Pilots didn't know about evacuation
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The cockpit crew were already aware and were investigating, still didn't decide to evacuate (otherwise the CC would have known about this decision), she came to the cockpit but didn't even try to inform she decided to evacuate (like simply saying it?). Now we will try to imagine all kind of excuses, but the CC clearly up. Looks like a stubborn and macho CC to me. Nobody died during the evacuation, so not a big deal anyway.
I remember the beginning of CRM, it was all about listening to the Cabin Crew and keep them in the loop. Nowadays CRM should be about keeping the cokpit in the loop... ;-)
I remember the beginning of CRM, it was all about listening to the Cabin Crew and keep them in the loop. Nowadays CRM should be about keeping the cokpit in the loop... ;-)
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Now we will try to imagine all kind of excuses, but the CC clearly up. Looks like a stubborn and macho CC to me.
Some (but certainly not all) cabin crew, especially those in a senior position, truly believe they are the 'cabin captain' and do as they see fit.
Time for these few to realise that...they are subordinate to those on the flight deck, period.
IE: always has been, always will be.
Why?
Because, the company says so and the regulatory authority says so.
IF they don't like this arrangement, there is the HR door to dismissal, or resignation.
Airlines would certainly be better off without these malcontents in their employ.
We are seeing a huge divergence of views between those up front and those in back.
Up front there's procedures to perform, many of which are vital, time constrained and demanding of close attention to perform properly.
In back the SLF get justifiably exercised about the presence of toxic fumes or any suspected precursors of fire. Fire safety doctrines lean heavily to getting out pronto at the least suspicion of any fire as a fire can progress from fumes to conflagration in a very few seconds. History has amply demonstrated with a number of tragedies the perils of dithering.
The CC may be completely adherent to the SOPs, but the SLF will take matters in their own hands if they come to feel that the hazard is not getting the attention they feel it deserves.
Up front there can be a lag in a critical situation in back being communicated to them. Door open annunciations may not be in the SOPs, but are an instant communication that SLF and/or CC feel the need to get out pronto.
Up front there's procedures to perform, many of which are vital, time constrained and demanding of close attention to perform properly.
In back the SLF get justifiably exercised about the presence of toxic fumes or any suspected precursors of fire. Fire safety doctrines lean heavily to getting out pronto at the least suspicion of any fire as a fire can progress from fumes to conflagration in a very few seconds. History has amply demonstrated with a number of tragedies the perils of dithering.
The CC may be completely adherent to the SOPs, but the SLF will take matters in their own hands if they come to feel that the hazard is not getting the attention they feel it deserves.
Up front there can be a lag in a critical situation in back being communicated to them. Door open annunciations may not be in the SOPs, but are an instant communication that SLF and/or CC feel the need to get out pronto.
Just curious, but at what point does this become a legal issue of libel? A brief 5-page AAIB report (which is in variance with the internally published report) is being used as a stick to beat someone who isn't permitted to defend themself on here.
If I were a lawyer with a bit of spare time then I'd be keen to go back over the previous pages to see if a few people on here have overstepped the mark.
Mods?
If I were a lawyer with a bit of spare time then I'd be keen to go back over the previous pages to see if a few people on here have overstepped the mark.
Mods?
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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Originally Posted by blue up
which is in variance with the internally published report
is being used as a stick to beat someone who isn't permitted to defend themself on here.
Originally Posted by RBF
Door open annunciations may not be in the SOPs, but are an instant communication that SLF and/or CC feel the need to get out pronto.
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Now THIS is an interesting thread and debate.
I did three years in the trenches (Cabin) before I couldn't take any more, and thus have a deep respect for the job. Tiring, stressful and overwhelming at times, but always with a smile (well I worked at BA so not always ) and, whilst attending to that needy passenger in 3C who is probably on the verge of being the worst passenger in history, always trying to be aware of what else is going on with regards to the safety and well being of passengers.
I think it holds self evident that CRM, or more specifically communication, is the reason this incident occurred, both between the SCCM and Flight Crew and the SCCM and the other crew and passengers. Also it might be fair to say that the unease of the SCCM might have been something the FC should have anticipated, though that is not a given.
411A is an interesting read always but I disagree that this CCM should be hung out to dry, I think she acted incorrectly but she did so with absolutely the right thing in mind and as the victim of a break down in communication.
A retrain may indeed be important and an examination of the use of correct phraseology. If an Evacuation was not intended but rather a swift disembarkation, the correct PA should have been used, if such a PA does not exist then that is something the company should address. Though I must admit the correct PA is unlikely to be one that comes quickly to mind - that's a company issue too.
More importantly I hope that this incident brings to all crew members attentions the need to keep everyone in the loop at all times.
As for pax instigating evacuations whenever they feel uncomfortable - if that becomes an SOP my mother will not be allowed to fly again....
I did three years in the trenches (Cabin) before I couldn't take any more, and thus have a deep respect for the job. Tiring, stressful and overwhelming at times, but always with a smile (well I worked at BA so not always ) and, whilst attending to that needy passenger in 3C who is probably on the verge of being the worst passenger in history, always trying to be aware of what else is going on with regards to the safety and well being of passengers.
I think it holds self evident that CRM, or more specifically communication, is the reason this incident occurred, both between the SCCM and Flight Crew and the SCCM and the other crew and passengers. Also it might be fair to say that the unease of the SCCM might have been something the FC should have anticipated, though that is not a given.
411A is an interesting read always but I disagree that this CCM should be hung out to dry, I think she acted incorrectly but she did so with absolutely the right thing in mind and as the victim of a break down in communication.
A retrain may indeed be important and an examination of the use of correct phraseology. If an Evacuation was not intended but rather a swift disembarkation, the correct PA should have been used, if such a PA does not exist then that is something the company should address. Though I must admit the correct PA is unlikely to be one that comes quickly to mind - that's a company issue too.
More importantly I hope that this incident brings to all crew members attentions the need to keep everyone in the loop at all times.
As for pax instigating evacuations whenever they feel uncomfortable - if that becomes an SOP my mother will not be allowed to fly again....
Controversial, moi?
The CC may be completely adherent to the SOPs, but the SLF will take matters in their own hands if they come to feel that the hazard is not getting the attention they feel it deserves.
During internal BA SEP recurrent training I recall seeing an interview conducted with one of the CC survivors of the Manchester disaster. She said that she could see the cabin ceiling glowing red at the aft of the aircraft with smoke and fumes evident and yet the majority of the passengers in that section sat almost mesmerised until spurred into action by shouted instructions from the crew.
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As stated by Mouse; pax too stunned to react will remain in their seats until "woken up" by CC shouting command. Accumulated data available about evacuations has led to this "accepted wisdom" in the industry.
Things appear to have changed somewhat after 9/11 though.
One case in point, there are more; pax attempting to open the rear door after landing on the Hudson, with the FA trying to keep it closed.
These pax certainly attempted to take matters in their own hands.
Things appear to have changed somewhat after 9/11 though.
One case in point, there are more; pax attempting to open the rear door after landing on the Hudson, with the FA trying to keep it closed.
These pax certainly attempted to take matters in their own hands.
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Interestingly a couple of years back we did a simulated emergency scenario in the standard winter refresher, which entailed using a full crew (cabin crew + pilots) and the cabin trainer (mock up of aircraft). It was going swimmingly, pilots were being informed of a possible situation with fumes/ smoke, and asked cabin crew to keep them informed whilst they ran their checks. Then the person running the scenario escalated the event and said there was now a bit more smoke. Instead of the cabin crew coming to tell us so we could order the evacuation, we heard the cabin crew opening doors, deploying the slides and initiating the evacuation. In "theory" we hadn't turned the engines off yet, hadn't ordered any evacuation, and hadn't even been informed by the cabin crew that they had decided to initiate an evacuation. After everyone had exited the aircraft we opened the flight deck door, calmly got off, and asked why had there been an evacuation as the minor problem had been sorted and the engines had still been running. Cue plenty of "I don't know, someone opened a door so we did too" type comments.
It certainly opened my eyes!!!!
It certainly opened my eyes!!!!
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One would imagine however that, had it not been a simulator, the altitude of the aircraft would have been more self evident non?
The training at BA was always quite clear - clearly catastrophic and unsurvivable(sp?). (Examples were given).
I know that was not the case here but it is part of a wider discussion to be had. I spoke to pilots when I was cabin crew and again since becoming one myself. Some find it baffling that anyone would disagree that CC should be allowed to initiate an evacuation should it be necessary, others thought it should be something only allowed if it was confirmed that the FC are incapacitated.
My answer is always quite simple, if there is fire in the cabin, or indeed lapping at my feet, I would not expect anyone to sit going through their silent drills awaiting the command. Hit the evac horn (to alert everyone) look out the window, make an assessment (engines/hazards etc.) and get out. I would expect the crew on any flight to do the same, that said, if there is time for a call then the situation is not catastrophic and the evacuation command should only come from the Flight Deck. I think someone said it earlier when they said, if you have to think about it, you probably should not.
I wonder how common it actually is anyway? Is someone more clever than I (not a difficult thing to find), aware of any stats on the subject. I know that unless I felt I was without any other option the initiation of an evacuation whilst I was crew was a very last ditch option.
The training at BA was always quite clear - clearly catastrophic and unsurvivable(sp?). (Examples were given).
I know that was not the case here but it is part of a wider discussion to be had. I spoke to pilots when I was cabin crew and again since becoming one myself. Some find it baffling that anyone would disagree that CC should be allowed to initiate an evacuation should it be necessary, others thought it should be something only allowed if it was confirmed that the FC are incapacitated.
My answer is always quite simple, if there is fire in the cabin, or indeed lapping at my feet, I would not expect anyone to sit going through their silent drills awaiting the command. Hit the evac horn (to alert everyone) look out the window, make an assessment (engines/hazards etc.) and get out. I would expect the crew on any flight to do the same, that said, if there is time for a call then the situation is not catastrophic and the evacuation command should only come from the Flight Deck. I think someone said it earlier when they said, if you have to think about it, you probably should not.
I wonder how common it actually is anyway? Is someone more clever than I (not a difficult thing to find), aware of any stats on the subject. I know that unless I felt I was without any other option the initiation of an evacuation whilst I was crew was a very last ditch option.
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Worrying indeed AB Girl & Max Angle.
What do you both think may be the cause of this lack of knowledge/training/SOP discipline if I may ask? And What did your companies do to address this undesirable state of things?
In our mob 1 of the annual SEP refreshers always contains 2 scenarios in the full motion cabin & (rudimentary) cockpit sim. The sim also comes with "real" smelly and viz-killing smoke, noise and outside visuals. 1 scenario always ends in an evacuation so everybody gets a chance to experience the slide again, the other may or may not.
Usually the evac signal comes from the cockpit, and we evacuate accordingly. Sometimes it doesn´t, we can´t get hold of them, evac is very clearly indicated and the CC initiates one. Sometimes the situation escalates to where we think we may need to evacuate but the pilots tell us not to so we hold off a little longer and then get told to remain seated all of us.
There are always things that could/should have gone better, and they come out in the de-briefing. Usually pointed out by the "culprits" themselves.
These exercises get done usually 3 times a day, 360 days a year.
In the about 60 I have been part of, I have never experienced any of what what the 2 of you describe. Nor have I ever heard of it happening from colleagues or trainers.
The one real evacuation we´ve had in the past 10 years went textbook. The aircraft was a write off I believe, but I know nobody got injured beyond a sprained ankle.
We were lucky with overwing pax who had actually listened carefully to the brief on how to open the hatches, we were lucky that there was no fire and we had cockpit and cabin crew cooperating in an exemplary manner. The last factor being ascribed to endless, varied scenario-training of people with a modicum of intelligence and to SOP brainwashing.
What do you both think may be the cause of this lack of knowledge/training/SOP discipline if I may ask? And What did your companies do to address this undesirable state of things?
In our mob 1 of the annual SEP refreshers always contains 2 scenarios in the full motion cabin & (rudimentary) cockpit sim. The sim also comes with "real" smelly and viz-killing smoke, noise and outside visuals. 1 scenario always ends in an evacuation so everybody gets a chance to experience the slide again, the other may or may not.
Usually the evac signal comes from the cockpit, and we evacuate accordingly. Sometimes it doesn´t, we can´t get hold of them, evac is very clearly indicated and the CC initiates one. Sometimes the situation escalates to where we think we may need to evacuate but the pilots tell us not to so we hold off a little longer and then get told to remain seated all of us.
There are always things that could/should have gone better, and they come out in the de-briefing. Usually pointed out by the "culprits" themselves.
These exercises get done usually 3 times a day, 360 days a year.
In the about 60 I have been part of, I have never experienced any of what what the 2 of you describe. Nor have I ever heard of it happening from colleagues or trainers.
The one real evacuation we´ve had in the past 10 years went textbook. The aircraft was a write off I believe, but I know nobody got injured beyond a sprained ankle.
We were lucky with overwing pax who had actually listened carefully to the brief on how to open the hatches, we were lucky that there was no fire and we had cockpit and cabin crew cooperating in an exemplary manner. The last factor being ascribed to endless, varied scenario-training of people with a modicum of intelligence and to SOP brainwashing.
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What do you both think may be the cause of this lack of knowledge/training/SOP discipline if I may ask?
So-called CRM run amok.
Some airlines, however...have positively not allowed this nonsense to occur, and never will.
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After everyone had exited the aircraft we opened the flight deck door, calmly got off, and asked why had there been an evacuation as the minor problem had been sorted and the engines had still been running
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We need some balance here! If that cabin trainer was anything like the cabin trainer I have been in many times with BA, you would have NO way of knowing if the engines were running, you were flying or underwater! As Matt says, it is useful but NOT realistic.
I have a lot more faith in cabin crew in general than some here.
I have a lot more faith in cabin crew in general than some here.