Sweeping condemnation of Transport Canada's approach to aviation safety
SMS and small airlines
There is one way SMS could have a positive impact on small bush operations and that is through the insurance industry.
If a safe operation results in a insurance lower cost, which it should, there is a large incentive to get with the program.
Sadly insurance works the opposite way in that the safe operators subsidize the cowboys.
20driver
If a safe operation results in a insurance lower cost, which it should, there is a large incentive to get with the program.
Sadly insurance works the opposite way in that the safe operators subsidize the cowboys.
20driver
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Read the comments above. If you only have an SMS to save money or to please your national authority you have the wrong culture and your SMS will never be effective.
One useful site which may help those concerned with their organization's true safety culture and the ongoing implementation project of SMS will find the following Transport Canada site (and others, if the title is Googled), "Score Your Safety Culture", interesting and perhaps helpful as a starting point to see where the weak points are. Here is the URL:
Score Your Safety Culture
Obviously, good answers require a brutally honest response. Like investing, it is unwise to confuse affection and loyalty with rationality and "what is".
If the questionaire were evenly distributed throughout management and line crews I wondered if responses would divide along those lines and would such a division reflect the politics of perception or would it reflect how close each group is to the reality of the daily operation and the potential for groupthink within management in terms of how well things are going despite "the data", and within the employee group on how bad things are going, despite the hegemonies? A little of both I suspect, knowing aviation people and safety.
Score Your Safety Culture
Obviously, good answers require a brutally honest response. Like investing, it is unwise to confuse affection and loyalty with rationality and "what is".
If the questionaire were evenly distributed throughout management and line crews I wondered if responses would divide along those lines and would such a division reflect the politics of perception or would it reflect how close each group is to the reality of the daily operation and the potential for groupthink within management in terms of how well things are going despite "the data", and within the employee group on how bad things are going, despite the hegemonies? A little of both I suspect, knowing aviation people and safety.
zalt;
A number of factors prevent such an approach, which TC may not be entirely unsympathetic to, especially as SMS is being introduced.
First, management might not get the answers they "like" -
One way to address the matter is to have management's and line employees' responses separated so that the gulf, if there is one, between management's perceptions of their organization's safety culture, and the employees' perceptions, may be seen.
If the gulf is large, there is a credibility problem and likely a safety-culture problem. If the gulf is tiny, likely the company is healthy.
Obviously line employee contentment, state of any negotiations, state of the industry and most of all and mainly for management, the phenomenon of "groupthink" which tends to suppress "bad" news (safety issues) and tout good (shareholder/profit/performance) news, are all factors which may lead to some gulf between the two sets of responses.
I have seen circumstances where the blunt honesty of employees (line and management) in such studies has been not only suppressed but placed beyond all possible access, so damaging was the response. Damaging, that is, in terms of liability - the information may or may not have been used to guide change. Hoping for change is a wasted wish. In this business, "hope" has no place; only confimed and tested results should have currency.
All this said, yes, I think the test should be a yearly, public exercise for all organizations involved in medium to high risk endeavours and not just aviation and the results should be made available to all employees. That would never happen of course for, long before anything was communicated, corporate legal would have prevented it.
And to a very small degree, I can sympathize, knowing that there are elements that would use such information for their own agendas especially if it involved an accident. Honesty is always relative in this and most businesses. SMS however, is not about making public statements about one's level of safety - it is a way of doing business which is recursive, not reactive. It is not a technique for creating a public personna that only legal must be content with.
A number of factors prevent such an approach, which TC may not be entirely unsympathetic to, especially as SMS is being introduced.
First, management might not get the answers they "like" -
One way to address the matter is to have management's and line employees' responses separated so that the gulf, if there is one, between management's perceptions of their organization's safety culture, and the employees' perceptions, may be seen.
If the gulf is large, there is a credibility problem and likely a safety-culture problem. If the gulf is tiny, likely the company is healthy.
Obviously line employee contentment, state of any negotiations, state of the industry and most of all and mainly for management, the phenomenon of "groupthink" which tends to suppress "bad" news (safety issues) and tout good (shareholder/profit/performance) news, are all factors which may lead to some gulf between the two sets of responses.
I have seen circumstances where the blunt honesty of employees (line and management) in such studies has been not only suppressed but placed beyond all possible access, so damaging was the response. Damaging, that is, in terms of liability - the information may or may not have been used to guide change. Hoping for change is a wasted wish. In this business, "hope" has no place; only confimed and tested results should have currency.
All this said, yes, I think the test should be a yearly, public exercise for all organizations involved in medium to high risk endeavours and not just aviation and the results should be made available to all employees. That would never happen of course for, long before anything was communicated, corporate legal would have prevented it.
And to a very small degree, I can sympathize, knowing that there are elements that would use such information for their own agendas especially if it involved an accident. Honesty is always relative in this and most businesses. SMS however, is not about making public statements about one's level of safety - it is a way of doing business which is recursive, not reactive. It is not a technique for creating a public personna that only legal must be content with.
You're a wise man PJ2. I hope that you have some involvement in SMS in your company. They can only benefit from your insight and your common sense approach to safety.
Jeff
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Every presentation I've seen by TCCA has been very much 'an SMS is about documentation, documentation & documentation'.
One of the European offshore safety agencies, Holland(?), has made a postive safety culture a condition for the continued approval to operate an oil platform.
One of the European offshore safety agencies, Holland(?), has made a postive safety culture a condition for the continued approval to operate an oil platform.
Zalt:
Two comments regarding TC and culture:
First, I'm not sure how you legislate or regulate culture. It's tough for rulemakers to create rules that they can't measure for compliance. All you can do is set out guidelines for operators to implement the elements that are common in a safety culture, such as non-punitive reporting, data-driven decision making and a continuous improvement process. It's up to the organization to put them into place and build the right culture around them. If the head shed in the organization isn't committed to culture change, a regulator will have a hard time affecting that change until the operator breaks a safety regulation.
Second, I've asked the question to some acquaintances who are inspectors. While they believe in the concept of SMS, they contend that TC has not spent enough time talking about culture within their own organization. How can they be expected to effectively assess culture change in the organizations they oversee when they don't even see a positive safety culture building in their own house?
Two comments regarding TC and culture:
First, I'm not sure how you legislate or regulate culture. It's tough for rulemakers to create rules that they can't measure for compliance. All you can do is set out guidelines for operators to implement the elements that are common in a safety culture, such as non-punitive reporting, data-driven decision making and a continuous improvement process. It's up to the organization to put them into place and build the right culture around them. If the head shed in the organization isn't committed to culture change, a regulator will have a hard time affecting that change until the operator breaks a safety regulation.
Second, I've asked the question to some acquaintances who are inspectors. While they believe in the concept of SMS, they contend that TC has not spent enough time talking about culture within their own organization. How can they be expected to effectively assess culture change in the organizations they oversee when they don't even see a positive safety culture building in their own house?
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J.O.
Sir, you have hit it right on the head. I have always maintained that SMS is a valuable business tool to be utilizrd by a strong company management who are interested in productivity and safety enhancements within their organization.
Anyone who has read the DNR report will see that the inspectorate in TC are a disguntled group, who utilize litttle if any HFT/SMS principles other than paperwork. The experience level of the inspectorate in terms of commercial operations has decreased to the point where they are nothing more than auditors of a vast paperwork regime. Safety is not going to be enhanced by compliance with up to date manuals and paperwork systems just to satisfy regulatory compliance. I feel that we have missed the boat by a large degree in the aftermath of de-regulation and the failure to increase the inspectorate and their level of commercial aircraft operations knowledge and understanding.
A company who sincerely wants to use the benefits of SMS is limited somewhat by the lack of any kind of culture of understanding of the system at TC. I think that the common belief today, is that if your paperwork is up to par, you have achieved a level of safety, satisfactory to TC.
The imbedding of the culture in the lower end of the commercial marketplace cannot be achieved by regulatory demand, it has to come from the operators themselves and any view of what is going on in 703 is enough to realize that the culture is many years away from being an accepted standard to which we all conform.
carholme
Sir, you have hit it right on the head. I have always maintained that SMS is a valuable business tool to be utilizrd by a strong company management who are interested in productivity and safety enhancements within their organization.
Anyone who has read the DNR report will see that the inspectorate in TC are a disguntled group, who utilize litttle if any HFT/SMS principles other than paperwork. The experience level of the inspectorate in terms of commercial operations has decreased to the point where they are nothing more than auditors of a vast paperwork regime. Safety is not going to be enhanced by compliance with up to date manuals and paperwork systems just to satisfy regulatory compliance. I feel that we have missed the boat by a large degree in the aftermath of de-regulation and the failure to increase the inspectorate and their level of commercial aircraft operations knowledge and understanding.
A company who sincerely wants to use the benefits of SMS is limited somewhat by the lack of any kind of culture of understanding of the system at TC. I think that the common belief today, is that if your paperwork is up to par, you have achieved a level of safety, satisfactory to TC.
The imbedding of the culture in the lower end of the commercial marketplace cannot be achieved by regulatory demand, it has to come from the operators themselves and any view of what is going on in 703 is enough to realize that the culture is many years away from being an accepted standard to which we all conform.
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And these for CASA in Australia: http://www.pprune.org/forums/d-g-gen...-sms-casa.html and http://www.pprune.org/forums/d-g-rep...were-none.html
and this: http://www.amroba.org.au/pdf/meetingwithbyron.pdf
and this: http://www.amroba.org.au/pdf/meetingwithbyron.pdf
"CASA has failed, in all aspects, to meet the needs of the Australian aviation industry, especially the needs of private owners of aircraft. CASA has failed to maintain the safety culture that had been developed over the previous 100 years and has, by its own actions in applying the aviation legislation, alienated the aviation industry that holds responsibility for the aviation safety record. Safety issues are not addressed as a partnership to improve safety. It is this failure to work in
partnership, originally initiated by DCA over 50 years ago, and now adopted internationally to improve safety, that has seen an
upward swing in ATSB incident and accident tables.
This change was initiated and implemented by CASA when it stopped working in partnership with industry in the interest of aviation safety. Government’s application of the criminal code to aviation legislation created a completely different approach to aviation safety that has failed. CASA modus operandi of enforcing safety by strict compliance to known defective legislation has seen safety matters go underground. CASA enforcement policy has had a negative effect on the industry and is the reason most leave the industry. Industry size has been regulatory drastically reduced whilst CASA size has drastically increased. CASA is no longer seen as a competent internationally respected Aviation Regulator.
It is seen as a bunch of individuals that have gone power crazy under the protection of the public service and are out of control because the CASA management cannot control their employees.
partnership, originally initiated by DCA over 50 years ago, and now adopted internationally to improve safety, that has seen an
upward swing in ATSB incident and accident tables.
This change was initiated and implemented by CASA when it stopped working in partnership with industry in the interest of aviation safety. Government’s application of the criminal code to aviation legislation created a completely different approach to aviation safety that has failed. CASA modus operandi of enforcing safety by strict compliance to known defective legislation has seen safety matters go underground. CASA enforcement policy has had a negative effect on the industry and is the reason most leave the industry. Industry size has been regulatory drastically reduced whilst CASA size has drastically increased. CASA is no longer seen as a competent internationally respected Aviation Regulator.
It is seen as a bunch of individuals that have gone power crazy under the protection of the public service and are out of control because the CASA management cannot control their employees.
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Critics slam changes to aircraft safety inspection system
From CBC:
Transport Canada's man in charge of aviation safety doesn't like the term SMS, referring to it as a "buzzword." But Merlin Preuss has nevertheless spent a fair bit of time recently defending the concept, which he says will lead to a more accountable aviation industry — and safer skies. Critics such as retired justice Virgil Moshansky, on the other hand, argue that Transport Canada's Safety Management Systems allows the industry to police itself, which is akin to "putting the fox in charge of the hen house."
So as we move into an era of deregulation for many major industries, who are Canadians to believe?
SMS (Safety Management Systems), the shorthand Transport Canada uses to describe its new approach, makes the aviation industry responsible for implementing systems designed to ensure safe air travel in Canada. Under the concept, the federal department will do fewer direct safety audits of air carriers, instead keeping watch over safety checks done by the airlines themselves.
In a spring report, federal Auditor General Sheila Fraser examined Transport Canada's march toward fully implementing its air safety management system. The report uses the following example to define the safety management system:
"For example, instead of conducting an inspection to assess whether the tires in the aircraft landing gear are sufficiently inflated, Transport Canada will assess whether a company has the systems in place to ensure that the tires are inflated, following up if necessary. The goal is to make companies more accountable for the management of risks. Transport Canada will still be accountable for safety oversight. The department maintains that safety management systems will allow more thorough identification and resolution of potential safety problems, making the transportation system safer."
'I would strongly recommend that the federal government assume a proactive approach to taking the pulse of the aviation safety in this country, before another major air disaster occurs, as is being predicted by many responsible and informed individuals in the aviation industry.'
—2007 report by retired judge Virgil Moshansky
SMS is akin to trends in other industrial sectors, such as the food industry. In the wake of a massive meat recall caused by a deadly outbreak of listeriosis in August this year, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency is facing questions about allowing the industry to, in the words of the Agriculture Union of the Public Service Alliance of Canada, "police itself."
Though SMS was introduced in the late 1990s, it was only in 2005 that Transport Canada began asking larger carriers to start developing their own systems. According to the auditor general, the entire airline industry is expected to have safety management systems in place between 2011 and 2013. "Until then, Transport Canada has the task of managing the transition, while continuing its oversight responsibilities," the auditor general's report says.
Assessing SMS
One of the findings after the inquiry into the 1989 crash of an Air Ontario Fokker F-28 jet in Dryden, Ont., in which 24 people died, urged Transport Canada to hire more inspectors. In a 2007 report entitled The Role of the Judiciary in Aviation Safety: The Inside Story and Legacy of Dryden, retired judge Virgil Moshansky, who headed up the Dryden inquiry, repeated a warning that he had issued to parliamentarians months earlier:
"Having regard to the documented systemic problems in the aviation industry which have been surfacing for some time now, I am of the view that, 18 years after the Dryden crash, another wakeup call to Transport Canada is overdue. I would strongly recommend that the federal government assume a proactive approach to taking the pulse of the aviation safety in this country, before another major air disaster occurs, as is being predicted by many responsible and informed individuals in the aviation industry."
Critics like Moshansky argue that Transport Canada is eliminating many of the checks and balances it needs in order to ensure safety, at a time when the department is relying on the industry police itself.
Lack of resources
John Scott, who has been a pilot for 42 years, used to work for the federal aviation safety board as an accident investigator and now speaks for the Retired Airline Pilots Association of Canada. He remembers a time when Transport Canada had more inspectors than it currently employs.
'According to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the rapidly expanding aviation industry and the limited resources of oversight authorities make it increasingly difficult to sustain the existing approach to managing safety.'
—Auditor General Sheila Fraser"
They would go to airlines, or flight schools, and they would be the ones conducting the tests. They would do the evaluations and they would give you your ticket," Scott said. "Over time, the number of inspectors has continually decreased. I'm not going to say that Transport Canada has abrogated their responsibility, but the responsibility for checking has essentially devolved to the companies."
In her report, the auditor general pointed out that "in 2006, air transport in Canada carried 99 million passengers, up 6 per cent from 2005, and the number is expected to grow 40 per cent from 2006 to 2015. According to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the rapidly expanding aviation industry and the limited resources of oversight authorities make it increasingly difficult to sustain the existing approach to managing safety."
During his appearance before Parliament's public accounts committee this summer, Preuss, Transport Canada's director general of civil aviation, was asked about the number of inspectors. He conceded there were 134 vacancies, but offered little elaboration. In an e-mailed response, Transport Canada explained that 15 of those vacancies are engineers — as opposed to inspectors. The department's inspectorate workforce now stands at 737. Taking the vacancies into consideration, Transport Canada is unable to fill 15 per cent of its inspectorate workforce.
Mike Wing, national president of the Union of Canadian Transportation Employees, which represents the civil aviation safety inspectors who work for Transport Canada, said Preuss's testimony shows the number of people conducting inspections is diminishing. That means there will be increased reliance on the industry to monitor itself with little oversight from Transport Canada, Wing said.
Air transport in Canada carried 99 million passengers in 2006, up 6 per cent from 2005, and the number is expected to grow 40 per cent from 2006 to 2015. (Michael Probst/AP)"This is about changing the type of inspection that we do," he said. "We're going to be primarily just taking a look at safety management. There will be much fewer specialists in the system. There will be people trained on SMS and things to look for in safety management systems, but it doesn't mean that those people have got the technical background that the inspectorate has traditionally had to ensure safety."
While Preuss conceded that the number of inspectors Transport Canada will need under SMS is an open question, he categorically denied that his department is abrogating responsibility for safety. Transport Canada will still conduct its own inspections under SMS, but in addition, it will now monitor the industry's safety systems, which are much better than they used to be, he said.
"No, we're not even asking [the industry] to police themselves. We are asking them to identify hazards before they become big problems … and you break a rule, you've created a hazard virtually by definition," Preuss said. "So one of the things we've asked them to do is put a system in place that shows us that yesterday and today and tomorrow, you're in compliance with the current regulations. And that gets inspected, and we have all the enforcement tools we had yesterday and we will apply them — and we have."
However, an internal memo from November 2006 casts some doubt on the vigilance with which the department will monitor the industry. In his paper, The Role of the Judiciary in Aviation Safety, Moshansky sums up that memo: "Transport Canada instructed its aviation inspectors not to initiate any further enforcement investigations into regulatory contraventions and to close all open cases against SMS certificate holders."
Whistleblower protection
Another important check on the system is protection for employees — whether with the airline industry or Transport Canada - who speak out about safety concerns. The Accountability Act offers some protection, and so, too, does bill C-7, the piece of legislation that gives Transport Canada the legal authority it needs to fully implement the security management system. The bill is currently in its third reading before Parliament and has not yet passed into law.
Charlambe "Bobby" Boutris, FAA aviation safety inspector and Boeing 737-700 Partial Program Manager for aircraft maintenance at the Southwest Airlines (SWA) Certificate Management Office (left), testifies on Capitol Hill in Washington on April 3, 2008, before the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee hearing on FAA safety oversight of airlines. (Lawrence Jackson/AP)In order to get a sense of how important whistleblowers can be, one need only look at the United States and the experiences of Bobby Boutris and Doug Peters. The two inspectors with the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration spoke out publicly about safety concerns at Southwest Airline after unsuccessfully attempting to deal with the problems internally.
In Canada, bill C-7 does offer some protection, although it has no specific whistleblower protection.
"Although whistleblower protection was not introduced, the House [transport] committee agreed to add a number of new provisions to the bill that provide additional protection for employees who provide information under management systems and voluntary reporting process," states a Library of Parliament summary of the progress of bill C-7.
The summary has this to say about the additional protection: "The House committee further clarified under the new section 5.392(3) that a Canadian aviation document holder shall not use information disclosed under the management system in disciplinary proceedings against the employee who disclosed the information unless sanctioned under the management system. It also added section 5.392(4) to protect an employee who disclosed information in good faith under the management system against reprisals, including measures that adversely affect them, the employee's employment, or working conditions, from the Canadian aviation document holder."
As far as Transport Canada's director of policy and regulatory services, Franz Reinhardt, is concerned, bill C-7 protects employees.
"Transport Canada needs as much safety information as possible, so that's why we encourage employees to report internally through non-punitive, voluntary reporting within the company to make sure the company will have identification of safety hazards and can take corrective measure[s] as soon as possible, even before small incidents evolve into bigger accidents," Reinhardt said. "And in bill C-7, we have drafted the provisions for a whistleblower protection for individuals reporting internally who would be afraid of reprisals … regarding their employment. So if they do avail themselves of that internal reporting system, they may rest assured that, if no followup is made and they report publicly, that they will be protected and there will be no danger for their employment."
Union president Wing disagreed with Reinhardt's assessment.
"I don't see anything in the legislation that says that is the case … the [transport] committee did have an amendment to ensure whistleblower protection within this act. They [parliament] turned down that amendment," Wing said. "So in my mind, this act does not have that protection."
Scott of the Retired Airline Pilots Association of Canada also said there isn't enough protection.
"Until the Canadian government through the legal body produces a very clear whistleblower protection for aviation, then we're not there yet," he said.
"If the Canadian government were to have a look at the whistleblower protection that's been established in the United States, that is as good a founding to use as a premise … because they have done an awful lot of research," Scott added.
In addition to the need for increased traditional inspections and better whistleblower protection, critics such as Scott and Moshansky also feel there should be regular inquiries into air safety, preferably of a judicial nature, where witnesses can be compelled to testify.
They also feel that a third party, much like the office of the federal auditor general, should be set up to monitor whether Transport Canada is doing its job.
Without these checks and balances, the critics charge, Canada is setting itself up for potential disaster.
Transport Canada's man in charge of aviation safety doesn't like the term SMS, referring to it as a "buzzword." But Merlin Preuss has nevertheless spent a fair bit of time recently defending the concept, which he says will lead to a more accountable aviation industry — and safer skies. Critics such as retired justice Virgil Moshansky, on the other hand, argue that Transport Canada's Safety Management Systems allows the industry to police itself, which is akin to "putting the fox in charge of the hen house."
So as we move into an era of deregulation for many major industries, who are Canadians to believe?
SMS (Safety Management Systems), the shorthand Transport Canada uses to describe its new approach, makes the aviation industry responsible for implementing systems designed to ensure safe air travel in Canada. Under the concept, the federal department will do fewer direct safety audits of air carriers, instead keeping watch over safety checks done by the airlines themselves.
In a spring report, federal Auditor General Sheila Fraser examined Transport Canada's march toward fully implementing its air safety management system. The report uses the following example to define the safety management system:
"For example, instead of conducting an inspection to assess whether the tires in the aircraft landing gear are sufficiently inflated, Transport Canada will assess whether a company has the systems in place to ensure that the tires are inflated, following up if necessary. The goal is to make companies more accountable for the management of risks. Transport Canada will still be accountable for safety oversight. The department maintains that safety management systems will allow more thorough identification and resolution of potential safety problems, making the transportation system safer."
'I would strongly recommend that the federal government assume a proactive approach to taking the pulse of the aviation safety in this country, before another major air disaster occurs, as is being predicted by many responsible and informed individuals in the aviation industry.'
—2007 report by retired judge Virgil Moshansky
SMS is akin to trends in other industrial sectors, such as the food industry. In the wake of a massive meat recall caused by a deadly outbreak of listeriosis in August this year, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency is facing questions about allowing the industry to, in the words of the Agriculture Union of the Public Service Alliance of Canada, "police itself."
Though SMS was introduced in the late 1990s, it was only in 2005 that Transport Canada began asking larger carriers to start developing their own systems. According to the auditor general, the entire airline industry is expected to have safety management systems in place between 2011 and 2013. "Until then, Transport Canada has the task of managing the transition, while continuing its oversight responsibilities," the auditor general's report says.
Assessing SMS
One of the findings after the inquiry into the 1989 crash of an Air Ontario Fokker F-28 jet in Dryden, Ont., in which 24 people died, urged Transport Canada to hire more inspectors. In a 2007 report entitled The Role of the Judiciary in Aviation Safety: The Inside Story and Legacy of Dryden, retired judge Virgil Moshansky, who headed up the Dryden inquiry, repeated a warning that he had issued to parliamentarians months earlier:
"Having regard to the documented systemic problems in the aviation industry which have been surfacing for some time now, I am of the view that, 18 years after the Dryden crash, another wakeup call to Transport Canada is overdue. I would strongly recommend that the federal government assume a proactive approach to taking the pulse of the aviation safety in this country, before another major air disaster occurs, as is being predicted by many responsible and informed individuals in the aviation industry."
Critics like Moshansky argue that Transport Canada is eliminating many of the checks and balances it needs in order to ensure safety, at a time when the department is relying on the industry police itself.
Lack of resources
John Scott, who has been a pilot for 42 years, used to work for the federal aviation safety board as an accident investigator and now speaks for the Retired Airline Pilots Association of Canada. He remembers a time when Transport Canada had more inspectors than it currently employs.
'According to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the rapidly expanding aviation industry and the limited resources of oversight authorities make it increasingly difficult to sustain the existing approach to managing safety.'
—Auditor General Sheila Fraser"
They would go to airlines, or flight schools, and they would be the ones conducting the tests. They would do the evaluations and they would give you your ticket," Scott said. "Over time, the number of inspectors has continually decreased. I'm not going to say that Transport Canada has abrogated their responsibility, but the responsibility for checking has essentially devolved to the companies."
In her report, the auditor general pointed out that "in 2006, air transport in Canada carried 99 million passengers, up 6 per cent from 2005, and the number is expected to grow 40 per cent from 2006 to 2015. According to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the rapidly expanding aviation industry and the limited resources of oversight authorities make it increasingly difficult to sustain the existing approach to managing safety."
During his appearance before Parliament's public accounts committee this summer, Preuss, Transport Canada's director general of civil aviation, was asked about the number of inspectors. He conceded there were 134 vacancies, but offered little elaboration. In an e-mailed response, Transport Canada explained that 15 of those vacancies are engineers — as opposed to inspectors. The department's inspectorate workforce now stands at 737. Taking the vacancies into consideration, Transport Canada is unable to fill 15 per cent of its inspectorate workforce.
Mike Wing, national president of the Union of Canadian Transportation Employees, which represents the civil aviation safety inspectors who work for Transport Canada, said Preuss's testimony shows the number of people conducting inspections is diminishing. That means there will be increased reliance on the industry to monitor itself with little oversight from Transport Canada, Wing said.
Air transport in Canada carried 99 million passengers in 2006, up 6 per cent from 2005, and the number is expected to grow 40 per cent from 2006 to 2015. (Michael Probst/AP)"This is about changing the type of inspection that we do," he said. "We're going to be primarily just taking a look at safety management. There will be much fewer specialists in the system. There will be people trained on SMS and things to look for in safety management systems, but it doesn't mean that those people have got the technical background that the inspectorate has traditionally had to ensure safety."
While Preuss conceded that the number of inspectors Transport Canada will need under SMS is an open question, he categorically denied that his department is abrogating responsibility for safety. Transport Canada will still conduct its own inspections under SMS, but in addition, it will now monitor the industry's safety systems, which are much better than they used to be, he said.
"No, we're not even asking [the industry] to police themselves. We are asking them to identify hazards before they become big problems … and you break a rule, you've created a hazard virtually by definition," Preuss said. "So one of the things we've asked them to do is put a system in place that shows us that yesterday and today and tomorrow, you're in compliance with the current regulations. And that gets inspected, and we have all the enforcement tools we had yesterday and we will apply them — and we have."
However, an internal memo from November 2006 casts some doubt on the vigilance with which the department will monitor the industry. In his paper, The Role of the Judiciary in Aviation Safety, Moshansky sums up that memo: "Transport Canada instructed its aviation inspectors not to initiate any further enforcement investigations into regulatory contraventions and to close all open cases against SMS certificate holders."
Whistleblower protection
Another important check on the system is protection for employees — whether with the airline industry or Transport Canada - who speak out about safety concerns. The Accountability Act offers some protection, and so, too, does bill C-7, the piece of legislation that gives Transport Canada the legal authority it needs to fully implement the security management system. The bill is currently in its third reading before Parliament and has not yet passed into law.
Charlambe "Bobby" Boutris, FAA aviation safety inspector and Boeing 737-700 Partial Program Manager for aircraft maintenance at the Southwest Airlines (SWA) Certificate Management Office (left), testifies on Capitol Hill in Washington on April 3, 2008, before the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee hearing on FAA safety oversight of airlines. (Lawrence Jackson/AP)In order to get a sense of how important whistleblowers can be, one need only look at the United States and the experiences of Bobby Boutris and Doug Peters. The two inspectors with the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration spoke out publicly about safety concerns at Southwest Airline after unsuccessfully attempting to deal with the problems internally.
In Canada, bill C-7 does offer some protection, although it has no specific whistleblower protection.
"Although whistleblower protection was not introduced, the House [transport] committee agreed to add a number of new provisions to the bill that provide additional protection for employees who provide information under management systems and voluntary reporting process," states a Library of Parliament summary of the progress of bill C-7.
The summary has this to say about the additional protection: "The House committee further clarified under the new section 5.392(3) that a Canadian aviation document holder shall not use information disclosed under the management system in disciplinary proceedings against the employee who disclosed the information unless sanctioned under the management system. It also added section 5.392(4) to protect an employee who disclosed information in good faith under the management system against reprisals, including measures that adversely affect them, the employee's employment, or working conditions, from the Canadian aviation document holder."
As far as Transport Canada's director of policy and regulatory services, Franz Reinhardt, is concerned, bill C-7 protects employees.
"Transport Canada needs as much safety information as possible, so that's why we encourage employees to report internally through non-punitive, voluntary reporting within the company to make sure the company will have identification of safety hazards and can take corrective measure[s] as soon as possible, even before small incidents evolve into bigger accidents," Reinhardt said. "And in bill C-7, we have drafted the provisions for a whistleblower protection for individuals reporting internally who would be afraid of reprisals … regarding their employment. So if they do avail themselves of that internal reporting system, they may rest assured that, if no followup is made and they report publicly, that they will be protected and there will be no danger for their employment."
Union president Wing disagreed with Reinhardt's assessment.
"I don't see anything in the legislation that says that is the case … the [transport] committee did have an amendment to ensure whistleblower protection within this act. They [parliament] turned down that amendment," Wing said. "So in my mind, this act does not have that protection."
Scott of the Retired Airline Pilots Association of Canada also said there isn't enough protection.
"Until the Canadian government through the legal body produces a very clear whistleblower protection for aviation, then we're not there yet," he said.
"If the Canadian government were to have a look at the whistleblower protection that's been established in the United States, that is as good a founding to use as a premise … because they have done an awful lot of research," Scott added.
In addition to the need for increased traditional inspections and better whistleblower protection, critics such as Scott and Moshansky also feel there should be regular inquiries into air safety, preferably of a judicial nature, where witnesses can be compelled to testify.
They also feel that a third party, much like the office of the federal auditor general, should be set up to monitor whether Transport Canada is doing its job.
Without these checks and balances, the critics charge, Canada is setting itself up for potential disaster.
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They also feel that a third party, much like the office of the federal auditor general, should be set up to monitor whether Transport Canada is doing its job.
Until changes are made in TCCA's top management starting with the DGCA safety will take second place to political expediency.
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Whilst TC might hate the term SMS - it's running a seminar in Toronto all about it this month...
And Chuck is right - political expedience rules the roost in Ottawa beyond operational common sense - but name a national transportation body that's different in that respect ?
This ostrich culture also runs through other Federal bodies, and what is regarded as a systemic failure in food inspection, led to many deaths due to a serious listeriosis outbreak. If the same happens due to TC failures leading directly or indirectly to fatalities in an aviation accident, god help them.
Details (English) - for the SMS briefing at CYYZ.
And Chuck is right - political expedience rules the roost in Ottawa beyond operational common sense - but name a national transportation body that's different in that respect ?
This ostrich culture also runs through other Federal bodies, and what is regarded as a systemic failure in food inspection, led to many deaths due to a serious listeriosis outbreak. If the same happens due to TC failures leading directly or indirectly to fatalities in an aviation accident, god help them.
Details (English) - for the SMS briefing at CYYZ.
I know one should never let the facts get in the way of a good rant, but there is absolutely no evidence to date to suggest that the listeriosis outbreak had anything to do with government oversight or a lack thereof. In fact, the CEO of the company involved said, and I quote, "The buck stops with us. We failed."
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And Chuck is right - political expedience rules the roost in Ottawa beyond operational common sense - but name a national transportation body that's different in that respect ?
True, on the other hand any country that professes to be a democracy should have the tools to remove people from positions of power who have demonstrated they are unable or unwilling to perform their duties and abide by the very laws, rules and policies their position requires them to abide by.
When does a Canada become a Zimbawbe?
Do the citizens just need to accept corrupt officials until one morning they wake up a to a Bob Mugwabe?
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True enough...but McCain admitted Maple Leaf did undertake the inspections themselves, one assumes using the govt. issued loose leaf binder, and look what happened...non-compliance, deaths, massive food recalls and shiny suited Prairies lawyers all over the class action express. Imagine what would happen if an airline was involved in something similar ?
And Chuck - yes. The incompetents in the TC corner offices - get rid of them and no fat payout as they leave head first via the revolving door. Round about now, someone should mention the nuclear watchdog firing and Emperor Harper...
I'm off to have a pork luncheon meat sandwich.
And Chuck - yes. The incompetents in the TC corner offices - get rid of them and no fat payout as they leave head first via the revolving door. Round about now, someone should mention the nuclear watchdog firing and Emperor Harper...
I'm off to have a pork luncheon meat sandwich.
So, if you get whacked on your way home this evening by a guy who runs a stop sign, are you going to blame the police for failing to have an officer on the scene to stop him?
I'm not trying to say that SMS is a panacea and that we can all sleep soundly with it in place. In fact, effective safety management will always require a healthy level of unease at the senior management level, and a willingness to take responsibility, as the CEO of Maple Leaf has done. But expecting the government to be the primary source of safety assurance doesn't recognize that they are often not in a position to do it effectively. I think it's high time that we stopped being a nanny state and started enforcing credibility and accountability on the people who should be responsible, and that's the people who lead safety-critical organizations.
I'm not trying to say that SMS is a panacea and that we can all sleep soundly with it in place. In fact, effective safety management will always require a healthy level of unease at the senior management level, and a willingness to take responsibility, as the CEO of Maple Leaf has done. But expecting the government to be the primary source of safety assurance doesn't recognize that they are often not in a position to do it effectively. I think it's high time that we stopped being a nanny state and started enforcing credibility and accountability on the people who should be responsible, and that's the people who lead safety-critical organizations.
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But expecting the government to be the primary source of safety assurance doesn't recognize that they are often not in a position to do it effectively.
That is an interesting opinion, are you saying that a regulator can not be aware of how the industry is complying or not complying with the law?
Oh, wait a minute....now I understand, of course they can not when they sit in cubicles and swap make believe paper work with those that are supposed to regulate.
So lets get rid of the police forces as well and turn over the regulating of society to the general population...yeh that would really make it safe for your wife and kids to roam around on their own.
That is an interesting opinion, are you saying that a regulator can not be aware of how the industry is complying or not complying with the law?
Oh, wait a minute....now I understand, of course they can not when they sit in cubicles and swap make believe paper work with those that are supposed to regulate.
So lets get rid of the police forces as well and turn over the regulating of society to the general population...yeh that would really make it safe for your wife and kids to roam around on their own.
That's just a little disingenuous, not to mention that it takes my words completely out of context. Last time I checked, criminals and bad drivers were not heavily invested in safety critical enterprises. As the old saying goes, "if you think safety is expensive, try having an accident". A bad accident, particularly in today's challenging airline environment, could easily be the death of an airline. For example, I think that Spanair will be lucky to survive their current situation.
Safety through regulation alone will never achieve an increase in the level of safety beyond where we are today, because organizations that focus on meeting the regulations are, by nature, focussed on meeting the minimum standard. And that's all that TC has ever been able to enforce, because at the end of the day, that's all the regulations can ever be, a minimum standard. My company has policies that are more stringent than the regulations. These have been borne out of our business experiences, and TC has no rules to cover those experiences.
What frequently gets missed in discussions about SMS is that when an organization has an effective SMS, that system will place a heightened focus on the human and organizational factors that contribute to hazards and unsafe events. Many of these factors cannot be controlled by regulation. Fixing them means the organization needs to do alot of navel gazing to fix their internal processes and cultures that contribute to the problems in the first place.
Regulators have a role to play now and in the future. It's their job to ensure that SMS is more than smoke and mirrors, and that the system is not only compliant with the regulations, but that it's effective. But there's nothing wrong with forcing organizations to ensure safety through internal management processes, because when it's done right, that is how it will be effective.
There are also examples of regulatory requirements that are out of touch with the industry, particularly when it comes to technological advances. For example, getting approval to conduct GPS-based non-precision approaches requires an operator to jump through regulatory hoops that were written when GPS was still looked upon as unproven voodoo magic that could be shut off at a moment's notice by the US government. It fails to recognize that many modern aircraft have GPS navigation fully integrated into flight management systems, and that the sum total difference from a pilot's perspective is knowing where the navigation info (raw data) comes from, and what to do about it when the raw data is lost. The rest of the SOP for flying the approach is identical to flying an NDB approach from the nav database. Before SMS, we would have no choice but to jump through those out of touch hoops. But through SMS, an operator should be able to apply for approval to conduct these approaches simply by proving an equivalent level of safety that points out the similarities with what they're approved to do today and that manages the differences to mitigate risk.
Safety through regulation alone will never achieve an increase in the level of safety beyond where we are today, because organizations that focus on meeting the regulations are, by nature, focussed on meeting the minimum standard. And that's all that TC has ever been able to enforce, because at the end of the day, that's all the regulations can ever be, a minimum standard. My company has policies that are more stringent than the regulations. These have been borne out of our business experiences, and TC has no rules to cover those experiences.
What frequently gets missed in discussions about SMS is that when an organization has an effective SMS, that system will place a heightened focus on the human and organizational factors that contribute to hazards and unsafe events. Many of these factors cannot be controlled by regulation. Fixing them means the organization needs to do alot of navel gazing to fix their internal processes and cultures that contribute to the problems in the first place.
Regulators have a role to play now and in the future. It's their job to ensure that SMS is more than smoke and mirrors, and that the system is not only compliant with the regulations, but that it's effective. But there's nothing wrong with forcing organizations to ensure safety through internal management processes, because when it's done right, that is how it will be effective.
There are also examples of regulatory requirements that are out of touch with the industry, particularly when it comes to technological advances. For example, getting approval to conduct GPS-based non-precision approaches requires an operator to jump through regulatory hoops that were written when GPS was still looked upon as unproven voodoo magic that could be shut off at a moment's notice by the US government. It fails to recognize that many modern aircraft have GPS navigation fully integrated into flight management systems, and that the sum total difference from a pilot's perspective is knowing where the navigation info (raw data) comes from, and what to do about it when the raw data is lost. The rest of the SOP for flying the approach is identical to flying an NDB approach from the nav database. Before SMS, we would have no choice but to jump through those out of touch hoops. But through SMS, an operator should be able to apply for approval to conduct these approaches simply by proving an equivalent level of safety that points out the similarities with what they're approved to do today and that manages the differences to mitigate risk.