Mechanic Dead-Who is at fault?
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Good find stevef...
Lets not forget what was in the investigation:
"the pilots also failed to consult an operations manual, which they had in the plane. The manual spelled out procedures for dealing with maintenance problems at an airport with no Continental maintenance base."
So Check Airman, Is it still a reasonable request if your manual has procedures that weren't followed and someone gets killed????
Mr. Brown, as to not following engineer instructions, If I need to do an abnormal procedure (engine run) and I'm told the area is clear, I think it's a perfectly reasonable request to set higher than idle power.
"the pilots also failed to consult an operations manual, which they had in the plane. The manual spelled out procedures for dealing with maintenance problems at an airport with no Continental maintenance base."
So Check Airman, Is it still a reasonable request if your manual has procedures that weren't followed and someone gets killed????
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Mr. Brown, a newspaper article said the pilots didn't consult the manual, not the NTSB report.
Notwithstanding, for the sake of argument, let's say they did indeed consult the manual. Common sense tells me the manual would not require the pilots to keep watching an area of the aircraft that is difficult or impossible to see. I imagine that any reasonable manual would have the pilots keeping an eye on engine indications, as maintenance engineers would be properly stationed outside the plane.
Even if one pilot was required to be standing by the nosegear on the intercom, what could have been done to prevent the situation? Chances are, by the time the pilot (or anybody else) realized the guy was standing up, it would have been too late.
I'm not saying that pilots should not be blamed just because I'm a pilot too, rather I'm saying that they acted reasonably, in a manner that was expected and the fact that they were at the gate had no bearing on the accident.
Notwithstanding, for the sake of argument, let's say they did indeed consult the manual. Common sense tells me the manual would not require the pilots to keep watching an area of the aircraft that is difficult or impossible to see. I imagine that any reasonable manual would have the pilots keeping an eye on engine indications, as maintenance engineers would be properly stationed outside the plane.
Even if one pilot was required to be standing by the nosegear on the intercom, what could have been done to prevent the situation? Chances are, by the time the pilot (or anybody else) realized the guy was standing up, it would have been too late.
I'm not saying that pilots should not be blamed just because I'm a pilot too, rather I'm saying that they acted reasonably, in a manner that was expected and the fact that they were at the gate had no bearing on the accident.
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A further concern is the wild variability in contract maintenance. When you make the call, one never knows who or what is going to show up, wrench in hand. The guy could have decades of experience on your a/c type, or not touched anything heavier than an ultralight for years. I had a guy show up to tinker with an FCU that was stone deaf. Odds are the crew and the contract mech are going to be used to different phraseology, different hand signals, etc. It's usually a nightmare dealing with contract mx, this one worse than the typical encounter. Reading a company manual doesn't make it easier.
No huge surprise that the "odd man out" as it were was the guy that got sucked in.
No huge surprise that the "odd man out" as it were was the guy that got sucked in.
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Hopefully this tragic accident reminds some people of the dangers of working with airplanes. I cringe when I hear a pilot say "It's just like driving a car, or riding a bicycle." IT IS NOT. Airplanes are very large, potentially lethal machines. Thinking that you're working with an car only breeds complacency at the workplace, then we have accidents like these. Those of us in aviation need to remember the inherent dangers and try to remain vigilant at all times.
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The pilots ran an engine at 70% N1 on stand for gods sake!!!!!!!!!!! Muppets...
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Thinking that you're working with an car only breeds complacency at the workplace,
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I see, so all pilots that describe flying as just like driving a car are now complacent? Makes perfect sense to me.
No
I said it breeds complacency. I resent the statement. The only similarity is that they are modes of transport. When I drive, I'm in a totally different frame of mind than when I'm flying. For one thing, I'm far more relaxed in a car. Of course, this doesn't mean I'm nervous in a cockpit, just that there's a lot more to think about when you're flying.
No
I said it breeds complacency. I resent the statement. The only similarity is that they are modes of transport. When I drive, I'm in a totally different frame of mind than when I'm flying. For one thing, I'm far more relaxed in a car. Of course, this doesn't mean I'm nervous in a cockpit, just that there's a lot more to think about when you're flying.
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So...What if it had been a mechanic running it up at 70% which was approved?
Operating an engine at that power on an operational stand puts everybody in the area at risk.
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Well said Mr brown,
Run ups of that magnitude are normally only done in an engine run bay or on a remote stand with no ancilliaries anywhere near (or of course in a clear area after taxi out).
On a ramp you have no control of what is passing behind (passenger bus, luggage trolley whatever) and it can do so without anyone having time to stop it. You can't beleive that the red beacon will stop everybody, especially if there is no tug attached & they can see there is no push imminent. No ramp personnel expect that kind of thing on a stand it's just crazy.
Run ups of that magnitude are normally only done in an engine run bay or on a remote stand with no ancilliaries anywhere near (or of course in a clear area after taxi out).
On a ramp you have no control of what is passing behind (passenger bus, luggage trolley whatever) and it can do so without anyone having time to stop it. You can't beleive that the red beacon will stop everybody, especially if there is no tug attached & they can see there is no push imminent. No ramp personnel expect that kind of thing on a stand it's just crazy.
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Brown and Rumble, I think you're missing the point. The location of the plane was inconsequential. If anything, one could argue the pilots made an error in judgment if they applied 70%N1 at the stand. Many people are arguing that the pilots should be punished for doing it at the stand. I'll say it again, the location of the engine run was not a contributing factor.
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I'll say it again, the location of the engine run was not a contributing factor.
I can only speak for myself but as an engineer if I know, an engine run is being carried out at that power, to go nowhere near the engine as there is a very limited safe areas in which to carry out inspections. Bring it up to that power then back to idle and I'll have a look. I'm sure most other engineers would agree too, the engine can have my hat, ID, coat even wallet, I aint going anywhere near it, which is why I think all the details of the incident have not been released.
The event committee consisted of the airlines rep, a pilot union rep and an ex airline pilot for that airline( the FAA inspector), I think thats just a little one sided don't you?... Have all the facts actually been given?
Many people are arguing that the pilots should be punished for doing it at the stand
Everyone makes mistakes from time to time but you have to take responsibility for your own actions..
I know its a bad thing to have a blame culture in aviation I 'd hate to see anyone get locked up for such an incident but it would be nice to at least have the truth which I think the family of that chap deserve...
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I was a rampie at CAL's hub in Houston for about ten years so I might be able to add some light (and hopefully not much heat) to the discussion...
High power run ups were regularly conducted on the gate at IAH. Ground crews stopped traffic behind the AC & ground to cockpit communications were maintained. Since the prohibition on high power run ups was airport specific, and contained in a maintenance manual not available to the crew, it does not seem appropriate to condemn the crew for running up at the gate, when it would have been normal for them to do so back at the hub.
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The event committee consisted of the airlines rep, a pilot union rep and an ex airline pilot for that airline( the FAA inspector), I think thats just a little one sided don't you?...
/Unquote
The FAA guy was ex-TI, not CAL. I knew of one ex-TI guy who hated CAL and everyone associated with it. He was a recruiter for ExpressJet, having CAL experience on your resume was a sure fire way to get not hired. So no, it may well not have been very one sided at all.
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it would be nice to at least have the truth which I think the family of that chap deserve...
/Unquote
He failed to remain clear of the danger zone.
And the flight crew did not push him.
Everything else in the whole chain of events might have been done differently... deplane the pax, MX tow the ship to a runup area, have a mechanic at the controls, with the proper pages from the CAL Manual referred to... but when the procedure calls for the thrust levers to be advanced, but if you step into the danger zone, the result is going to be the same tragedy.
High power run ups were regularly conducted on the gate at IAH. Ground crews stopped traffic behind the AC & ground to cockpit communications were maintained. Since the prohibition on high power run ups was airport specific, and contained in a maintenance manual not available to the crew, it does not seem appropriate to condemn the crew for running up at the gate, when it would have been normal for them to do so back at the hub.
/Quote
The event committee consisted of the airlines rep, a pilot union rep and an ex airline pilot for that airline( the FAA inspector), I think thats just a little one sided don't you?...
/Unquote
The FAA guy was ex-TI, not CAL. I knew of one ex-TI guy who hated CAL and everyone associated with it. He was a recruiter for ExpressJet, having CAL experience on your resume was a sure fire way to get not hired. So no, it may well not have been very one sided at all.
/Quote
it would be nice to at least have the truth which I think the family of that chap deserve...
/Unquote
He failed to remain clear of the danger zone.
And the flight crew did not push him.
Everything else in the whole chain of events might have been done differently... deplane the pax, MX tow the ship to a runup area, have a mechanic at the controls, with the proper pages from the CAL Manual referred to... but when the procedure calls for the thrust levers to be advanced, but if you step into the danger zone, the result is going to be the same tragedy.
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robthree, so if I understand you, flight crews regularly did high power runs following airport procedures at IAH which according to a previous post is disallowed in the COM? 
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The FAA guy was ex-TI, not CAL. I knew of one ex-TI guy who hated CAL and everyone associated with it. He was a recruiter for ExpressJet, having CAL experience on your resume was a sure fire way to get not hired. So no, it may well not have been very one sided at all.
it does not seem appropriate to condemn the crew for running up at the gate, when it would have been normal for them to do so back at the hub.
You cannot operate an aircraft based on what is the norm at your own base, full stop........
He failed to remain clear of the danger zone.
What if he didn't know. The danger area, as far as he was concerned, could have been no where near his hat.... Just speculation ,I know, but maybe if the investigator was allowed to interview the pilots we might know more......
It would be nice to have all the details, but unfortunaltey the event committee decided that there was no case for an investigation( a little suspicious considering the panel members), so hopefully the congressional committee will be able to find out more..
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Since the prohibition on high power run ups was airport specific, and contained in a maintenance manual not available to the crew
In Europe this basic information is usually included within the Jeppesen plate for that airport.
Anyway as I suggested previously I don't think this can be attributed to any one person or department, but maybe (hopefully) changes will be introduced to ensure it doesn't happen again. That's the way aviation safety works - regrettably there are always casualties before these changes are seen as required.
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Boeing prohibits High power runs with the cowls open with personnel in the danger zone of the engine because the cowl is part of the containment structure and as such an uncontained rotor failure would send schrapnel into the fuselage or personnel in that area......Motoring is allowed which can get about 32% N2. Plenty for an oil pressure leak check. Did Continental provide proper training for these contract mechanics or was it the typical deal where an FBO gets the contract and there mechs watch a video.....my guess is just that.......The poor guy may never have been around a large diameter fan engine before and probably did not know any better......The captain surely did and should have consulted with Continental maintenance and his ops manual. He would have found a prohibition for powered engine runs there at the gate with passengers as well as a very specific procedure for doing any engine run..........As we all know however.....vestri vita est in vestri manuum............It has always been that way...Continental was grossly negligent, the captain and co-pilot were grossly negligent, the mechanics employer was grossly negligent and the mechanic is dead....is est quis is est. tristis vero
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God help us.
Sounds like 2 mistakes then, but who had the bigger watch ?
Surely not the the poor sap who was governed by time.
Another example of d*ckheads with ideas above their station complaining after the fact with 20/20 vision about things they don`t understand.
If they hadn`t agreed on the course of action why did they attempt it ?
Surely not the the poor sap who was governed by time.
Another example of d*ckheads with ideas above their station complaining after the fact with 20/20 vision about things they don`t understand.
If they hadn`t agreed on the course of action why did they attempt it ?
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Ps.
Mid eighties a tecknic was sucked into a Bae 146 Alf engine in Hatfield, UK.
l remember being a tad on edge during the oil leak check on start up since, and still am.
Mid eighties a tecknic was sucked into a Bae 146 Alf engine in Hatfield, UK.
l remember being a tad on edge during the oil leak check on start up since, and still am.
