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Another look at the Ethiopean Airlines 737-800 crash at Beirut.

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Another look at the Ethiopean Airlines 737-800 crash at Beirut.

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Old 25th Mar 2012, 16:45
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sabenaboy

Time to let it go if the post is no longer in evidence. else you will be stoking a fire
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Old 25th Mar 2012, 17:11
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Very true point Northbeach. If the panel lights on the MCP are dim, it's hard to see if the A/P engagement bar is illuminated. When flying in turbulence and moving the control wheel in every direction to maintain stable flight, the A/P will be difficult at best to engage. With no fault of the F/O... his head could have been down doing paperwork, and not looking at the proper engagement indication either.

My confirmation of A/P engagement, besides the illumination of the A/P engagement light is a bit of a thump in the control wheel as the servos take over.

The older anolog autopilots of the -200 day were no problem at all, as lever would never pass the CWS position.
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Old 25th Mar 2012, 17:27
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Well, you can engage the autopilot in any untrimmed state or in turbulences, however in a very non-intuitive way that is certainly not advised at all. Simply let go of all controls and it will engage. It does not as long as any user input force acts on the controls. Not clever, but possible. However a pilot should be able to fly in those conditions.

Anyway, with that kind of background i was surprised that he wasn't able to simply fly it, would have thought that any previous ag pilot knows much worse conditions than those he was in.
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Old 25th Mar 2012, 17:34
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Denti, I suspect in that case the AP would drop right out again though, that was demonstrated to me
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Old 25th Mar 2012, 17:41
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From what i have seen in the recent past, many aircrew cannot fly a simple departure without flight director.
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Old 26th Mar 2012, 10:17
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There is an interesting human factors aspect to this. On the plus side the captain was an experienced pilot. He had done lots of ag flying followed by years working his way through various transport aircraft including long haul. On the negative side he was a relatively inexperienced captain and the actual amount of instrument hand flying he had done on jets may not have been all that high.

So he was not just a button pusher. However when tested by adverse weather, probably somewhat tired and paired with an inexperienced FO he demonstrated conclusively that he was unable to cope. It is possible that this would have been the outcome whatever amount of training he had received. However it is probable that more focus on basic instrument flying would have helped him reach a better outcome.

My company at least seems to be moving in this direction as I have noticed a distinct tendency in recent sims towards fmc failure, less magenta line following and more autopilot off instrument flying. Anyone else seen the same or am I being too optimistic?
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Old 26th Mar 2012, 10:29
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Thank you Centaurus for starting this thread, and also jet-lover for his frank and revealing contribution.

I too find it quite strange that a former Ag pilot had difficulty hand-flying, however consider this; most Ag flying is conducted in daylight, using visual cues outside the aircraft (yes, I know that night cotton work in Australia is different, but my understanding is that the Captain mainly flew Agcats in Ethiopia), whereas the task he struggled with was a night instrument departure - 2 vastly different scenarios.

I share the concerns of many contributors here regarding the automation mindset. In my view it is better to learn from the ground up; i.e. learn the basics first and then add varying levels of automation.

Additionally the current "training to a price" mentality often produces pilots who arrive at the actual aircraft not knowing such basic things as how to adjust the rudder pedals or seat position, or how to open their cockpit window in an emergency. This worries me.
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Old 26th Mar 2012, 16:40
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F/O... his head could have been down doing paperwork,
I certainly hope not, that early on in the climb and while the other guy is hand flying (and not well might I add) seems to be a bad time to be distracted with non-essential stuff like paperwork.

Additionally the current "training to a price" mentality often produces pilots who arrive at the actual aircraft not knowing such basic things as how to adjust the rudder pedals or seat position, or how to open their cockpit window in an emergency. This worries me.
Who cares about rudder pedal adjustment and seat position. You learn these things in a microsecond during IOE, that is what it is for. As far as opening the emergency exits, I have a hard time believing any airline would not be required to provide the emergency training in which all exit on the aircraft need to be demonstrated and practiced. Then again, have never flown for an African carrier.

This accident is just a prime example of bad basic skills. Skills that should be acquired early on and be solidly comfortable with. That is why flight hours has no bearing on it. It can happen to a low time pilot or a high time pilot. Today's economics and lack of regulation have led to a perfect storm where you see very poor training, coupled with very low experience. This accident had a little of both, other LOC examples, like Colgan Q400 in Buffalo, had one (Quality of Training).

The problem with today's airliners is that they have been built to hide "poor training", or if you will, compensate for it with automatics and other safety systems. As others mentioned, older automatics would not even engage until in clean config or even at cruise altitude. Guess what? you can't fly on instruments, you never get off the ground. How's that for weeding out the incompetent.

Today's training focuses on minimum AP engagement height. Don't get me wrong, I think the automatics are a great tool, I just think it is being used in the wrong way and it will never be able to replace good training on a bad day. The problem is that it is very good at replacing bad training on most days, and unfortunately, I think it has reached the acceptable or tolerable aircraft loss rate. Sure, there is a little outrage, but the majority of the flying public forgets in a weeks time and nothing gets done.
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Old 26th Mar 2012, 17:02
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From Tom!
Flight Safety Foundation: Home Page

I would like to thank Tom! for the most excellent link.
Two very good articles, one called "Spiral Dive" and one called "Toxic Captain." The former addresses the Beirut crash, and the latter a crash in Cameroon.

Well written with concise summaries.

To answer a question placed further up "would you fly on Air France" I have little opportunity.

I have, however, advised my brother, who frequently travels internationally, to take AF off of his list until I can confirm to him that I have learned that their training issues have been resolved.

I hope that BEA will issue a final report, and that we can learn from AF what they have done to rectify a few of their issues in training.

If any of you who are pilots who fly for AF would like to PM me regarding what changes and improvements have been made in CRM and flying training at AF since 447 went down (on a non-atribution basis as necessary), I may be able to advise "thumbs up on AF" sooner than later.
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Old 26th Mar 2012, 17:28
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You are welcome Lonewolf.

The newest issue drops into my digital inbox every month and I recommend it to everyone. Makes some good reading in cruise and sometimes an interesting discussion with the captain. Food for thought stuff.
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Old 26th Mar 2012, 22:53
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From what i have seen in the recent past, many aircrew cannot fly a simple departure without flight director.
Agree. Have seen this countless times each year and it makes me shake my head in dismay knowing that experienced captains - let alone low hour cadets in the RH seat - are so fixated on the flight director that they will never switch it off even when it is giving patently misleading indications.

When pilots are so addicted to using the FD even on a bright and sunny day, you just know that one black night like Beirut they may not cope with the simple task of flying the aircraft. In the simulator, the potential dangers of flight director addiction really show up when pilots are required during proficiency (?) checks to fly manually on standby flight instruments where the small ADI takes no prisoners.
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Old 26th Mar 2012, 23:22
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Red face

I converted to the 75 in its very early days. Full time A/T and an F/D that actually worked and was worth using were great novelties and the glass cockpit confounded even the most sceptical of critics. My first subsequent sim check made me sit up sharply – I had suddenly become aware of the great (no, enormous) gulf between steam instruments and the siren lure of glass. During my career I had only one occasion to have to use stand by instruments – and that involved a single engine go-around. Was I glad I had had that wake-up call! Is it now all too late?
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Old 26th Mar 2012, 23:32
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Training is key. I canīt remember ever doing a sim where there wasnīt an approach or a departure done without flight director, normally single engine. I know that it will be in the sim and as a result I know my attitudes and thrust settings for different phases of flight. I think this should be the norm. When airspeed becomes unreliable or flight directors disappear, it is not the time to start wondering where abouts on the PFD the nose needs to be.
When changing companies four years ago I was pleasantly surprised when the training Captain gave me a sector during line training with no A/P and no flight director (B737). These are the basics. With Ļtraining to a priceĻthe new pilots start with full automatics and never get a chance to achieve a high level of competency without them because line flying utilizes them fully. If they then join a company who skimps on simulator training or only trains using full automatics the skills never actually develop. Itīs not the fault of the new pilots, itīs the continual erosion of skills brought about by the economics of the airlines. Is that the fault of the airline management? I donīt think so. Private companies will always aim for the most cost effective route. Therefore, they aim for the minimum training that is legislated. So whoīs capable of fixing the problem? The people writing the legislation. (read ineffective outdated government departments who loath to change anything for fear of being responsible if it doesn't work out and who are lobbied heavily by the management of the airlines). So....the only way it will change is when true leadership emerges within said government regulating bodies........are you holding your breath?
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Old 27th Mar 2012, 06:51
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Recovery from unusual attitude is something that has been lost and completely unexistent in most jet flown airlines. I remember in my company I did it like 7 years ago on the turbo prop but since I came unto the jet, it has never been done. Imagining the whole scenario is pretty scary. Taking off from Accra on a dark night, over the ocean, with all manners of cells flashing lights every now and then, fighting to keep the aircrafts steady and remembering to follow your SOPs and departure procedure all at the same time can be a lot to take on at the moment. It is easy to disintegrate and diagnose someone else's mistake but you would have to agree that if you do not fly like this on a regular basis, the tendency is to engage the autopilot to reduce your workload. Nothing wrong with that, but be cautious not to get distracted by another flash of lightning and wondering what the airplane is doing since you are already disorientated from looking outside at the ocean and forget your SOP to confirm that the autopilot truly engaged on the FMA. It takes experience in the same scenario, not experience on an aircraft. I do not think closing the thrust and taking hands off would save the situation in this case though. I strongly doubt that. We could try it on the next Sim.
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Old 27th Mar 2012, 08:24
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Centaurus

How right you are. When the company fails, all any pilot with experience can do is to pass on their own experiences to young and often poorly trained colleagues.

The most interesting thing I have noticed over 40 years of flying is that the best trainers and mentors are those that continue to fly small aircraft outside their jobs on commercial jets.Not only does this get them away from being system operators, it also keeps their basic flying skills and commonsense in good order.

It never ceases to amaze me these days how many experienced pilots check their basic commonsense in at flight despatch when they go flying fully automated jets.
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Old 27th Mar 2012, 08:45
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A pertinent comment from the captain of the aircraft who landed the 747 safely in this video, if you watch from 44 minutes,I hope if I am ever unlucky enough to be SLF (which I am) on an aircraft in trouble I have somebody like him in the drivers seat.

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Old 27th Mar 2012, 13:01
  #37 (permalink)  
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less magenta line following and more autopilot off instrument flying.
The flight director and autothrottles should be switched off to get any real value. Anyone can blindly follow a FD.
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Old 28th Mar 2012, 08:02
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'Cause & Circumstance' in B&CA

Citing from Richard N. Aarons' article:

The 24-year-old first officer was new to the line. He had accumulated 673 flying hours total time - 350 as first officer on B737-700/800s. Both men had received CRM training.. The first officer was the pilot monitoring (PM). It is significant, perhaps, that one of his training instructors had written in his file that the first officer should not "interfere with PF duties unnecessarily" nor should he ask "irrelevant questions".
I bet this encouraged him a lot to question his Captain or offer help...
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Old 28th Mar 2012, 20:36
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I remember reading this one In flight and discussing these very ideas with the skipper. If I remember rightly the FO did nothing and the report was critical on his inactions. He was also inexperienced. Not only does this report highlight the critical need for some hands on instrument time but it's also a must read for all new FOs.
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Old 29th Mar 2012, 20:51
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Exclamation

I believe, from my experience, that the factor in general, creates the majority of air accident are: 1) Lack ( or shortage ) of training, imposed by most Companies due to financial goal, 2) Crew mis understanding or coordination - due to language and culture - and 3) Deu to crew fatigue and also extension of the duty time...
---Generally speaking, the global economical drisis, shall aggravate the finance of the Air line Companies, and the crew must be very careful on the above mentined items !!
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