KOS evac

[Boomerang_Butt]

Thanks, always wondered about that one!

[A and C]

I echo the opinion that the crew found them selfs with an evacuation at the very worst moment in terms of slide deployment and passenger expectation, most of the pax would most likely have already got the baggage out of the lockers and been in an "out the front door" mind set.

As to the overwing exits, I think it would be very hard for the average passenger to take it on them selfs to open one of these, the public attitude to emergency equipment is very strange. Have you ever been in a public building when a fire has broken out? I have and most people tried to ignore it despite the fire alarms and smoke, as to using the fire fighting equipment..............even the staff of this hotel ran away from this! It was left to myself and the Flight Engineer to put the fire out. (and not even a free beer as thanks!)
I guess that we were the only two people on site who has receved any realistic fire trainning.

So going back to the evacuation it is hardly a surprize that passengers don't want to open the overwing exits as the only reason for them sitting next to them is the extra leg room.

As to the lack of action from the ground staff, this will come as no surprize to anyone who flys to the Greek Islands, most of the staff are on the islands over the summer for a sort of long paid holiday from the Athens area. They have not the first idea when it comes to airfield operatons.

Ten years ago when I started flying to the Greek Islands I was told by the chief pilot that I could expect very little help from the Greeks in event of an emergency, as far as I can see very little has changed in the last ten years apart from giving the staff the safety cure all Hi-Vis jacket.

[Lonewolf_50]

Sometimes it's easier to just let the bag go than to stand in the door arguing about it while people fry.

I tend to agree with you. If a parent can carry a baby, a businessman (or authoer) can carry his "baby," which is his small valise with his little brain (laptop) as well with as little, or less hazard, since he/she is a bit less concerned with dropping his valise than a mother/father is with dropping an infant during the evac ...

Of interest seeing the comments on the apparent miscommunication between ground crew and cabin&cockpit crew: what provisions do most airlines have to facilitate easy communication between those within and those without during ground operations?

How often is a situation rehearsed based on this scenario, I wonder, with both ground crew and cabin/cockpit crew involved in the training scenario?

I too assess this as a 'precautionary evac.'

Aye, but are crew (ground and aircraft) prepared mentally for when "precautionary" turns into "emergency" during a ground evac? The cockpit crews have the benefit of training where precautionary turns emergency in flight ... do ground crews and baggage handlers get similar training?

[Boomerang_Butt]

If I recall correctly, there was a case in Sydney (QfF744?)where an evacuation was required at the terminal... (brake fire I think) in a couple of cases the catering staff drove the trucks away to enable slides to be used... if anyone has the exact details or a link it'd be appreciated.

But, I am sure the ground crew are briefed on possible scenarios, indeed in a few cases it has been the ground crews who first became aware that there was a problem. (engine surge/fire) and a few catering crew have told me they keep a wary eye on the doors as they are approaching in case one opens suddenly...

During my training, we were told if a catering/cleaning truck was blocking our door and we HAD to use it (due to being unable to use other exits) we had to get their attention however we could and wave them off... usually, once a slide is deployed the others become aware of it pretty quickly and scarper fast!

I vaguely recall reading something (could have been the same case above) about a slide deploying onto terminal building structure/roof and pax escaping that way...

[Boomerang_Butt]

Just to add, in my company we are told (very emphatically) that a precautionary can become a "full evacuation" at ANY TIME including immediately after a precautionary PA has been made...

In that case for us our commands change to express the new urgency/speed required... for example, from walking down the stairs to running down the stairs/sitting & sliding to jumping & sliding

In a precautionary using stairs, the crew are the ones in control of the stairs (if used) and ground crew are trained not to approach with them until we wave them over, in this case if an evac was required the fastest method would of course be to get the stairs over asap as opposed to closing a door to re-arm it... once that command is given to evacuate you use what you have- stairs if there, if your door is still closed, re-arm and go go go...

(Note, one SOP only, it might be different at other airlines)

[flugholm]

You can critizise or defend the flight crew as much as you want --- what worries me is the people in the high viz jackets on the apron. I don't expect them to be some kind of Bruce Willis type heroes, but... None of them shows any sign of urgency: It takes a long time for two of them to move the stairs away from L2 (starting at 1:20), also with no urgency. The baggage carts (which presumable prevent the crew from popping the R2 slide) are never moved out of the way.

Well, hetfield already uttered the "peanuts" sentence...

[windytoo]

To continue the theme about how other airline's procedures might affect a situation like this. In our outfit, we wait until we have reached the final parking position, shut the engines down and then the captain asks for the doors to be disarmed on the PA. Once he receives the check that the doors are all disarmed he switches the seatbelt signs off to start the disembarkation. On the other hand travelling as a Passenger on BA, I have noticed that the call for the doors to be disarmed comes some time prior to reaching the stand while the aircraft is still moving under its own power. Depending on which system was used in this strange above situation, it would surely have quite a difference on the eventual outcome. In these days where everything has to be written down and standardized for the lawyers, does this not lay someone open to be sued for damages? One would have thought that the airframe manufacturer would have come to the best conclusion when they conducted the evacuation tests, wouldn't they?
I also realize that passengers rarely pay any attention to the seatbelt sign, so maybe it's a theoretical scenario anyway!

[Magplug]

Originally Posted by Windytoo

On the other hand travelling as a Passenger on BA, I have noticed that the call for the doors to be disarmed comes some time prior to reaching the stand while the aircraft is still moving under its own power.

Interesting observation. All UK companies have their different SOP's and all variations are of course approved by the regulatory authorities.

The SOP's surrounding escape slides are shaped by the inherent dangers and the risks involved. There is a risk of the slide being unusable at certain stages of the operation if it is fouled by something. There is a risk to ground personnel (there have been deaths) due to receiving a slide in the face on the ground. There is probably the greatest risk - and expense - of inadvertent operation by crewmember who became confused over the door state. So you have to balance all the risks.

When an aircraft arrives and shuts down next to an airbridge at least one door slide has become unusable due to the proximity of the airbridge so you might argue that it is better to have to have the doors disarmed just before parking. On the other hand it is SOP in many charter companies for the Captain to order 'close + arm' before the aircraft leaves the stand. Both methods achieve the objective although both methods carry inherent risks.

Slide SOP's are best served by having a fundamental SOP for use and then allowing the Captain the latitude to arm/disarm for other unusual situations. One thing is for sure.... having an engine fire 3 or 4 minutes after shutdown is a most unusual situation and not one you can legislate an SOP for.

As for failing to lower the flaps...... in the big scheme of things that omission would not prevent passengers leaving via the overwing exits if they had a fire burning behind them. In the event that omission was academic.

In my book the event was handled successfully as everyone escaped without injury and they all lived to tell the tale. The can be no better outcome.


BOAC.......Popcorn Munchers....... Priceless!

[ATC Watcher]

There is always a big, often huge diffrence between theory, simulation and the real thing, as this evac proves again.

Reading the 3 pages of the Canadian report on the evac of the AF A340 in Toronto in 2005 does put back things in perspective. Hardly anything worked as planned. And what is in the report is not mentioning everything that went wrong in that evac.
The fact that 200 of the 290 pax exited most with their carry-on luggage though one single exit in the back in less than 2 min and that nobody was killed in the process are in fact the only 2 (very) positive things.
This AF evac is used in many presentations across the industry to demonstrate the difference between training ( and those AF CC were highly trained ) and reality.