French Concorde crash

[Lemurian]

exeng:

I have changed my mind

You are a gentleman and a man of courage, Sir.
With respect...

jcjeant :

The BEA (by the voice of Mr Arslanian) tell at the trial that they received the testimonies (pilots and firemen and also tower personnal of course) but they discarded them.
So .. as they were discarded .. the witnesses don't appeared for testimony at the trial.

Nice try. You just forget that the BEA doesn't chose who will appear in court as witness. The judges do, on requests made either by the instructing judge or the lawyers, all based on the dossier instructed by the appointed magistrate.
Apparently, you not only read aerotech that you haven't grasped, but you also read on legalities of the French system you ignore.
Your persistence is admirable.

Iron duck :

I can't tell from the maps where the fire services were located. However, looking at the photographs on page 92 of the BEA report, the photographer was looking almost straight down the runway. The angle of view and runway heading diverge by only a few degrees.

Very difficult to judge angles on a long lens shot.
Look again at the angles and it will become a lot more obvious that the view was taken from one of the high-speed exits of RWY 26L, in my opinion V1.
Less dramatic, eh ?

DozyWannabe :

Variations on the story include F-BTSC passing within 7m, 70m or 7 yards(!) of the alleged Chirac 747, the alleged 747 itself either on the runway and exiting,

As that idea started in the French press and that I've met the pilot of that airplane, Yes!, he was exiting the runway...26L on V1 !

[DozyWannabe]

Originally Posted by Lemurian

As that idea started in the French press and that I've met the pilot of that airplane, Yes!, he was exiting the runway...26L on V1 !

You've stated this fact before, but I want to get it on this thread for confirmation - was Jacques Chirac on that aircraft?

Also, out of my own curiosity... did the pilot say whether anyone on that aircraft could have been witness to F-BTSC's takeoff run?

(Note to others, the aircraft was exiting 26L, F-BTSC was taking off on 26R.)

[KBPsen]

wings folded,

I have made no comments on the trial and how it was conducted, but if you feel the need to put words in my mouth feel free to continue to do so.

I have made comments on the possibility of an appeal and, despite the verbosity, it appears you know as much about that as I do.

[wings folded]

So the short answer is that you don't know.

Your words.

I am not a judge on this case.

Neither are you.

[Lemurian]

Dozywannabe :

was Jacques Chirac on that aircraft?

No. Wasn't even at the airport when the accident happened.

did the pilot say whether anyone on that aircraft could have been witness to F-BTSC's takeoff run?

I think the investigators took numerous testimonies from that aircraft. The *unidentified* comment on the origin of the fire not from the engines came from that flight deck. Who were proven right.

There are a few comments to be made on that accident :
the very first, after reading the BEA report is that that crew didn't have a chance in hell to escape their predicament :
=They had the engine thermo-physics against them :
- #1 and 2, although in perfect order, even after the tyre-burst couldn't deliver any appreciable thrust due to their running in very hot air, explosively surging...

=They had time against them :
- The time the fire allowed them before the destruction of the flight controls on the port wing.

= They had aerodynamics against them :
- The landing gear could not retract as the left doors were damaged by the flying debris from the tyres, increasing the overall drag... It is obvious - to me - that the Captain was perfectly aware of his airplane flyability as the IAS oscillated around 205 kt, which was the Zero rate of climb speed - Vzrc -.
Unfortunately the unavailability of #1 Engine would have meant a Two -engine Vzrc of 300 kts... Being on the back of the thrust curve, he had no chance of turning the situation around.
But try hard he did.

So you see, I don't even want to answer to the imbecile's comments of one ex cargo clown as they are very low in the merde...where they belong.

[AlphaZuluRomeo]

Originally Posted by DozyWannabe (post #220)

The tragic irony in this case is that it might have been possible to get to Le Bourget's boundary if the engine fire warning had been ignored - but to do so would have gone against every aviator's training, not to mention instinct.

Why might that have been possible ?
I mean... OK, the crew shut off engine #2. But :
- As this engine produced, at this time, barely more thrust than idle, and
- As the flight control surfaces (left wing elevons) were being damaged by the fire
... what would ignoring the fire warning (maybe) have changed ?


Lemurian (post #228) : Thanks, Sir

AZR

[DozyWannabe]

AZR : I was referring to the viewpoint on a previous thread that some believe that had they "firewalled" the throttles on all four then they might have stood a better chance - I should have made it clear it was a very small "might". I suspect that, as Lemurian says, the hot gases from the fire would have prevented the engines from producing enough thrust to make a difference, even if they were not physically damaged.

[M2dude]

AlphaZuluRomeo
I like most of the British Concorde 'family' am generally resisting the temptation of contributing to this particular thread, but I will allow myself just this one little point. There is all sorts of speculation as to the effects of shutting down No2 engine, and that it was only producing idle(ish) thrust at the time but I would like to mention that:
a) This engine was found to have very little compressor damage, and almost certainly the loss of thrust was due to massive fuel ingestion.

b) It is quite possible that the ingested fuel pattern would have altered to the point of at least a substantial recovery of thrust.

c) There is only one way (short of extinguishing it altogether) to detach a fuel fed fire from the flame itself, and that is by increasing airspeed. On only 2 1/2 engines there was absolutely no way that the IAS could increase above the 211 KIAS achived that day.

d) It is always possible (but none of us can possibly prove this) that the flame pattern COULD have altered with an increased IAS to the point that some time could have been bought. (We can only speculate whether that would have been enough for SD to have reached Le Bourget or not).

With Respect
Dude

[fran35780]

French Concord

Please read again the final report :

http://www.bea-fr.org/docspa/2000/f-...-sc000725a.pdf


1.12.1.3 Piece of Metal
A strip of metal about 43 centimetres long, bent at one of its ends, was found on the
runway shoulder at Slab 152 level. Its width varies from 29 to 34 mm and it has drilled
holes, some containing rivets, similar to the Cherry aeronautical type. The holes are not at
regular intervals.
On visual inspection, the piece appeared to be made of light alloy, coated on one side
with epoxy primer (greenish) and on the other side with what appeared to be red aircraft
mastic for hot sections (RTV 106). It did not appear to have been exposed to high
temperature.
This piece was not identified as part of the Concorde.
Figure 21: Piece found at line 152



and :

1.16.6.4 Examination of the Wear Strip
The wear strip found on the runway was subjected to laboratory examination:
• the strip was 435 mm long, 29 to 34 mm wide and about 1.4 mm thick. It was
made of a type TA6V alloy composed of titanium (89.67%), aluminium (7.03%),
vanadium (2.28%) and iron (1.02%). It was covered on one side in green primer
composed of an epoxy bisphenol A resin containing elements of silicate and
pigments of strontium chromate. The other side was covered in red silicon mastic
for high temperatures. The rivets, of Cherry Max type, were made of an aluminium
alloy bush - magnesium AG-5 or 5056 - and a steel stem with an alloy of
chrome-nickel-molybdenum covered with a layer of cadmium,
• the strip possessed twelve drill holes with random spacing, some off centre with
the longitudinal axis,
• the presence of circular indentations on the mastic side bears witness that the part
opposite it possessed extra drill holes. Seventeen hole marks were counted in
addition to the twelve holes drilled in the strip,
• black marks were noted on the outer side of the strip and black elastomer debris
was found jammed in one of the rivets. The spectra of these marks and deposits
are similar to the Concorde tyre.
1.16.6.5

[SLFinAZ]

My "issue" with the courts finding is very basic. The past history of damage specific to tire failure made the the reality of a catastrophic failure a statistical certainty over a large enough sample of data. The question wasn't IF a fatal event would happen but when. I can see absolutely no logic that would exclude AF from the fundamental reality that they were operating an airframe with a statistical certainty of catastrophic failure. To place the focus on the specific events at hand totally ignores the statistical certainty of the event.

The fundamental truth is that the Concorde should not have been flying without significant modifications to the fuel tanks and tires....period.

[jcjeant]

Hi,

About the witnesses (trial audition)
Sorry Google translation ....

Google Vertaling

Original source:
10 février 2010 Procès du crash du CONCORDE

[wings folded]

My "issue" with the courts finding is very basic. The past history of damage specific to tire failure made the the reality of a catastrophic failure a statistical certainty over a large enough sample of data. The question wasn't IF a fatal event would happen but when. I can see absolutely no logic that would exclude AF from the fundamental reality that they were operating an airframe with a statistical certainty of catastrophic failure. To place the focus on the specific events at hand totally ignores the statistical certainty of the event.

The fundamental truth is that the Concorde should not have been flying without significant modifications to the fuel tanks and tires....period.

So as a lay person in Arizona, you are better informed than a duly constituted court where the accident occurred.

Glad that you are so shure of your own importance. I may be alone, but I do not adhere to your knowledge or version of events.

[ChristiaanJ]

Another nice sample of ignorance about the reality in aviation.

Originally Posted by SLFinAZ

The past history of damage specific to tire failure made the the reality of a catastrophic failure a statistical certainty over a large enough sample of data.

Damage specific to tyre failure was assessed by exhaustive testing before the aircraft even flew, and during certification.
The in-service history showed that the certification conclusions were mostly correct (a tyre burst would result at most in a minor fuel leak), but that as a result of a tyre burst, fragments of the wheel itself, and the "cow-catcher" (spray guard) could do damage and penetrate the wing - which led to modifications.

"Statistical certainty"... there is no such thing.
If you have "a large enough sample of data"... or in other words if you fly an aircraft long enough.... every aircraft will crash sooner or later, or to be more accurate, every aircraft type will crash sooner or later.

Do I really have to remind you of the DC-10, for instance?
Nothing was done about the cargo door incidents, until the Turkish Airlines aircraft crashed at Ermenonville (near Paris).
Do I have to remind you about TWA 800?

...the statistical certainty of the event...

As the saying goes, there are lies, damn lies... and statistics.

CJ

[Lemurian]

jcjeant :

About the witnesses (trial audition)
Sorry Google translation ....

If you can made a fair judicial decision on that google garbage, count me out...
Actually, I should have to thank you as you've provided us with the most extraordinary refutal of the so-called *professional testimonies* of the fire fighters... Remember those who said that they should know better than anyone ?
so look : the ONLY witnesses who saw fire originating on the RIGHT side of the aircraft are the exercizing firemen.
So much for the reliability of expert witnesses.

the text in French follows, with my stresses

" Le témoignage des pompiers :
Da 548 (1ère fois) : jusqu’à V6 rien, quand le Concorde passe à l’intersection S5, il a vu le réacteur intérieur gauche s’allumer, puis le droit mais pas de la même manière.
(he saw the left engine catch fire, then the right one, but not in the same way)
En mai 03 (2ème fois) : Da 2732 : il maintient sa déclaration pour lui c’est l’aile droite qui a pris feu en premier. Le feu démarre entre le chemin de sécurité, entre 26D et W7.
(He maintains his earlier declaration :to his mind, the right wing caught fire first.)

Da 550 (1ère fois) : jusqu’en S5, rien de particulier. Départ du feu en S5. Le Concorde se trouvait en phase de leur bâtiment. Le départ des flammes est du côté droit.
(Concorde was in front of their building, the flames started on the right side)
2ème fois, en mai 03 : Da 2733 : le bruit du Concorde l’interpelle, dans son champ de vision, après S6, rien d’anormal, départ de flamme entre le chemin de sécurité et S5.Le feu est à droite.
That's the second interview. For him, the fire is on the right side
En juillet 03 : Da 2274 : il voit passer le Concorde, une dizaine de mètres avant S5, il voit une fumée à gauche, il n’a rien entendu de particulier.
(This one changed his mind after the third interview. I do not know why.)
"

[wings folded]

Mr Christian

every aircraft will crash sooner or later, or to be more accurate, every aircraft type will crash sooner or later.

There are happy exceptions, but your remark is not without merit.

A small fleet (eg Concorde) will tend not to crash so much as a huge fleet (eg Boeing 747).

[Iron Duck]

Lemurian

Very difficult to judge angles on a long lens shot.
Look again at the angles and it will become a lot more obvious that the view was taken from one of the high-speed exits of RWY 26L, in my opinion V1.

I'm a commercial photographer. It's not a long lens shot. It's a crop from the middle of a negative shot on a compact camera. This is obvious from the size of the film grain. The lower picture on page 92 clearly shows a taxiway in the foreground that appears to be perpendicular to the runway.

Given the scale of the objects, the photo's perspective suggests to me that it was shot from a position above the ground that would correspond with the window height of a widebody. It is certainly not shot on a long lens from the aerodrome boundary.

It is very difficult to judge distant acute angles, yes, but a simple study of the map on page 39 reveals that for an aircraft holding on S1 (looking again, I now reckon that's where the camera is), the angle between its line of sight to Concorde in the uppermost shot and the runway heading is around 5°. At rotation, the angle is more like 30°.

[SLFinAZ]

I'm sorry but these are self serving comments....

The Concorde had 6 incidents in which tire failure led directly to fuel leaks. In no way can the incident in DC be considered minor. The statistical sample of over 50 tire failures leads to a ratio of roughly 10% of tire failures leading to structural damage significant enough to cause a fuel leak. Even if only the DC event is construed as major we still have a 10% chance of a fuel leak and a 2% chance of a potentially catastrophic failure.

Any self serving analysis that this is acceptable would not fly in any civil litigation....in fact no reputable attorney would let this get to a trial. There was a clear and present statistically significant danger that could have been addressed by modifying the fuel tanks. Had such modifications been made the accident would not have occurred. The incident in DC clearly showed that the nature of the tire failure was not clearly linked to the fuel tank failure.

The mere fact that the Concorde was allowed to continue in service without modified fuel tanks was in fact criminally negligent based on the statistical certainty of percussive failure of the fuel tank in the event of tire failure.

[Iron Duck]

Lemurian

As that idea started in the French press and that I've met the pilot of that airplane, Yes!, he was exiting the runway...26L on V1 !

That's very interesting, because looking at the map, the area between the camera position and the runway is occupied solely by taxiways either perpendicular or parallel to the runway. Therefore, any pavement visible in the foreground must either be parallel to the runway (which it clearly isn't), perpendicular (which it appears to me to be), or correspond with the junction of S2, V1 and V4.

Position 4 on the map corresponds to a corrected radio altitude of 26 feet, so in the rotation photo it looks to me as if the camera is either at that junction with S3 in the foreground, or on the curve of S1 with S2 in the foreground. How else can the pavement perspective be explained?

If the camera had been in an aircraft holding on taxiway V1, by position 4 the Concorde would have passed the camera's position. But it hasn't: in the pictures we see a 3/4 view from the front.

[DozyWannabe]

From which we can gather, presuming the information is correct, that the photograph may have been taken from an airliner, but not the AF 747 that was clearing 26L.

[Lemurian]

Iron Duck,
[img]http:www.concordesst.com/accident/picture/m1.jpg[/img]
Take a look at this picture whch in my opinion the best of the lot.
You may very well be right as the runway/taxiway configuration shown can only be S2 in the foreground, the runway and then the combination of W1/S2(north).
For an angle resolving clue, one has to take in the first airborne picure the alignment made by the left main gear oleo and the top of the fin.
Found some 27 °.
Not bad.
and thanks for the correction.