Air Canada A320 loss of control in flight: 14/4/09
Just speculation, but would this by any chance be the first flight after a maintenance action?
Now an example of informed speculation would be:
"It's probably the last flight before a maintenance action"
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Seems unlikely since the Flight Tracker linked on the first post claims a 1708EDT departure time. Any significant maintenance action of the kind usually associated with flight control oddity tends to be during an overnight or longer maintenance opportunity, and thus first flight of the day, which it seems unlikely this would be for the airframe.
Snowfalcon2;
Of course it's more complex than that which I state. The statement was posted against the mistaken notions, mostly from 320 critics who either dont' fly or haven't flown the Airbus, that it is not the design towards which one looks for the sources of problems but training and standards/checking, which must be reinforced by a good data analysis program that is accepted and used by the operator.
Well, who's training are we discussing in "the" training? Each operator is responsible for the training supplied to their pilots. Some consider it at the same level as a home study course while others do serious in-depth computer-based ground school and simulator programs consisting of at least seven (absolute minimum for a full transition) to more. I suspect the standard varies across operators - it's not a course by Airbus nor is it Airbus's course - usually it is a course designed by the operator and bought from one of many private companies who supply these kinds of courses. So you question is not answerable in the way it is asked.
Someone with only 6000hrs isn't (or shouldnt') have any problem transitioning from, say, a 737 to a 320 or right seat to left seat. Its an airplane first, then a software platform to greater or lesser degrees. Learn to fly the airplane, then learn to work the bells and whistles, (most courses do not do that, but that's a training issue, not an aircraft issue).
Of course it's more complex than that which I state. The statement was posted against the mistaken notions, mostly from 320 critics who either dont' fly or haven't flown the Airbus, that it is not the design towards which one looks for the sources of problems but training and standards/checking, which must be reinforced by a good data analysis program that is accepted and used by the operator.
what about the case, for example, when you have a 6000 hr pilot transitioning from another brand of a/c who has to de-learn old ingrained procedures - is that addressed good enough in the training?
Someone with only 6000hrs isn't (or shouldnt') have any problem transitioning from, say, a 737 to a 320 or right seat to left seat. Its an airplane first, then a software platform to greater or lesser degrees. Learn to fly the airplane, then learn to work the bells and whistles, (most courses do not do that, but that's a training issue, not an aircraft issue).
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PJ2
Makes more sense than most. A computer generated loss of control is as common as what, a Rudder hardover in a 73? The airframe has a better record than the pilot, regardless the (similar) type. A quick review of all the threads here would bear that out.
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airfoilmod;
No, that is not the case.
The question assumes, and is stated "as though", computer-generated loss of control is in the same league as the 737 rudder issue. It is not. The 737 rudder hardover has a historical record, has caused a number of fatal accidents and has an established training regime designed specifically to counter the occurence, while there is only one computer-generated loss-of-control accident which was unprecedented, (ie, not indicated in any flight data or incident report before the occurence), non-fatal, and in which the aircraft landed safely.
Again, this is not to say that computer-generated issues are not possible. No one can say this. But the record is what it is. Loss of control through a computer-generated problem is statistically close to zero; the rudder hardover case is not, and it is not "rare" - in fact, the problem exists today because, while the rudder power units have been redesigned, they are not installed on the entire fleet, (someone please correct me on this if wrong - this is my recollection).
Please know that I'm not defending one over the other here, I'm simply pointing out the problem with the question's assumptions, as posed. I dont' think the question addresses the Airbus issues which have arisen in the accidents which have occurred thus far.
A computer generated loss of control is as common as what, a Rudder hardover in a 73?
The question assumes, and is stated "as though", computer-generated loss of control is in the same league as the 737 rudder issue. It is not. The 737 rudder hardover has a historical record, has caused a number of fatal accidents and has an established training regime designed specifically to counter the occurence, while there is only one computer-generated loss-of-control accident which was unprecedented, (ie, not indicated in any flight data or incident report before the occurence), non-fatal, and in which the aircraft landed safely.
Again, this is not to say that computer-generated issues are not possible. No one can say this. But the record is what it is. Loss of control through a computer-generated problem is statistically close to zero; the rudder hardover case is not, and it is not "rare" - in fact, the problem exists today because, while the rudder power units have been redesigned, they are not installed on the entire fleet, (someone please correct me on this if wrong - this is my recollection).
Please know that I'm not defending one over the other here, I'm simply pointing out the problem with the question's assumptions, as posed. I dont' think the question addresses the Airbus issues which have arisen in the accidents which have occurred thus far.
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PJ2
I presumed most would assume I meant merely what you took the time to explain, that the two were not at all comparable in order of occurrence, that with either type, the a/c is predictable in the way you state, statistically, whereas flight crew are not conducive to such methods.
I fear that lost in the parochial approach to type is a failing of what is mitigable, Human (Pilot) error. Exhaustively designed and built aircraft seldom surprise, and when they do, there is a trail to follow backwards to the procuring cause.
I presumed most would assume I meant merely what you took the time to explain, that the two were not at all comparable in order of occurrence, that with either type, the a/c is predictable in the way you state, statistically, whereas flight crew are not conducive to such methods.
I fear that lost in the parochial approach to type is a failing of what is mitigable, Human (Pilot) error. Exhaustively designed and built aircraft seldom surprise, and when they do, there is a trail to follow backwards to the procuring cause.
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Loss of control through a computer-generated problem is statistically close to zero
Such BS comes in very handy for the manufacturors, the lobbied-up regulators and the stingy airline managers.
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The Airbus 320/330/340 QRHs have mandatory reset procedures for troubleshooting all computers on board which may affect the operation. These procedures have been in use for a very long time and will be trained for and should be well understood. One just doesn't launch on a troubleshooting expedition in the 320 or any computerized device with home-grown or internet-researched "solutions". If a crew doesn't go by the book, then that is a training and standards issue, not an airplane issue.
An operator recently told me that they had no problems on line checks and sim checks, I said a sim is an artificial enviornment and both on the sim and line the pilot is on their best behavior during the checking event. The operator did not have FOQA or ASAP...so they really did not know what was going on with the line pilots.
Iceman49;
Yes, fully agree with you.
Today, an airline that is operating without a FOQA program and therefore doesn't know what it's fleet is doing on a daily basis, or an airline that has the FOQA box ticked but isn't examining the data, hasn't staffed the program with sufficient resources or doesn't engage the program, is an airline that is exposed to risk in a number of ways.
A checking program which does not include FOQA data reviews with a robust reporting system to the flight operations VP and higher, is no longer the best checking program. It is no longer good enough under SMS. It will be prone to observer biases which tend to see what flight operations wants in terms of results; ignoring or paying lip service to FOQA data permits commercial priorities to take precedence over safety under the heading of "we didnt' know", which is, of course, a variation on wilful negligence, especially if the data contained, for example, an airframe limitation exeedance (speed, 'g', engine temps, etc) but was kept flying for whatever reason. In short, while all kinds of things used to happen when the data wasn't available, it is no longer acceptable for an airline to run without such data programs.
A flight operations group which doesn't have, or if it does, doesn't look at the FOQA data, doesn't know what trends and/or incidents have occurred but which are not, for varying reasons, reported, it doesn't know what it's normal operation looks like, (how tight are the bell curves in terms of stable approach parameters - is the curve "peaky" or wide, with lots of outliers?) and, because SMS is a data-driven program and because computing power and box installations are relatively cheap as is the ability to examine the data daily, if the airline has an accident and it can be demonstrated by the prosecution that that airline either didn't have a FOQA program in place, or if it did, was in possession of safety information but didn't act upon it or, if the program was in place with a couple of token resources but flight operations routinely ignored the data even when serious incidents were seen in the data, then that airline is at legal and economic risk. FOQA programs can save an airline millions but it first has to be understood, engaged in and supported; otherwise all the predictions that those ignorant of FOQA make, actually come true as a self-fulfilling prophecy.
In short, if you're not doing FOQA, you're at risk; if you're doing FOQA and not looking at the data, or looking at the data but doing anything about it, (contrary to the FAA laws on FOQA confidentiality and keeping the FAA at arm's length), you're at risk. Add to this mix the fact that the regulator is vacating it's traditional role and de-regulating safety by handing the responsibility over to private enterprise. More than ever now, an airline needs to know how it's fleet is being flown and what trends if any, are present.
Sorry for the thread-drift.
Agreed training and standards is an issue, not the aircraft, however you can have all of the training and standards you want, but if you have an idividual go off on their own... all bets are off. The only measurement tool we had before, is sim and line check rides, now with FOQA there is the ability to actually see if what is being taught and checked is truly being complied with.
An operator recently told me that they had no problems on line checks and sim checks, I said a sim is an artificial enviornment and both on the sim and line the pilot is on their best behavior during the checking event. The operator did not have FOQA or ASAP...so they really did not know what was going on with the line pilots.
An operator recently told me that they had no problems on line checks and sim checks, I said a sim is an artificial enviornment and both on the sim and line the pilot is on their best behavior during the checking event. The operator did not have FOQA or ASAP...so they really did not know what was going on with the line pilots.
Today, an airline that is operating without a FOQA program and therefore doesn't know what it's fleet is doing on a daily basis, or an airline that has the FOQA box ticked but isn't examining the data, hasn't staffed the program with sufficient resources or doesn't engage the program, is an airline that is exposed to risk in a number of ways.
A checking program which does not include FOQA data reviews with a robust reporting system to the flight operations VP and higher, is no longer the best checking program. It is no longer good enough under SMS. It will be prone to observer biases which tend to see what flight operations wants in terms of results; ignoring or paying lip service to FOQA data permits commercial priorities to take precedence over safety under the heading of "we didnt' know", which is, of course, a variation on wilful negligence, especially if the data contained, for example, an airframe limitation exeedance (speed, 'g', engine temps, etc) but was kept flying for whatever reason. In short, while all kinds of things used to happen when the data wasn't available, it is no longer acceptable for an airline to run without such data programs.
A flight operations group which doesn't have, or if it does, doesn't look at the FOQA data, doesn't know what trends and/or incidents have occurred but which are not, for varying reasons, reported, it doesn't know what it's normal operation looks like, (how tight are the bell curves in terms of stable approach parameters - is the curve "peaky" or wide, with lots of outliers?) and, because SMS is a data-driven program and because computing power and box installations are relatively cheap as is the ability to examine the data daily, if the airline has an accident and it can be demonstrated by the prosecution that that airline either didn't have a FOQA program in place, or if it did, was in possession of safety information but didn't act upon it or, if the program was in place with a couple of token resources but flight operations routinely ignored the data even when serious incidents were seen in the data, then that airline is at legal and economic risk. FOQA programs can save an airline millions but it first has to be understood, engaged in and supported; otherwise all the predictions that those ignorant of FOQA make, actually come true as a self-fulfilling prophecy.
In short, if you're not doing FOQA, you're at risk; if you're doing FOQA and not looking at the data, or looking at the data but doing anything about it, (contrary to the FAA laws on FOQA confidentiality and keeping the FAA at arm's length), you're at risk. Add to this mix the fact that the regulator is vacating it's traditional role and de-regulating safety by handing the responsibility over to private enterprise. More than ever now, an airline needs to know how it's fleet is being flown and what trends if any, are present.
Sorry for the thread-drift.
daikilo;
Your question wasn't responded to likely because nobody knows yet or if they do they're not publishing it.
What do you mean by "maintenance intervention"? Any action outside of the normal, planned maintenance actions before each flight or an MEL item at the gate, or fresh out of the hangar after a major check?
PJ2
Your question wasn't responded to likely because nobody knows yet or if they do they're not publishing it.
What do you mean by "maintenance intervention"? Any action outside of the normal, planned maintenance actions before each flight or an MEL item at the gate, or fresh out of the hangar after a major check?
PJ2
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CAT
Mechanical turbulence generally refers to turbulence caused by the wind hitting obstacles (like mountains) and being affected (updrafts/down-drafts) by them, but I don't think this was the case at FL360.
Perhaps they meant CAT?
BF
Perhaps they meant CAT?
BF
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Slamer:
And how do cables differ when they're ultimately moved by computer? Don't forget the 737NG either...but I guess you're just spoling for an AvB fight...
..does slamer refer to your landings in MSFS? (You've spelt slammer wrong as well or did you mean s-lame-r )
FC101
E145 driver
Luddite about FBW, eh? That include the 777? Then the 787?
Or are we talking sidesticks versus something between your legs?
B777 still has cables...!
Or are we talking sidesticks versus something between your legs?
B777 still has cables...!
..does slamer refer to your landings in MSFS? (You've spelt slammer wrong as well or did you mean s-lame-r )
FC101
E145 driver
From the Avherald:
The Canadian TSB reported on Apr 20th, that the crew received a "SPOILER FAULT" message on the electronic centralized aircraft monitoring system (ECAM) and noticed, that the ground spoilers were partially removed from the display. After consultation with the airline's maintenance department the crew decided to return to Montreal. On short final the crew declared emergency due to severe vibration of the airframe. The aircraft had undergone maintenance during which the ground spoilers had been disabled and were not reactivated. The airframe vibrations came from the spoilers, that started to flutter after the landing flaps were deployed.
The Canadian TSB reported on Apr 20th, that the crew received a "SPOILER FAULT" message on the electronic centralized aircraft monitoring system (ECAM) and noticed, that the ground spoilers were partially removed from the display. After consultation with the airline's maintenance department the crew decided to return to Montreal. On short final the crew declared emergency due to severe vibration of the airframe. The aircraft had undergone maintenance during which the ground spoilers had been disabled and were not reactivated. The airframe vibrations came from the spoilers, that started to flutter after the landing flaps were deployed.
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If the ground spoilers were indeed left in maintenance mode, wouldn't the crew have noticed this during their pre-departure flight control checks?
just curious
cod
just curious
cod