FAA requires memory item briefing prior to flight
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Saw this in the sim once and it was priceless. Engine fire warning at lift off. Captain orders "Recall Items Engine Fire, Severe damage or Separation checklist'.
First Officer known as PM says (after chewing knuckles) "Let's see...uum...Engine Severe Separation and Fire damage checklist...er... can you repeat that request please captain?"
Captain PF: "Idiot, Dolt, Illiterate Bogan, I said go a bloody-head with the EFSD or S checklist - and fast..we have a fire.."
F/O in humble mumbling tone. "Sorry Cap'n - I forgot wot the Recalls are...mind if I have a quick sneak at the QRH first..."
First Officer known as PM says (after chewing knuckles) "Let's see...uum...Engine Severe Separation and Fire damage checklist...er... can you repeat that request please captain?"
Captain PF: "Idiot, Dolt, Illiterate Bogan, I said go a bloody-head with the EFSD or S checklist - and fast..we have a fire.."
F/O in humble mumbling tone. "Sorry Cap'n - I forgot wot the Recalls are...mind if I have a quick sneak at the QRH first..."
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must have been the "dog and hydrant" syndrome!!!
whenever someone takes a new position, they must make some sort of change to give evidence that their coming to the new position was just in the nick of time.
every new chief pilot, head of training, checkairman, and must be the same within the FAA walls,
just as a dog cannot walk past a fire hydrant, without pissing on it, a new occupant of a position, must make some new change, to mark his/her turf!!!!
and after all these years of more and more layers of briefings and procedures, one must dig deep to find something new to add to the heap.
every new chief pilot, head of training, checkairman, and must be the same within the FAA walls,
just as a dog cannot walk past a fire hydrant, without pissing on it, a new occupant of a position, must make some new change, to mark his/her turf!!!!
and after all these years of more and more layers of briefings and procedures, one must dig deep to find something new to add to the heap.
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and after all these years of more and more layers of briefings and procedures, one must dig deep to find something new to add to the heap
However...
I worked for one carrier (now the largest in SE Asia) which took the checklists/QRH directly from the manufacturer (Boeing) and pasted their logo on the front cover....and said, 'follow this.'
Worked like a charm.
Same with the L1011 at another carrier.
All the rest...pure unadulterated BS.
Fact.
"Dont those idiots know thats why it is a MEMORY item? So we dont HAVE to brief it"
I wonder if anyone ever said that in the crew room of a certain Greek carrier which has featured in "Aircrash Investigations"?
I wonder if anyone ever said that in the crew room of a certain Greek carrier which has featured in "Aircrash Investigations"?
"Dont those idiots know thats why it is a MEMORY item? So we dont HAVE to brief it"
I wonder if anyone ever said that in the crew room of a certain Greek carrier which has featured in "Aircrash Investigations"?
I wonder if anyone ever said that in the crew room of a certain Greek carrier which has featured in "Aircrash Investigations"?
Assuming that the proposal is in fact FAA policy, then they appear to ignore or misunderstand several fundamental human factors safety principles.
The FAA’s action would increase the crew’s responsibility for safety without addressing their own responsibility to review a certification weakness of warning systems – having one warning with two meanings.
This is a form of blame culture; any future incident involving a mistake by the crew in briefing will be their fault, without consideration of the opportunities for error in the aircraft system and operation – the FAA’s responsibility - passing the buck, overloading the front end.
Similarly changing procedures during a high workload period also exposes crews to opportunity for error … more opportunities for blame.
The FAA appear to follow the old ideas of crew error and human performance, failing to look at the upstream influences in accidents; this is like applying more band-aids to the holes in the ‘Swiss Cheese’ without considering why the holes were there in the first place.
“it's giving the appearance of doing something.” - knee jerk reaction.
Memory items are not necessarily the best way of addressing some future event; they are better used sparingly in existing critical events.
There would be few drills or checks that would apply to all aircraft or circumstances. Some aircraft do not use air for take off or use APU air only, thus the critical checks occur after takeoff – the selection or change of air supply. Similarly there is need to check other pressurisation system switching, e.g. outflow values manual/auto, dump valve setting (before taxi), and that the control system is working during the climb. All of these checks are best completed with the aid of a checklist, which reduces the chance of error.
These are examples of proactive threat management, avoiding a warning and the associated hazard, thus reducing the need to review the drills.
Finally there should be consideration of crew performance.
Is there a need to improve crew knowledge of systems, their response to abnormal indications, avoidance of rush, or improvements in emergency checklist information. Again the FAA has top level responsibility for these. There may be little value in demanding operators to check these items as they created them, whereas a overview audit from the local FAA inspector might identify weaknesses and enable sharing of best practice across the industry.
Those in the FAA discussing these aspects might do well to consult their own Human Factors Web site, and also that of NASA who are researching checklists and concurrent tasks … … on an FAA research budget ?!!
The FAA’s action would increase the crew’s responsibility for safety without addressing their own responsibility to review a certification weakness of warning systems – having one warning with two meanings.
This is a form of blame culture; any future incident involving a mistake by the crew in briefing will be their fault, without consideration of the opportunities for error in the aircraft system and operation – the FAA’s responsibility - passing the buck, overloading the front end.
Similarly changing procedures during a high workload period also exposes crews to opportunity for error … more opportunities for blame.
The FAA appear to follow the old ideas of crew error and human performance, failing to look at the upstream influences in accidents; this is like applying more band-aids to the holes in the ‘Swiss Cheese’ without considering why the holes were there in the first place.
“it's giving the appearance of doing something.” - knee jerk reaction.
Memory items are not necessarily the best way of addressing some future event; they are better used sparingly in existing critical events.
There would be few drills or checks that would apply to all aircraft or circumstances. Some aircraft do not use air for take off or use APU air only, thus the critical checks occur after takeoff – the selection or change of air supply. Similarly there is need to check other pressurisation system switching, e.g. outflow values manual/auto, dump valve setting (before taxi), and that the control system is working during the climb. All of these checks are best completed with the aid of a checklist, which reduces the chance of error.
These are examples of proactive threat management, avoiding a warning and the associated hazard, thus reducing the need to review the drills.
Finally there should be consideration of crew performance.
Is there a need to improve crew knowledge of systems, their response to abnormal indications, avoidance of rush, or improvements in emergency checklist information. Again the FAA has top level responsibility for these. There may be little value in demanding operators to check these items as they created them, whereas a overview audit from the local FAA inspector might identify weaknesses and enable sharing of best practice across the industry.
Those in the FAA discussing these aspects might do well to consult their own Human Factors Web site, and also that of NASA who are researching checklists and concurrent tasks … … on an FAA research budget ?!!
While we are reciting all this stuff, why not say the Lord's Prayer and sing God Save the Queen as well?
Good grief ! Have you checked that with the P.C. Police ?
I've read that Mohammed is the most popular boys' name in the UK now ?
Good grief ! Have you checked that with the P.C. Police ?
I've read that Mohammed is the most popular boys' name in the UK now ?
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integrity--
all the briefings in the world will not prevent accidents.
the only thing that will, is a continuous personal striving toward what could be termed, integrity, perhaps.
and from where i stand, that can only come from within each individual.
simple things, but not easy, especially when one is flying close to the flight and duty time limits--one must beat him/herself mentally--my initial private flight instructor would yell at me and hit me with the sectional when i did something stupid--such as do something that gave indication that i had not listened or was not putting my 100% into the activity at hand. now i silently yell at myself when i notice that i have slacked off.
actually look at the switch, actually look at the indicator, actually read the notams. actually look at the pitot tubes during the walk around, etc. that is what happened in the helios 737 and in fact 90 percent of all the accidents i have read. there are only a few that fall outside of that.
nothing can replace self discipline on the flight line and no one can regulate it or brief it, or put it into a QRH and adding extra text and verbage during the flight will only contribute to missing more ATC calls.
i agree with 411 about the boeing books. same for the flight crew training manual.
less is better--but it requires our individual personal integrity.
the only thing that will, is a continuous personal striving toward what could be termed, integrity, perhaps.
and from where i stand, that can only come from within each individual.
simple things, but not easy, especially when one is flying close to the flight and duty time limits--one must beat him/herself mentally--my initial private flight instructor would yell at me and hit me with the sectional when i did something stupid--such as do something that gave indication that i had not listened or was not putting my 100% into the activity at hand. now i silently yell at myself when i notice that i have slacked off.
actually look at the switch, actually look at the indicator, actually read the notams. actually look at the pitot tubes during the walk around, etc. that is what happened in the helios 737 and in fact 90 percent of all the accidents i have read. there are only a few that fall outside of that.
nothing can replace self discipline on the flight line and no one can regulate it or brief it, or put it into a QRH and adding extra text and verbage during the flight will only contribute to missing more ATC calls.
i agree with 411 about the boeing books. same for the flight crew training manual.
less is better--but it requires our individual personal integrity.
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Why does the regulator need to be involved in this?
Let's keep things simple and use manufacturers' manuals.
Now having said that why not, at crews' discretion review one QRH recall item section on each flight? Just as a reminder, and during cruise once the workload has reduced....
Let's keep things simple and use manufacturers' manuals.
Now having said that why not, at crews' discretion review one QRH recall item section on each flight? Just as a reminder, and during cruise once the workload has reduced....
Captain orders "Recall Items Engine Fire, Severe damage or Separation checklist'.
took the checklists/QRH directly from the manufacturer (Boeing) and pasted their logo on the front cover....and said, 'follow this.'
I know you wind 'em up a bit on Prune but I'd certainly agree there.
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my initial private flight instructor would yell at me and hit me with the sectional
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Pressurization & Take-Off Warning horn
"...The FAA’s action would increase the crew’s responsibility for safety without addressing their own responsibility to review a certification weakness of warning systems – having one warning with two meanings..."
The dumb Helios pilots who couldn't identify the Boeing cabin altitude warning horn, [identical to the take-off warning horn] would have had a second chance of saving themselves if they had been flying an L1011 with augmented voice generated warnings.
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dear A37575
i chose that instructor!
flying is not a forgiving environment so why should all instruction be soft as pillows!
when i decided to learn to fly, 1979, i wanted the best instructor at the airport (MEM) and after asking around, his name kept coming up. they said he was rough around the edges, but within the first lesson i could tell that in his heart he only wanted the best for me just as i only wanted the best for me!
he flew choppers in nam, so that might explain some of his technique-- and i only encountered his harshness when i had not given 100 percent.
so keep your opinion to yourself until you meet him personally. funny how many other pilots that were instructed by him still think the world of him.
flying is not a forgiving environment so why should all instruction be soft as pillows!
when i decided to learn to fly, 1979, i wanted the best instructor at the airport (MEM) and after asking around, his name kept coming up. they said he was rough around the edges, but within the first lesson i could tell that in his heart he only wanted the best for me just as i only wanted the best for me!
he flew choppers in nam, so that might explain some of his technique-- and i only encountered his harshness when i had not given 100 percent.
so keep your opinion to yourself until you meet him personally. funny how many other pilots that were instructed by him still think the world of him.
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This is where Boeing could learn something from Lockheed: The L1011 TriStars which I had flown many moons ago had a voice generated "Don Oxygen Mask" warning alternate with the cabin altitude warning horn
All flying stab.
DLC.
Dual/dual autopilots, and CATIIIB, right out of the factory.
The first true FMS on a wide-body...with, VNAV/LNAV/engine thrust management, all in one (dual) neat package, courtesy of Hamilton Sundstrand.
A true...gentlemans airplane.
Ahhhh, Lockheed!
Now, lets look at operating procedures, specific to the respective type.
Lockheed states them, right in the AFM.
Boeing...likewise
Douglas...likewise
Airboos...don't specifically know (never flown one) but I suspect, them...too.
So, I ask (and I've been around a very long time)...just WHY do some airlines 'think' they know more than the manufacturer?
Personally, I think some of these 'other airlines' are nutty as a fruit cake.
In short,
RTFB, for best results.
The manufacturers book.
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Don't evacuate from memory?
MAX ANGLE
"Actually there is only one reason to have memory items, they are tasks which must be actioned without delay in circumstances that do not allow time for a checklist to be consulted. They should be strictly limited to the "do or die" items such as initial actions for stopping, engine failure, decompression and unreliable airspeed, can't think of anything else that needs them really, evacuation should certainly not be performed from memory, plenty of time to set the park brake and get the QRH out."
You sure?
http://www.aaib.gov.uk/sites/aaib/cm...8%20G-BGJL.pdf
"The crew then started on the non-memory 'Passenger Evacuation (Land) Drill' which proved unrealistically long for such an emergency, calling for passenger evacuation as item 14."
55 fatalities.
"Actually there is only one reason to have memory items, they are tasks which must be actioned without delay in circumstances that do not allow time for a checklist to be consulted. They should be strictly limited to the "do or die" items such as initial actions for stopping, engine failure, decompression and unreliable airspeed, can't think of anything else that needs them really, evacuation should certainly not be performed from memory, plenty of time to set the park brake and get the QRH out."
You sure?
http://www.aaib.gov.uk/sites/aaib/cm...8%20G-BGJL.pdf
"The crew then started on the non-memory 'Passenger Evacuation (Land) Drill' which proved unrealistically long for such an emergency, calling for passenger evacuation as item 14."
55 fatalities.
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Indeed 411a - Airbus tells you how it's to be done in the FCOM's...
Airlines do NOT need to embelish these - the aeroplane is certified with just the manufacturers books.. Sadly it's the astronaut wannabes at managerial level who want to adapt procedures.
BAck to topic - if you don't know the memory items you should not be flying the aeroplane. However, they don't ned to be briefed... Kind of makes a mockery of MEMORY doesn't it??
Airlines do NOT need to embelish these - the aeroplane is certified with just the manufacturers books.. Sadly it's the astronaut wannabes at managerial level who want to adapt procedures.
BAck to topic - if you don't know the memory items you should not be flying the aeroplane. However, they don't ned to be briefed... Kind of makes a mockery of MEMORY doesn't it??