TWA 800 - the acceptable cost of accidents.
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TWA 800 - the acceptable cost of accidents.
Arthur Alan Wolk: FAA Concludes an Occasional TWA 800 Repeat Crash Is Cost Effective
PHILADELPHIA, May 22 /PRNewswire/ -- The following was issued today by Arthur Alan Wolk of Wolk and Genter: In a stunning edition of a Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR), the Federal Aviation Administration has concluded that it would be acceptable, from a cost standpoint, to accept another crash like TWA 800, rather than opt for a more expensive, but proven effective, fuel tank inerting system, reasoning that the cost of paying for lives lost and the aircraft would be cheaper than requiring a retrofit of a nitrogen based fuel tank inerting system that would guarantee no more fuel tank explosions.
In spite of a recent explosion of a Philippine Airlines 737 center fuel tank while the aircraft sat at the gate, an event Boeing and FAA officials argued was impossible, just like TWA 800, all the FAA has ordered is that each manufacturer of aircraft with more than thirty seats revalidate their fuel system certification analysis.
The FAA assumed that if it did nothing, there would be about five more fuel tank explosions in seventeen years. This calculation was made before the most recent that killed a flight attendant. The FAA went on to reason that if airlines keep the center fuel tanks fueled somewhat, and pilots don't run fuel pumps in a dry tank, about 4.3 of these accidents can be avoided -- leaving only .8 that are likely to occur. What that means is that if you are a passenger in a 350 seat airliner whose center fuel tank explodes, as you fall to earth, still alive in the fiery debris, you can rest assured that no other planeload of people as unfortunate as you will, statistically speaking, die the same way in the remaining portion of the seventeen years. Comforting, huh!
What is most remarkable about this abdication of responsibility is that statistical analysis of the risk was done by none other than the guys who certificated the airplanes' fuel systems as safe and who claimed that an explosion from such causes was impossible. The SFAR was in fact written with the help of none other than the plane makers and airlines who do not want to have to make a retrofit or design fuel inerting into new aircraft. In short, the foxes that guard the henhouse are responsible for the new rule.
Equally frightening is that in 1972, a test program funded by us taxpayers demonstrated that in a DC-9 aircraft fitted with a nitrogen inerting system, fuel system fires and explosions would be made impossible with such a system installed. The added weight, only 650 pounds! The system was found to work effectively and efficiently, yet nothing came of it to save the lives of over 230 innocent people in 1996 some 24 years later.
What mindset allows our Government to be so devoid of common sense and responsibility? The adage "Close enough for Government work" is the touchstone of FAA performance. Having found that manufacturers have failed to comply with the existing FAA regulations, the FAA, instead of making the airplanes safe and insisting on compliance, simply changed the regulations to save the industry money -- the same money that industry already saved by failing to meet the regulations in the first place. Arthur Alan Wolk
PHILADELPHIA, May 22 /PRNewswire/ -- The following was issued today by Arthur Alan Wolk of Wolk and Genter: In a stunning edition of a Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR), the Federal Aviation Administration has concluded that it would be acceptable, from a cost standpoint, to accept another crash like TWA 800, rather than opt for a more expensive, but proven effective, fuel tank inerting system, reasoning that the cost of paying for lives lost and the aircraft would be cheaper than requiring a retrofit of a nitrogen based fuel tank inerting system that would guarantee no more fuel tank explosions.
In spite of a recent explosion of a Philippine Airlines 737 center fuel tank while the aircraft sat at the gate, an event Boeing and FAA officials argued was impossible, just like TWA 800, all the FAA has ordered is that each manufacturer of aircraft with more than thirty seats revalidate their fuel system certification analysis.
The FAA assumed that if it did nothing, there would be about five more fuel tank explosions in seventeen years. This calculation was made before the most recent that killed a flight attendant. The FAA went on to reason that if airlines keep the center fuel tanks fueled somewhat, and pilots don't run fuel pumps in a dry tank, about 4.3 of these accidents can be avoided -- leaving only .8 that are likely to occur. What that means is that if you are a passenger in a 350 seat airliner whose center fuel tank explodes, as you fall to earth, still alive in the fiery debris, you can rest assured that no other planeload of people as unfortunate as you will, statistically speaking, die the same way in the remaining portion of the seventeen years. Comforting, huh!
What is most remarkable about this abdication of responsibility is that statistical analysis of the risk was done by none other than the guys who certificated the airplanes' fuel systems as safe and who claimed that an explosion from such causes was impossible. The SFAR was in fact written with the help of none other than the plane makers and airlines who do not want to have to make a retrofit or design fuel inerting into new aircraft. In short, the foxes that guard the henhouse are responsible for the new rule.
Equally frightening is that in 1972, a test program funded by us taxpayers demonstrated that in a DC-9 aircraft fitted with a nitrogen inerting system, fuel system fires and explosions would be made impossible with such a system installed. The added weight, only 650 pounds! The system was found to work effectively and efficiently, yet nothing came of it to save the lives of over 230 innocent people in 1996 some 24 years later.
What mindset allows our Government to be so devoid of common sense and responsibility? The adage "Close enough for Government work" is the touchstone of FAA performance. Having found that manufacturers have failed to comply with the existing FAA regulations, the FAA, instead of making the airplanes safe and insisting on compliance, simply changed the regulations to save the industry money -- the same money that industry already saved by failing to meet the regulations in the first place. Arthur Alan Wolk
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AW, GEE!
Go to Presidential Order 12866. Clinton ordered it.
Go to the mysteriously revised Federal Law, it got changed so that the FAA is no longer responsible for safety.
This isn't rocket science, boys & girls!
What part of the "New World Order" are you having trouble understanding???
Daddy Bush laid it out.
Junior got elected, but Cheney is functionally the actual President. Don't take my word for it; check it out yourself.
Pay attention, ya'll hear!
Go to Presidential Order 12866. Clinton ordered it.
Go to the mysteriously revised Federal Law, it got changed so that the FAA is no longer responsible for safety.
This isn't rocket science, boys & girls!
What part of the "New World Order" are you having trouble understanding???
Daddy Bush laid it out.
Junior got elected, but Cheney is functionally the actual President. Don't take my word for it; check it out yourself.
Pay attention, ya'll hear!
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I can make aircraft 100 percent safe. Never let em fly!
Unfortately, Safety though an emotional topic, has costs, and if you make flying TOO expensive you will keep people off the planes and more will die on the highways. The Gov't had a figure, and it was a couple million dollars per life. I will look around and see if I can find the formula.
There is a balance, and as disgusting as that sounds, Flying is already hundreds of times safer then driving. Nobody even thinks of getting rid of cars even though they kill way more than Hand Guns and Cigarrettes every year.
Cheers
Wino
Unfortately, Safety though an emotional topic, has costs, and if you make flying TOO expensive you will keep people off the planes and more will die on the highways. The Gov't had a figure, and it was a couple million dollars per life. I will look around and see if I can find the formula.
There is a balance, and as disgusting as that sounds, Flying is already hundreds of times safer then driving. Nobody even thinks of getting rid of cars even though they kill way more than Hand Guns and Cigarrettes every year.
Cheers
Wino
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We aren't looking at aviation safety as an absolute. We are looking at the economically viable level of safety. There is a tendency to say that you cannot put a price on a human life, but you can. The courts do it every day. An American life is worth a median of US$8,000,000, Other nationalities are cheaper; how much cheaper depending on the particular national legal system.
Over the last decade and a half, policies on aviation have changed and governments have de-regulated aviation to make air travel more accessable to lower income levels. [Presumably even the unemployed should be able to take their holidays in the sunshine? They do have votes you know.] The resulting downwards pressure on costs make it impossible to continue reducing aviation accident rates. Indeed, our various governments have decided that accident rates had already fallen to an economically acceptable level, any further reductions would involve diseconomies of scale.
I cannot say that I agree with this line of thinking. As an airline engineer the idea that known safety hazards of flight are not addressed because doing so would be too costly goes against all that I stand for. I would personally be prepared to pay much more for a flight if I knew that it would decrease my chances of dying in an accident. Evidently the majority of voters think otherwise and you and I are obliged to fly with them.
On a lighter note, I recall a chap at Britannia Airlines whose wife went to Spain every year on his FOC ticket but he always drove down to join her. He believed that flying is too dangerous and in a car his life was in his own hands. Colleagues pointed out that when your number is up, it is up. His response? "That's OK, when my number's up I'll go quietly. But there's another 150 people in that plane and if one of their number's up you have to go with them"
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Through difficulties to the cinema
Over the last decade and a half, policies on aviation have changed and governments have de-regulated aviation to make air travel more accessable to lower income levels. [Presumably even the unemployed should be able to take their holidays in the sunshine? They do have votes you know.] The resulting downwards pressure on costs make it impossible to continue reducing aviation accident rates. Indeed, our various governments have decided that accident rates had already fallen to an economically acceptable level, any further reductions would involve diseconomies of scale.
I cannot say that I agree with this line of thinking. As an airline engineer the idea that known safety hazards of flight are not addressed because doing so would be too costly goes against all that I stand for. I would personally be prepared to pay much more for a flight if I knew that it would decrease my chances of dying in an accident. Evidently the majority of voters think otherwise and you and I are obliged to fly with them.
On a lighter note, I recall a chap at Britannia Airlines whose wife went to Spain every year on his FOC ticket but he always drove down to join her. He believed that flying is too dangerous and in a car his life was in his own hands. Colleagues pointed out that when your number is up, it is up. His response? "That's OK, when my number's up I'll go quietly. But there's another 150 people in that plane and if one of their number's up you have to go with them"
**********************************
Through difficulties to the cinema
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Every time there's a "fare war", every time people spend that extra three hours to dig up a $30 savings on their flight--they inadvertently set their own standard for the economy of safety, and consequently accept the risks involved whether they like it or not.
It isn't as though it takes a mental giant to put it together that their savings must be coming off the back end somewhere.
When carriers start spreading it thin, they're looking to do it in areas of service that are least likely to be noticed by the average passenger, and one of those areas is maintenance.
I wish people would either start putting their money where their mouths go, or stop blubbering about the risks to their precious lives. The risk is (it would seem) perfectly acceptable--so long as they get to drag their miserly carcasses off the jetway on the other end.
It isn't as though it takes a mental giant to put it together that their savings must be coming off the back end somewhere.
When carriers start spreading it thin, they're looking to do it in areas of service that are least likely to be noticed by the average passenger, and one of those areas is maintenance.
I wish people would either start putting their money where their mouths go, or stop blubbering about the risks to their precious lives. The risk is (it would seem) perfectly acceptable--so long as they get to drag their miserly carcasses off the jetway on the other end.
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Cyclic
As you can see from the threads we have to accept that safety does have a price and that is a price that many people are not prepared to pay. As someone said we can make them perfectly safe if we keep tthme on the gound.
Why do people spend hours on the internet looking for the LOWEST price airfare.
Re the system in the DC9 - 660 pounds is of course over 3 passengers and that is without the cost of maintenance which one can see as being high.
Also this type of system smacks of car airbags - remember how they were a MUST have and look at the chaos now !
As you can see from the threads we have to accept that safety does have a price and that is a price that many people are not prepared to pay. As someone said we can make them perfectly safe if we keep tthme on the gound.
Why do people spend hours on the internet looking for the LOWEST price airfare.
Re the system in the DC9 - 660 pounds is of course over 3 passengers and that is without the cost of maintenance which one can see as being high.
Also this type of system smacks of car airbags - remember how they were a MUST have and look at the chaos now !
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First of all, lets make it clear that the author of the piece is an aviation plaintiff attorney. While the motivation may appear to be safety related, my guess is that it is the groundwork to establish oneself as the representative/expert in future litigation.
He was also quoted this week in the USA today as saying Boeing's move to Chicago (Cook County Courts, some of the most generous/liberal courts in the nation) will result in larger settlements for accident victims.
Just reading between the lines.
He was also quoted this week in the USA today as saying Boeing's move to Chicago (Cook County Courts, some of the most generous/liberal courts in the nation) will result in larger settlements for accident victims.
Just reading between the lines.
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There is a difference between acknowleging facts and planning a disaster.
When you have such regulations as crew-rest regulations overlooked with government assistance, there's something badly wrong. When the FAA refuses to push CRM into the cockpit, something is wrong.
I get pretty disgusted with the Corporate Stockholm Syndrome arguing that child molestation is actually child love. It's only rape if you resist - RIGHT!
When I climb in an airplane, I go for the highest probability of a safe and comfortable flight. Professionalism MUST exceed 'teamplaying.'
Making excuses for mass murder in the form of a programmed "statistically acceptable" airline disaster doesn't cut it.
Naturally, anyone with an acquired taste for Koolaid will buy the FAA argument. That's not the professional.
When you have such regulations as crew-rest regulations overlooked with government assistance, there's something badly wrong. When the FAA refuses to push CRM into the cockpit, something is wrong.
I get pretty disgusted with the Corporate Stockholm Syndrome arguing that child molestation is actually child love. It's only rape if you resist - RIGHT!
When I climb in an airplane, I go for the highest probability of a safe and comfortable flight. Professionalism MUST exceed 'teamplaying.'
Making excuses for mass murder in the form of a programmed "statistically acceptable" airline disaster doesn't cut it.
Naturally, anyone with an acquired taste for Koolaid will buy the FAA argument. That's not the professional.
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Here is a paragraph I lifted from a post I made on Rotorheads. It supports what Art Wolk stated above. I will add to this later to illustrate the process.
Regarding the FAA countering the findings of the NTSB on the 737 problem it is well known that the findings of the FAA fall on the side of the airlines. To ground the 737 would have been catastrophic to the airlines. The FAA would have performed a cost benefit analysis to determine the cost to the airlines against the cost of the airlines paying out insurance claims in the event of another 737 loss of control accident stemming from a defective rudder control system. In other words, it was cheaper to let another 737 crash than it was to ground the fleet.
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The Cat
Regarding the FAA countering the findings of the NTSB on the 737 problem it is well known that the findings of the FAA fall on the side of the airlines. To ground the 737 would have been catastrophic to the airlines. The FAA would have performed a cost benefit analysis to determine the cost to the airlines against the cost of the airlines paying out insurance claims in the event of another 737 loss of control accident stemming from a defective rudder control system. In other words, it was cheaper to let another 737 crash than it was to ground the fleet.
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The Cat
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Here is a follow-up to the above post.
The following was excerpted from book I wrote but never got published. It was taken out of context so hopefully it does not lose any thing.
. The U.S. Government (along with most of big business) determines if a project is going to be beneficial by performing what is known as a “Cost Benefit Analysis”. Here is how it works. Bumdung, Iowa wants to increase the size of its local airport to include the lengthening of the main runway. The Federal Government, which will eventually pay for the work, determines exactly how much can be saved both in money and the reduction of user inconvenience if the project is given their approval. They also determine the environmental impact of the project as well as the overall benefits to the local area. Each of these as well as many other elements are assigned to a category of being cost beneficial and not being cost beneficial. If the project can be completed for an amount that is lower than the dollar amount of the cost beneficial elements, the project will be approved, this seems quite straight forward and very business like but let’s take it one step further.
In the 747 explosion over the Atlantic, 230 passengers and crew were killed. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has ruled that the cause was the build-up of fuel vapors and the introduction of a non-specific ignition source. They implied that the ignition source could have been caused by a static discharge (which further implies that the elements within the tank were not properly bonded). Another source of ignition could have come from a wire with broken insulation (it was a known fact that early 747’s used a type of wire that was insulated with a material that was subject to cracking from atmospheric and environmental exposure). One other source of ignition could be from a lightning strike in conjunction with inadequate bonding. The reader should know that every commercial airliner is hit by lightening on the average one time each year.
Having experienced one explosion in a 747, the NTSB wants to prevent similar explosions, so they suggest that future tank explosions could be prevented, if the airlines would install nitrogen inerting systems in the fuel tanks of all of their respective aircraft. To do this, the airlines would have to down their aircraft for the time it takes to install the systems, losing the revenue generated by the aircraft. In addition to this, they will have to absorb the costs of the modification. To determine the economic feasibility of such an extensive modification the FAA would perform a cost benefit analysis. The FAA could easily determine the financial impact on the airline industry but what do they weigh this figure against?
They must weigh these costs against the value of the human lives that would be saved if the modification were incorporated. The reader can trot down to the local super market to determine the sale price of a dozen eggs or the discount price for a gallon of milk, but where does he or she go to find the manufacturers suggested retail price for a human being? He or she would have to look no further than the Department Of Transportation (DOT) in Washington, D.C. The DOT is the parent organization of both the FAA and the NTSB. The DOT uses, what else, a complex mathematical formula that takes into consideration all types of numeric input to include the gross national product figures for that fiscal year. The latest dollar value placed on an American citizen is 2.7 million dollars. In running their calculation, the FAA bean counters multiply the 2.7 million dollars, by the 230 lives lost in the 747 explosion.
This equates to six billion two hundred ten million dollars. They weigh one figure against the other and if it costs more to incorporate the fix in America’s airliners than the value of the human lives saved, the FAA will not recommend the modification. That sounds cold but that’s the way it’s done. No aircraft will be modified and as a result, the conditions that caused the first explosion are still waiting in the wings (excuse the pun), ready to manifest themselves in a second explosion. It might interest the reader to know that several other aircraft along with a lot of passengers were lost due to fuel tank explosions. But those other explosions occurred in aircraft that were not on the FAA registry, so they don’t count.
What are the possibilities that a second or third or maybe even a fourth or fifth 747 might explode causing massive loss of life. And, if a second, third or a fourth explosion were to occur, would the FAA recalculate another Cost Benefit Analysis. Compared with the FAA’s allowable frequency of 10-9, for a single failure that can result in an aircraft loss, the probability of another explosion is quite high.
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The Cat
The following was excerpted from book I wrote but never got published. It was taken out of context so hopefully it does not lose any thing.
. The U.S. Government (along with most of big business) determines if a project is going to be beneficial by performing what is known as a “Cost Benefit Analysis”. Here is how it works. Bumdung, Iowa wants to increase the size of its local airport to include the lengthening of the main runway. The Federal Government, which will eventually pay for the work, determines exactly how much can be saved both in money and the reduction of user inconvenience if the project is given their approval. They also determine the environmental impact of the project as well as the overall benefits to the local area. Each of these as well as many other elements are assigned to a category of being cost beneficial and not being cost beneficial. If the project can be completed for an amount that is lower than the dollar amount of the cost beneficial elements, the project will be approved, this seems quite straight forward and very business like but let’s take it one step further.
In the 747 explosion over the Atlantic, 230 passengers and crew were killed. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has ruled that the cause was the build-up of fuel vapors and the introduction of a non-specific ignition source. They implied that the ignition source could have been caused by a static discharge (which further implies that the elements within the tank were not properly bonded). Another source of ignition could have come from a wire with broken insulation (it was a known fact that early 747’s used a type of wire that was insulated with a material that was subject to cracking from atmospheric and environmental exposure). One other source of ignition could be from a lightning strike in conjunction with inadequate bonding. The reader should know that every commercial airliner is hit by lightening on the average one time each year.
Having experienced one explosion in a 747, the NTSB wants to prevent similar explosions, so they suggest that future tank explosions could be prevented, if the airlines would install nitrogen inerting systems in the fuel tanks of all of their respective aircraft. To do this, the airlines would have to down their aircraft for the time it takes to install the systems, losing the revenue generated by the aircraft. In addition to this, they will have to absorb the costs of the modification. To determine the economic feasibility of such an extensive modification the FAA would perform a cost benefit analysis. The FAA could easily determine the financial impact on the airline industry but what do they weigh this figure against?
They must weigh these costs against the value of the human lives that would be saved if the modification were incorporated. The reader can trot down to the local super market to determine the sale price of a dozen eggs or the discount price for a gallon of milk, but where does he or she go to find the manufacturers suggested retail price for a human being? He or she would have to look no further than the Department Of Transportation (DOT) in Washington, D.C. The DOT is the parent organization of both the FAA and the NTSB. The DOT uses, what else, a complex mathematical formula that takes into consideration all types of numeric input to include the gross national product figures for that fiscal year. The latest dollar value placed on an American citizen is 2.7 million dollars. In running their calculation, the FAA bean counters multiply the 2.7 million dollars, by the 230 lives lost in the 747 explosion.
This equates to six billion two hundred ten million dollars. They weigh one figure against the other and if it costs more to incorporate the fix in America’s airliners than the value of the human lives saved, the FAA will not recommend the modification. That sounds cold but that’s the way it’s done. No aircraft will be modified and as a result, the conditions that caused the first explosion are still waiting in the wings (excuse the pun), ready to manifest themselves in a second explosion. It might interest the reader to know that several other aircraft along with a lot of passengers were lost due to fuel tank explosions. But those other explosions occurred in aircraft that were not on the FAA registry, so they don’t count.
What are the possibilities that a second or third or maybe even a fourth or fifth 747 might explode causing massive loss of life. And, if a second, third or a fourth explosion were to occur, would the FAA recalculate another Cost Benefit Analysis. Compared with the FAA’s allowable frequency of 10-9, for a single failure that can result in an aircraft loss, the probability of another explosion is quite high.
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The Cat
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The airlines are just as guilty in promoting the safety of their operation.
The civil airlines also have numbers crunchers to promote the image that their fleets are super safe. The term they use, is “passenger seat miles.” A passenger seat mile is just that, Joe Doaks sitting in a seat that is mounted in an aircraft that has flown one mile. Here is an example of the airlines' obfuscation of the facts relating to their real safety record. An airplane flies from Los Angeles to New York. It has two hundred passengers aboard and the distance is 3000 miles. On that flight alone the airline has flown six hundred thousand passenger seat miles. On the flight back there are 150 passengers which totals out to 450,000 passenger seat miles for a grand total of one million fifty thousand-passenger seat miles. That really is a lot of passenger seat miles but the aircraft was in the air for a total of nine hours. Lets say that that particular airline has twenty aircraft on that same route every day and they fly for five days each week and during that time period they have a mishap on one of the flights where a passenger was seriously injured. They can honestly state in whatever publication they want that they flew one hundred and five million passenger seat miles and only one passenger sustained an injury. What they don’t tell the public, is that while they were accumulating that monumental number of passenger seat miles their twenty aircraft were in the air for a total of nine hundred hours.
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The Cat
The civil airlines also have numbers crunchers to promote the image that their fleets are super safe. The term they use, is “passenger seat miles.” A passenger seat mile is just that, Joe Doaks sitting in a seat that is mounted in an aircraft that has flown one mile. Here is an example of the airlines' obfuscation of the facts relating to their real safety record. An airplane flies from Los Angeles to New York. It has two hundred passengers aboard and the distance is 3000 miles. On that flight alone the airline has flown six hundred thousand passenger seat miles. On the flight back there are 150 passengers which totals out to 450,000 passenger seat miles for a grand total of one million fifty thousand-passenger seat miles. That really is a lot of passenger seat miles but the aircraft was in the air for a total of nine hours. Lets say that that particular airline has twenty aircraft on that same route every day and they fly for five days each week and during that time period they have a mishap on one of the flights where a passenger was seriously injured. They can honestly state in whatever publication they want that they flew one hundred and five million passenger seat miles and only one passenger sustained an injury. What they don’t tell the public, is that while they were accumulating that monumental number of passenger seat miles their twenty aircraft were in the air for a total of nine hundred hours.
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The Cat
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Yeah, but Lu, you can't convince me that the FAA's decision not to aggressively pursue the rudder malfunctions (and to a larger extent - inconsistent safety issues) wasn't due to political pressure. The pressure comes from politicians, who're pressured by big business interests, who're pressured by their consumers.
Doesn't matter how you come at this thing - it's still comes back to what we are willing to pay for.
We all get what we pay for... sooner or later.
Doesn't matter how you come at this thing - it's still comes back to what we are willing to pay for.
We all get what we pay for... sooner or later.
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Lu,
You seem to advocate inert gas systems in fuel tanks, regardless of cost, or effectiveness. You are saying put in this system and we will never have another fuel tank explode!
How many other "must have" modifications that you think should be mandated.
You ridicule bean counters but at the end of the day there has to be some balance and just as they say its not economic you say never mind that install it.
No where in your entries does "cost effectiveness" come in. It seems that cost should not a consideration.
I am not sure if you have looked at the engineering specifics of how fuel tank inert gas systems would practically work and be maintained.
The actual usage and replenishement of the gas could be a nightmare. However it would be a "no go" item so thats safe enough.
I would be interested in your ideas of how it would function.
We might as well go for every passenger to have an ejector seat and parachute.
As we all know there are "flavours of the month" and the TWA one has been there for some time.
Several things intrigue me about this incident.
First the ignition source has never been determined.
Second only Boeing aircraft
Third, fuel tanks and wiring are in all aircraft why did it take so many years of operation before it happened.
Fourth I have seen aircraft quite badly damaged and burnt from lightening strikes but the tanks did not explode. I would have thought that this source of ignition would have been spotted on the investigation.
You seem to advocate inert gas systems in fuel tanks, regardless of cost, or effectiveness. You are saying put in this system and we will never have another fuel tank explode!
How many other "must have" modifications that you think should be mandated.
You ridicule bean counters but at the end of the day there has to be some balance and just as they say its not economic you say never mind that install it.
No where in your entries does "cost effectiveness" come in. It seems that cost should not a consideration.
I am not sure if you have looked at the engineering specifics of how fuel tank inert gas systems would practically work and be maintained.
The actual usage and replenishement of the gas could be a nightmare. However it would be a "no go" item so thats safe enough.
I would be interested in your ideas of how it would function.
We might as well go for every passenger to have an ejector seat and parachute.
As we all know there are "flavours of the month" and the TWA one has been there for some time.
Several things intrigue me about this incident.
First the ignition source has never been determined.
Second only Boeing aircraft
Third, fuel tanks and wiring are in all aircraft why did it take so many years of operation before it happened.
Fourth I have seen aircraft quite badly damaged and burnt from lightening strikes but the tanks did not explode. I would have thought that this source of ignition would have been spotted on the investigation.
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Unfortunately...it all comes down to business and politics...sometimes internal business and politics within a particular country and sometimes cross border politics... Silk Air MI 185 for example..
At the end of the day, whilst governments and airlines state they care about improving Aviation Safety...and whilst they may believe what they are saying...their quest for the almighty dollar (Business Profits and Politics) has a way of diminishing or diluting their commitment to enhancing aviation safety further.. Sad but true...
At the end of the day, whilst governments and airlines state they care about improving Aviation Safety...and whilst they may believe what they are saying...their quest for the almighty dollar (Business Profits and Politics) has a way of diminishing or diluting their commitment to enhancing aviation safety further.. Sad but true...
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HOT DOG: Looks like the Red-Wine takes priority over your knowledge in Aviation ??
_____________________________________________
Accident description
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: 11.05.1990
Type: Boeing 737-3Y0
Operator: Philippine Air Lines
Registration: EI-BZG
C/n: 24466/1771
Year built: 1989
Crew: 0 fatalities / 6 on board
Passengers: 8 fatalities / 113 on board
Total: 8 fatalities / 119 on board
Location: Manila (Philippines)
Phase: Ground
Nature: Scheduled Passenger
Flight: Manila IAP - Iloilo (Flightnumber )
Remarks:
A powerful explosion in the center fuel tank pushed the cabin floor violently upwards, while the aircraft was being pushed back for a flight to Iloilo. The wingtanks ruptured, causing the Boeing to burst into flames. The center fuel tank was empty at the time, except for some fuel vapours. The vapours ignited probably due to damaged wiring, because no bomb, incendiary device or detonator has been found.
Source: (also check out sources used for every accident)
IATA 1990 total losses list
_____________________________________________
Accident description
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: 11.05.1990
Type: Boeing 737-3Y0
Operator: Philippine Air Lines
Registration: EI-BZG
C/n: 24466/1771
Year built: 1989
Crew: 0 fatalities / 6 on board
Passengers: 8 fatalities / 113 on board
Total: 8 fatalities / 119 on board
Location: Manila (Philippines)
Phase: Ground
Nature: Scheduled Passenger
Flight: Manila IAP - Iloilo (Flightnumber )
Remarks:
A powerful explosion in the center fuel tank pushed the cabin floor violently upwards, while the aircraft was being pushed back for a flight to Iloilo. The wingtanks ruptured, causing the Boeing to burst into flames. The center fuel tank was empty at the time, except for some fuel vapours. The vapours ignited probably due to damaged wiring, because no bomb, incendiary device or detonator has been found.
Source: (also check out sources used for every accident)
IATA 1990 total losses list
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Sadly, the bottom line to many is, "It hasn't happened to me, so it can't be important."
Well, then hang on, because Murphy's Law is random - we're all "next."
I've been there, Ive done that and survived. Don't think you're not "next."
Getting to the truth and getting all these 'highly probable' scenarios fixed had damn well be a priortity - not excuse making on behalf of the 'system.' That's the profitable Corporate Stockholm syndrome at work. It only works for those who don't fly and benefit financially.
Well, then hang on, because Murphy's Law is random - we're all "next."
I've been there, Ive done that and survived. Don't think you're not "next."
Getting to the truth and getting all these 'highly probable' scenarios fixed had damn well be a priortity - not excuse making on behalf of the 'system.' That's the profitable Corporate Stockholm syndrome at work. It only works for those who don't fly and benefit financially.