Incident at Airport Dortmund (Germany)
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Aerial view
Not enough we have to accept that at least one person in the cabin and one on the spotters balcony will be filming ANYTHING we do or say, no, now they go one step further:
YouTube - Ein kleiner Blick auf die Air Berlin, Flughafen Dortmund 03.01.10
No comment.
YouTube - Ein kleiner Blick auf die Air Berlin, Flughafen Dortmund 03.01.10
No comment.
The Crew did an outstanding job.! In positively CRAP conditions, Dark, slush, snow, shortish runway and long sector (= high weight).
Having just watched the RTL an bord video the crew did exactly as per SOP.
Probably full thrust take-off, abort, Passenger comments, “were braking”,
Full reverse, as evident by the blow back on to the window. STOP.
On completion, Cockpit announcement “Attention on Station”. (OM/ FSM p48)
Flight Crew (wenn handlungsfähig)
Anwendung Kommando
Alarmierung der Crew ATTENTION CREW ON STATION (2 times)
Beruhigen der Crew NORMAL OPERATION (2 times)
Evakuierung “EVACUATE, EVACUATE, EVACUATE”
Evakuierung mit
Angabe des
Evakuierungsweges EVACUATE ……. (left, right, forward) (3 times)
This is were assessment is made, and if there is no reason to you “DO NOT EVACUATE into a hostile environment”.
The NG has some rather interesting fun when heavy on a contaminated runway.
A few years back an AB –800 landing in TXL, meet all the performance requirements and factorization for landing in similar conditions, they overran by 100ft! We were #2 and had to divert to SXF.
Now think before you comment, would you really want to depart into the clag with “unreliable” airspeed and have to return in OVC 005 conditions.
NO NEITHER WOULD I.
End result, no injuries, no damage, crew did what they were supposed to.
Having just watched the RTL an bord video the crew did exactly as per SOP.
Probably full thrust take-off, abort, Passenger comments, “were braking”,
Full reverse, as evident by the blow back on to the window. STOP.
On completion, Cockpit announcement “Attention on Station”. (OM/ FSM p48)
Flight Crew (wenn handlungsfähig)
Anwendung Kommando
Alarmierung der Crew ATTENTION CREW ON STATION (2 times)
Beruhigen der Crew NORMAL OPERATION (2 times)
Evakuierung “EVACUATE, EVACUATE, EVACUATE”
Evakuierung mit
Angabe des
Evakuierungsweges EVACUATE ……. (left, right, forward) (3 times)
This is were assessment is made, and if there is no reason to you “DO NOT EVACUATE into a hostile environment”.
The NG has some rather interesting fun when heavy on a contaminated runway.
A few years back an AB –800 landing in TXL, meet all the performance requirements and factorization for landing in similar conditions, they overran by 100ft! We were #2 and had to divert to SXF.
Now think before you comment, would you really want to depart into the clag with “unreliable” airspeed and have to return in OVC 005 conditions.
NO NEITHER WOULD I.
End result, no injuries, no damage, crew did what they were supposed to.
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glad rag
You only had to look back 4 posts previous to yours to see that selecting Flap 40 is an SOP on that aircraft in the event of an RTO.
Eh? what does A320 have to do with it? The aircraft in question was a boeing 737.
Lot of flap showing in that picture for take off???????
Runway is relatively short and stop margins with Airbus A320 with Conf 3 in the 30 to 60 meter region with WET RWY with medium weights and engine anti-ice on. TOGA thrust provides much better margins but it is still a short runway and many companies operating in and out have put restrictions as to who can be the pilot flying
Guess that will be the reason.
Guess that will be the reason.
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Flaps 40 on the 737 is an item on the evacuation checklist; the point is that passengers using the overwing emergency exits need to slide down the trailing edge of the wings. It has nothing to do with a takeoff-flap setting.
The mandatory callout "80 knots" - "checked" is not just an incapacitation call, but it also checks the correct airspeed indication. I haven't flown the 737 for several years now, but the AIRSPEED DISAGREE checklist (is that the correct title?) applies only after airborne (determine which indication is correct, if necessary with the performance inflight-tables).
during takeoff-run, there is no time for that. The non-normal briefing should include something like "After 80 knots, before V1, I will reject the takeoff only if the aircraft is unsafe for flying". Which was the case here.
If it had happened after V1, the situation would have been different (which is why V1 is usually reduced on a contaminated runway).
The final decision on weather or not to evacuate the aircraft after it has come to a stop usually lies with the commander. It depends on what AB's manual says (I don't work for them).
Another thing to bear in mind what some know-everything-guys didn't mention in their wisdom (one guy said in a previous post that "Air Berlin choses pilots according to fluency in German language over any flying abilities"), in this case, is the freezing weather.
If you evacuate the plane, not only will some people undoubtedly get injured. You will also have some 160+ passengers, many under shock, some others with special needs, some elderly, some small children, etc. - walking/sitting/lying around in the area, on a wet snowy surface. Waiting for the ambulances to arrive and taking care of the majority of people may easily take another twenty to thirty minutes. Maybe this factor is not yet deadly, but it's certainly a serious health-hazard.
An evacuation may still be necessary if the aircraft is on fire, but that was not the case. It seems that the Crew went through their checklist, and then decided to disembark the passengers in a safe manner. With both engines and the APU shut down, and most electrics unpowered, there was no reason to panic. All that had happened was a collapsed nosegear.
Therefore I believe it was a very good decision.
The mandatory callout "80 knots" - "checked" is not just an incapacitation call, but it also checks the correct airspeed indication. I haven't flown the 737 for several years now, but the AIRSPEED DISAGREE checklist (is that the correct title?) applies only after airborne (determine which indication is correct, if necessary with the performance inflight-tables).
during takeoff-run, there is no time for that. The non-normal briefing should include something like "After 80 knots, before V1, I will reject the takeoff only if the aircraft is unsafe for flying". Which was the case here.
If it had happened after V1, the situation would have been different (which is why V1 is usually reduced on a contaminated runway).
The final decision on weather or not to evacuate the aircraft after it has come to a stop usually lies with the commander. It depends on what AB's manual says (I don't work for them).
Another thing to bear in mind what some know-everything-guys didn't mention in their wisdom (one guy said in a previous post that "Air Berlin choses pilots according to fluency in German language over any flying abilities"), in this case, is the freezing weather.
If you evacuate the plane, not only will some people undoubtedly get injured. You will also have some 160+ passengers, many under shock, some others with special needs, some elderly, some small children, etc. - walking/sitting/lying around in the area, on a wet snowy surface. Waiting for the ambulances to arrive and taking care of the majority of people may easily take another twenty to thirty minutes. Maybe this factor is not yet deadly, but it's certainly a serious health-hazard.
An evacuation may still be necessary if the aircraft is on fire, but that was not the case. It seems that the Crew went through their checklist, and then decided to disembark the passengers in a safe manner. With both engines and the APU shut down, and most electrics unpowered, there was no reason to panic. All that had happened was a collapsed nosegear.
Therefore I believe it was a very good decision.
Last edited by Nightfire; 4th Jan 2010 at 12:49.
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Aborted after V1 maybe?
On the German news, a pax from the accident made the statement and hand sign that the aircrafts body angle had started to pitch up and then down (he did not say whether he felt the aircraft had gone airborne) followed of course by the rejected take-off run. He also made no estimate to the speed at which the aircraft left the runway. He did mention when the aircraft came to rest, the engines were shutdown and the controlled evacuation was ordered.
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In the end, job well done by the crew as nobody got injured. That is the benchmark.
I have had this situation before, where my speed indication (speed tape and ASI on a B733) went to zero after the 80kts. callout of the PNF. I called the failure checked PNF side ASI worked and gave controls to him. With 2 working speed indications, we climbed to do some trouble shooting, discussed the options (weather was bad) and returned to the field. I felt that the situation was not critical enough to perform a near V1 reject. It is a somewhat difficult failure to decide on actually and a good exercise for the sim.
In order for all speed indications to go blank, you need to have a failure of all pitot tubes, both ADC's and no ground-speed readout from the IRS.
Unlikely indeed, but I do know a crew which had this situation in reality, luckily in severe CAVOK with a B735. So it IS possible.
I have had this situation before, where my speed indication (speed tape and ASI on a B733) went to zero after the 80kts. callout of the PNF. I called the failure checked PNF side ASI worked and gave controls to him. With 2 working speed indications, we climbed to do some trouble shooting, discussed the options (weather was bad) and returned to the field. I felt that the situation was not critical enough to perform a near V1 reject. It is a somewhat difficult failure to decide on actually and a good exercise for the sim.
In order for all speed indications to go blank, you need to have a failure of all pitot tubes, both ADC's and no ground-speed readout from the IRS.
Unlikely indeed, but I do know a crew which had this situation in reality, luckily in severe CAVOK with a B735. So it IS possible.
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very negatively impressed by the view of all that snow on the engines.
Nothing to do with the aborted TO, but I'm curious what the wing conditions were.
And yes, the engines are deiced.
Nothing to do with the aborted TO, but I'm curious what the wing conditions were.
And yes, the engines are deiced.
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There but for the grace of God go I. Any one of us could have an IAS disagree at 100+kts on a dark and stormy, snowy night on a short runway. You go, you're wrong, you reject, you're wrong.
If its short and the weather is good, easy, you go.
If its long and its rubbish, easy, you stop.
Everything else is in the grey area in which you have to make a decision in 0.04 of a second. This poor sod made a decision and lost out by about 100m it looks like.
As long as the decision was early enough and the numbers were right then these guys should be fine.
B.T.W. is it Captains only rejects at Air Berlin?
If its short and the weather is good, easy, you go.
If its long and its rubbish, easy, you stop.
Everything else is in the grey area in which you have to make a decision in 0.04 of a second. This poor sod made a decision and lost out by about 100m it looks like.
As long as the decision was early enough and the numbers were right then these guys should be fine.
B.T.W. is it Captains only rejects at Air Berlin?
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Here you can see a picture of the (almost?) intact nose gear:
Rutschpartie auf der Startbahn - Bildergalerie bei GMX
Rutschpartie auf der Startbahn - Bildergalerie bei GMX
I Just Drive, you present an interesting view of take off procedures.
Surely, during take-off, the margins of the decision to go or stop are in procedures and are checked in the pre flight plan. The crew’s task is to execute the plan, not take ad hoc decisions which judge runway length, weather, and the nature of the failure during take off.
Pre flight planning determines V1.
Operational procedures should specify the crew actions in the event of failures. Conditional issues in the decision may be the nature of a failure and the airspeed e.g. engine failure always stop before V1, ASI malfunction only stop below 80kts. This simplifies the decision making and reduces risk of error.
An ASI failure or malfunction above 80kts might involve the same drill, - use the standby ASI.
Appropriately trained crews should be capable of continuing flight irrespective of the weather or runway length with a relatively minor failure.
Several posts in this thread suggest that crews / operators have not thought about this likely scenario, may not have specific guidance, or have practiced the procedure.
The problem is not about being wrong; it’s about thinking about safety issues in advance, planning, and acting according to the plan or evolving situation.
Surely, during take-off, the margins of the decision to go or stop are in procedures and are checked in the pre flight plan. The crew’s task is to execute the plan, not take ad hoc decisions which judge runway length, weather, and the nature of the failure during take off.
Pre flight planning determines V1.
Operational procedures should specify the crew actions in the event of failures. Conditional issues in the decision may be the nature of a failure and the airspeed e.g. engine failure always stop before V1, ASI malfunction only stop below 80kts. This simplifies the decision making and reduces risk of error.
An ASI failure or malfunction above 80kts might involve the same drill, - use the standby ASI.
Appropriately trained crews should be capable of continuing flight irrespective of the weather or runway length with a relatively minor failure.
Several posts in this thread suggest that crews / operators have not thought about this likely scenario, may not have specific guidance, or have practiced the procedure.
The problem is not about being wrong; it’s about thinking about safety issues in advance, planning, and acting according to the plan or evolving situation.
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alf5something,
Yes you are correct. V1 is calculated and it it is what it is.
There are many failures that are practised in the sim and there are rejects and there are continues.
However, its very much not as cut and dry as that.
This example is a classic if it is what it has currently been reported as.
At 80kts, both speed tapes are spot on in agreement.
At 120kts, there is a sudden and dramatic disgreement.
V1 = 125kts.
Edited to say that in general, an IAS disagree that is spotted, diagnosed and countered using the Sby ASI wouldn't be something i'd stop for at high speed.
(All numbers made up)
You can stop or you can go.
I was exaggerating the point that on a long runway with awful weather id be inclined to stop.
On a short runway with good weather id be inclined to go.
IN THE MOST SIMPLISTIC OF TERMS.
The rest is a judgement call. It gets made and then god willing, you only have to suffer trial by PPRUNE.
Yes you are correct. V1 is calculated and it it is what it is.
There are many failures that are practised in the sim and there are rejects and there are continues.
However, its very much not as cut and dry as that.
This example is a classic if it is what it has currently been reported as.
At 80kts, both speed tapes are spot on in agreement.
At 120kts, there is a sudden and dramatic disgreement.
V1 = 125kts.
Edited to say that in general, an IAS disagree that is spotted, diagnosed and countered using the Sby ASI wouldn't be something i'd stop for at high speed.
(All numbers made up)
You can stop or you can go.
I was exaggerating the point that on a long runway with awful weather id be inclined to stop.
On a short runway with good weather id be inclined to go.
IN THE MOST SIMPLISTIC OF TERMS.
The rest is a judgement call. It gets made and then god willing, you only have to suffer trial by PPRUNE.
sleepypilot very negatively impressed by the view of all that snow on the engines.
Nothing to do with the aborted TO, but I'm curious what the wing conditions were.
And yes, the engines are deiced.
Nothing to do with the aborted TO, but I'm curious what the wing conditions were.
And yes, the engines are deiced.
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LYKA, correct. Just reviewed the 777 AOM, and it's the same
"...a careful check of the fuselage, wings, tail, control surfaces, surface actuators, gaps between the airframe and control surfaces, engine nacelle inlets, landing gear, and gear doors must be made, and all ice, frost or snow must be removed from these areas prior to takeoff..."
Nevertheless I would, and will, always ask for a "clean" plane. That amount of snow did not look like the result of the precipitation between de/anti-icing treatment and takeoff.
"...a careful check of the fuselage, wings, tail, control surfaces, surface actuators, gaps between the airframe and control surfaces, engine nacelle inlets, landing gear, and gear doors must be made, and all ice, frost or snow must be removed from these areas prior to takeoff..."
Nevertheless I would, and will, always ask for a "clean" plane. That amount of snow did not look like the result of the precipitation between de/anti-icing treatment and takeoff.
lot of flap showing in that picture for take off???????
You only had to look back 4 posts previous to yours to see that selecting Flap 40 is an SOP on that aircraft in the event of an RTO.
You only had to look back 4 posts previous to yours to see that selecting Flap 40 is an SOP on that aircraft in the event of an RTO.
Flaps 40 on the 737 is an item on the evacuation checklist; the point is that passengers using the overwing emergency exits need to slide down the trailing edge of the wings. It has nothing to do with a takeoff-flap setting.
I Just Drive, thanks for the clarification.
I see a problem with the residual choice of Go / Stop, at high speed (>80kts, but less than V1). My understanding of the safety statistics and industry recommendations is that for either a main ASI failure, or system disagreement, the Go option is the safer choice.
Many operators provide guidance for this via the 80 kt check and recommending the Go option above this speed (for an ASI failure / disagreement) , i.e. although physically possible to either go or stop, the go option is safer.
With good procedures and training, then the Go/Stop decision should be clear-cut, irrespective of the weather or runway conditions/length, the decision should not be left to our inclination. The Go/Stop decision is one of those few ‘canned decisions’ (but not prejudged) where after recognizing the situation – failure/speed, the choice is very easy.
The differing views expressed in the thread appear to relate to the operators guidance / procedures to be used for ASI failure (and if none, does this invoke the Capt’s judgment), or in the understanding of the relative risks leading to a Go choice, e.g. some people have suggested that flight with a single ASI is hazardous.
Although we do not have the details of this event, the thread discussion should be about the decision to depart the airfield if the runway conditions are marginal and not to consider the Go/Stop choice after a failure. The runway state / weather should not influence the Go/Stop decision for an ASI failure; they are part of the departure decision.
If the runway condition was a factor, then there could be similarities with recent landing accidents;- crews may not have good information about the runway state. Thus if the runway conditions are marginal, i.e reported ‘good’, but there is doubt, then crews should decide not to fly until the conditions improve or can be verified.
It’s better to make the decision in the planning phase than be faced with a poor option during take off.
I see a problem with the residual choice of Go / Stop, at high speed (>80kts, but less than V1). My understanding of the safety statistics and industry recommendations is that for either a main ASI failure, or system disagreement, the Go option is the safer choice.
Many operators provide guidance for this via the 80 kt check and recommending the Go option above this speed (for an ASI failure / disagreement) , i.e. although physically possible to either go or stop, the go option is safer.
With good procedures and training, then the Go/Stop decision should be clear-cut, irrespective of the weather or runway conditions/length, the decision should not be left to our inclination. The Go/Stop decision is one of those few ‘canned decisions’ (but not prejudged) where after recognizing the situation – failure/speed, the choice is very easy.
The differing views expressed in the thread appear to relate to the operators guidance / procedures to be used for ASI failure (and if none, does this invoke the Capt’s judgment), or in the understanding of the relative risks leading to a Go choice, e.g. some people have suggested that flight with a single ASI is hazardous.
Although we do not have the details of this event, the thread discussion should be about the decision to depart the airfield if the runway conditions are marginal and not to consider the Go/Stop choice after a failure. The runway state / weather should not influence the Go/Stop decision for an ASI failure; they are part of the departure decision.
If the runway condition was a factor, then there could be similarities with recent landing accidents;- crews may not have good information about the runway state. Thus if the runway conditions are marginal, i.e reported ‘good’, but there is doubt, then crews should decide not to fly until the conditions improve or can be verified.
It’s better to make the decision in the planning phase than be faced with a poor option during take off.
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Originally Posted by atakacs
Don't you want to minimize lift at all cost in such a situation ? Or is flap 40 adding significant drag ? Or is it irrelevant ?!
Passengers using the overwing exits will find it significantly easier to slide down the wing using the flaps than jump down the wing from about 2 to 3 meters wing height.
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Some very interesting information from Boeing can be found at Boeings Aero Magazine #11.
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Just watched the cabin video and that looked like a filthy filthy night.
Well done to all of the crew on board. It's easy to sit and criticise in the warmth of your armchair, a different story altogether to have to do it.
Well done to all of the crew on board. It's easy to sit and criticise in the warmth of your armchair, a different story altogether to have to do it.