UPS Aircraft Down In Dubai
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I'm now sat next to a nasty piece of lithium. I'll pour water in it, will it explode? I bloody well hope not, because my COSHH is going to look a bit bad. Oh guess what, it got a bit angry.
These batteries that are likely to suffer from "thermal runaway" should not be allowed on aircraft. I know they are currently class 9(RMD), but they should be not allowed. Anyone brave enough to do that.
These batteries that are likely to suffer from "thermal runaway" should not be allowed on aircraft. I know they are currently class 9(RMD), but they should be not allowed. Anyone brave enough to do that.
I'm now sat next to a nasty piece of lithium. I'll pour water in it, will it explode? I bloody well hope not,
If it was the former: Be careful !!! That's gonna be some serious fireworks.
If it was the latter not too much should happen because Lithium Batteries contain only a very limited amount of Lithium itself. A 60g (2oz) Lithium Battery contains roughly 0,6g (0,02oz) Lithium i.e. very roughly only 1% of its weight is Lithium.
As I already wrote in an earlier post: The whole process in the Batteries requires significant (electric) energy in the cells to be launched. Take the electric energy out of the cells and you won't achieve a thermal runaway.
Yes they are flammable because they contain flammable substances (mainly alcohol). But self ignition only works with sufficient charge of the batteries. Without that you will have to throw them into an open fire and have to wait until the pressure breaks the can (Li-Ion).
Unfortunately the cells don't like being too empty (i.e. below a certain voltage). They will loose capacity or even fail completely (no harm just ending up as a paper weight). Therefore the manufacturers charge them too much for safe transport because otherwise the quote of defective batteries would rise.
(For LiPo the ideal range would be 3,3 - 3,5 V. Below 3 V the cell will suffer, above 3,6 V the energy starts being theoretically suffciient for self ignition, Li-Ion at a bit lower Voltage)
Edit:
Brief explanation how a thermal runaway in these cells works:
The cells contain a high number of thin layers of Copper / Aluminum foils. These layers are separated by a separator which is a sort of alcohol soaked plastic foil.
If at one place the separator is damaged, a short circuit occurs. This creates heat. The heat will melt the plastic foil further and also melt the next plastic foil separating the next metal foil coils/sheets. Thus creating a further short circuit. This continues through the whole battery. The temperature in the can will increase. At a certain point the can will break. Now the hot evaporated alcohol getting in contact with oxygen is ignited by glowing metal resulting from the short circuits and creates the flames you see in vids of this.
Last edited by henra; 10th Oct 2010 at 09:33. Reason: Edit block entered
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It was on a nice 1g piece of Li metal, it fizzed a bit, but not a lot happened other than lot's of H2 was produced.
Question is, if Li batteries are so flammable, why are the in class 9 and not 3?
Question is, if Li batteries are so flammable, why are the in class 9 and not 3?
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From the FAA SAFO
more from the SAFO
Probably good advice from Sguppy
These recommendations are limited to lithium batteries transported in the cargo hold of an aircraft (including cargo holds that are not distinct from the flight deck), and do not apply to lithium batteries carried onboard by passengers and crewmembers, or otherwise stowed in the passenger cabin of the aircraft.
FAA testing has shown that encased or enclosed lithium metal batteries may pose a safety risk. Two types of robust, readily available containers were tested at the FAA Tech Center: five gallon steel pails with crimp on gasketed lids, and 30 gallon steel drums with bolt closed ring seals and gasketed metal lids. For both types of container, as few as six loose CR2 lithium metal cells were sufficient to cause failure when induced into thermal runaway by an electric cartridge heater. The confined electrolyte and the molten lithium ignition source formed an explosive condition, forcefully separating the lid from the container. The explosive force in this test was likely high enough to cause physical damage to an aircraft’s Class C cargo compartment.
Don't underestimate this hazard.
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Purity
SNS3Guppy: sir or madam,
The last two paragraphs of your post of 18 Sep, the last para but a line, should be printed on the front page of every log book sold.
Poetic wisdom.
Thank you.
The last two paragraphs of your post of 18 Sep, the last para but a line, should be printed on the front page of every log book sold.
Poetic wisdom.
Thank you.
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Let's not downplay the hazard, either. It's not merely a little alcohol, and fighting a metal fire with reactive materials using water is not in anybody's best interest.
Halon will most definitely quench an Li battery fire, it may however ignite once the Halon goes.
I've not seen the insides of an Li Battery, I may well slice one open in a fume hood this afternoon. I cannot believe there is that much alcohol in it to combust, if there is then why?
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Has anyone any information on an aircraft fire where the crew descended to 25,000 unpressurized and what the results were? How about manufacturer or government testing regarding fire suppression at 25,000 pressure altitude?
When descending to FL250 and following the cargo fire procedure, how long does it take to get the cabin pressure to 25,000? Someone posted that the 747 depressurizes at 2500 fpm. Is that correct? Is that the same for all the Boeings? Other manufacturers? Is it advisable or even possible to hurry that up manually? What would be the physiological effects of doing that? Someone posted a USAF study whereas 25,000 was chosen to lesson the chances of decompression sickness. What can we expect as to the possibilities of continued fire at 25,000 cabin altitude? What can we expect at 25,000 physiologically? Will a pack at 1/2 flow keep the cockpit warm? Is pressure breathing required? Et cetera...
I don't know what will happen with the lithium batteries at 25,000 feet. Besides the lack of oxygen, it should get pretty cold back there. If they do continue to burn, hopefully the stuff around them will not and the batteries may eventually burn out. Sound reasonable?
When at cruise at about 5-6,000 cabin altitude, if a major fire develops and an immediate descent is made, will the cabin altitude ever rise to a "fire extinguishing" level? Is it possible and should it be considered to put the fire out at 25,000 unpressurized before descending?
Sorry for the shotgun approach with the questions, but there seems to be a lack of information on a lot of this stuff.
As for the specifics of UPS 6, I'm waiting to learn the flight profile after discovering the smoke. What was the cabin altitude profile during this return? Did the cabin ever get depressurized sufficiently to impede the fire? When did the smoke become so dense as to partially or completely obscure vision both inside and out, both in terms of flight profile and time since discovery?
When descending to FL250 and following the cargo fire procedure, how long does it take to get the cabin pressure to 25,000? Someone posted that the 747 depressurizes at 2500 fpm. Is that correct? Is that the same for all the Boeings? Other manufacturers? Is it advisable or even possible to hurry that up manually? What would be the physiological effects of doing that? Someone posted a USAF study whereas 25,000 was chosen to lesson the chances of decompression sickness. What can we expect as to the possibilities of continued fire at 25,000 cabin altitude? What can we expect at 25,000 physiologically? Will a pack at 1/2 flow keep the cockpit warm? Is pressure breathing required? Et cetera...
I don't know what will happen with the lithium batteries at 25,000 feet. Besides the lack of oxygen, it should get pretty cold back there. If they do continue to burn, hopefully the stuff around them will not and the batteries may eventually burn out. Sound reasonable?
When at cruise at about 5-6,000 cabin altitude, if a major fire develops and an immediate descent is made, will the cabin altitude ever rise to a "fire extinguishing" level? Is it possible and should it be considered to put the fire out at 25,000 unpressurized before descending?
Sorry for the shotgun approach with the questions, but there seems to be a lack of information on a lot of this stuff.
As for the specifics of UPS 6, I'm waiting to learn the flight profile after discovering the smoke. What was the cabin altitude profile during this return? Did the cabin ever get depressurized sufficiently to impede the fire? When did the smoke become so dense as to partially or completely obscure vision both inside and out, both in terms of flight profile and time since discovery?
Last edited by F111UPS767; 12th Oct 2010 at 18:01.
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Someone posted that the 747 depressurizes at 2500 fpm.
Main Deck Cargo Compartment Suppression
The main deck cargo compartment is a Class E compartment. Pushing the Main Deck Cargo Fire Arm switch configures equipment cooling to closed loop and turns off two packs and airflow to all cargo compartments.
Subsequently pushing the Cargo Depress/Disch switch initiates automatic aircraft depressurization at the rate of 9,000 feet per minute to slightly less than aircraft pressure altitude, or 20,000 feet cabin altitude, whichever comes first. Then depressurization continues as required at the reduced rate of 2,500 feet per minute until the cabin pressure altitude is just below the the aircraft cabin altitude, or 25,000 feet cabin altitude whichever comes first.
Let's not downplay the hazard, either. It's not merely a little alcohol, and fighting a metal fire with reactive materials using water is not in anybody's best interest.
We're not talking about a small bit of alcohol burning. We're talking about explosive potential, sustained combustion, toxic combustion byproducts, and a sustainable ignition source that can easily propagate to other fuels, to say nothing of melting liquid metal.
I agree on your conclusion but not on the technicalities behind.
Technically it is mostly alcohol+ plastic burning.
The explosion comes from the metal containment allowing pressure to build which then escapes in an explosive manner once the can breaks. That's what causes the dynamics. It is a bit like blackpowder.
Ignite it openly and it will burn. Put it in a can and it will explode.
Again: It is not the relatively low amount of Lithium which causes the undeniable danger of these cells, it is the other combustibles inside....
Edit:
If you need a further hint towards the fact that the Lithium is not the most critical thing in these cells: The FAA considers water to be the best means for extinguishing burning Litium cells. You wouldn't really want to put out a reactive metal fire that way...
Last edited by henra; 14th Oct 2010 at 20:02. Reason: Edit block added
SNS3Guppy:
Please read my first sentence carefully, you will note that I don't doubt the conclusion, just the technical background.
Please read my first sentence carefully, you will note that I don't doubt the conclusion, just the technical background.
Sure, downplay the whole thing. After all, the UPS flight didn't really crash and burn, did it? All a hoax?
Or is it possible that one can't take this thread seriously enough, and that the threat is real, and the hazard is real? Could it be?
Or is it possible that one can't take this thread seriously enough, and that the threat is real, and the hazard is real? Could it be?
Hmmm, sounds like the intentions of my posts are a bit unclear...
Again: Iis not my intention to downplay anything.
These cells carry flammable substances in significant amounts and are capable of self ignition under certain circumstances.
The latter part is what makes them more dangerous than most other flammable materials.
I was trying to explain the mechanisms behind this self- ignition process.
Edit:
You don't doubt the conclusion, just the criteria used to reach the conclusion?
Quoting F111UPS767...
"Has anyone any information on an aircraft fire where the crew descended to 25,000 unpressurized and what the results were? How about manufacturer or government testing regarding fire suppression at 25,000 pressure altitude?
When descending to FL250 and following the cargo fire procedure, how long does it take to get the cabin pressure to 25,000? Someone posted that the 747 depressurizes at 2500 fpm. Is that correct? Is that the same for all the Boeings? Other manufacturers? Is it advisable or even possible to hurry that up manually? What would be the physiological effects of doing that? Someone posted a USAF study whereas 25,000 was chosen to lesson the chances of decompression sickness. What can we expect as to the possibilities of continued fire at 25,000 cabin altitude? What can we expect at 25,000 physiologically? Will a pack at 1/2 flow keep the cockpit warm? Is pressure breathing required? Et cetera...
I don't know what will happen with the lithium batteries at 25,000 feet. Besides the lack of oxygen, it should get pretty cold back there. If they do continue to burn, hopefully the stuff around them will not and the batteries may eventually burn out. Sound reasonable?
When at cruise at about 5-6,000 cabin altitude, if a major fire develops and an immediate descent is made, will the cabin altitude ever rise to a "fire extinguishing" level? Is it possible and should it be considered to put the fire out at 25,000 unpressurized before descend?"
Regardless of altitude the percentage of oxygen in the air remains at 21%.
So depressurizing an aircraft at altitude will have no effect on snuffing out a fire.
A fire will sustain itself with an oxygen content down to 16%.
"Has anyone any information on an aircraft fire where the crew descended to 25,000 unpressurized and what the results were? How about manufacturer or government testing regarding fire suppression at 25,000 pressure altitude?
When descending to FL250 and following the cargo fire procedure, how long does it take to get the cabin pressure to 25,000? Someone posted that the 747 depressurizes at 2500 fpm. Is that correct? Is that the same for all the Boeings? Other manufacturers? Is it advisable or even possible to hurry that up manually? What would be the physiological effects of doing that? Someone posted a USAF study whereas 25,000 was chosen to lesson the chances of decompression sickness. What can we expect as to the possibilities of continued fire at 25,000 cabin altitude? What can we expect at 25,000 physiologically? Will a pack at 1/2 flow keep the cockpit warm? Is pressure breathing required? Et cetera...
I don't know what will happen with the lithium batteries at 25,000 feet. Besides the lack of oxygen, it should get pretty cold back there. If they do continue to burn, hopefully the stuff around them will not and the batteries may eventually burn out. Sound reasonable?
When at cruise at about 5-6,000 cabin altitude, if a major fire develops and an immediate descent is made, will the cabin altitude ever rise to a "fire extinguishing" level? Is it possible and should it be considered to put the fire out at 25,000 unpressurized before descend?"
Regardless of altitude the percentage of oxygen in the air remains at 21%.
So depressurizing an aircraft at altitude will have no effect on snuffing out a fire.
A fire will sustain itself with an oxygen content down to 16%.
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F111UPS767...
Has anyone any information on an aircraft fire where the crew descended to 25,000 unpressurized and what the results were? How about manufacturer or government testing regarding fire suppression at 25,000 pressure altitude?
Jet Jockey A4...
Regardless of altitude the percentage of oxygen in the air remains at 21%.
So depressurizing an aircraft at altitude will have no effect on snuffing out a fire.
A fire will sustain itself with an oxygen content down to 16%.
JJ - I did a bit of searching and came up with "mass burning rate" and have found studies that show that mbr is lower at low ambient pressure at high altitude. However, I cannot find a good answer yet to the original question, above.
Has anyone any information on an aircraft fire where the crew descended to 25,000 unpressurized and what the results were? How about manufacturer or government testing regarding fire suppression at 25,000 pressure altitude?
Jet Jockey A4...
Regardless of altitude the percentage of oxygen in the air remains at 21%.
So depressurizing an aircraft at altitude will have no effect on snuffing out a fire.
A fire will sustain itself with an oxygen content down to 16%.
JJ - I did a bit of searching and came up with "mass burning rate" and have found studies that show that mbr is lower at low ambient pressure at high altitude. However, I cannot find a good answer yet to the original question, above.
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Originally Posted by Jet Jockey
Regardless of altitude the percentage of oxygen in the air remains at 21%.
So depressurizing an aircraft at altitude will have no effect on snuffing out a fire.
A fire will sustain itself with an oxygen content down to 16%.
So depressurizing an aircraft at altitude will have no effect on snuffing out a fire.
A fire will sustain itself with an oxygen content down to 16%.
Following the same reasoning, a human needs 21% oxygen to breath, therefore we should all breathe easily at FL450 since as you correctly state the percentage remains the same.
However the density does not and there are less molecules of oxygen available per cubic meter the higher you get up. Therefore the recommendation to depressurize the aircraft which should work with all fires except those providing their own oxygen for combustion.
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At 25000ft, the standard barometric pressure is 40 kPa (299 mmHg). This means that there is 39% of the oxygen available at sea level.
39%... What is needed to sustain combustion?
Altitude.org | Altitude air pressure calculator
39%... What is needed to sustain combustion?
Altitude.org | Altitude air pressure calculator
post 732
Excellent post SNS3Guppy. We're all learning something here. 
Something else; I hear that Boeing issued a letter with preliminary lessons learned from UPS6. Advising to keep pack 1 or 3 on to keep the smoke out of the cockpit. Anyone have a copy?
Something else; I hear that Boeing issued a letter with preliminary lessons learned from UPS6. Advising to keep pack 1 or 3 on to keep the smoke out of the cockpit. Anyone have a copy?
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FROM: THE BOEING COMPANY
TO: Boeing Correspondence (MOM)
[MESSAGE NUMBER:MOM-MOM-10-0713-01B] Multi Operator Message
MESSAGE DATE: 12 Oct 2010 1812 US PACIFIC TIME / 13 Oct 2010 0112 GMT
This message is sent to all 747-400F and 747-400BCF customers and to respective Boeing 747-400 Field Service bases, Regional Directors, the Air Transport Association, International Air Transport Association, and Airline Resident Representatives.
SERVICE REQUEST ID: 1-1708015942
ACCOUNT: Boeing Correspondence (MOM)
DUE DATE: No Action Required
PRODUCT TYPE: Flight Operations
PRODUCT LINE: 747
PRODUCT: 16 - FCOM/QRH - Flight Crew Procedures
SUBJECT: FIRE MAIN DECK Non-Normal Checklist
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
SUMMARY:
Boeing is planning changes to the existing FIRE MAIN DECK and FIRE MN DK AFT, FWD, MID non-normal checklists for 747-400F and 747-400BCF airplanes, and is planning to issue supplemental information on main deck firefighting procedures and environmental control system behavior during a main deck fire. The intent is to increase awareness on the part of flight crews of the intended system configuration during a main deck fire, for the purposes of minimizing fire propagation and preventing accumulation of significant smoke on the flight deck.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
DESCRIPTION:
Boeing has undertaken a review of both the environmental control systems used in main deck firefighting, and the associated flight crew procedures, on the 747-400F and 747-400BCF airplane models. This review was prompted by a recent accident involving a 747-400F airplane, in which both a main deck cargo fire and smoke accumulation on the flight deck are believed to have played roles, and in which flight recorder evidence indicates that none of the three air conditioning packs was operating for much of the flight following the cargo fire indication.
As a result, in the near term, Boeing plans to modify the FIRE MAIN DECK and FIRE MN DK AFT, FWD, MID non-normal checklists in order to add text indicating that, after two packs are automatically shut down per system design, either air conditioning pack number 1 or pack number 3 must remain operating to prevent excessive flight deck smoke accumulation during a main deck fire. These modified checklists will be issued via Flight Crew Operations Manual Bulletins, during or prior to November 2010. Other changes to these checklists are also under consideration.
Boeing will also issue a Flight Operations Technical Bulletin on this subject, for the purpose of providing additional technical details on the operation of the relevant systems and components during main deck firefighting, as well as on the overall main deck firefighting philosophy behind the system and procedure designs. This technical bulletin will be issued in the fourth quarter of 2010.
In the meantime, we recommend that flight crews of 747-400F and 747-400BCF model airplanes be made aware that either air conditioning pack number 1 or pack number 3 must remain operating after accomplishing the checklists associated with the following EICAS warning messages: FIRE MAIN DECK, FIRE MN DK AFT, FIRE MN DK FWD, or FIRE MN DK MID. The purpose of this is to prevent excessive smoke accumulation on the flight deck under actual fire/smoke conditions.
Tony Hagen - 747 Fleet Chief
Rick Braun - Acting Chief Pilot, Flight Technical and Safety Boeing Training and Flight Services
Ken Caley
Director - Flight Operations Services
Boeing Training and Flight Services
Commercial Aviation Services
The Boeing Company
TO: Boeing Correspondence (MOM)
[MESSAGE NUMBER:MOM-MOM-10-0713-01B] Multi Operator Message
MESSAGE DATE: 12 Oct 2010 1812 US PACIFIC TIME / 13 Oct 2010 0112 GMT
This message is sent to all 747-400F and 747-400BCF customers and to respective Boeing 747-400 Field Service bases, Regional Directors, the Air Transport Association, International Air Transport Association, and Airline Resident Representatives.
SERVICE REQUEST ID: 1-1708015942
ACCOUNT: Boeing Correspondence (MOM)
DUE DATE: No Action Required
PRODUCT TYPE: Flight Operations
PRODUCT LINE: 747
PRODUCT: 16 - FCOM/QRH - Flight Crew Procedures
SUBJECT: FIRE MAIN DECK Non-Normal Checklist
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
SUMMARY:
Boeing is planning changes to the existing FIRE MAIN DECK and FIRE MN DK AFT, FWD, MID non-normal checklists for 747-400F and 747-400BCF airplanes, and is planning to issue supplemental information on main deck firefighting procedures and environmental control system behavior during a main deck fire. The intent is to increase awareness on the part of flight crews of the intended system configuration during a main deck fire, for the purposes of minimizing fire propagation and preventing accumulation of significant smoke on the flight deck.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
DESCRIPTION:
Boeing has undertaken a review of both the environmental control systems used in main deck firefighting, and the associated flight crew procedures, on the 747-400F and 747-400BCF airplane models. This review was prompted by a recent accident involving a 747-400F airplane, in which both a main deck cargo fire and smoke accumulation on the flight deck are believed to have played roles, and in which flight recorder evidence indicates that none of the three air conditioning packs was operating for much of the flight following the cargo fire indication.
As a result, in the near term, Boeing plans to modify the FIRE MAIN DECK and FIRE MN DK AFT, FWD, MID non-normal checklists in order to add text indicating that, after two packs are automatically shut down per system design, either air conditioning pack number 1 or pack number 3 must remain operating to prevent excessive flight deck smoke accumulation during a main deck fire. These modified checklists will be issued via Flight Crew Operations Manual Bulletins, during or prior to November 2010. Other changes to these checklists are also under consideration.
Boeing will also issue a Flight Operations Technical Bulletin on this subject, for the purpose of providing additional technical details on the operation of the relevant systems and components during main deck firefighting, as well as on the overall main deck firefighting philosophy behind the system and procedure designs. This technical bulletin will be issued in the fourth quarter of 2010.
In the meantime, we recommend that flight crews of 747-400F and 747-400BCF model airplanes be made aware that either air conditioning pack number 1 or pack number 3 must remain operating after accomplishing the checklists associated with the following EICAS warning messages: FIRE MAIN DECK, FIRE MN DK AFT, FIRE MN DK FWD, or FIRE MN DK MID. The purpose of this is to prevent excessive smoke accumulation on the flight deck under actual fire/smoke conditions.
Tony Hagen - 747 Fleet Chief
Rick Braun - Acting Chief Pilot, Flight Technical and Safety Boeing Training and Flight Services
Ken Caley
Director - Flight Operations Services
Boeing Training and Flight Services
Commercial Aviation Services
The Boeing Company
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When fire fighting water does not cvool the fire out it turns to steam and the steam seperates the fire from oxygen. Foam more directly forms a physical barrier.
I see Boeing's notice came after the accident, a sign of a poorprior hazard analysis.
I see Boeing's notice came after the accident, a sign of a poorprior hazard analysis.