Gulf Air flight from Bahrain overshoots runway at Kochi (Cochin)
I Have Control
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Slippery when wet.
Anybody know what r/w conditions and braking actions were? Too many a/d's on the subcontinent are slick with rubber deposits, which the local authorities never ever remove. Tricky fields at best, in India and neighbouring countries, IMHE.
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Well,
If the DGCA already has come to a conclusion after a few days, I am pretty sure that the report is not even worth the paper it is written on.
I do not have any personal experience but I have heard from reliable sources that the conditions in this airport can be quite challenging. It ended quite well, some minor injuries and an airplane damaged. Could have been much worse.
Let's wait and see what the investigators come up with.
If the DGCA already has come to a conclusion after a few days, I am pretty sure that the report is not even worth the paper it is written on.
I do not have any personal experience but I have heard from reliable sources that the conditions in this airport can be quite challenging. It ended quite well, some minor injuries and an airplane damaged. Could have been much worse.
Let's wait and see what the investigators come up with.
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737-800...?
Some one is smoking some thing!
Last time I checked, a 737-800 did not look like a A320 but you never know, Boeing might check it out after it flew to SHJ..
As for VOCI its alway 3000 in HZ regardless of what the Metar says, just ask the controller!
Last time I checked, a 737-800 did not look like a A320 but you never know, Boeing might check it out after it flew to SHJ..
As for VOCI its alway 3000 in HZ regardless of what the Metar says, just ask the controller!
I landed there the night before on a wet runway. The new high speed exit is too short unless you want to brake heavily. And this runway (like a lot in India) is not suitable for heavy braking unless really needed!
I have landed there a lot and NEVER use the high speed exit.
I have landed there a lot and NEVER use the high speed exit.
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i landed in kai tak many years ago during the monsoon and very heavy rain. no one seemed to have a problem at that time despite flying rather antique machinery.
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If the runway is wet, I plan to use max reverse thrust and enough braking to suit the conditions. Expect the worst and hope for the best.
Don't try and reinvent the wheel as Qantas did at BKK IIRC.
Don't try and reinvent the wheel as Qantas did at BKK IIRC.
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Jackx123....how many scary photos Kai Tek close shaves are available on the web???....
And sometimes "antique" is better
And sometimes "antique" is better
Last edited by ironbutt57; 4th Sep 2011 at 11:57.
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iron,
sorry for my irony but i guess what i was trying to say is that there were only 1 or 2 accidents in the last 30 years before closing that can be blamed on the monsoon/typhoon of which one of them was china air landing 2/3 down the road heading for a drink.
Interestingly BA refused to attempt an approach shortly before china air. It all comes down to good and bad judgement at the end of the day.
In any case there is no point rambling on about the past, but i still get that feeling when i look back and think of no. 13.
sorry for my irony but i guess what i was trying to say is that there were only 1 or 2 accidents in the last 30 years before closing that can be blamed on the monsoon/typhoon of which one of them was china air landing 2/3 down the road heading for a drink.
Interestingly BA refused to attempt an approach shortly before china air. It all comes down to good and bad judgement at the end of the day.
In any case there is no point rambling on about the past, but i still get that feeling when i look back and think of no. 13.
there were only 1 or 2 accidents in the last 30 years before closing that can be blamed on the monsoon/typhoon of which one of them was china air landing 2/3 down the road heading for a drink.
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India's Directorate of General Aviation (DGCA) released their final report concluding the probable cause of the accident was:
The Runway Excursion was caused due to an error of judgment of the PIC during which was due to loss of situational awareness during reduced visibility conditions.
The captain (35, ATPL, 7000 hours total, 1200 hours in command on type) was pilot flying, the first officer (37, 3000 hours total flying experience) was pilot monitoring.
The aircraft had been on an ILS approach to Cochin's runway 27 with the autopilot tracking localizer and glideslope, the aircraft was in full landing configuration and maintained a drift angle of 4 degrees. At about 670 feet AGL the autopilot was disconnected, the flight director kept in tracking the ILS. The aircraft descended through 500 feet AGL fully stabilized on localizer and on glideslope. Following descending through 200 feet AGL the aircraft began to increasingly roll right reaching 4 degrees of bank angle and drifted right of the localizer, the controls were crossed with the aircraft kept side slipping. The captain later reported that the downpour increased substantially decreasing visibility to about 2000 meters (however within pilot limitations). The first officer, pilot monitoring, continued to call out "Continue, localizer nice, profile nice and continue". After touchdown the pilot monitoring called "maintain center line", the DGAC commenting too late too little and not forceful with the captain obviously having lost awareness with respect of the position to the center line.
Tracks on the runway identified the left main gear touched down 459 meters past the runway threshold 12.8 meters to the right of the runway center line and the right main gear touched down about 21.5 meters right of the center line and 1.5 meters to the right of the right runway edge and went over a right hand runway edge light immediately thereafter before leaving the paved surface and rolling over soft ground. The left main wheels departed paved surface 570 meters past the runway threshold. The pilot applied left hand rudder however to no avail as the aircraft was already on soft surface with airspeed reducing. The aircraft came to a stop 1235 meters past the runway threshold and about 760 meters past touch down. All occupants were evacuated. Of the 144 occupants (138 passengers and 6 crew) one passenger received serious injuries (fracture of right ankle, fractures of 6 ribs and stitches in left elbow), 7 passengers were treated at the airport medical facilities.
The aircraft received substantial damage including a collapsed and sheared nose gear, skin damage and buckling, slush and mud inside the electronics compartment ventilation, main landing gear doors cracked, hydraulic and electrical lines at the main landing gear damaged, both engines' nose cowls torn, buckled and crushed, right hand engine fan blades shingled, slush and mud ingested by both engines. 5 runway edge lights were destroyed.
At 22:30Z, 5 minutes past touch down, the weather was observed as: winds at 10 knots from 040, moderate drizzle, visibility 4000 meters, scattered cloud at 800 feet, 26 degrees Celsius.
Six safety recommendations were released as result of the investigation.
The Runway Excursion was caused due to an error of judgment of the PIC during which was due to loss of situational awareness during reduced visibility conditions.
The captain (35, ATPL, 7000 hours total, 1200 hours in command on type) was pilot flying, the first officer (37, 3000 hours total flying experience) was pilot monitoring.
The aircraft had been on an ILS approach to Cochin's runway 27 with the autopilot tracking localizer and glideslope, the aircraft was in full landing configuration and maintained a drift angle of 4 degrees. At about 670 feet AGL the autopilot was disconnected, the flight director kept in tracking the ILS. The aircraft descended through 500 feet AGL fully stabilized on localizer and on glideslope. Following descending through 200 feet AGL the aircraft began to increasingly roll right reaching 4 degrees of bank angle and drifted right of the localizer, the controls were crossed with the aircraft kept side slipping. The captain later reported that the downpour increased substantially decreasing visibility to about 2000 meters (however within pilot limitations). The first officer, pilot monitoring, continued to call out "Continue, localizer nice, profile nice and continue". After touchdown the pilot monitoring called "maintain center line", the DGAC commenting too late too little and not forceful with the captain obviously having lost awareness with respect of the position to the center line.
Tracks on the runway identified the left main gear touched down 459 meters past the runway threshold 12.8 meters to the right of the runway center line and the right main gear touched down about 21.5 meters right of the center line and 1.5 meters to the right of the right runway edge and went over a right hand runway edge light immediately thereafter before leaving the paved surface and rolling over soft ground. The left main wheels departed paved surface 570 meters past the runway threshold. The pilot applied left hand rudder however to no avail as the aircraft was already on soft surface with airspeed reducing. The aircraft came to a stop 1235 meters past the runway threshold and about 760 meters past touch down. All occupants were evacuated. Of the 144 occupants (138 passengers and 6 crew) one passenger received serious injuries (fracture of right ankle, fractures of 6 ribs and stitches in left elbow), 7 passengers were treated at the airport medical facilities.
The aircraft received substantial damage including a collapsed and sheared nose gear, skin damage and buckling, slush and mud inside the electronics compartment ventilation, main landing gear doors cracked, hydraulic and electrical lines at the main landing gear damaged, both engines' nose cowls torn, buckled and crushed, right hand engine fan blades shingled, slush and mud ingested by both engines. 5 runway edge lights were destroyed.
At 22:30Z, 5 minutes past touch down, the weather was observed as: winds at 10 knots from 040, moderate drizzle, visibility 4000 meters, scattered cloud at 800 feet, 26 degrees Celsius.
Six safety recommendations were released as result of the investigation.
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Pure rubbish
Thanks David. That is what I call a "Fact Light" report and a gross, almost criminal departure from an Annex 13 layout. The nine pages of pointless facts were copy-paste from the AIP bloated by a list of bits broken when the aircraft went gardening. Useful stuff like the actual weather and the real braking action of the runway were alarmingly absent. The calibration data of the runway braking action measuring device might also have been an interesting inclusion. Also missing was crew recollection, evacuation data, a report on the serviceability at on the time of the incident of the runway edge lighting (centre-line lights were in the process of being installed) and the status of the RVR measuring equipment. And call me old fashioned, but isn't the noswheel connected to the rudder? Because that also appeared not to work.
The report then goes on to introduce new "facts" in the analysis and findings. This is not acceptable. At the very end, the recommendations are plucked from thin air. Nowhere in the report was a case made for their inclusion and therefore I can not see how implementing any of them will improve flight safety.
The writers of this report should be publicly drowned in a bucket. At 13 pages it is not even big enough to be used as a fire lighter but I suppose if it was printed on absorbent paper it might have other uses.
PM
The report then goes on to introduce new "facts" in the analysis and findings. This is not acceptable. At the very end, the recommendations are plucked from thin air. Nowhere in the report was a case made for their inclusion and therefore I can not see how implementing any of them will improve flight safety.
The writers of this report should be publicly drowned in a bucket. At 13 pages it is not even big enough to be used as a fire lighter but I suppose if it was printed on absorbent paper it might have other uses.
PM
Thanks David. That is what I call a "Fact Light" report and a gross, almost criminal departure from an Annex 13 layout. The nine pages of pointless facts were copy-paste from the AIP bloated by a list of bits broken when the aircraft went gardening. Useful stuff like the actual weather and the real braking action of the runway were alarmingly absent. The calibration data of the runway braking action measuring device might also have been an interesting inclusion. Also missing was crew recollection, evacuation data, a report on the serviceability at on the time of the incident of the runway edge lighting (centre-line lights were in the process of being installed) and the status of the RVR measuring equipment. And call me old fashioned, but isn't the noswheel connected to the rudder? Because that also appeared not to work.
The report then goes on to introduce new "facts" in the analysis and findings. This is not acceptable. At the very end, the recommendations are plucked from thin air. Nowhere in the report was a case made for their inclusion and therefore I can not see how implementing any of them will improve flight safety.
The writers of this report should be publicly drowned in a bucket. At 13 pages it is not even big enough to be used as a fire lighter but I suppose if it was printed on absorbent paper it might have other uses.
PM
The report then goes on to introduce new "facts" in the analysis and findings. This is not acceptable. At the very end, the recommendations are plucked from thin air. Nowhere in the report was a case made for their inclusion and therefore I can not see how implementing any of them will improve flight safety.
The writers of this report should be publicly drowned in a bucket. At 13 pages it is not even big enough to be used as a fire lighter but I suppose if it was printed on absorbent paper it might have other uses.
PM
