Records: Southwest Airlines flew 'unsafe' planes

[E.Z. Flyer]

F.A.A. Fines Southwest Air in Inspections

I disagree that it is an open and shut case. Statistically, SWA could not have flown the frequency of flights they did without there being an adequate safety margin. They (SWA) did recognize and agree that within their own airworthiness routine of flight safety margins and tolerances, that within .06% margin errors did occur. SWA further acknowledged that this error was their own and they are solely liable and responsible for what they claimed before the FAA as an error in computer software. That such an error caused them to state that aircraft had been fully inspected when in fact they are not.

It is the basis and the reason they notified the FAA as soon as they became aware of the problem. However to say though, SWA mechanics did not look the other way or ignore the airworthiness of any one part of any aircraft ever. It is not yet identified as a case of procedures that should have been followed as ignored.

Within the group of roughly 1500 flights that continued to operate past inspection, there would likely be an airworthiness issue for which SWA notified the FAA.

Should SWA be fined? SWA's point is they identified an error that needs to be resolved.

F.A.A. Fines Southwest Air in Inspections

[FrequentSLF]

“This was never an issue of a safety-of-flight concern,”

Title taken from the article of the New York Times

As a SLF I am wondering how lightly some safety issues are taken. AD must be complied or the a/c shall be grounded. Am I wrong?

A 4" crack is not a safety concern? How big a crack must be before is a safety concern? Why SWA repaired those crack if they were not a safety concern?

FrequentSLF

[Capitalism]

That argument is easily refuted because to receive immunity from fines & criminal prosecution, airlines must cease noncompliance after self-disclosing a violation.

This was obviously not the case. The FAA supervisor whom allegedly gave concurrence regarding operations beyond the 4,500-flight inspection threashold has since been fired or reassigned.

So the only question left to ask is whether or not there's incentive to comply in the first place. And I believe there is only one right answer to that question.

Open & shut

[sevenstrokeroll]

according to cnn's report on rep. oberstar's investigation, this does, repeat , does include rudder inspections as well as fatigue crack inspections. many of the concerns raised in the article aren't journalistic spin, but quotes from the congressman. worst thing in 23 years or something like that.

that no one died during this time because of lack of inspections does not mean things were safe.

all , or virtually all, big 737 operators have other plane types in their fleet. southwest does not. this would of certainly had a bigger impact on southwest than any other airline.


some say southwest has never had a fatal crash...that is spin. we must all remember the innocent little boy who was killed when a southwest airliner overran the runway at chicago midway...at Christmas time just a couple of years ago. the boy's name: joshua woods.

[E.Z. Flyer]

Southwest Airlines Responds to FAA Letter of Penalty

Southwest Airlines Responds to FAA Letter of Penalty

DALLAS--March 6, 2007--Receipt of the FAA letter of penalty gives us the chance to present our case and get the facts out which we feel will support our actions taken back in March 2007. We understand the FAA's concerns, and we are anxious to work with them. We assure our Customers that this was never a safety of flight issue.

The FAA penalty is related to one of many routine and redundant inspections on our aircraft fleet involving an extremely small area in one of the many overlapping inspections. These inspections were designed to detect early signs of skin cracking.

Southwest Airlines discovered *the missed inspection area, disclosed it to the FAA, and promptly reinspected all potentially affected aircraft in March 2007. The FAA approved our actions and considered the matter closed as of April 2007. The Boeing Company supports Southwest's aggressive compliance plan was technically valid, and in Boeing's opinion, Southwest acted responsibly and the safety of the fleet was not compromised.

Southwest has an excellent maintenance program, with more Boeing 737 aircraft experience than any carrier in the world. Our experience has helped improve the overall safety of the fleet.

* A spokeswoman for Southwest, Linda Rutherford, acknowledged that when the airline disclosed its error, it checked a box saying it had ceased the violation. But, she said, that was an “administrative error.”

“We continued flying with the concurrence of F.A.A. and the F.A.A.’s approval of our plan to bring ourselves back into compliance,” Ms. Rutherford said.

She added that the airline had inspected “99.4 percent” of the area it was supposed to, but, because of an error in the computer program that tells inspectors what tasks to accomplish, skipped 0.6 percent.

“This was never an issue of a safety-of-flight concern,” she said.

F.A.A. Fines Southwest Air in Inspections NY Times Article


Boeing Statement on Southwest 737 Fleet Safety

Southwest Airlines contacted Boeing for verification of their technical opinion that the continued operation of their Classic 737s, for up to ten days until the airplanes could be reinspected, did not pose a safety of flight issue. Based on a thorough review of many factors, including fleet history and test data, as well as other inspections and maintenance previously incorporated, Boeing concluded the 10-day compliance plan was technically valid. In Boeing's opinion, the safety of the Southwest fleet was not compromised.


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Southwest enters the blogosphere! Check out our corporate blog, Nuts About Southwest, at www.blogsouthwest.com and our Adopt-A-Pilot blog at www.adoptapilot.blogs.com.

[carholme]

If Boeing agreed with Southwests actions, why did Southwest not apply for an AMOC, having consulted with the manufacturer. Or as is probably the case, did Southwest talk to Boeing after the fact.

Spin is great whether it is from the media or the respondent but an AD is an AD is an AD.

Secondly, in this great culture of SMS, where was their internal oversight?

carholme

[sevenstrokeroll]

just because boeing says its safe, doesn't mean its safe.

boeing said the 737 rudder system was safe, before and after PIT and COS.

[Golden Rivit]

All Large company's have corruption,http://www.thelastinspector.com/27822.html

[IGh]

FAA "safety" system faults, Oberstar, OIG interaction

The IG's web-site has this tid-bit, sounds merely that there may have been some lifting-the-rug, and sweeping -- and a minor safety complaint may have gone uncorrected. If the FAA guys at that SW-region had simply done their job, responded properly to a minor safety issue, then there would likely have been no story (and SWA would never have been mentioned in later press).

= = = \/ = = = EXCERPTS = == == \/ = = =


http://www.oig.dot.gov/item.jsp?id=2232

Department of Transportation … Office of Inspector General

“… The objectives of our review will be to determine
(1) the thoroughness of FAA’s investigation of whistleblower allegations and
(2) the type and timeliness of corrective actions FAA took in response to any inappropriate inspector actions.

We will also examine FAA’s air carrier oversight processes … to determine if there are areas in which FAA could strengthen its oversight.

Our audit will include work at FAA Headquarters, regional offices, Flight Standards field offices, and air carrier offices.

= = = = /\ = = = END Excerpt = = = /\ = = =

[barit1]

All Large company's have corruption,http://www.thelastinspector.com/27822.html

...and large governments, of course, have no corruption?

[ankh]

imaging

http://www.ndt.net/article/v04n09/bcohen/fig26.jpg

"Fig 26: Thermal Wave Image of Corrosion and Disbonding near tear strap/stringer of a Boeing 737"

"In addition to imaging the pattern of subsurface flaws and corrosion, the technique can rapidly (a few seconds) make quantitative measurements of less than 1% material loss for various regions in the image"

From: http://www.ndt.net/article/v04n09/bcohen/bcohen.htm

[skiingman]

pasoundman, i suppose I shall use the sarcasm tag next time.

A 4" crack is not a safety concern? How big a crack must be before is a safety concern?

Depends on what the crack is in, how often the part is inspected, and what happens if the crack propagates.

[Jimmyjimjim]

MacDaddy,

Yes.

I agree no need to spend any thought on either aviation safety or global warming. Its all a myth.
Carry on.

[ankh]

Federal Register: October 6, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 193)

> how big

What you see on the surface isn't a good guide. This was an "early warning" that could have prevented the Aloha failure, but was missed:
http://faalessons.workforceconnect.org/l2/Aloha/cc1

Note the indication of the small visible crack, compared to the underlying failure discovered by looking:

http://faalessons.workforceconnect.o...8_d969f3089a55

These keep happening as the aircraft get older, for example

[Docket No. FAA-2005-22629; Directorate Identifier 2005-NM-089-AD]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 737-200, -300, -400, and -
500 Series Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD)
for certain Boeing Model 737-200, -300, -400, and -500 series
airplanes. This proposed AD would require a one-time inspection of
frames between station 360 and station 907 to determine if a subject
support bracket for the air conditioning outlet extrusion is installed,
and related repetitive investigative actions and repair if necessary.
This proposed AD also provides an optional preventive modification that
would end the repetitive investigative actions. This proposed AD would
also require a one-time post-modification/repair inspection for
cracking of each repaired/modified frame. This proposed AD results from
numerous reports indicating that frame cracks have been found at the
attachment holes for support brackets for the air conditioning outlet
extrusion. We are proposing this AD to detect and correct such
cracking, which, if the cracking were to continue to grow, could result
in a severed frame. A severed frame, combined with existing multi-site
damage at the stringer 10 lap splice, could result in rapid
decompression of the airplane.
-----------------------------------------------------

Aloha event:
http://faalessons.workforceconnect.o...b_6e0424c8a413
http://faalessons.workforceconnect.org/l2/Aloha/cold/
http://faalessons.workforceconnect.org/l2/Aloha/find1/
http://faalessons.workforceconnect.org/l2/Aloha/find2/

[Brian Abraham]

From AVweb today

Boeing Defends Southwest

Boeing is leaping to the defense of its biggest customer, issuing a statement saying it agreed with Southwest Airlines’ plan to continue flying 46 older 737s that hadn’t been inspected for specific fatigue cracks. “In Boeing's opinion, the safety of the Southwest fleet was not compromised,” Boeing said in a statement released late Thursday, a day after the FAA proposed fines of $10.2 million against the airline. $10 million of that fine is to be levied for 1,451 flights conducted on the 46 737-300s after Southwest blew the whistle on itself for not carrying out the fatigue crack inspections during the previous year. After discovering the lapse in inspections and reporting it to the FAA, the airline reinspected the aircraft and found six with small cracks, which were repaired. However, the aircraft remained in service during the 10 days it took to inspect them and that’s what the FAA is so cranky about. "The FAA is taking action against Southwest Airlines for a failing to follow rules that are designed to protect passengers and crew," said Nick Sabatini, the agency's associate administrator for safety. "We expect the airline industry to fully comply with all FAA directives and take corrective action."

Southwest, perhaps with some justification, is pointing out that it discovered the error itself and moved to fix the problem as soon as it could. Before launching any of the 46 aircraft involved, it checked with Boeing to see if that posed a potential hazard. “Southwest Airlines contacted Boeing for verification of their technical opinion that the continued operation of their Classic 737s, for up to ten days until the airplanes could be reinspected, did not pose a safety of flight issue,” Boeing said in a statement. “Based on a thorough review of many factors, including fleet history and test data, as well as other inspections and maintenance previously incorporated, Boeing concluded the 10-day compliance plan was technically valid.”

[carholme]

So when did Southwest talk to Boeing, before or after the supposed memory lapse. If it was before they were hit by the FAA, why wasn't the Boeing approval submitted to the FAA in the form of an AMOC for the ADs? This would have been the correct method if they wanted a time extension of the ADs for "operational reasons"
In these days of SMS, where was the internal oversight in Southwest? A $10 million fine wasn't imposed because the FAA has nothing better to do.
You want self regulation, you get it but don't come whining when you screw up or expect others to justify your situation for you.

carholme

[IGh]

non-functional safety programs: ASAP, SMS, &ct

"... In these days of SMS, where was the internal oversight ..."

This is one aspect (and there will be others from inside FAA's SW Region) that will be of future interest to the SMS-boosters:
Can SMS (or ASAP) really work? -- when inside the FAA’s SW-Region there exists a cozy relationship between “regulator” and “operator”? In some cases, there has been a role-reversal, with the operator informing the local “regulator” about their locally invented “standard”.

Currently the ASAP program (as practiced inside FAA’s SW-Region) has shown some of the weaknesses that will affect SMS: an investigation of a minor-mishap failed to recognize the “system” weakness that caused a minor mishap. The USA’s independent Safety Board claims they (NTSB) have no authority to re-appraise such a misguided ASAP Event Review (citing that anything-ASAP is privileged information). With a failed ASAP-program (won’t correct minor errs and lack of oversight), and a failed company “safety czar”, the employees can only resort to the failed “FAA Safety Hotline”, then LASTLY the IG -- after all other “safety” programs fail.

In other cases, instead of an early and honest acknowledgement of a company’s err, combined with the local-FAA’s lack of oversight, both the regulator and the operator were too quick to assert that the err was instead merely a human err of an airline’s employee. Both the regulator and the operator joined together to reassure others that their local “system” was fine (while failing to correct the minor system-err).

For an example of SW-Region’s oversight, consider the Findings #34, #35, and #36 in AAR-01/02 (pg 169 bottom): neither the local regulator, nor the managers at that airline, were capable of discerning the specific points of non-compliance inside the operator’s “system” (eg, an erroneous or falsified “standard” included in manuals).

[PJ2]

Regarding SMS and "the Regulator", be they Canadian or US, what can be said?

SMS means that it is Flight Operations managers, not the Regulator, who will now "self-regulate" and inform the Regulator of what they are doing, reversing traditional roles in favour of commercial, not safety values. The conflict of interest is both palpable and inappropriate.

At it's most basic, rubber-meets-the-road level, the "Flight Operations" manager who gave a pilot grief in the morning for an operations matter cannot retain sufficient credibility for that same pilot to discuss a matter of safety in the afternoon with the same "SMS" manager.

On a much larger scale, where do safety programs come from if "everyone is responsible for safety"? How do they gain funding in such an environment? Can such a conversation take place when the language is that of business, not safety? Those who have been in high-level safety board meetings will know how sensitive and even difficult it is for such topics to gain traction let alone be opened up at all.

In a profit-driven enterprise, it is the airlines' management's responsibility to control costs and ensure the commercial enterprise is "efficiently run" so that the shareholder has his/her just reward. So who, in such an arrangement, must at the same time make those tough decisions which comply with the principles of flight safety while increasing costs?

In this curious, de-regulated environment, how can the two fundamentally-opposed principles work within one department or one manager? Is a three-day course on SMS sufficient to make everyone a safety specialist? Can they spot operational issues of higher risk and act? Is there pressure not to?

This is something that SMS will have to demonstrate before it can be believed and the record thus far is poor - the present case is not the only occurrence. When making decisions which intend only to control costs as we have seen demonstrated here, where does safety actually emerge from? Who, within a conservative, traditional bureaucratic organizational structure such as an airline management, is going to attach their name to "increased costs" at meetings where reducing costs is the constant (and likely the only) agenda? Who will risk their career stalling while others who remain quiet and subservient, advance? Where will the advocates to spend on safety come from when the mantra is "control costs"? The case for flight safety is curiously very difficult to argue because the results are, (hopefully) "nothing happens" - so complacency is easy to come by. Conversely, when "nothing is happening", that is used as an argument that the airline is indeed "successful", and that standards may be "safely" reduced in a process characterized as "the Normalization of Deviance", a term which Diane Vaughan created in her 1996 book on the Challenger accident.

Airline managements are likely welcoming this "deregulation of flight safety" mantra mainly because documentation, not action, is the primary metric and, it is increasingly understood as the Regulator "steps back", the "key to success" in SMS. In other words, compliance is easily demonstrated through the existence of reams and reams of such documentation possessing effective titles and references, but observing actual actions and decisions does not count.

Operational/Commercial priorities cannot co-exist within the same governing entity, department or manager, as the priorities of effective and meaningful safety principles and programs. There exists a natural and necessary tension between the two as we all know - a perfectly safe airline is one that doesn't fly and short-term gain for investors comes from ignoring safety. One must be free to advocate and even argue from either position but not both - it simply isn't possible.

Unless there is solid buy-in, understanding and support for safety decisions over commercial decisions made by traditional operations-driven managers in the daily operation and unless airline managements comprehend these principles and make corporate decisions accordingly under SMS and finally, unless such priorities are clearly, unequivocally, publicly supported first by the CEO and rest of the executive management of the airline AND the shareholders, the entire SMS process is doomed to failure with risk to all increasing thereby.

In my experience, (and in view of this latest incident at Southwest which is much more than the tempest in a teapot that those who are only focussed on the operational side have spun it as), SMS has a great deal to answer for already.

[AA SLF]

S'west has grounded 41 of 117 planes in their fleet with immediate effect. It is going to be a mess at S'west check-in counters. . . . .

ps - see CNN for more news . . . .

[Airbubba]

Southwest Airlines grounds dozens of jets after safety probe

11:29 AM CDT on Wednesday, March 12, 2008
By DAVE MICHAELS / The Dallas Morning News
[email protected]

Southwest Airlines has grounded as many as 42 of its Boeing jets for possible structural damage, the Federal Aviation Administration said Wednesday.

The airline’s decision comes as it faces regulatory and congressional investigations into its decision last year to keep flying 46 jets that required safety inspections for fuselage damage.


Southwest informed the FAA about the decision to ground the jets earlier Wednesday morning, FAA spokeswoman Laura Brown said.

Shortly before 11 a.m., a Southwest Airlines spokeswoman declined to confirm or deny the FAA report.

As of Dec. 31, 2007, Southwest flew 520 Boeing 737 jets, including 194 of the older Boeing 737-300 that have been the target of the stepped-up fuselage inspections.

Southwest said Tuesday that it had placed three employees on leave in connection with an internal investigation into the safety lapses.