AF 744 off runway at Montreal

[Basil]

I used to pooh-pooh the suggestion that long sleeve shirts should not be worn on the flight deck.
I'm now beginning to wonder if this would be a good idea after all.

[suninmyeyes]

Does anyone know how long the plane was stuck for (hours or days), and when it finally left YUL? I presume it would not have been too difficult as I know the 747 Classic typically only had between 6 and 12 tonnes on the nose gear.

Methods of retrieval:

I doubt reverse thrust was used to get it out unless they wanted to wreck the engines. Was it an airbag job, or did they put something solid down in the trench and use a tug which may well have got stuck in the grass too?

It's a shame Jo Patroni would have retired by now!

[Airbubba]

Air Canada has gone over 25 years without a fatal accident...

I'm aware of that, congratulations, maybe memorizing all those drills is a good idea after all! However American is a much larger airline and I was talking in terms of hours or number of operations, i.e. takeoffs and landings. Sadly, American's run of luck was destined to end and, after a fatal crash in LIT in 1999, they lost hundreds of pax and three aircraft in 2001 to terrorist activity and the A306 tail separation. And, as I mentioned, FedEx has never had a fatal accident although they have had several widebody hull losses in recent years. Are these statistical blips in an ever lower accident rate? Or do some companies do it right while others operate under a black cloud? I don't claim to know but we've all seen these runs of luck, good and bad, in this business.

My airline requires the handling pilot to stow the speedbrake after landing before the non-handling pilot starts the after landing checks. As P2 it's quite a stretch to stow the speedbrake whilst operating the tiller, and would be quite easy to advance #1 throttle.

There are a lot of variations on this from what I've observed. As you know, many airlines don't allow the P2 to operate the tiller at all these days, in the U.S. even widebodies often have the right tiller removed. The FO operating the speedbrake is like the captain operating the flaps, you have to look and reach around two or more throttles (a lot of us have done two, three and four over the years). I've bumped a throttle before reaching for flaps, autothrottles are usually engaged and you catch the error pretty quickly in the air. However, I could sure see where a throttle bump at the wrong moment on rollout could sure do you dirty in a big plane.

[CAT II]

Long sleeved shirts.

Not only a good idea but also a Boeing recommendation...

[Taildragger67]

Airclues,

Photos 6 & 10 of the F-GITA at Faaa sequence would suggest #1 TR open.

[misd-agin]

Long sleeved shirts.
Not only a good idea but also a Boeing recommendation...


*******************************

Boeing recommended to use, or not use, long sleeve shirts?

Do you have a reference?

[Captain Airclues]

Taildragger67

I believe that the engine was in forward thrust when it left the runway. Just wondering if something similar could have happened at Montreal.

ASN Aircraft accident Boeing 747-428 F-GITA Papeete-Faaa Airport (PPT), Tahiti

Dave

[BRE]

Non-stabilized approach in Tahiti. Now, that could be down to airline culture.



"L'accident est dû à une approche non stabilisée et à la mise en forte poussée positive du moteur 1 à l'atterrissage, conséquences d'une particularité du système automatique de vol entraînant le passage en mode remise de gaz à un point de la trajectoire correspondant à la hauteur de décision.
Ceci a entraîné :
- le toucher long avec une vitesse excessive
- la déviation de la trajectoire vers la droite et la sortie latérale de piste.
Le non respect des procédures opérationnelles concernant les vérifications et les annonces en approche et à l'atterrissage, ainsi que le manque de communication entre les pilotes ont été des facteurs fortement contributifs à l'accident. Notamment les écarts supérieurs aux tolérances de plusieurs paramètres de vol auraient dû conduire à remettre les gaz.
L'absence d'information du constructeur vers les exploitants et les équipages sur cette particularité du système automatique de vol est également un facteur contributif à l'accident."

[Lemurian]

F-GITA at Faa

Non-stabilized approach in Tahiti. Now, that could be down to airline culture.

Harsh words backed by very ittle facts, hey ?
Then a two paragaphs out of a 75 page report... If a newspaper had published your post, you'd have the whole population of this site on your back, claiming "journo blabber".
As with most incidents/accidents, the causes are a-plenty :

• An unknown feature of the 744 VNAV/VOR auto flight system which triggers GA thrust when the aircraft goes under the MDA, even on manual/FD approach. That Go Around is only identified by a "Thrust Ref" FMA annunciation.
  That feature, at that time was unknown by the flightv deck population, including Boeing instructors.
• A very poorly managed crew communication : the handling pilot, fighting the throttles didn't convey his problem to his colleague...
• When the throttles were released after touch-down, the handling pilot only managed reverse on #2, 3 and 4, while the #1 escaped him and went full thrust (107 % N1). That was only identified as "no reverse on #1". Again, a CRM concern.
• No spoiler and no auto-brake due to the #1 throttle position
• The airplane veered right out of the runway at 60 kt and stopped in the water...The #2, 3 and 4 engines were flooded and stopped. #1 couldn't be cut off due to loss of electrical power.

On the subject of un-stabilised approaches, AF recorded at the time a rate of 3.38 % on all approaches with rather stringent criteria for the definition.
It is also to be noted that the incident happened when the population of three different airlines (Air France, Air Inter and UTA) had to be integrated and that the catastrophic economical situation of the new AF wasn't the best for serene aircrews...
Back to the topic .
Looking at the pictures of the latest incident, as the aircraft came to a stop just past of the high-speed turn-off B2 and that only the nose gear was in the grass, my opinion is about a tiller problem. Nothing more and I bet a beer on it.

[PJ2]

Lemurian;

Looking at the pictures of the latest incident, as the aircraft came to a stop just past of the high-speed turn-off B2 and that only the nose gear was in the grass, my opinion is about a tiller problem. Nothing more and I bet a beer on it.

Exactly...won't be the first time - happened recently on a 777...

[Pugilistic Animus]

but you try not to commit to a particular taxiway until you are sure that's what the controllers want you to do.

why not ask?

[FXchick]

(quote)Does anyone know how long the plane was stuck for (hours or days), and when it finally left YUL? I presume it would not have been too difficult as I know the 747 Classic typically only had between 6 and 12 tonnes on the nose gear. (unquote)

It departed 2 days later around 1 pm local time- empty of both pax and freight - I watched it go - it was removed from the side of the runway the same night after they unloaded pax and cargo according to people I know in the know.

No one answered the question so I thought I might.

Sorry bout th lack of ability to quote properly, I tried.

[Airbubba]

An unknown feature of the 744 VNAV/VOR auto flight system which triggers GA thrust when the aircraft goes under the MDA, even on manual/FD approach. That Go Around is only identified by a "Thrust Ref" FMA annunciation.
That feature, at that time was unknown by the flightv deck population, including Boeing instructors.

This 'feature' has been known on 75's and 76's for some time now, it's a real gotcha if you're shooting a non-precision approach without a runway waypoint in the FMS database and the missed approach point is past the runway threshold. You get to minimums, see the runway, get an altitude capture and all hell breaks loose unless you immediately set the missed approach altitude in the window. Or, so they tell me.

[Mariner]

Long sleeved shirts.
Not only a good idea but also a Boeing recommendation...


*******************************

Boeing recommended to use, or not use, long sleeve shirts?

Do you have a reference?

unquote

From a recent [aug 23 2007] Boeing bulletin about landing on slippery runways (and I'm sure it is in more of their publications):

Reverse Thrust Operation
Awareness of the position of the forward and reverse thrust levers must be maintained
during the landing phase. Improper seat position as well as the wearing of long jacket or
shirt sleeves may cause inadvertent advancement of the forward thrust levers, preventing
movement of the reverse thrust levers.

[alph2z]

Hard to find document. A bug in CADORS of TSB.

Date: 2008/08/28
Further Action Required: Yes
O.P.I.: International Aviation

Narrative: Update #1: According to the TSB #A08Q0171: The Boeing 747-428 operated by Air France AFR346 landed on 24R at Montreal/Trudeau (CYUL). During rollout and approaching BRAVO 2 taxiway, the nose gear deflected to the right. The crew applied maximum braking and the aircraft stopped with the nose gear on the grass about 26 feet on the right hand side of the runway. The main gear remained on the runway. There were no injuries and passengers were deplaned using passenger transfer vehicles. No evidence of damage was noted on the aircraft. Two TSB investigators deployed to the scene.

alph2z: .......and the nose wheel may have temporarily been stuck massively pointing right.

Looks like I owe myself a beer.
.

[Lemurian]

QUOD ERAT DEMONSTRANDUM

[GlobalExpressDriver]

As a personal preference, I always wear long sleeve 100% cotton shirts. However, they are buttoned at the wrist.

I flew 744's ...

[BRE]

Airbubba:
It is odd that some carriers seem to have hull losses every two or three years, regular as clockwork, while others go decades without losing a plane. American probably had the longest safe streak ever in number of operations from the DC-10 engine separation at ORD in 1979 to the Cali 757 crash in 1995

.

Lemurian:
On the subject of un-stabilised approaches, AF recorded at the time a rate of 3.38 % on all approaches with rather stringent criteria for the definition.
It is also to be noted that the incident happened when the population of three different airlines (Air France, Air Inter and UTA) had to be integrated and that the catastrophic economical situation of the new AF wasn't the best for serene aircrews...

Lemurian, my post was in response to airbubba's musings. The unstabilized approach certainly wasn't the single cause for the Papete overrun, but maybe it would have been a non-event if procedures had been followed.

You can probably get away with not doing things by the book 99.9% of the time, but when something else does not work as it should, you may be sorry.

Looking at three more recent accidents (Gonesse, Pearson, Pau) that happened in better economic times, there was always an element of procedures not adhered to that in combination with other expected events contributed to the accident. So one might be tempted to speculate whether this is down to culture.

Also, by your argument, will United and USAir be excused from having a hull loss a year because their crews aren't the most serene due to the economic situation of their airlines?

Fortunately, there is no evidence of anything procedural in the Dorval runway excursion.

[Lemurian]

Looking at three more recent accidents (Gonesse, Pearson, Pau) that happened in better economic times, there was always an element of procedures not adhered to that in combination with other expected events contributed to the accident. So one might be tempted to speculate whether this is down to culture.

Gonesse ?... I presume you mean the Concorde crash ? What "non-adherence to procedures" are you referring to ?
Pau ? What ? when ? where ? I can't find any instance there .
In every accident, there is always an element of human factor involved. So what's your point ?

Also, by your argument, will United and USAir be excused from having a hull loss a year because their crews aren't the most serene due to the economic situation of their airlines?

Far from it. Consider that as an addition to the previous paragraph about integration of three airlines'cultures into the AF way of doing things, plus the fact that on the Faa incident, the crew was made up with one ex-top mangement pilot from UTA captaining a demoted Commander from AeroMaritime (by the way, that makes it FOUR airlines under integration). That cockpit adheres closely to the definition of "particular cockpit".

[BRE]

wikipediaAlternative theories

British investigators and former French Concorde pilots looked at several other possibilities that the report ignored, including an unbalanced weight distribution in the fuel tanks and loose landing gear. They came to the conclusion that the Concorde veered course on the runway, which reduced take-off speed below the crucial minimum. The aircraft had veered very close to a Boeing 747 known to be carrying French President Jacques Chirac.[8]
They argued that the Concorde was in trouble before takeoff, as it was overweight for the given conditions, with an excessively aft center of gravity and taking off downwind. When it stood at the end of the runway, ready to roll, it was more than six tonnes over its approved maximum takeoff weight for the given conditions.[9]
Moreover, it was missing the crucial spacer from the left main landing-gear beam that would have made for a snug-fitting pivot. This compromised the alignment of the landing gear and the wobbling beam and gears allowing three degrees of movement possible in any direction. The uneven load on the left leg’s three remaining tires skewed the landing gear disastrously, with the scuff marks of four tires on the runway showing that the plane was skidding out of control.[10]
Finally, Brian Trubshaw and John Cochrane, Concorde's two test pilots when the aircraft was being developed in the early 1970s, set the aft operating limit at 54 per cent - beyond that, they found, it risked becoming uncontrollable, likely to rear up backwards and crash, exactly as Flight 4590 did in its final moments over Gonesse. However, Flight 4590's centre of gravity went beyond 54 per cent, with the BEA stating a figure of 54.2 per cent, while a senior industry source said that the true figure may have been worse: with the extra fuel and bags, it may have been up to 54.6 per cent.[9]
These investigators were frustrated by the lack of cooperation from French authorities, including an unwillingness to share data and the immediate resurfacing of the Concorde's takeoff runway after the crash. They alleged that the BEA was determined to place the sole blame of the accident on the titanium strip to show that the Concorde itself was not at fault. The piece of metal from the DC-10 was found 7 meters forward, and 37 meters to the right of where the Concorde's tyre blew.[11]
The BEA's interim report maintained that the leftward yaw was caused not by incorrectly assembled landing gear but by loss of thrust from the number 1 and 2 engines. Data from the Flight Data Recorder Black Box indicates that the aircraft was centred on the runway and accelerating normally up until the point where the tyre burst occurred. The instantaneous wind speed at the closest anemometer to the take-off point was recorded as zero knots.[12]

BEA did their best to discredit this (which wasn't much). Even if you give them credit, it still was a non-adherence to precedures that didn't help the situation.