeing.
I would load all the charts if this forum software made such easy like other fora.
Discussion of RNAV 'criteria' is all well and good if relevant. What about an approach NOT using the 'box'? Do we know? What then? Good old 'airmanship', eh?
The ILS IAP in question (Runway 30) can be flown using LNAV from the en route environment, through the applicable STAR, to the FAF, at which point the ILS must be used. "New airmanship" requires RNAV (LNAV) be used in this manner with a modern AB or Boeing.
I would load all the charts if this forum software made such easy like other fora.
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Thanks, PJ - as expected. So, a ballroom full of FMC 'ROC's would not have made any difference. We can surmise
a) They set up a home made RNAV 'approach' and it went drastically wrong
b) They screwed up a simple ILS for inexplicable reasons (was it actually 's'?)
c) There was a malfunction which caused the a/c to dive towards the ground
Aterpster - 'New airmanship' - no such thing, I'm afraid. Flying still requires 'old airmanship' not to be forgotten in the starry-eyed gaze at the magentas, whilst, of course, using the facilities to the best advantage.
a) They set up a home made RNAV 'approach' and it went drastically wrong
b) They screwed up a simple ILS for inexplicable reasons (was it actually 's'?)
c) There was a malfunction which caused the a/c to dive towards the ground
Aterpster - 'New airmanship' - no such thing, I'm afraid. Flying still requires 'old airmanship' not to be forgotten in the starry-eyed gaze at the magentas, whilst, of course, using the facilities to the best advantage.
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BOAC:
Thus, why I put it in quotes. I wouldn't be surprised that both you and I started in this business about the same time.
There are, as you know, too many new airmen who know very little about airmanship.
Aterpster - 'New airmanship' - no such thing, I'm afraid. Flying still requires 'old airmanship' not to be forgotten in the starry-eyed gaze at the magentas, whilst, of course, using the facilities to the best advantage.
There are, as you know, too many new airmen who know very little about airmanship.
aterpster, BOAC;
Re "the new airmanship" - it's why I wrote this only-slightly-off-topic comment in the AF447 Thread #9.
Having someone or something other than oneself do one's thinking and one's work in place of one, results in losing one's ability to do such thinking and such work. The discussion and the many solutions posited to counter such effects begins at a point after one has accepted someone or something else's notion of what to do and why. The discussion thus becomes lost in details of this or that untoward single outcome, be it a medical, aviation, nuclear, architectural or economical "accident" as in the structural failures leading up to October, 2008.
Some say, Technology-'R'-Us, rather than the other way around. That doesn't mean we eschew such brilliant technical developments; without even any debate we know our technologies make life longer, better and safer, and those are values our society holds.
The enchantment, mainly on the part of owners/managers but not line crews, with the subtstantial benefits of computer automation is justified primarily through economical metrics especially in financially-challenging times, with vague notions of "safety" bringing up the hindmost. Automation was an economic solution, not an operational one.
But the effect of not doing something for a long period of time (physically or mentally) is that of losing one's edge, one's way of thinking and and one's habits.
That has long since become a vicious circle because the traditional goals of "standards, training and checking", the ones that a host of old guys from this and other professions who know "old airmanship", (and "old medicine", "old engineering", etc), have shifted towards skills and thinking in operating automation itself, and not the old-fashioned skills required in actually operating the system, (or machine, etc).
Knowing one's altitude and distance while on an approach is a basic skill which has been marginalized by FMS systems and CRT displays. I recall flying a DC9 in a fleet that had only one DME because the company was too cheap to put in the second DME on the F/O's side. One ALWAYS knew where one was on the approach because it took work and a solid engagement with the airplane and its constantly-changing situation to do so.
Was it less safe? Of course it was, compared to present capabilities and displays. So why do we see crews today continue an ILS approach with all the information available to them including an accurate, detailed, scaled map display showing exactly where the airport is, the FAF is and even the required crossing altitudes for the FAF, etc?
Ninety-nine percent of the time it isn't a problem and a successful if not transparent shift in thinking has taken place and one just carries on. But where accidents occur, the question can't be answered in traditional ways. Recognition that a fundamental shift in cognitive behaviour is required to work and perform successfully in highly-technical systems is needed first, before solutions, primarily for training and checking, emerge.
PJ2
Re "the new airmanship" - it's why I wrote this only-slightly-off-topic comment in the AF447 Thread #9.
Having someone or something other than oneself do one's thinking and one's work in place of one, results in losing one's ability to do such thinking and such work. The discussion and the many solutions posited to counter such effects begins at a point after one has accepted someone or something else's notion of what to do and why. The discussion thus becomes lost in details of this or that untoward single outcome, be it a medical, aviation, nuclear, architectural or economical "accident" as in the structural failures leading up to October, 2008.
Some say, Technology-'R'-Us, rather than the other way around. That doesn't mean we eschew such brilliant technical developments; without even any debate we know our technologies make life longer, better and safer, and those are values our society holds.
The enchantment, mainly on the part of owners/managers but not line crews, with the subtstantial benefits of computer automation is justified primarily through economical metrics especially in financially-challenging times, with vague notions of "safety" bringing up the hindmost. Automation was an economic solution, not an operational one.
But the effect of not doing something for a long period of time (physically or mentally) is that of losing one's edge, one's way of thinking and and one's habits.
That has long since become a vicious circle because the traditional goals of "standards, training and checking", the ones that a host of old guys from this and other professions who know "old airmanship", (and "old medicine", "old engineering", etc), have shifted towards skills and thinking in operating automation itself, and not the old-fashioned skills required in actually operating the system, (or machine, etc).
Knowing one's altitude and distance while on an approach is a basic skill which has been marginalized by FMS systems and CRT displays. I recall flying a DC9 in a fleet that had only one DME because the company was too cheap to put in the second DME on the F/O's side. One ALWAYS knew where one was on the approach because it took work and a solid engagement with the airplane and its constantly-changing situation to do so.
Was it less safe? Of course it was, compared to present capabilities and displays. So why do we see crews today continue an ILS approach with all the information available to them including an accurate, detailed, scaled map display showing exactly where the airport is, the FAF is and even the required crossing altitudes for the FAF, etc?
Ninety-nine percent of the time it isn't a problem and a successful if not transparent shift in thinking has taken place and one just carries on. But where accidents occur, the question can't be answered in traditional ways. Recognition that a fundamental shift in cognitive behaviour is required to work and perform successfully in highly-technical systems is needed first, before solutions, primarily for training and checking, emerge.
PJ2