Honduras plane crash
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bubbers44,
I still find it highly unlikely that the L410 and her crew were authorized to execute the RNP approach. So they had been left with the VOR/DME approach they were executing, anyway.
I now stand corrected and the RNAV 02 from the north would have prevented this accident.
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dvv:
There is no possible way the L410 had an IRU and all the FMS redundancy required for the RNP AR Rwy 2 IAP.
It is likely the crash side is somewhere in the vicinity of the procedure turn fix on the VOR/DME Rwy 02 (a misnomer, because it is a CLT only IAP).
Nonetheless, a discussion of the RNP AR approaches is certainly germaine to a discussion of the topography of this airport.
I still find it highly unlikely that the L410 and her crew were authorized to execute the RNP approach. So they had been left with the VOR/DME approach they were executing, anyway.
It is likely the crash side is somewhere in the vicinity of the procedure turn fix on the VOR/DME Rwy 02 (a misnomer, because it is a CLT only IAP).
Nonetheless, a discussion of the RNP AR approaches is certainly germaine to a discussion of the topography of this airport.
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Newspaper reports place the crash at a distance of about 1km from this 1989 crash:
US DOT publication DOT-TSC-FA9D1-99-01
US DOT publication DOT-TSC-FA9D1-99-01
Last edited by dvv; 18th Feb 2011 at 21:15. Reason: typo
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This topo shows the crash site based on that chart. It doesn't seem reasonable because that site is some 1,000 feet below MDA:
http://terps.com/charts/Graph%20crash%20site.pdf
http://terps.com/charts/Graph%20crash%20site.pdf
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dvv, I have full knowledge of all non RNAV approaches into TGU but non of RNAV approaches. The way the '89 727 hit the same hill as this crash indicates they both made the same mistake and descended early.That approach required full attention to the step down altitudes. Maybe they got in a downdraft approaching the hill with high winds on their nose. Maybe they just didn't read the chart right. We rarely did this approach because we approached from the north.
Last edited by bubbers44; 19th Feb 2011 at 13:28. Reason: clarity
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bubbers44, I won't be surprised if we never know the cause of the crash with any degree of certainty - I'm not even sure there were a CVR and FDR on board the L410.
BTW, googling around, I've found that they're building a wind farm on Cerro de Hula, which might make this VOR/DME approach even more interesting...
BTW, googling around, I've found that they're building a wind farm on Cerro de Hula, which might make this VOR/DME approach even more interesting...
Many similarities ? TAWS Saves - Opportunities for error.
Unfortunately its happened before and will again until TAWS/EGPWS is fitted.
- A non precision approach.
- A chart for a DME procedure. The plan format shows waypoints as distance to the DME, but the profile has both distance to the threshold and DME. NB #24 the difference between the blue and red flight paths is approx 1.7nm = difference between threshold and DME location!!
- No visual descent point shown. 5620ft procedure altitude might suggest 7nm from the threshold (300ft/nm); if so then why not put the straight-in MAP there? Then this would not be compatible with a 2nm visual minima.
- No table of altitude against distance for the procedure; the VS table appears to be for the MAP and not a VDP, thus not suitable for a continuous descent procedure.
Unfortunately its happened before and will again until TAWS/EGPWS is fitted.
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PEI 3721:
This is not a straight-in approach procedure. If you did a constant angle or rate of descent procedure you would eat direct prior to the VOR station.
No table of altitude against distance for the procedure; the VS table appears to be for the MAP and not a VDP, thus not suitable for a continuous descent procedure.
at, thanks I overlooked that point.
However, why not provide constant descent information to the MAP (altitude and range to the DME) which would raise the flight path over the terrain, yet not compromise any circling capability.
A pedantic comment, but describing the procedure as VOR/DME implies similarities with a straight in approach, whereas it is actually a VOR/DME airfield ‘contact’ procedure.
Has it been established that the aircraft was on the procedure vice flying a circling maneuver?
However, why not provide constant descent information to the MAP (altitude and range to the DME) which would raise the flight path over the terrain, yet not compromise any circling capability.
A pedantic comment, but describing the procedure as VOR/DME implies similarities with a straight in approach, whereas it is actually a VOR/DME airfield ‘contact’ procedure.
Has it been established that the aircraft was on the procedure vice flying a circling maneuver?
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I'm not even sure there were a CVR and FDR on board the L410
DGAC reconstruirá escena del fatal accidente con otro avión - LaTribuna.hn
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You can not land straight in in an airliner on this 02 approach. You overfly the runway at about 5,000 ft and circle to the left if landing on 02 or dog leg and come back to 20. I have done both procedures and they work fine. Captains hate going to 20 from this approach because they can't see anything the way they are turning.
Last edited by bubbers44; 20th Feb 2011 at 03:44. Reason: clarify
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Disorientation
Ref Post 24 by dvv (1989 crash of B727) and that it was Let L -410 in this accident (I do not know about the avionics onboard, but presume it to be primitive), and with interest in Spatial Disorientation, I have the following observations:-
(a) the flight path of the tragic flight in 1989 initially seemed to be high, when at a certain point the pilot started to fly lower than the mandated glide path.
(b) If the Let L-410 pilots also flew a similar approach, then they were attempting to maintain a certain visual angle to their approach to this airfield, with the hill feature obstructing the r/w.
(c) Could they, both B727 and Let L-410 had an aberrant "visual" approach making them go below the mandated glide path?
(d) If they flew low, apparently the r/w layout and how it appears for a pilot flying with a hill feature obstructing the approach, giving rise to their perceived correct approach but in the end, it was probably a visual perceptual error.
Has Spatial Disorientation, error in visual perception to be specific, been considered in this case?
PS: I am not a pilot, hence may be incorrect in certain presumptions.
(a) the flight path of the tragic flight in 1989 initially seemed to be high, when at a certain point the pilot started to fly lower than the mandated glide path.
(b) If the Let L-410 pilots also flew a similar approach, then they were attempting to maintain a certain visual angle to their approach to this airfield, with the hill feature obstructing the r/w.
(c) Could they, both B727 and Let L-410 had an aberrant "visual" approach making them go below the mandated glide path?
(d) If they flew low, apparently the r/w layout and how it appears for a pilot flying with a hill feature obstructing the approach, giving rise to their perceived correct approach but in the end, it was probably a visual perceptual error.
Has Spatial Disorientation, error in visual perception to be specific, been considered in this case?
PS: I am not a pilot, hence may be incorrect in certain presumptions.
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Possible causes
Was this the same RWY that the TACA A320 slid off a couple of years ago?
On this L410, I thought that the EGPWS would have clicked in to keep that Hill out of harm's way? Thoughts?
On this L410, I thought that the EGPWS would have clicked in to keep that Hill out of harm's way? Thoughts?
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Swiss Cheese, for the EGPWS to kick in, it should be there in the first place, and I wouldn't assume it was. And yes, the A320 slid off the other end of the only runway at Toncontín.
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Could they, both B727 and Let L-410 had an aberrant "visual" approach making them go below the mandated glide path?
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bubbers44:
Close attention is required to all aspects of that airport, its runway length and slopes, and its terrain environment. That is why it is treated as a special qualifications airport for U.S. air carriers and I would think those from other nations, too.
The 727 in '89 just descended too early. Obviously happened in this crash also. The approach to 02 needs close attention to be safe.
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Once on the visual portion of the approach it is very challenging landing north on 02. Landing long or fast can put you off the 70 ft cliff. The 20 approach is coming into the pass to TGU so is very safe. The 02 approach puts you over terrain that will make an early descent a disaster. All the accidents I have read about happened on the 02 approach descending early.90% of the 20 approaches were a circle to 02 because of the prevailing wind.
The displaced threshold gave you 5400 ft of runway with a downslope of about 1 degree at 3300 ft MSL with a 70 ft cliff at the end. You could only make minor mistakes on this one. Wet runways made it even more challenging. We always had our landing distance charts out landing at TGU. It wasn't that hard to land there when you were comfortable with the procedures but the new guys were spooked by it at first. Some never went back.
The displaced threshold gave you 5400 ft of runway with a downslope of about 1 degree at 3300 ft MSL with a 70 ft cliff at the end. You could only make minor mistakes on this one. Wet runways made it even more challenging. We always had our landing distance charts out landing at TGU. It wasn't that hard to land there when you were comfortable with the procedures but the new guys were spooked by it at first. Some never went back.
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bubbers44:
Watching that YouTube video of the 737 floating down Runway 02 gives me a major case of heartburn. It seems taking a transport jet to a Runway 02 landing when the runway is wet is setting the stage for another Sao Paulo.
French simulation of Sao Paulo:
YouTube - TAM CRASH IN SAO PAULO - BRAZIL
The displaced threshold gave you 5400 ft of runway with a downslope of about 1 degree at 3300 ft MSL with a 70 ft cliff at the end. You could only make minor mistakes on this one. Wet runways made it even more challenging. We always had our landing distance charts out landing at TGU. It wasn't that hard to land there when you were comfortable with the procedures but the new guys were spooked by it at first. Some never went back.
French simulation of Sao Paulo:
YouTube - TAM CRASH IN SAO PAULO - BRAZIL