EK407 Tailstrike @ ML
Joined: Apr 2009
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From: Dubai
Joined: Dec 2006
Posts: 431
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From: KUL
Thoughts?
Pretty much garbage. Author hasn't got a clue what a flex takeoff is and that flex/ derate/ assumed temp are best industry practice. Fatigue has already been ruled out as a factor. Preliminary report is due out soon. EK made a mistake with less than proactive media work though, which is I believe in the process of being rectified.
Actually the Melbourne 2001 engine surge comes to mind. EK claimed rightfully that there was no fire and then somebody came up with a video of a huge fireball belching out of the N1 fan (which is to be expected during a surge but is absolutely not an engine fire). EK ended up appearing defensive pointing this out and were seen as liars by the uninitiated crowd.
Actually the Melbourne 2001 engine surge comes to mind. EK claimed rightfully that there was no fire and then somebody came up with a video of a huge fireball belching out of the N1 fan (which is to be expected during a surge but is absolutely not an engine fire). EK ended up appearing defensive pointing this out and were seen as liars by the uninitiated crowd.
Joined: May 2008
Posts: 314
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From: pit
The Mach 5.5 did it again!
If you use the word garbage, be careful, it might bite back.
Regarding flex/derate/assumed take off:
You cite best industry practice. Well, it's not completely true. With the EK software, you can only go for full thrust or max reduction. Any in-between, which is used a lot elsewhere for a little more safety margin but not full thrust, is not recommedable here, because the gross error trapping procedure a la EK will no longer be possible. It's not in the SOP, so either full or full reduction, which I believe is not best practice.
Regarding surge and fireballs:
A surge does NOT necessarily have a fireball, and you pretend it is to be expected. It may or it may not. If there is a fireball however, I would NEVER rule out a possible real fire, as you so brilliantly do by pretending that this is absolutely no fire.
By the way: How do you know that fatigue has already been ruled out? The prelim is not out yet, isn't it?
The more you post, the more you seem like a seat cushion warmer in the obscene palace, but not someone confronted with the real garbage happening on line with EK.
If you use the word garbage, be careful, it might bite back.
Regarding flex/derate/assumed take off:
You cite best industry practice. Well, it's not completely true. With the EK software, you can only go for full thrust or max reduction. Any in-between, which is used a lot elsewhere for a little more safety margin but not full thrust, is not recommedable here, because the gross error trapping procedure a la EK will no longer be possible. It's not in the SOP, so either full or full reduction, which I believe is not best practice.
Regarding surge and fireballs:
A surge does NOT necessarily have a fireball, and you pretend it is to be expected. It may or it may not. If there is a fireball however, I would NEVER rule out a possible real fire, as you so brilliantly do by pretending that this is absolutely no fire.
By the way: How do you know that fatigue has already been ruled out? The prelim is not out yet, isn't it?
The more you post, the more you seem like a seat cushion warmer in the obscene palace, but not someone confronted with the real garbage happening on line with EK.
Joined: Jan 2008
Posts: 16
Likes: 0
From: UK-at times
so-pilot's only thanks-
do we really think, that on a Max Flex/Red thrust (Airbus/Boeing) take-off, at night, we can differentiate/identify correct acceleration for
-a 3700m runway
-a 3500m runway
-a 3900m runway with a second segment limit
-a 3200m uphill runway with tailwind component
etc etc.
Of course we can't. The only reality is staring at the red/whites and knowing you need to be airborne -soonish!
Regardless.
This crew responded to an impending threat
So forget the 'perception/should 'ave caught it/ rule of thumb', theories. The only thing that 'got 'em' was an input error.
Now- if you read back an altitude, and wind in something else in the window,you have a potential breakdown in separation=potential collision. However, there are still a couple of protection levels available (TCAS, ATC).
Typing in an incorrect weight has only one error trapping mechanism- the other pilot.
Some more work needed here perhaps?
Like many others here- I feel for the crew.
And perhaps EK need a gentle 'Taser up the Rear' to re-define their culture.
At the moment, despite nice new kit, flashy terminal, they are looking rather shabby.
No offense to the highly professional line aircrew there.
Cheers
do we really think, that on a Max Flex/Red thrust (Airbus/Boeing) take-off, at night, we can differentiate/identify correct acceleration for
-a 3700m runway
-a 3500m runway
-a 3900m runway with a second segment limit
-a 3200m uphill runway with tailwind component
etc etc.
Of course we can't. The only reality is staring at the red/whites and knowing you need to be airborne -soonish!
Regardless.
This crew responded to an impending threat
So forget the 'perception/should 'ave caught it/ rule of thumb', theories. The only thing that 'got 'em' was an input error.
Now- if you read back an altitude, and wind in something else in the window,you have a potential breakdown in separation=potential collision. However, there are still a couple of protection levels available (TCAS, ATC).
Typing in an incorrect weight has only one error trapping mechanism- the other pilot.
Some more work needed here perhaps?
Like many others here- I feel for the crew.
And perhaps EK need a gentle 'Taser up the Rear' to re-define their culture.
At the moment, despite nice new kit, flashy terminal, they are looking rather shabby.
No offense to the highly professional line aircrew there.
Cheers
Joined: Dec 2006
Posts: 431
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From: KUL
oh pool...
Pool: Didn't they tell you to stop posting after a couple of stiff ones? Okay - I ll respond to the stuff that's worth to be qualified.
EK performance software are the 1:1 Boeing and Airbus factory modules. In terms of what it does, dial up the Pelesys module or Wiki and look for 'balanced V1'.
In the MEL surge case the media hype about a fire cooked up days after it was established that there hasn't been any. Media just got onto it because the footage was too good. For the rest of your post: Yes, I love you too.
EK performance software are the 1:1 Boeing and Airbus factory modules. In terms of what it does, dial up the Pelesys module or Wiki and look for 'balanced V1'.
In the MEL surge case the media hype about a fire cooked up days after it was established that there hasn't been any. Media just got onto it because the footage was too good. For the rest of your post: Yes, I love you too.
Joined: Mar 2008
Posts: 3
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From: Sydney Australia
Re: Thoughts?
Mr Mach5.5:
Would you be kind enough to share with us the source of this information ? ATSB investigator ? EK management ? Tarot cards ? And while you're at it you could also let us know exactly what your relationship is with EK.
Otherwise an old cynic like me might think that the pro-active media work has already started 
.
Regards
Fatigue has already been ruled out as a factor.
EK made a mistake with less than proactive media work..
.Regards
Joined: Jan 2004
Posts: 487
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From: Planet Earth, mostly
Source: eeekayspinnmethinks
Joined: Apr 2008
Posts: 37
Likes: 0
From: Philippines
Typing in an incorrect weight has only one error trapping mechanism- the other pilot.
If this is true, it could not be that difficult to flag a query.
A simple extra line like "souls on board" and distance to go could easily trap a typing error?
If this is true, it could not be that difficult to flag a query.
A simple extra line like "souls on board" and distance to go could easily trap a typing error?
Joined: Feb 2004
Posts: 752
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From: Hades.
Typing in an incorrect weight has only one error trapping mechanism- the other pilot.
The SOPs have been devised to catch just this sort of mistake.
The question is... Why didn't the mistake get caught
Joined: Apr 2000
Posts: 58
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From: Australia
MEDIA ALERT Adjust font size:
2009/04
ATSB Preliminary Factual Report: A340-500 Tail Strike at Melbourne Airport, 20 March 2009
28 April 2009
A media conference to release the Preliminary Factual Report on the investigation into the circumstances surrounding the A340-500 Tail Strike at Melbourne Airport on 20 March 2009, will be held on: Thursday 30 April 2009
Where: ATSB offices, Level 2, 62 Northbourne Avenue, CANBERRA
Time: 10:30 am (local time)
Mr Julian Walsh, Director of Aviation Safety Investigation will discuss factual information known to the investigation team at this time and will outline the investigation process.
Media Contact: 1800 020 616
2009/04
ATSB Preliminary Factual Report: A340-500 Tail Strike at Melbourne Airport, 20 March 2009
28 April 2009
A media conference to release the Preliminary Factual Report on the investigation into the circumstances surrounding the A340-500 Tail Strike at Melbourne Airport on 20 March 2009, will be held on: Thursday 30 April 2009
Where: ATSB offices, Level 2, 62 Northbourne Avenue, CANBERRA
Time: 10:30 am (local time)
Mr Julian Walsh, Director of Aviation Safety Investigation will discuss factual information known to the investigation team at this time and will outline the investigation process.
Media Contact: 1800 020 616
Joined: Apr 2009
Posts: 4
Likes: 0
From: Melbourne
Weight of Emirates tail-strike plane queried
By Geoff Easdown
Herald Sun
April 29, 2009 08:01am
AIR accident investigators probing the near-disastrous Emirates tail-strike incident at Melbourne Airport are concerned that wrong load numbers were punched into the jet's flight computer. The Herald Sun has been told the take-off load could have been up to 100 tonnes more than the weight recorded.
The ATSB will release its report tomorrow on the March 20 incident at Tullamarine, which it has already billed as “significant”. The report, which details everything that happened that night, is said to include graphic pictures taken by airport security cameras. Other photos show damage to the runway as well as burns in surrounding grass caused by the plane's four jet engines.
Two senior Emirates executives have flown to Melbourne from the airline's Dubai headquarters to carry out media briefings. Sources told the Herald Sun yesterday that the situation may have arisen because too many people were on the flight deck before the aircraft pulled back from the terminal.
Apart from the four pilots usually in Emirates cockpits on long-haul flights, between two and four other people could have been present in the pre-flight check period. ”There is a great deal of conjecture about, that wrong load numbers were punched into the FMC (Flight Management Computer),” International Air Pilots' Association spokesman Barry Jackson said last night. Pilots are handed a load chart for each flight before takeoff. It includes fuel levels, cargo and passenger loadings.
Emirates Flight EK407, with 225 passengers, was racing down runway 16 at 280km/h when the pilot and first officer realised almost too late they had insufficient power to lift the big jet into the air. Their last-minute action saved the passengers. Emirates refused to confirm if it had demoted its vice-president of airline safety.
By Geoff Easdown
Herald Sun
April 29, 2009 08:01am
AIR accident investigators probing the near-disastrous Emirates tail-strike incident at Melbourne Airport are concerned that wrong load numbers were punched into the jet's flight computer. The Herald Sun has been told the take-off load could have been up to 100 tonnes more than the weight recorded.
The ATSB will release its report tomorrow on the March 20 incident at Tullamarine, which it has already billed as “significant”. The report, which details everything that happened that night, is said to include graphic pictures taken by airport security cameras. Other photos show damage to the runway as well as burns in surrounding grass caused by the plane's four jet engines.
Two senior Emirates executives have flown to Melbourne from the airline's Dubai headquarters to carry out media briefings. Sources told the Herald Sun yesterday that the situation may have arisen because too many people were on the flight deck before the aircraft pulled back from the terminal.
Apart from the four pilots usually in Emirates cockpits on long-haul flights, between two and four other people could have been present in the pre-flight check period. ”There is a great deal of conjecture about, that wrong load numbers were punched into the FMC (Flight Management Computer),” International Air Pilots' Association spokesman Barry Jackson said last night. Pilots are handed a load chart for each flight before takeoff. It includes fuel levels, cargo and passenger loadings.
Emirates Flight EK407, with 225 passengers, was racing down runway 16 at 280km/h when the pilot and first officer realised almost too late they had insufficient power to lift the big jet into the air. Their last-minute action saved the passengers. Emirates refused to confirm if it had demoted its vice-president of airline safety.
Joined: Jan 2006
Aviation Qualifications: ATPL
Posts: 85
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From: Australia
Not making excuses but from the official report Capt & F/O hours for the last 30 days were 98.9 & 89.7 respectively, fatigue has to play a part in there somewhere & airlines better start taking some notice of this issue
Joined: Jan 2008
Posts: 159
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From: Australia
Not a pilot, just trying to understand something. Would the hours referred to in the report (98.9 and 89.7 respectively) refer to DUTY hours or IN COCKPIT hours or FLYING hours (defined loosely as, say, hours in cockpit with engines running).
If it is duty hours (from when arriving at place of work until leaving place of work), then:
1 - if half the 30 days were non-duty days this averages to 6.7 duty hours per day (based on 100 hours). This would not sound like an overworked person, only working 1 day in 2, and only for approx 7 hours a day.
2 - if this was compared to 'the average worker' (whoever that is) working 5 days on, 2 days off, then there would be a maximum of 20 duty days in this 30-day cycle, which equals 5 duty hours per day. This also sounds like a reasonably non-overworked person - working 5 days in 7 for an average of 5 hours a day.
Now averages are misleading - given, but I am trying to understand the basis for comments like "... fatigue has to play a part...."
If the hours cited are actual IN COCKPIT hours (and not DUTY hours), what is a reasonable estimate of the actual DUTY hours these pilots may have done in the past 30 days?
If it is duty hours (from when arriving at place of work until leaving place of work), then:
1 - if half the 30 days were non-duty days this averages to 6.7 duty hours per day (based on 100 hours). This would not sound like an overworked person, only working 1 day in 2, and only for approx 7 hours a day.
2 - if this was compared to 'the average worker' (whoever that is) working 5 days on, 2 days off, then there would be a maximum of 20 duty days in this 30-day cycle, which equals 5 duty hours per day. This also sounds like a reasonably non-overworked person - working 5 days in 7 for an average of 5 hours a day.
Now averages are misleading - given, but I am trying to understand the basis for comments like "... fatigue has to play a part...."
If the hours cited are actual IN COCKPIT hours (and not DUTY hours), what is a reasonable estimate of the actual DUTY hours these pilots may have done in the past 30 days?