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Spanair accident at Madrid

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Spanair accident at Madrid

Old 1st Sep 2008, 17:31
  #1381 (permalink)  
 
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Please enlighten me - I am not aware of a any accidents caused by a faulty Thrust Reverser that had been MEL'd?

Please do not include the A320 series accident(s) that involved an MEL'd Thrust Reverser that the MEL Operations led to a human factors issue. AFAIK the accidents were nothing to do with the Rev U/S - they were to do with the procedures and crew actions... which is best corrected by addressing those procedures (as has been done) rather than a hyterical "Ban Thrust Rev U/S MEL section"...

NoD
Maybe the swiss cheese holes found a good path...Why not stopping them before any procedure related to crew actions?

My two cents opinon

AN
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Old 1st Sep 2008, 19:35
  #1382 (permalink)  
 
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If there proves to be a common mode between MEL'd T/Rs and crew actions, then surely both would benefit from review?
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Old 1st Sep 2008, 19:39
  #1383 (permalink)  
pasoundman
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Profit Max
Now, your suggestion regarding grounding a/c with inoperable T/R, this is the same issue. If the airline knows that more of their a/c will be on the ground because of inoperable T/R, it will have to buy more a/c to be on standby. This costs money. And passengers are not prepared to pay for it.
Or just MAYBE T/Rs could be made more reliable ?

I've heard of too many accidents where they've come into play.
 
Old 1st Sep 2008, 20:02
  #1384 (permalink)  
 
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If a reverser is U/S and MEL'd, isn't it physically locked out so it can't deploy?

That has to be safer than a reverser that isn't locked out?

The MD-82 has an over-center locking mechanism, in addition to a latch, so it would require failure of two items to deploy un-commanded.

ECAM Actions.
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Old 1st Sep 2008, 20:47
  #1385 (permalink)  
 
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philpat

if your dad said the wellington was the last pilot's airliner, you might be misquoting him.

back to the thread.

a locked out thrust reverser should be quite safe, provided the proper "locking out" actions were done.

thrust reversers are usually very safe and very , very useful for many aspects of ground handling of aircraft.
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Old 1st Sep 2008, 21:07
  #1386 (permalink)  
IGh
 
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Unexpected ThRev Yaw X Roll

Discussion from a few slots earlier:
"... any accidents caused by a faulty Thrust Reverser that had been MEL'd?..."

I couldn't recall any on the DC-9/MD80. But this B717 pilot claimed that the B717 (shorter/ lesser "Tail Volume") BMW-engine's ThRev dealt him a rapid Yaw X Roll upset:

Incident occurred Monday,
19Feb01 , Milwaukee, WI
Aircraft: Boeing 717-231, registration: N2410W
Injuries: 67 Uninjured.
[Recent = Probable Cause Approval Date: 3/30/04]

CHI01IA124
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20010427X00832&key=1
A Boeing 717 sustained an in-flight thrust reverser deployment following a takeoff. The flight returned without further incident.

After the prior flight the reverser was unlocked but not deployed. The flightcrew found the reverser unlock light during preflight. The crew could not clear the indication and contract maintenance was contacted to lock out the reverser. The contractor was not familiar and asked for the procedure to be faxed to him. The contractor used an incomplete set of procedures to lock out the reverser.

Post incident inspection revealed the thrust reverser doors had over deployed....

... Board determines the probable cause(s) of this incident as follows:

The failure of the operator to provide complete and comprehensive thrust reverser lock-out maintenance procedures and guidance to the contract maintenance personnel resulting in a partial and inadequate securing of the faulty thrust reverser and a subsequent inadvertent deployment following takeoff. Contributing to the incident is the failure of the contract maintenance personnel to verify that the maintenance instructions received where complete, accurate, and up to date.

[The above mishap is a firm argument FOR EXPLICIT mx sign-off, rather than merely implicitly mentioning a MxManual Procedure #.]
The MD80 sim' suggested to me that control was OK during flight with the ThRev DEPLOYED (but that was the Sim').

Privately, I recorded these comments from that B717-pilot's S&C observations during that mishap-flight with the Buckets Deployed:
The 'mild' rudder 'pulsations' were there throughout the time the buckets were deployed. I believe that it was some degree of intermittent rudder blanking. I doubt that this will be one of those traits that can be simulated. At any rate, it was during the last couple of hundred feet (finalizing the crab, sink, and speed) that the airplane 'seemed to want' that trim. I had flown the airplane without any rudder or aileron trim to that point, as the 'muscling' did not feel that bad. It was only when I realized that the nose did not want to come over into the quartering right headwind (right engine secured) that I 'felt' right rudder trim was the thing to do. Things were happening fast at this point, and I cannot unequivocally state that the right rudder trim helped the situation.
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Old 1st Sep 2008, 22:28
  #1387 (permalink)  
 
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Maybe the swiss cheese holes found a good path...Why not stopping them before any procedure related to crew actions?
If there proves to be a common mode between MEL'd T/Rs and crew actions, then surely both would benefit from review?
Sorry to be harsh, but this is a "Professional Pilots' Forum". Unless you have actually studied and understood the applicable accident reports, and their recommendations, then proposing actions such as you do is about as logical as banning all takeoffs worldwide from RW36 because that was what the Spanair took off from

Thrust Reversers are useful, but rarely vital. They have numerous safety / indication systems to avoid the odd accident caused by a Thrust Reverser. Any unservicability with these systems - and surely it is far better to just lock the system out, and await a timely analysis engineering solution?

A knee jerk reaction to just "ban Thr Rev U/S under MEL" will lead to a lot of p***ed off Pax stuck around the world, and pressure to continue flying with a "slightly dodgy Reverser", or hasty, maybe inappropriate rectification to "clear" the fault. Invariably I would prefer to operate with an MEL'd Rev U/S (and locked out) than one I had the slightest concern about...

NoD
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Old 1st Sep 2008, 22:37
  #1388 (permalink)  
 
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IGh...

Thanks for that, re the 717. Hard to cater for (any) incorrectly applied Maint procedures On the B757/767 and A320 series, the lock out pins / whatever are clear to the Flt Crew on the walkround... less obvious maybe on other types, particularly with engines mounted about your level. That said, the error you relate might not even be as simply seen as "pins in place"?

NoD
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Old 1st Sep 2008, 22:54
  #1389 (permalink)  
 
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The time to talk about corrective actions is when the cause is known.

A lot of folks were talking about engine failures, non-containments, and what's wrong with engines in general. then they started talking about flaps and slats and when they couldn't agree on whether they were deployed or not they start talking about reversers and even though there is no agreement on whether they are deployed or not some are already proposing corrective actions without any comparative data.

I will say it again everything that man designs or builds will break, some more often than others. For crying out loud how do you fix something that hasn't broke? You're just liable to screw it up even worse.

Let's get back to arguing about what's broke before we try to fix it and that goes for crew error suppositions as well.

I used to have a big sign on my office door

"all ye who enter bring data"

Then we could decide how to fix it
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Old 1st Sep 2008, 23:14
  #1390 (permalink)  
 
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Sorry lomapaseo, I don't bring data, but just enquire some 12 days I believe after the original accident has there been any worthwhile statement or initial report from the Spanish authorities?

It is so easy to sit back and say nothing while other similar aircraft carry on flying.
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Old 1st Sep 2008, 23:19
  #1391 (permalink)  
 
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I used to have a big sign on my office door

"all ye who enter bring data"

Then we could decide how to fix it
Well said, no further comments.


Green-dot
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Old 2nd Sep 2008, 01:23
  #1392 (permalink)  
 
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YouTube - Conversacion entre Spainair y Barajas antes del accidente

Resume in english

From Spanair Coordinator to Barajas:

as JKK5022 come back to the gates request to change the registration to HFS (EC-HFS) and delay slot to 1235Z

The Spanair coordinator also request stand C49 to deboard if finally is necesary

the JK5025 also change the registration to HFS in arrival to madrid from Gran Canaria (this is the return flight for JKK5022

At the end of this call, Barajas request a confirmation call for these changes after maintenance service confirm the problem (30 minutes on ground, enter the technicians and disconect the RAM sensor breaker, about manual, 10 days inop is GO)

In the secon call Spanair request undo the changes and put again as registration in the flight plan HFP (EC-HFP) to JK5022 and JK2025
and confirm the slot to 1235Z

The trith call is from Barajas Emergency service to Madrid Fireman service to coordinate the emergency plan
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Old 2nd Sep 2008, 02:23
  #1393 (permalink)  
 
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TR deploying before n/w ground contact

YouTube - MD-82 SAS landing EHAM

SAS MD 82 landing at EHAM deploying TR before n/g weight on wheel
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Old 2nd Sep 2008, 03:42
  #1394 (permalink)  
pasoundman
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NigelOnDraft
Thrust Reversers are useful, but rarely vital. They have numerous safety / indication systems to avoid the odd accident caused by a Thrust Reverser. Any unservicability with these systems - and surely it is far better to just lock the system out, and await a timely analysis engineering solution?
Since when is TEN DAYS 'timely' ? Seriously what excuse can there be for that other than saving a few pence ? Especially considering how they can be so deadly.
 
Old 2nd Sep 2008, 03:46
  #1395 (permalink)  
pasoundman
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lomapaseo
they start talking about reversers and even though there is no agreement on whether they are deployed or not
The pictures show ONE deployed reverser. Maybe having both of them working might just have helped a little bit ?
 
Old 2nd Sep 2008, 04:51
  #1396 (permalink)  
fdr
 
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Reverser

Ecam:
Hi.
the T/R deployment is procedurally delayed on the MD-80 until nose wheel touchdown to avoid ground contact from the lower reverser buckets.
regards
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Old 2nd Sep 2008, 07:06
  #1397 (permalink)  
 
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"all ye who enter bring data"
all ye who enter, bring data
would have been an instruction to deliver information. Without the comma it is a statement, perhaps emphasising your powers of observation.
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Old 2nd Sep 2008, 07:12
  #1398 (permalink)  
 
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A long time ago an MD82 crashed at Madrid but even with CVR's and FDR's recovered nobody knows what happened. Why?

Maybe it is time to release this information to the public.
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Old 2nd Sep 2008, 10:20
  #1399 (permalink)  
 
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Since when is TEN DAYS 'timely' ? Seriously what excuse can there be for that other than saving a few pence ? Especially considering how they can be so deadly.
We frequently have a Thr Rev U/S for 10 days - it is the allowable period, and as you say, pennies count, so most defects do not get cured for much or all of the allowable period. Fact of life... not ideal.. but here we go.

How are they "so deadly" They are rarely "required" in Performance Terms, and when "locked out" (correctly) somewhat less deadly than being available

NoD
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Old 2nd Sep 2008, 10:34
  #1400 (permalink)  
 
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B717 T/R deployment

Thanks for that, re the 717. Hard to cater for (any) incorrectly applied Maint procedures
Nigel, in that case, the 717 T/R lockout pins were not installed correctly. If maintenance does it wrong (as they did then), crews can still detect it during their preflight (pins are obvious, red painted and protrude when installed correctly in the B717 as well as some other types as you relate). I do not know about the MD8x.
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