Plane Crash In Manas Kyrgyzstan - CFIT
Asdrius
Again thanks for the translations above
The landing, rollout, fire explosions and passenger comments at that phase I understand and have seen before.
The inflight comments are of the most interest as well as on-the-ground witnesses of the planes approach.
Engine failures are typically described by witnesses as preceeded by fire or bangs. Silence alone, implies fuel problems or commanded thrust reductions.
Again thanks for the translations above
The landing, rollout, fire explosions and passenger comments at that phase I understand and have seen before.
The inflight comments are of the most interest as well as on-the-ground witnesses of the planes approach.
Engine failures are typically described by witnesses as preceeded by fire or bangs. Silence alone, implies fuel problems or commanded thrust reductions.
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Russian interstate aviation comittee recently released some oficial preliminary information for this accident. It can be found in russian here: Boeing-737
Here is my brief translation:
CVR contained recordings of previous flight Moscow-Bishkek and no recordings of accident flight. But FDR contained information of whole accident flight from engine start-up to the last 3-4 sec. before impact. Those last seconds suffered fire damage and work still continues on analysis.
Flight took of 20.30 from rw 08, with take off weight - 47000kg. According to SID DW-1 crew made left turn to course 240 and continued climb. 20:36:40 at an altitude of 3000 meters and 37 km from the airport, because of pressurization problems, crew decided to return.
ATC cleared them for visual approach rw08. Weather conditions at the time were: Visibility over 10km, Clouds 6/8 at 5000m, wind 130 at 3 m/s, Temp: +26C, QNH 1012.
According to preliminary info from FDR, by making right turn airplane approached landing course descending to an altitude of 1040 m.QNH (400 m. AGL). 20:41:40 crew reported visual contact of runway. 20:42:30, 12km from the runway, the plane reached height of 400m and entered the landing course, speed was 250kts IAS. Maintaning 400m height crew started decreasing speed. 20:43:25 5km from runway the speed was 185kts and the plane being not configured for landing, the crew asked ATC for left orbit. After ATC clearance crew made a left turn with 30 degree bank and speed continued to decrease to 155kts. After a minute the plane was straightened at course reverse to landing direction and at very low altitude. The plane contacted ground 7,5km from rw08, with gear down and flaps 15. According to preliminary analysis of FDR and accident site there are no signs of technical malfunctions in airplane engines and systems(except pressurization).
Here is my brief translation:
CVR contained recordings of previous flight Moscow-Bishkek and no recordings of accident flight. But FDR contained information of whole accident flight from engine start-up to the last 3-4 sec. before impact. Those last seconds suffered fire damage and work still continues on analysis.
Flight took of 20.30 from rw 08, with take off weight - 47000kg. According to SID DW-1 crew made left turn to course 240 and continued climb. 20:36:40 at an altitude of 3000 meters and 37 km from the airport, because of pressurization problems, crew decided to return.
ATC cleared them for visual approach rw08. Weather conditions at the time were: Visibility over 10km, Clouds 6/8 at 5000m, wind 130 at 3 m/s, Temp: +26C, QNH 1012.
According to preliminary info from FDR, by making right turn airplane approached landing course descending to an altitude of 1040 m.QNH (400 m. AGL). 20:41:40 crew reported visual contact of runway. 20:42:30, 12km from the runway, the plane reached height of 400m and entered the landing course, speed was 250kts IAS. Maintaning 400m height crew started decreasing speed. 20:43:25 5km from runway the speed was 185kts and the plane being not configured for landing, the crew asked ATC for left orbit. After ATC clearance crew made a left turn with 30 degree bank and speed continued to decrease to 155kts. After a minute the plane was straightened at course reverse to landing direction and at very low altitude. The plane contacted ground 7,5km from rw08, with gear down and flaps 15. According to preliminary analysis of FDR and accident site there are no signs of technical malfunctions in airplane engines and systems(except pressurization).
Last edited by Asdrius; 12th Sep 2008 at 13:45.
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Have operated several times into Bishkek, it looks like the first approach was rushed and correctly thrown away (looks like engines operating ok), and then a badly executed second approach. Whilst there are mountains all round, terrain shouldn't have been a factor on their second approach.
lomapaseo “EGPWS fitted to the aircraft? … what bearing does this have in an approach crash into flat terrain?”
Could be ‘everything’. EGPWS provides a ‘terrain clearance floor’ where the alert height is proportional to the distance from an airport/runway, thus even over flat terrain a low altitude alert could be given; similarly a bank angle alert if so configured. The latest updates to the system also takes care of airfields on hill tops, where CFIT accidents have occurred below the airfield altitude.
There have been several CFIT incidents during night visual approaches where the risks of a black hole illusion or a turning disorientation are high (1).
FSF ALAR Tool Kit - “In almost 40 percent of the landing (descent) phase and landing (approach) phase accidents, significant terrain features were absent in the vicinity of the airfield. This indicates that CFIT accidents do occur in areas without high terrain” (2).
Ref:
1. Celebrating TAWS ‘Saves’: But lessons still to be learnt.
2. FSF ALAR Tool Kit report ‘Killers in Aviation’.
Could be ‘everything’. EGPWS provides a ‘terrain clearance floor’ where the alert height is proportional to the distance from an airport/runway, thus even over flat terrain a low altitude alert could be given; similarly a bank angle alert if so configured. The latest updates to the system also takes care of airfields on hill tops, where CFIT accidents have occurred below the airfield altitude.
There have been several CFIT incidents during night visual approaches where the risks of a black hole illusion or a turning disorientation are high (1).
FSF ALAR Tool Kit - “In almost 40 percent of the landing (descent) phase and landing (approach) phase accidents, significant terrain features were absent in the vicinity of the airfield. This indicates that CFIT accidents do occur in areas without high terrain” (2).
Ref:
1. Celebrating TAWS ‘Saves’: But lessons still to be learnt.
2. FSF ALAR Tool Kit report ‘Killers in Aviation’.
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EGPWS fitted on a B737-200? I really never heard about it ...
But, anyway, flying over flat terrain in a possible landing configuration for a seven-three (gear down and f15) is worthless in terms of terrain alert.
But, anyway, flying over flat terrain in a possible landing configuration for a seven-three (gear down and f15) is worthless in terms of terrain alert.
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From MAK website
The technical commission of intergovermental aviation committee (commission), assigned, according to the agreement with the ministry of transport and communications Of [kyrgyzskoy] republic, for the investigation of aviation incident with the aircraft B -737-200 EX-009 of airline “[Itek] Eyre”, informs:
On September 12, 2008 commission completed the field stage of the investigation of the crash of the aircraft B -737-200 EX-009 of airline “[Itek] Eyre”, by occured 24.08.2008 in the airport zone Of [manas].
According to the results of the works on the spot of aviation incident and preliminary interpretation of the parameters of flight, at the moment the collisions with the earth of chassis of aircraft were released, flaps were deflected to 15 degrees.
Failures of power plant and systems of aircraft (besides hermetic sealing system) it is not revealed.
Destruction there was no aircraft in air.
At present commission performs the work on the detailed and detailed study of all data, registered by onboard parametric registrar in the final phase of flight. Work according to study and analysis of entire technical flight and operational documentation is conducted. Completes the analysis of the basic normative documents, which are concerned the installation of barometric pressure with the execution of flights and the air traffic control.
Is conducted the analysis of the work of the signaling system of closing doors and hatchways, and also work of conditioning system for the purpose of the determination of the probable reasons for [negermetizatsii] of aircraft after takeoff.
Training flying and cabin crews and its possible connection with appearance and development of special situation on board the aircraft is investigated and is analyzed.
In accordance with the international legislation in the work of commission participate the specialists of civil aviation Of [kyrgyzskoy] republic, and also NTSB of the USA (national bureau of investigation in the field of transportation) as producing country and developer of aircraft, and aviation administration of Iran (as the observer). To aviation authorities for the enterprises of civil aviation are directed operational recommendations regarding averting of similar aviation incidents. Commission will complete its work after the fulfillment of all necessary measures, provided for the investigation of this aviation incident. Commission in accordance with standards and recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organization will carry out the complete analysis of all circumstances and factors, on the basis which will be established the reasons for aviation incident and recommendations regarding averting of similar aviation incidents are developed. In accordance with the international legislation the investigation, conducted by commission, does not assume the establishment of the portion whose- or of fault or responsibility and is conducted for the sole purpose of averting aviation incidents. The investigation of aviation incident is conducted in the contact with the organs Of [kyrgyzskoy] republic, which conduct preliminary consequence.
On September 12, 2008 commission completed the field stage of the investigation of the crash of the aircraft B -737-200 EX-009 of airline “[Itek] Eyre”, by occured 24.08.2008 in the airport zone Of [manas].
According to the results of the works on the spot of aviation incident and preliminary interpretation of the parameters of flight, at the moment the collisions with the earth of chassis of aircraft were released, flaps were deflected to 15 degrees.
Failures of power plant and systems of aircraft (besides hermetic sealing system) it is not revealed.
Destruction there was no aircraft in air.
At present commission performs the work on the detailed and detailed study of all data, registered by onboard parametric registrar in the final phase of flight. Work according to study and analysis of entire technical flight and operational documentation is conducted. Completes the analysis of the basic normative documents, which are concerned the installation of barometric pressure with the execution of flights and the air traffic control.
Is conducted the analysis of the work of the signaling system of closing doors and hatchways, and also work of conditioning system for the purpose of the determination of the probable reasons for [negermetizatsii] of aircraft after takeoff.
Training flying and cabin crews and its possible connection with appearance and development of special situation on board the aircraft is investigated and is analyzed.
In accordance with the international legislation in the work of commission participate the specialists of civil aviation Of [kyrgyzskoy] republic, and also NTSB of the USA (national bureau of investigation in the field of transportation) as producing country and developer of aircraft, and aviation administration of Iran (as the observer). To aviation authorities for the enterprises of civil aviation are directed operational recommendations regarding averting of similar aviation incidents. Commission will complete its work after the fulfillment of all necessary measures, provided for the investigation of this aviation incident. Commission in accordance with standards and recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organization will carry out the complete analysis of all circumstances and factors, on the basis which will be established the reasons for aviation incident and recommendations regarding averting of similar aviation incidents are developed. In accordance with the international legislation the investigation, conducted by commission, does not assume the establishment of the portion whose- or of fault or responsibility and is conducted for the sole purpose of averting aviation incidents. The investigation of aviation incident is conducted in the contact with the organs Of [kyrgyzskoy] republic, which conduct preliminary consequence.
hamil – “… flying over flat terrain in a possible landing configuration for a seven-three (gear down and f15) is worthless in terms of terrain alert.” (#70)
This would be true with the old GPWS, but the Enhanced version (EGPWS) provides an alert at any time if the aircraft is not landing on a runway irrespective of configuration.
There is an ICAO requirement for all jet (turbine) aircraft to have EGPWS or an equivalent system (TAWS) fitted.
This would be true with the old GPWS, but the Enhanced version (EGPWS) provides an alert at any time if the aircraft is not landing on a runway irrespective of configuration.
There is an ICAO requirement for all jet (turbine) aircraft to have EGPWS or an equivalent system (TAWS) fitted.
There is an ICAO requirement for all jet (turbine) aircraft to have EGPWS or an equivalent system (TAWS) fitted.
Requirement / Recommendation: Depends how you interpret ‘shall’.
ICAO Annex 6 ‘requires’ aircraft to have GPWS. Paras 1.15.1 onwards, state that aircraft ‘shall’ be equipped with a forward looking terrain avoidance system.
The only recommendation appears to refer to “turbine-engined aeroplanes of a maximum certificated take-off mass of 5 700 kg or less and authorized to carry more than five but not more than nine passengers” (6.15.5)
According to the ICAO supplement, Kyrgystan has not provided any information on national differences vs ICAO Annex 6, which neither confirms or denies any national requirement to fit EGPWS.
ICAO Annex 6 ‘requires’ aircraft to have GPWS. Paras 1.15.1 onwards, state that aircraft ‘shall’ be equipped with a forward looking terrain avoidance system.
The only recommendation appears to refer to “turbine-engined aeroplanes of a maximum certificated take-off mass of 5 700 kg or less and authorized to carry more than five but not more than nine passengers” (6.15.5)
According to the ICAO supplement, Kyrgystan has not provided any information on national differences vs ICAO Annex 6, which neither confirms or denies any national requirement to fit EGPWS.
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"Are you sure that it's not just a recommendation? I believe that only the country authorities can issue requirements"
Yes that's correct, it needs to be made law in the country for it to be legally binding, and ICAO obviously doesn't make laws for countries. In saying that, many countries around the world will make laws that comply with ICAO. These are usually more stringent than the ICAO recommendations or whatever you want to call them, because these laws go into much more detail and have more requirements than ICAO's recommendations.
Yes that's correct, it needs to be made law in the country for it to be legally binding, and ICAO obviously doesn't make laws for countries. In saying that, many countries around the world will make laws that comply with ICAO. These are usually more stringent than the ICAO recommendations or whatever you want to call them, because these laws go into much more detail and have more requirements than ICAO's recommendations.
Thanks alf5071h and QF2
It would appear than that the country is not in compliance with ICAO standards in that regard and in that case may be labeled as such by other countries regulatory agencies implying some sort of resrtictions may be imposed outside the country borders.
I guess it's up to each individual country to decide on any such restrictions since there really is no way of forcing compliance inside a country's borders.
It would appear than that the country is not in compliance with ICAO standards in that regard and in that case may be labeled as such by other countries regulatory agencies implying some sort of resrtictions may be imposed outside the country borders.
I guess it's up to each individual country to decide on any such restrictions since there really is no way of forcing compliance inside a country's borders.
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A final report came out on May, 10 2009. The main points are (summarized from Russian):
http://www.mak.ru/russian/investigat...200_EX-009.pdf
MAK Website (Russian):
Boeing-737
- Aircraft returned because of an unsealed cabin (front door on the left probably not sealed).
- Main reason for crash: aircraft flew below the minimum height for visual approach landing at night and subsequently crashed and burned on the ground
- Crew didn't fulfill regulation for visual approach by losing visual contact to runway or orientation "markers", and didn't perform according to regulations after loss of visual contact
- First approach had to be aborted because aircraft didn't descend fast enough
- During second approach control over height was lost
http://www.mak.ru/russian/investigat...200_EX-009.pdf
MAK Website (Russian):
Boeing-737
