New Clues deepen AA587 Crash Mystery
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Moggie, I have neither heard nor read where the FAA or the NTSB has called for a grounding of A300's because of the vertical stab coming off. Yet in your earlier post, you stated:
"Why is it that any accident involving a european built airliner results in calls of "ground them" when Boeings, apparently, should just fly on? .... So lets get it straight guys - if the FAA are happy to let Boeing operators risk pax lives while they have a long slow think about rudder hardover and fuel pumps, why the call to ground the Airbus? protectionism that's why. And I don't care if it's non-PC to say so, it's true."
Please enlighten us as to who in the United States Government has called for grounding these aircraft. Otherwise, chimerical visions set out simply to generate more Boeing v. 'Bus controversy detracts from a sober discussion of a tragic event which may have profound consequences for aircraft design.
BTW, I believe the Lockheed Electra L-188 was either grounded, or severely restricted with respect to flight regime, around 1960. This was after the wing came off on two aircraft during cruise. Severe CAT was a contributing factor in one accident, and undampened prop whirl was the main factor in the second.
[ 16 November 2001: Message edited by: SaturnV ]
"Why is it that any accident involving a european built airliner results in calls of "ground them" when Boeings, apparently, should just fly on? .... So lets get it straight guys - if the FAA are happy to let Boeing operators risk pax lives while they have a long slow think about rudder hardover and fuel pumps, why the call to ground the Airbus? protectionism that's why. And I don't care if it's non-PC to say so, it's true."
Please enlighten us as to who in the United States Government has called for grounding these aircraft. Otherwise, chimerical visions set out simply to generate more Boeing v. 'Bus controversy detracts from a sober discussion of a tragic event which may have profound consequences for aircraft design.
BTW, I believe the Lockheed Electra L-188 was either grounded, or severely restricted with respect to flight regime, around 1960. This was after the wing came off on two aircraft during cruise. Severe CAT was a contributing factor in one accident, and undampened prop whirl was the main factor in the second.
[ 16 November 2001: Message edited by: SaturnV ]
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Saturn V - read my posts carefully and also look at "Tech Log". I did not say that the FAA or NTSB called "ground 'em" I was referring to the "popular" opinion on this site (not necessarily on this particular thread).
However, I do stand by my amazement that the FAA did not order immediata grounding/inspection/rectification of B737 after rudder hardovers or MDs after the Alaskan accident.
The popular opinion from west of Shannon is that any Airbus is unsafe - this is boll*cks. They are no better no worse than Boeing (OK in my opinion they are in fact better!) but there is always a cry from the Boeing boys that any european built airliner crash requires immediate grounding and a Boeing accident is just bad luck.
However, I do stand by my amazement that the FAA did not order immediata grounding/inspection/rectification of B737 after rudder hardovers or MDs after the Alaskan accident.
The popular opinion from west of Shannon is that any Airbus is unsafe - this is boll*cks. They are no better no worse than Boeing (OK in my opinion they are in fact better!) but there is always a cry from the Boeing boys that any european built airliner crash requires immediate grounding and a Boeing accident is just bad luck.
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I have some sympathy for Moggie's point in general, but less so in this case where most coverage I've seen has been reasonably fair. It certainly seems that there is a discussion to be had about composite materials, and no-one's interests are served by deflecting this into Airbus v Boeing
Incidentally this prejudice (pre-judgement of Airbus) isn't confined to West of Shannon - the BBC website is just as guilty, since after every Airbus incident (e.g. Gulf Air) it wheels out a list of prior Airbus incidents, but for US aircraft the list they use includes all manufacturers.
Incidentally this prejudice (pre-judgement of Airbus) isn't confined to West of Shannon - the BBC website is just as guilty, since after every Airbus incident (e.g. Gulf Air) it wheels out a list of prior Airbus incidents, but for US aircraft the list they use includes all manufacturers.
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What a pity that what started as a very interesting thread has degenerated into another tedious airbus v boeing whine.
To come back to AA587, is the broken fin supposed to hve followed on from an engine failure -and where does the fact that the wing, or part of it, detached come in??
To come back to AA587, is the broken fin supposed to hve followed on from an engine failure -and where does the fact that the wing, or part of it, detached come in??
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Overall timeline
T = start of AA 587 takeoff roll.
T-105 seconds (approx.): The JAL 747-400 begins its takeoff roll. Throughout the flight of AA 587, the horizontal distance between the two planes was somewhere between 4 and 4.3 miles. The JAL flight was about 800 feet higher than the AA flight generally speaking.
T-0: AA 587 begins its takeoff roll.
T+96 seconds: The flight data recorder indicates first encounter with wake turbulence. “Airplane attitudes did not change much.” Widened wake-funnel has significant cross-track vector components (think of as a sudden burst of cross-wind)
T+107: An airframe rattling noise is heard on the cockpit voice recorder. the faulty (repaired) attachment point has taken the brunt of the first (likely athwartwise) wake encounter and sheared. Structural integrity of the tail has now been lost (see later) and it is vulnerable to any further such side-blows.
T+114: The captain makes a comment about wake encounter.
T+116: Flight data recorder begins to show aircraft movement “consistent with wake encounter.” It is “similar in intensity” to the first wake encounter. The plane "responds normally" at first. Then come the three side acceleration excursions.
T+121: A second airframe rattling sound is heard on the CVR. (Tail has torn off?) No, loosened fin is now into a lengthy L/R rocking across its attachment base, having suffered an initial fracture at one or more of its attachment point composite upper lugs (on the gustwards side). This rocking process is a destructive flutter-failure mode. Its death-rattle is transmitted via the "sounding board" of the fuselage.
T+121.5: Rudder position data becomes “unreliable.” (Rudder has begun to depart along with tail?) AGREE, in that the rudder is beginning to be activated [by the flight control system] to counter L/R yawing motions induced because the base of the fin has become semi-detached on one side and is "rocking quickly left and right). At about this point, the plane begins to undergo the “side acceleration excursions.” Caused by the rocking (tip of fin moving through as much as a metre) First there’s a .3 G excursion in one direction, then a .4 G excursion in the same direction, then a .3 G excursion in the opposite direction. This is “coincident with rudder deflections.” (Tail has ripped off but the pilots don't know it?) DISAGREE, Tail is shaking lose - vertical fin is pivoting crooss-ship to and fro (i.e. L/R relative to the direction of flight) around its base due to one side's composite upper brackets being mostly sheared. "coincident with rudder deflections" simply means that the flight control system is feeding in compensatory rudder inputs which are unfortunately out-of-phase with fin oscillation - and tend to accelerate the fin's breakaway. ) BREAKAWAY itself would be clean and indicated by a cessation of the drumming, suddenly ineffectual rudder pedals and a CofG change nose-drop. Over the next couple of seconds, the plane undergoes dramatic course changes: Its heading changes at a rate of about 10 deg/second, the bank angle increases through 25 degrees with the left wing down. Pitch drops to 30 deg nose down. Standard spiral dive entry due to loss of directional stability - as a function of the yaw resulting from the differential thrust outputs of the engines at "max power" Vertical force increases to 2 G’s. N.B.: NTSB description of eyewitness reports: “The general observation that the witness seemed to -- remarkably similar observations have been that they saw the aircraft "wobble," is the word used. "Wobble" aptly describes the L/R yaw/roll oscillations (fin movements and with rudder countering, yet reinforcing the destructive process) over the few seconds that it took for the fin to wholly detach - after being compromised on one side's brackets. And they saw pieces come from it. (fin and fairings/fillets, later the engines) And then it went into a steep spiraling dive into the ground.”
T+124: The FDR stops recording. (Electrical system goes out?) The plane is at an altitude of about 2,900 feet. If the FDR is in the tail area, possibility is that the fin detachment caused some disruption to the electrics thereabouts because of cables being pulled out/through and the resulting generator trips. The 2g max recorded would be insufficient to detach the engines - so they would have started detaching at about the centripetal forces equivalent to 5g (T+137 say) once the thrusted spiral dive had almost reached its terminal velocity (about 1000ft agl).
T+125: The copilot calls for max power. [N.B: CVR continues to work because it is powered by batteries.] Still think this "max power" call might have been precipitated by the nose-drop resulting from the sudden C of G change as the fin and rudder departed.
T+127: There are several comments suggesting loss of control of the aircraft. By this stage the aircraft would have entered the spiral dive (about quarter-way into first turn)
T+144: The cockpit voice recording ends.
Layout of the wreckage:
"If you look at the locations of the fin and the rudder, first in line in direction the airplane was traveling, the fin was first. Then at about -- then came the rudder about 200 yards later (rudder/fin flailing after detachment would have quickly caused hinge-line fracture) . And then all of this is within a -- one-half nautical mile of the crash site. So it's a fairly tight cluster, relatively speaking, of the wreckage. Spiral would have been tight - about a half-mile radius event . Engine detachments may have been almost coincident (pylon attachments being similarly stressed by the same centripetal forces)
Power plants, it is the left engine, the number one engine, in case you're interested, that is at the gas station. That's on 129th Street. That's about 700 feet from the Crater. The right engine, number two, is next to the boat behind the house. It's on 128th Street. And that's about 800 feet from the crater. But again, if you center all of this wreckage, it's more or less in a line.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: How far from the crater?
BLACK: Number one engine 700 feet. Number two engine 800 feet. And these are rough measurements."
The lesson is obviously this: Composite structures (unlike fairings, fillets and other non load-bearing components) get their integrity and strength by being born of a singular process. A mixture of resins during in situ repairs just create weak-points that are always going to be vulnerabilities (as in this case). A glue sitting atop a glue will never make a good bond. When you incorporate a doubler and make that attachment point dissimilar and perhaps even sitting proud by a few mm, the likelihood is that it will be taking a disproportionately higher load (as well as being inherently weaker). That is not good. Thereafter whacking a few rivets through (as a salve to safety and QC) is really just a concession to your realisation and admission that it is otherwise a weaker proposition than the other attachment points. The six attachment points have to be both equally strong and share the loads equally, otherwise you have created a path for progressive failure. Structural composites have to be 100% as born from their process - or ditched and replaced. Repairs, in situ or otherwise, remain a bad idea. One has to wonder how many other "repairs" are out there.
T = start of AA 587 takeoff roll.
T-105 seconds (approx.): The JAL 747-400 begins its takeoff roll. Throughout the flight of AA 587, the horizontal distance between the two planes was somewhere between 4 and 4.3 miles. The JAL flight was about 800 feet higher than the AA flight generally speaking.
T-0: AA 587 begins its takeoff roll.
T+96 seconds: The flight data recorder indicates first encounter with wake turbulence. “Airplane attitudes did not change much.” Widened wake-funnel has significant cross-track vector components (think of as a sudden burst of cross-wind)
T+107: An airframe rattling noise is heard on the cockpit voice recorder. the faulty (repaired) attachment point has taken the brunt of the first (likely athwartwise) wake encounter and sheared. Structural integrity of the tail has now been lost (see later) and it is vulnerable to any further such side-blows.
T+114: The captain makes a comment about wake encounter.
T+116: Flight data recorder begins to show aircraft movement “consistent with wake encounter.” It is “similar in intensity” to the first wake encounter. The plane "responds normally" at first. Then come the three side acceleration excursions.
T+121: A second airframe rattling sound is heard on the CVR. (Tail has torn off?) No, loosened fin is now into a lengthy L/R rocking across its attachment base, having suffered an initial fracture at one or more of its attachment point composite upper lugs (on the gustwards side). This rocking process is a destructive flutter-failure mode. Its death-rattle is transmitted via the "sounding board" of the fuselage.
T+121.5: Rudder position data becomes “unreliable.” (Rudder has begun to depart along with tail?) AGREE, in that the rudder is beginning to be activated [by the flight control system] to counter L/R yawing motions induced because the base of the fin has become semi-detached on one side and is "rocking quickly left and right). At about this point, the plane begins to undergo the “side acceleration excursions.” Caused by the rocking (tip of fin moving through as much as a metre) First there’s a .3 G excursion in one direction, then a .4 G excursion in the same direction, then a .3 G excursion in the opposite direction. This is “coincident with rudder deflections.” (Tail has ripped off but the pilots don't know it?) DISAGREE, Tail is shaking lose - vertical fin is pivoting crooss-ship to and fro (i.e. L/R relative to the direction of flight) around its base due to one side's composite upper brackets being mostly sheared. "coincident with rudder deflections" simply means that the flight control system is feeding in compensatory rudder inputs which are unfortunately out-of-phase with fin oscillation - and tend to accelerate the fin's breakaway. ) BREAKAWAY itself would be clean and indicated by a cessation of the drumming, suddenly ineffectual rudder pedals and a CofG change nose-drop. Over the next couple of seconds, the plane undergoes dramatic course changes: Its heading changes at a rate of about 10 deg/second, the bank angle increases through 25 degrees with the left wing down. Pitch drops to 30 deg nose down. Standard spiral dive entry due to loss of directional stability - as a function of the yaw resulting from the differential thrust outputs of the engines at "max power" Vertical force increases to 2 G’s. N.B.: NTSB description of eyewitness reports: “The general observation that the witness seemed to -- remarkably similar observations have been that they saw the aircraft "wobble," is the word used. "Wobble" aptly describes the L/R yaw/roll oscillations (fin movements and with rudder countering, yet reinforcing the destructive process) over the few seconds that it took for the fin to wholly detach - after being compromised on one side's brackets. And they saw pieces come from it. (fin and fairings/fillets, later the engines) And then it went into a steep spiraling dive into the ground.”
T+124: The FDR stops recording. (Electrical system goes out?) The plane is at an altitude of about 2,900 feet. If the FDR is in the tail area, possibility is that the fin detachment caused some disruption to the electrics thereabouts because of cables being pulled out/through and the resulting generator trips. The 2g max recorded would be insufficient to detach the engines - so they would have started detaching at about the centripetal forces equivalent to 5g (T+137 say) once the thrusted spiral dive had almost reached its terminal velocity (about 1000ft agl).
T+125: The copilot calls for max power. [N.B: CVR continues to work because it is powered by batteries.] Still think this "max power" call might have been precipitated by the nose-drop resulting from the sudden C of G change as the fin and rudder departed.
T+127: There are several comments suggesting loss of control of the aircraft. By this stage the aircraft would have entered the spiral dive (about quarter-way into first turn)
T+144: The cockpit voice recording ends.
Layout of the wreckage:
"If you look at the locations of the fin and the rudder, first in line in direction the airplane was traveling, the fin was first. Then at about -- then came the rudder about 200 yards later (rudder/fin flailing after detachment would have quickly caused hinge-line fracture) . And then all of this is within a -- one-half nautical mile of the crash site. So it's a fairly tight cluster, relatively speaking, of the wreckage. Spiral would have been tight - about a half-mile radius event . Engine detachments may have been almost coincident (pylon attachments being similarly stressed by the same centripetal forces)
Power plants, it is the left engine, the number one engine, in case you're interested, that is at the gas station. That's on 129th Street. That's about 700 feet from the Crater. The right engine, number two, is next to the boat behind the house. It's on 128th Street. And that's about 800 feet from the crater. But again, if you center all of this wreckage, it's more or less in a line.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: How far from the crater?
BLACK: Number one engine 700 feet. Number two engine 800 feet. And these are rough measurements."
The lesson is obviously this: Composite structures (unlike fairings, fillets and other non load-bearing components) get their integrity and strength by being born of a singular process. A mixture of resins during in situ repairs just create weak-points that are always going to be vulnerabilities (as in this case). A glue sitting atop a glue will never make a good bond. When you incorporate a doubler and make that attachment point dissimilar and perhaps even sitting proud by a few mm, the likelihood is that it will be taking a disproportionately higher load (as well as being inherently weaker). That is not good. Thereafter whacking a few rivets through (as a salve to safety and QC) is really just a concession to your realisation and admission that it is otherwise a weaker proposition than the other attachment points. The six attachment points have to be both equally strong and share the loads equally, otherwise you have created a path for progressive failure. Structural composites have to be 100% as born from their process - or ditched and replaced. Repairs, in situ or otherwise, remain a bad idea. One has to wonder how many other "repairs" are out there.
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Rewinding the brain back to 1978, one remembers the grounding of the dc-10's over the o'hare engine separation..apparently caused by engine/pylon installation practices in place at continental and united,excerbated by a shim installed by douglas during manufacturing to correct production line.."discrepancies".(REF NTSB REPORT)..so now where do we go from here...apparently this a-300-600 was breaking up 3 mins after take-off....what was the operational history of this aircraft...any recent encounters with severe CAT? american did have one recently in an a-300....casting aspersions at manufacturers and airlines resolves nothing...let's find out why.... 
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Moggie:
I think you`ll find that all the 737s in BA (can`t say for other airlines `cos I don`t know!) have a rudder pressure reducer valve fitted, to reduce hydraulic px to the pcu, and therefore authority.They have also all had their yaw damper couplers upgraded. So don`t say nothing was done. It`s clearly just not true.......
I think you`ll find that all the 737s in BA (can`t say for other airlines `cos I don`t know!) have a rudder pressure reducer valve fitted, to reduce hydraulic px to the pcu, and therefore authority.They have also all had their yaw damper couplers upgraded. So don`t say nothing was done. It`s clearly just not true.......
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Belgique
The only thing missing from your breakdown is that the yawdamper would have been attempting to correct the deviation of the VS,causing the vibration.
The only thing missing from your breakdown is that the yawdamper would have been attempting to correct the deviation of the VS,causing the vibration.
It may be hard to tell between the yaw damper and the flight control system inputs on the Airbus. I believe centered rudder pedals on the Airbus command the flight control system to automatically do what's necessary to point the nose straight ahead, effectively a yaw damper.
Looking at the NTSB photos of the forward attachment points on the fuselage, they seem to be the same size as the center and rear attachment points. As we have just seen, the forward attachment points are more critical and perhaps more vulnerable to aerodynamic forces. Damage at the center or rear attachment points MIGHT have been survivable, but once a forward attachment point fails, its mate takes on the entire load in that area and in this case could not shoulder the added burden. Corrective rudder inputs in response to forward fin flexing add a substantial extra burden to the remaining forward fitting at the worst possible time.
Given the criticality of the forward attachment, why is it apparently the same size as the center and rear attachments?
We also see a fat composite lug fitted into a substantially smaller metal fitting and not much contact surface in the area surrounding the pin.
Looking at the NTSB photos of the forward attachment points on the fuselage, they seem to be the same size as the center and rear attachment points. As we have just seen, the forward attachment points are more critical and perhaps more vulnerable to aerodynamic forces. Damage at the center or rear attachment points MIGHT have been survivable, but once a forward attachment point fails, its mate takes on the entire load in that area and in this case could not shoulder the added burden. Corrective rudder inputs in response to forward fin flexing add a substantial extra burden to the remaining forward fitting at the worst possible time.
Given the criticality of the forward attachment, why is it apparently the same size as the center and rear attachments?
We also see a fat composite lug fitted into a substantially smaller metal fitting and not much contact surface in the area surrounding the pin.
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chillpill [page 3] what 757 CFM alternative are you thinking of? Mr. Boeing's website only lists RB211 and PW20xx alternatives...
All this talk about load-bearing composites is all very well, but considering no analysis has yet been done on likely g-forces at point of failure it seems a bit previous.
The tail wouldn't have fallen off if wake vortex hadn't occurred, unless the tail was faulty already. Mr. Airbus only has to build them to tolerances involving normal flight conditions - he can't account for incorrect separation, otherwise we wouldn't need separation.
Sure we'd all like to fly in scramjet-powered steel boxes but that's not gonna happen anytime soon...
All this talk about load-bearing composites is all very well, but considering no analysis has yet been done on likely g-forces at point of failure it seems a bit previous.
The tail wouldn't have fallen off if wake vortex hadn't occurred, unless the tail was faulty already. Mr. Airbus only has to build them to tolerances involving normal flight conditions - he can't account for incorrect separation, otherwise we wouldn't need separation.
Sure we'd all like to fly in scramjet-powered steel boxes but that's not gonna happen anytime soon...
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Composite materials are not all honeycomb – was any or a substantial amount of this rudder attachment point – the portion in the vertical fin that apparently failed – made of honeycomb composite?
Why was there a repair done, during manufacture, to the attachment point and was it accomplished at the forward attachment point? (damaged during installation, misalignment noticed in subsequent inspection after installation?)
Why was there a repair done, during manufacture, to the attachment point and was it accomplished at the forward attachment point? (damaged during installation, misalignment noticed in subsequent inspection after installation?)
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There was a repair carried out during airplane manufacture (assembly build), supposedly due to damage/delamination (may have occurred during shipment possibly). Someone said they thought the tails were a Spanish job (CASA?). Not sure which attachment point was involved but there was a doubler and rivets applied in situ.
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Interesting information from you Belgique..
One cannot help thinking that maybe a tailfin shouldn't just be attached as shown at the image you supplied above..
One would rather suggest a more substantial and solid attachment via some sort of heavy metal beam coming from within the body of the fuselage - like the wings are attached - and then going all the way up to the top of the fin along the front edge - do you get the picture..
I'm not an engineer, but the attachment points, I've seen from the photos and the sketch, seems very fragile to support such a crucial stabilizing part of the aircraft..?!
One cannot help thinking that maybe a tailfin shouldn't just be attached as shown at the image you supplied above..
One would rather suggest a more substantial and solid attachment via some sort of heavy metal beam coming from within the body of the fuselage - like the wings are attached - and then going all the way up to the top of the fin along the front edge - do you get the picture..
I'm not an engineer, but the attachment points, I've seen from the photos and the sketch, seems very fragile to support such a crucial stabilizing part of the aircraft..?!
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From NTSB pic's, it looks like the VS ripped off from forward starboard to aft port. Supporting pictures show the forward starboard bottom bracket (METAL) bent in an up/rearward direction. And, the aft port bottom bracket in tact, with 'ripped' composite top bracket showing direction and force of detachement.
It sure would be nice to get a better picture of that forward bottom bracket!
It sure would be nice to get a better picture of that forward bottom bracket!
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Moggie,
You may think what you want concerning some American/Boeing conspiracy to somehow stain the reputation of Airbus by calling for a grounding. But your theory falls on its face in light of the facts. Fact one, probably the biggest customers of Airbus jets are US airlines. I know for a fact UPS's order for up to 120 A-300's was the only thing that kept that production line from shutting down, also United and USAirways have substantial orders for A-320 series, as well as Fed-Ex for A-300/380. So if Boeing and the US gov were in cohoots I'm sure these orders would have gone to Boeing. As far as to why there is no similar outcry for groundings when a Boeing product crashes, others have pointed out when US jets were grounded in the past, and I believe that over the past 80, thats EIGHTY years, Boeing has a relatively PROVEN TRACK-RECORD whereas Airbus doesn't. Also Airbus prides itself on being the "cutting edge" of airliner technology, hence some of these newer technologies/processes are looked upon suspiciously ie composite tails. And finally how many times in your life have you seen the pictures of B-17's and 29's that brought their crews safely home after absorbing huge amounts of damage. The picture of the B-52 that lost its tail after an encounter with turbulance comes to mind. These are some of my reasons why you may not here a similar outcry. Maybe someone in Pprune-land can scan the famous picture of the B-52. Theres a reason why some say "if it ain't Boeing I aint going...there may be some truth to this phrase. PS UPS flies DC-8's and they are said to be built like a tank..and there are a few incidents of eights encountering turbulance and losing engines and portions of their wings and still flying home. I think the A-300 design is sound, I feel that particular plane had some defect that went unnoticed.
You may think what you want concerning some American/Boeing conspiracy to somehow stain the reputation of Airbus by calling for a grounding. But your theory falls on its face in light of the facts. Fact one, probably the biggest customers of Airbus jets are US airlines. I know for a fact UPS's order for up to 120 A-300's was the only thing that kept that production line from shutting down, also United and USAirways have substantial orders for A-320 series, as well as Fed-Ex for A-300/380. So if Boeing and the US gov were in cohoots I'm sure these orders would have gone to Boeing. As far as to why there is no similar outcry for groundings when a Boeing product crashes, others have pointed out when US jets were grounded in the past, and I believe that over the past 80, thats EIGHTY years, Boeing has a relatively PROVEN TRACK-RECORD whereas Airbus doesn't. Also Airbus prides itself on being the "cutting edge" of airliner technology, hence some of these newer technologies/processes are looked upon suspiciously ie composite tails. And finally how many times in your life have you seen the pictures of B-17's and 29's that brought their crews safely home after absorbing huge amounts of damage. The picture of the B-52 that lost its tail after an encounter with turbulance comes to mind. These are some of my reasons why you may not here a similar outcry. Maybe someone in Pprune-land can scan the famous picture of the B-52. Theres a reason why some say "if it ain't Boeing I aint going...there may be some truth to this phrase. PS UPS flies DC-8's and they are said to be built like a tank..and there are a few incidents of eights encountering turbulance and losing engines and portions of their wings and still flying home. I think the A-300 design is sound, I feel that particular plane had some defect that went unnoticed.
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Firstly my condolences to the passengers and crew aboard this flight.. but, I had a couple of questions to ask that I hadn't heard covered yet.
Does anyone know if AA587 had any "Trim Tank" fuel in the tail for "Take-Off Trim" or not?
Also is the Trim tank actually in the tail fin (vertical stabiliser )that became detached or located within the tail fuselage?
Does anyone know if AA587 had any "Trim Tank" fuel in the tail for "Take-Off Trim" or not?
Also is the Trim tank actually in the tail fin (vertical stabiliser )that became detached or located within the tail fuselage?
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“One would rather suggest a more substantial and solid attachment via some sort of heavy metal beam”
As someone else suggested – not only does this bring into question the integrity of the material used but the ability to detect the continued integrity of the material. Composite designed brackets may have twice the strength of a similarly sized metal fitting – but if they don’t show deterioration in strength as does metal were we can identify crystallization or other forms of weakness – they won’t do the job in the long run.
Any thoughts on this subject from the engineers – which I am clearly not?
As someone else suggested – not only does this bring into question the integrity of the material used but the ability to detect the continued integrity of the material. Composite designed brackets may have twice the strength of a similarly sized metal fitting – but if they don’t show deterioration in strength as does metal were we can identify crystallization or other forms of weakness – they won’t do the job in the long run.
Any thoughts on this subject from the engineers – which I am clearly not?