Article: NTSB: Emirates 777 continued flight after loud bang, messages
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ATC did not report debris on the runway.
Speaking of engineering and data, they can never see the big picture just by looking at their data on their screen. Do you need engineering now to make the decision for you? I have been in two incidents where engineering had no indication whatsoever, but I used my common sense. If I would have been too much by the book, I probably wouldn't be typing this right now!
Landed safely after the crew made a decision.
Squawk7777
Great hindsight, but absolutely of no relevance to pilot discision making.
If the decision was wrong enough to significantly affected safety of flight, than it's up to the manufacturer to provide, sound, sight and action cues to the pilots while flying, rather than leaving them to be critized by hindsight after the plane has safely landed.
It doesn't really matter what ATC reported. What really matters after looking at the engine is that it was not a wise decision to continue.
If the decision was wrong enough to significantly affected safety of flight, than it's up to the manufacturer to provide, sound, sight and action cues to the pilots while flying, rather than leaving them to be critized by hindsight after the plane has safely landed.
Squawk,
If you think the decision was bad, you must think it may have led to a bad outcome.
What do you think was the worst that could have happened, and why do you think it?
If you think the decision was bad, you must think it may have led to a bad outcome.
What do you think was the worst that could have happened, and why do you think it?
hindsight...
having had a stall on the B777 big engine at TOC on a short regional non ETOPS flight, and then been through the decision making process of evaluating the safety and operational aspects IAW warm fuzzy CRM processes.... I can say that for the operator I was with the following position resulted in flight:
1. I was aware that the engine had stalled, but had returned to normal operations immediately.
2. visual inspection of the engine front and rear indicated no damage.
3. as the flight was an out and back operation, and the nearest spare engine was at point of departure, I recommended that an RTP would be best outcome form an engineering perspective.
4. The engine parameters were identifiable and both recorded the stall, and the return to normal operations.
5. Company ops requested proceed to destination.
6. I had no safety of fight concerns with proceeding and did so.
7. On arrival at destination the engine was bore scoped and found normal, and the return flight was conducted.
8. On departure, with a full derate, the EGT went to limit. The rest of the operation was normal.
9. on arrrival at base, the engine was found to be junk. No parameters were identifiable on the AIMS as significantly changed in flight, but the engine went directly to shop and needed a full overhaul.
so what....
The crew get the info they get, and make a decision, either in the absence of other info, or not. The additional information may or may not be beneficial, ie pathological management behaviour does not mix well with decision making.
The big twins fly nicely on one engine, and the conditions on the day very much determine what the crews position may be in respect to safety. Acceptable safety is a moving target, and notwithstanding the rather odd position of FAR 91.07 and 91.13, where applicable, and where applied to a minor event of an engine on a type certified for CAT III single engine landings.... I would suspect that the EK crew made a determination that they were relatively happy with at the time. Tomorrow, their decision may be different, or not; it is conditional on the circumstances.
Be aware that the engine manufacturers spent a fair bit of effort trying to stop crews of the big twins shutting down engines just for the sake of competing a checklist. This is not something I agree with, I think that a checklist is reasonable to follow until the expected outcome diverges from reality, or a greater and contradicting safety risk exists.
In the example case I offer, the company was less conservative in their evaluation than I was, but both positions were based on safety of flight and operational considerations...
These failures are not black or white, they enter the region of grey where the decisions are conditional on many additional factors, most of which are not provided in the rumour network's quarterbacking.
ease up on the stoning
1. I was aware that the engine had stalled, but had returned to normal operations immediately.
2. visual inspection of the engine front and rear indicated no damage.
3. as the flight was an out and back operation, and the nearest spare engine was at point of departure, I recommended that an RTP would be best outcome form an engineering perspective.
4. The engine parameters were identifiable and both recorded the stall, and the return to normal operations.
5. Company ops requested proceed to destination.
6. I had no safety of fight concerns with proceeding and did so.
7. On arrival at destination the engine was bore scoped and found normal, and the return flight was conducted.
8. On departure, with a full derate, the EGT went to limit. The rest of the operation was normal.
9. on arrrival at base, the engine was found to be junk. No parameters were identifiable on the AIMS as significantly changed in flight, but the engine went directly to shop and needed a full overhaul.
so what....
The crew get the info they get, and make a decision, either in the absence of other info, or not. The additional information may or may not be beneficial, ie pathological management behaviour does not mix well with decision making.
The big twins fly nicely on one engine, and the conditions on the day very much determine what the crews position may be in respect to safety. Acceptable safety is a moving target, and notwithstanding the rather odd position of FAR 91.07 and 91.13, where applicable, and where applied to a minor event of an engine on a type certified for CAT III single engine landings.... I would suspect that the EK crew made a determination that they were relatively happy with at the time. Tomorrow, their decision may be different, or not; it is conditional on the circumstances.
Be aware that the engine manufacturers spent a fair bit of effort trying to stop crews of the big twins shutting down engines just for the sake of competing a checklist. This is not something I agree with, I think that a checklist is reasonable to follow until the expected outcome diverges from reality, or a greater and contradicting safety risk exists.
In the example case I offer, the company was less conservative in their evaluation than I was, but both positions were based on safety of flight and operational considerations...
These failures are not black or white, they enter the region of grey where the decisions are conditional on many additional factors, most of which are not provided in the rumour network's quarterbacking.
ease up on the stoning
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1. I was aware that the engine had stalled, but had returned to normal operations immediately.
2. visual inspection of the engine front and rear indicated no damage.
3. as the flight was an out and back operation, and the nearest spare engine was at point of departure, I recommended that an RTP would be best outcome form an engineering perspective.
4. The engine parameters were identifiable and both recorded the stall, and the return to normal operations.
5. Company ops requested proceed to destination.
6. I had no safety of fight concerns with proceeding and did so.
7. On arrival at destination the engine was bore scoped and found normal, and the return flight was conducted.
8. On departure, with a full derate, the EGT went to limit. The rest of the operation was normal.
9. on arrrival at base, the engine was found to be junk. No parameters were identifiable on the AIMS as significantly changed in flight, but the engine went directly to shop and needed a full overhaul.
2. visual inspection of the engine front and rear indicated no damage.
3. as the flight was an out and back operation, and the nearest spare engine was at point of departure, I recommended that an RTP would be best outcome form an engineering perspective.
4. The engine parameters were identifiable and both recorded the stall, and the return to normal operations.
5. Company ops requested proceed to destination.
6. I had no safety of fight concerns with proceeding and did so.
7. On arrival at destination the engine was bore scoped and found normal, and the return flight was conducted.
8. On departure, with a full derate, the EGT went to limit. The rest of the operation was normal.
9. on arrrival at base, the engine was found to be junk. No parameters were identifiable on the AIMS as significantly changed in flight, but the engine went directly to shop and needed a full overhaul.
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I am somewhat surprised.
There you have a 380 with an audible explosion, a very visible hole in the wing, one engine in shambles, two othesr no longer respond, no fuel dumping possible, the CG slowly running aft out of limits. The crew did an extensive assessment, worked on 52 ECAMs, and continued to fly the deadly wounded beast for another 2 1/2 hours to do the never ending ECAMs and ......... come out as heroes, lauded for their professionalism.
Then you have a T7 with an audible bang, no visible damage, only status messages, the engine running and responding smoothly. The crew did an extensive assessment and decided to continue for about 4 hours, to land successfully and .......... the crew gets mostly bashed for not doing a quickie back.
Both decisions may be defendable or questionable, but, believe me, I 'd rather be SLF on the EK flight than on the Qantas one!
There you have a 380 with an audible explosion, a very visible hole in the wing, one engine in shambles, two othesr no longer respond, no fuel dumping possible, the CG slowly running aft out of limits. The crew did an extensive assessment, worked on 52 ECAMs, and continued to fly the deadly wounded beast for another 2 1/2 hours to do the never ending ECAMs and ......... come out as heroes, lauded for their professionalism.
Then you have a T7 with an audible bang, no visible damage, only status messages, the engine running and responding smoothly. The crew did an extensive assessment and decided to continue for about 4 hours, to land successfully and .......... the crew gets mostly bashed for not doing a quickie back.
Both decisions may be defendable or questionable, but, believe me, I 'd rather be SLF on the EK flight than on the Qantas one!
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Decisions...
I apologise if my previous post left the impression that I felt the EK crew did somethong "wrong".
I consider these forums to be great for "news" ( always taken with a grain of salt or two ), as well as an almost graduate course in CRM. Where else can you get such insight into decision making ( good and bad ), on current events. Inflight smoke/fires, engine damage, loss of instrumentation, runway overruns. These are all events we have faced, or might face in our occupation. Tomorrow maybe?. "What would I do?'. I often don't even have to ask myself that question, as my mind seems to automatically begin that "process" of putting myself into the situation. And suprise-suprise, how the event parameters seem to unfold and change more often than a "married woman" as more people in the know seem to chime in.
Someone asked if, after "seeing" the damage after landing, would the EK crew have still felt they made the "right" decision.... Good question. It's often pointed out by some that "if a safe landing is made", then it was obviously the right decision. I have issues with that rationale.
I once has a two loud stalls in sucession on climb out. Did a "Sever Eng damage" checklist, as opposed to "Surge-Eng Stall". Dumped fuel, landed. Then I proceeded to "sweat" my decision. Should I have just tried "throttling back, ect", and maybe continued to destination?. ( Luxury of 4 engines
). Boroscope revealed a trashed engine. I give thanks to the powers that be for the damage. What I'm trying to say, is that we are often "shaped" by events in our past, both good and bad. If no damage was found, I would most likely have been "called into the office", ect. Then maybe I might make a different decision if the same events were to unfold again.
With the grace of hindsight, and being in the comfy of my room, not under stress or duress, in reference to the EK crew continuing..... I stated "I" would have landed. Too many people take that as a condemnation of the EK crew for continuing. Sort of misses the value of discussing these events in my humble opinion.
I consider these forums to be great for "news" ( always taken with a grain of salt or two ), as well as an almost graduate course in CRM. Where else can you get such insight into decision making ( good and bad ), on current events. Inflight smoke/fires, engine damage, loss of instrumentation, runway overruns. These are all events we have faced, or might face in our occupation. Tomorrow maybe?. "What would I do?'. I often don't even have to ask myself that question, as my mind seems to automatically begin that "process" of putting myself into the situation. And suprise-suprise, how the event parameters seem to unfold and change more often than a "married woman" as more people in the know seem to chime in.
Someone asked if, after "seeing" the damage after landing, would the EK crew have still felt they made the "right" decision.... Good question. It's often pointed out by some that "if a safe landing is made", then it was obviously the right decision. I have issues with that rationale.
I once has a two loud stalls in sucession on climb out. Did a "Sever Eng damage" checklist, as opposed to "Surge-Eng Stall". Dumped fuel, landed. Then I proceeded to "sweat" my decision. Should I have just tried "throttling back, ect", and maybe continued to destination?. ( Luxury of 4 engines
). Boroscope revealed a trashed engine. I give thanks to the powers that be for the damage. What I'm trying to say, is that we are often "shaped" by events in our past, both good and bad. If no damage was found, I would most likely have been "called into the office", ect. Then maybe I might make a different decision if the same events were to unfold again.With the grace of hindsight, and being in the comfy of my room, not under stress or duress, in reference to the EK crew continuing..... I stated "I" would have landed. Too many people take that as a condemnation of the EK crew for continuing. Sort of misses the value of discussing these events in my humble opinion.
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Gretchenfrage
Didn't the pilot of the Qantas A380 say why he couldn't land ?
From memory, I thought it was they needed to burn fuel off to get the weight down so that they could still pull up before the end of the runway.
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"With EK, Qantas (and the like), passengers should have great confidence.
They have a high calibre of pilots."
That's why I prefer to fly Qantas, at least you know you have a crew with some experience and as has been shown, can handle major emergencies when they occur.
Didn't the pilot of the Qantas A380 say why he couldn't land ?
From memory, I thought it was they needed to burn fuel off to get the weight down so that they could still pull up before the end of the runway.
Contacted
"With EK, Qantas (and the like), passengers should have great confidence.
They have a high calibre of pilots."
That's why I prefer to fly Qantas, at least you know you have a crew with some experience and as has been shown, can handle major emergencies when they occur.
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From memory, I thought it was they needed to burn fuel off to get the weight down so that they could still pull up before the end of the runway.
That's the difference to the EK case:
Both engines were running normally and thus promised a normal approach and eventual pull up. Therefore the decision to continue is quite acceptable.
The 380 was definitely not in a normal state, so a rapid emergency landing was, at least to my belief, indicated. If you can take off balanced on a runway, you will always be able to put the same aircraft down for an emergency landing.
-- V1 cut and remaining distance at MTOW vs. banging the dying animal right on the 300m mark and then give it all the brakes, revs you still have --
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A B747/777 engineer's viewpoint:
1. Loud bang on take off.
2. Multiple status messages (the jet is trying to tell you something here).
3. External integrity of twin-engined aircraft unknown.
If I am on board this flight, I would like to land asap please.
In my 40yrs in this business, I have seen major bits departing airframes/engines. If you are lucky, they will miss the Horizontal Stab which is following close behind you; maybe not..........
Not long ago, I was doing a post-flight inspection on a JT9-70 powered B747 Classic. I noticed something different about the #4 engine; the entire Exhaust Nozzle had gone, broken away at the Turbine rear face flange. This is a 'kin big bit on a -70 motor. Lucky it was the #4, & not the #3, for Horiz Stab reasons.
Why do we not have effective external camera coverage on aircraft? I can festoon my motorcycle & even my crash hat with dinky little cameras; what is the problem......at least the crew would have more info to work with.
Rant off.
1. Loud bang on take off.
2. Multiple status messages (the jet is trying to tell you something here).
3. External integrity of twin-engined aircraft unknown.
If I am on board this flight, I would like to land asap please.
In my 40yrs in this business, I have seen major bits departing airframes/engines. If you are lucky, they will miss the Horizontal Stab which is following close behind you; maybe not..........
Not long ago, I was doing a post-flight inspection on a JT9-70 powered B747 Classic. I noticed something different about the #4 engine; the entire Exhaust Nozzle had gone, broken away at the Turbine rear face flange. This is a 'kin big bit on a -70 motor. Lucky it was the #4, & not the #3, for Horiz Stab reasons.
Why do we not have effective external camera coverage on aircraft? I can festoon my motorcycle & even my crash hat with dinky little cameras; what is the problem......at least the crew would have more info to work with.
Rant off.
Last edited by Halton Brat; 22nd Sep 2011 at 15:32.
deferred.
7. On arrival at destination the engine was bore scoped and found normal, and the return flight was conducted.
The type provides a message in the AIMS maintenance pages on detection of the "Engine Stall".
Curiously, the engineering in this case was telling me that there was no problem of note whilst in flight, without being aware that the crew had reviewed the AIMS maintenance pages onboard and were quite aware that the maintenance dept were not telling the whole truth. Nevertheless, the issue is what constitutes a safety fo flight condition vs one of inconvenience to engineering... sort of like the Columbia decision making process in the background after the foam strike; Linda Ham: "so this is a scheduling issue..., not safety of flight...". Making a black and white, concrete resolution of "action in the event of..." neglects the environment that aircraft are operated in.
Legally, there is a background issue, that there are no maintenance approvals anywhere in the world I am aware of to conduct maintenance actions in flight, and from the manufacturers, the data monitoring of systems provided to ground engineering is not certified for the purposes of intervention in approved procedures. Might seem a small thing, but when the management gets to the point of getting crews to disregard checklists such as cargo fires etc... in flight then there is a bit of a problem. Where "CRM principles" and company decision making devolves to the extent that everything needs to go through the engineering dept before actioning, then everything between the covers of the QRH becomes negotiable.
Decision making under conditions of uncertainty makes the job interesting. The wash up does not always add much to the future quality of decision making, I suspect that management frequently reinforce bad habits in their response to events. A substantial percentage of management personnel are not trained in risk management, CRM or associated aspects of how their interaction with operations may affect adversely outcomes. Forums such as this have the luxury to opine without responsibility about the decisions made by crew post event, and with the benefit of knowing the outcome of the actual event. The rest of the operators out there every day deal with out of family events that have no specific checklist that covers all the procedures required to be followed. I for one would prefer to generally arrive at an acceptable course of actions that minimises the impact to the operation, rather then refine a response by employing limited resources to the problem at hand, which interferes with the normal operations (EA401, UAL173 like... even arguably AS261).
aviate
navigate
communicate
checklist.... complete
problem resolved? Y/N
Y...... have coffee
N...... apply adequate effort to result in a safe and adequate outcome.
or whatever else floats your boat, after all, as is often stated post event, by management: "...thats what you get paid the big bucks for.." With the heady race to the bottom, the reference to big bucks is probably false advertising now...
Operational safety is the outcome of signals that are effectively stochastic in nature, and quite often the result of unknown interactions of factors. Hollnagel's resonance theory gives a perspective of the non linearity of systems. Bottom line is that almost all events are unique in their nature, (but may have similarities to prior events). The target of acceptable safety is effectively a moving target, as are the risks to operational safety. The general unwashed crews around the world actually do a fairly credible job in balancing the issues, even if the customers fuelling the race to the bottom complain about far too many runway overruns, LOC etc. Checklists will invariably deal with generic issues and will frequently leave the PIC with a requirement to determine appropriate course of actions and the disposition of the aircraft. Please refrain from throwing stones.
Last edited by fdr; 22nd Sep 2011 at 23:21.
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Average of 13-minute flight time. Or maybe it's block time, in which case DXB is amazingly efficient.
A lot of training flights? Sim broken?
A lot of training flights? Sim broken?
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Loud Bang
First time I experienced a loud bang (from somewhere under my seat) my military flight commander told me not to eat onions for breakfast! More seriously, STATUS messages are just that (qv) and the reason why they are inhibited for 30 mins is so that too hasty a judgement is not reached. Two things here must be considered. One – airmanship, two – I was there and you weren’t (not on this particular incident).
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Any idea of an EK incident of a similar nature on 22 Sept. Sister in law was on a MCT-DXB flight, not sure a/c type (she told me it was big). Heard a bang on approach resulting in some sort of dust/smoke in economy. She was seated by the wing but did not look out. Greeted by emergency services on landing.
Any idea what this could have been?
Any idea what this could have been?
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It might be worth mentioning that the bypass duct is the airframe not the engine. The engine hours are irrelevant, it is the the duct life that counts. The bypass duct is also supplied by Boeing not Rolls-Royce
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Since this thread seems to decaying, maybe inject something back into it 
A similar BA problem AAIB Report Link
The messages, actions and decisions of the crew all discussed. I'm not trawling through this thread to see the similarities / differences to the EK situation, but I am sure others will
Just for sake of doubt, I can see little I would comment on, apart from one action raised my eyebrows a little. Will keep to myself for now
A similar BA problem AAIB Report Link The messages, actions and decisions of the crew all discussed. I'm not trawling through this thread to see the similarities / differences to the EK situation, but I am sure others will
Just for sake of doubt, I can see little I would comment on, apart from one action raised my eyebrows a little. Will keep to myself for now
Just for sake of doubt, I can see little I would comment on, apart from one action raised my eyebrows a little. Will keep to myself for now
The report appeared to confirm my suspicions of the symptoms as reported.
I recall several other similar events over the years of jet service where the turbine exhaust duct hardware has gone missing at takeoff but other than performance issues with the engine wasn't detected until subsequent landing.
These new glass cockpits do provide a lot more information but even with consultation with the home base tech guys don't make the decisions of go-no-go obvious for you.