Air accidents at record low
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Air accidents at record low
Air accidents are at a record low. The number of air accidents fell to its lowest level for more than 40 years last year.
There were 136 accidents worldwide over the past 12 months against 164 the previous year, making it the best year since 1963.
Aviation in general is becoming safer every year
There were 136 accidents worldwide over the past 12 months against 164 the previous year, making it the best year since 1963.
Aviation in general is becoming safer every year
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google hints at source being
http://www.baaa-acro.com/Communique%...-UK-010108.htm
(text in link explaining numbers as well)
cited eg by http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au...-12377,00.html
http://www.baaa-acro.com/Communique%...-UK-010108.htm
(text in link explaining numbers as well)
cited eg by http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au...-12377,00.html
Psychophysiological entity
Don't tempt fate!!!
Yes, it's funny how even scientists feel reluctant to prod at fate.
As I said on t'other thread, it does seem that SOPs and other modern teachings, coupled with high-tech systems, is countering a lower experience level in crews. I was once told that I needed 8,000 (that's not a mistake) to fly a certain Apache out of Luton. Things have changed a tad.
However, I'm mindful of one of my favorite sayings. 'Randomness comes in lumps.'
All the best for a safe new year.
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lower experience level in crews
Although next year could be totally different, lets not speak too soon...
Great play on Title wording
Anytime that you have more than 5 minutes between accidents than one could argure that Air accidents are at their all time low of zero in-between accidents
On the other hand if one considers that both pro-active and re-active preventive measures take years to implement and generate meaningful statistical effect than maybe a 5 year rolling average rate might be a more realistic measure, although it makes a lousy headline or grabber thread title
Anytime that you have more than 5 minutes between accidents than one could argure that Air accidents are at their all time low of zero in-between accidents
On the other hand if one considers that both pro-active and re-active preventive measures take years to implement and generate meaningful statistical effect than maybe a 5 year rolling average rate might be a more realistic measure, although it makes a lousy headline or grabber thread title
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Here are the numbers from http://aviation-safety.net
("number of fatal aircraft accidents and total number fatalities involving civil multi-engine airliners of which the basic model has been certified for carrying 13 or more passengers")
year, #accidents, #fatalities, øaccidents, øfatalities (ø over the last 5 years)
leading zeroes for formatting
2007 26 0750 28 0761
2006 27 0888 30 0831
2005 35 1059 31 0807
2004 28 0429 31 0812
2003 25 0679 34 0860
2002 37 1101 36 0968
2001 28 0768 37 0996
2000 36 1082 42 1206
1999 42 0671 45 1224
1998 39 1219 47 1382
1997 42 1240 49 1366
1996 52 1817 52 1426
1995 50 1173 52 1288
1994 53 1462 50 1192
1993 48 1138 52 1205
1992 57 1541 54 1206
1991 53 1125
1990 39 0693
1989 61 1530
1988 59 1143
I think we can speak of decreasing numbers here
("number of fatal aircraft accidents and total number fatalities involving civil multi-engine airliners of which the basic model has been certified for carrying 13 or more passengers")
year, #accidents, #fatalities, øaccidents, øfatalities (ø over the last 5 years)
leading zeroes for formatting
2007 26 0750 28 0761
2006 27 0888 30 0831
2005 35 1059 31 0807
2004 28 0429 31 0812
2003 25 0679 34 0860
2002 37 1101 36 0968
2001 28 0768 37 0996
2000 36 1082 42 1206
1999 42 0671 45 1224
1998 39 1219 47 1382
1997 42 1240 49 1366
1996 52 1817 52 1426
1995 50 1173 52 1288
1994 53 1462 50 1192
1993 48 1138 52 1205
1992 57 1541 54 1206
1991 53 1125
1990 39 0693
1989 61 1530
1988 59 1143
I think we can speak of decreasing numbers here
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Without wishing to cause this thread to drift, I'll mention first that 2007 was a bad year for GA and sport aviation fatalities in the UK, and that no-one has posted a comparison between normalised fleet age and fatalities, to which the cognoscenti would refer before drawing other conclusions... 
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Wait a minute... Before comparing one year with another, using data such as those in the post from the hawk, we need to standardise the numbers of accidents for activity level. That is to say, we need to compute the accident rate, not just the raw number of accidents.
There is a variety of ways of defining accident rate. It could be number of accidents per cycle, or per passenger kilometer flown, for example. It's a little worrying that, in their announcement, B.A.A.A./A.C.R.O does not seem to have done this, but maybe the rates are given somewhere else in their data base.
Of course, our intuition tells us that the number of cycles and the number of passenger kilometers were both higher in 2007 than in 2006, and so if the raw accident data show a decrease then so too should the accident rates. But the numbers that would go into the denominator (that is, the number of cycles, or the number of passenger kilometers, etc) probably haven't been increasing for each year over the last decade (consider the post 9/11 effect), and so we need to be cautious in interpreting long-term trends.
There is a variety of ways of defining accident rate. It could be number of accidents per cycle, or per passenger kilometer flown, for example. It's a little worrying that, in their announcement, B.A.A.A./A.C.R.O does not seem to have done this, but maybe the rates are given somewhere else in their data base.
Of course, our intuition tells us that the number of cycles and the number of passenger kilometers were both higher in 2007 than in 2006, and so if the raw accident data show a decrease then so too should the accident rates. But the numbers that would go into the denominator (that is, the number of cycles, or the number of passenger kilometers, etc) probably haven't been increasing for each year over the last decade (consider the post 9/11 effect), and so we need to be cautious in interpreting long-term trends.
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Statistics
It does look encouraging & if accurate, obviously a welcome trend but remember Mr Disraeli - "Lies, damned lies and statistics."
As lomapaseo says it takes years to develop safe practice but not long to lose it. Be wary of managers using this to deny the effect of pilot fatigue/poisoned cabin air/exhausted engineers etc.
Having made the industry safe we need to keep it that way and the first place complacency will emerge is in the boardroom.
As lomapaseo says it takes years to develop safe practice but not long to lose it. Be wary of managers using this to deny the effect of pilot fatigue/poisoned cabin air/exhausted engineers etc.
Having made the industry safe we need to keep it that way and the first place complacency will emerge is in the boardroom.
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Ten years ago, at an ALPA safety conference, we were told that if the accident rate was as bad in 2000 as it was in 1960, we'd have a major accident every week (in the US).
And if the accident rate is as bad in 2030 as it was in 2000, we'll have a major accident every week.....
And if the accident rate is as bad in 2030 as it was in 2000, we'll have a major accident every week.....
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Southernboy,
Safety improvement at present is coming from the industry trend for new aircraft in high-capacity (and thus modern) operating environments. New aircraft are more economical and better proofed against fatigued, inexperienced, and poorly-trained, pilots.
Decisions which are good for shareholders are good for safety.
Safety improvement at present is coming from the industry trend for new aircraft in high-capacity (and thus modern) operating environments. New aircraft are more economical and better proofed against fatigued, inexperienced, and poorly-trained, pilots.
Decisions which are good for shareholders are good for safety.
Decisions which are good for shareholders are good for safety
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Difficult to grasp, but...
PJ2, you miss my point. Buying modern aircraft and operating them in well-developed environments is worth far more, in safety terms, than any airy-fairy 'safety initiative'. 
These modern aircraft, and their operational environment, support safe operations by borderline-competant crew on a daily basis.
These modern aircraft, and their operational environment, support safe operations by borderline-competant crew on a daily basis.
frontlefthamster;
I did miss your point, thanks.
I would add to the notion that aircraft today make it safer by virtue of their design and reliability, that there are alongside such primary contributions, many other processes which, because they are "normal" to the daily ops are transparent to the operation and crews yet nevertheless are effective in avoiding serious incidents. One example might be an organizational decision to create policies (vice relying upon ops-specs or regs) regarding "Low visibility operations"; who does the approach under what conditions, etc. There are many other such examples.
Safety initiatives such as FOQA/FDM, ASRs, LOSA etc are.... "airy-fairy"?
I did miss your point, thanks.
I would add to the notion that aircraft today make it safer by virtue of their design and reliability, that there are alongside such primary contributions, many other processes which, because they are "normal" to the daily ops are transparent to the operation and crews yet nevertheless are effective in avoiding serious incidents. One example might be an organizational decision to create policies (vice relying upon ops-specs or regs) regarding "Low visibility operations"; who does the approach under what conditions, etc. There are many other such examples.
Safety initiatives such as FOQA/FDM, ASRs, LOSA etc are.... "airy-fairy"?
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Safety
Of course new aircraft are the reason and v welcome for all that but are you (FLH) suggesting that we can now sit back & ignore all the hard won lessons honed when a/c were unreliable?
New technology did not save numerous Indonesian nor the recent Turkish CFIT victims and many others did it?
Tired poorly trained pilots can still kill people, hi tech or no.
New technology did not save numerous Indonesian nor the recent Turkish CFIT victims and many others did it?
Tired poorly trained pilots can still kill people, hi tech or no.
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Tired poorly trained pilots can still kill people, hi tech or no
FOQA/FDM
ASRs
LOSA
flh:
FOQA, ASR and LOSA Programs don't need defending from me of course but I am interested in the views expressed nevertheless. I am not assuming naivete here at all and am taking your response seriously.
Would you stop work on "aviation safety" at the aircraft-design stage then? What are your views on the role of the regulator, and of individual airline policies and procedures, including SOPs both in and beyond the cockpit?
I ask because in one approach, unacceptable risk is (so your line of thought appears to suggest), designed out of the system whereas in the latter approach, some level of risk, acceptable or otherwise, is assumed to always be present and so programs are designed to highlight such areas so something can be done to mitigate risk-made-visible.
The notion that the rate of fatal accidents is somehow more acceptable in Africa than "elsewhere" depends upon who's views you are invoking. I doubt if either ICAO, IATA or even the FSF would concur with your opinion. The only logical conclusion one may draw from the observation is then, perhaps the Africans themselves accept the fatality rate as somehow "inevitable"? Is this more of a political observation than a tactical one? Either way, the point requires clarification.
I note a strong disdain for the work of "academics, pretenders or otherwise". I don't know how one actually comes to define "a wannabe" from a genuine academic but if I pursue that, this thread will likely be moved! I think suspending judgement in favour of curiosity is better approach, and is always a healthy attitude but only on the basis of the work produced - if it's poor work, (and there is a lot of it around and there are a lot of guys out there stumping ideas and selling books. I note however that the snake-oil doesn't survive very long), then academia needs to hear about it. Otherwise, dismissing "academics" for the sake of it is simply an irrational prejudice and not worthy of further discussion. I doubt if that's what you meant but that is for you to clarify, not me. For sure there are charlatans everywhere in all walks. One's notions must either withstand the marketplace of ideas or they must fail on their own merit (despite individual attitudes towards either profession). That goes for pilots and academics alike, although results of anyone "pretending to the throne" as pilots are clearly more serious. The business has a way of winnowing, as you likely know.
For me, and this will not come as a shock I am sure, I see a partnership between knowledge and design. Some here have said it differently - bad pilots still kill people regardless of how push-buttony, CRT'd and Idiot-proofed the craft their flying is. Not sure if you fly the Airbus product but that airplane will still very nicely and smoothly fly you into the ground. Are you a fan then of auto-go-arounds, auto-TCAS interventions and auto-CFIT responses? My assumption is that you are, for if you are not then there is indeed a limit to which design and automation will intercede in flight path control beyond the crew's authority and which then will clearly point to data-gathering, risk-management and human intervention responses.
FWIW, I find your challenge very interesting indeed as one place to find either justifications for, or the true criticisms (and change) of, any such "airy-fairy" work particularly in aviation where very expensive fluff does not belong, is from these very observations. Just because something is complex, has a long history and is the creation of and subject of many academic works does not automatically imbue them with the royal jelly.
But I will leave you with one example and you can either take it from there or I will assume you weren't serious in the first place and was just having fun with the remarks made: -Don Bateman, the inventor, (literally) of GPWS and later EGPWS, has almost certainly, (although I don't have the exact numbers), single-handedly saved more lives from his chair in academia than the Airbus design itself. That's obviously a guess but I think it's a pretty good one, given that most airliners have Don's invention and perhaps even EGPWS but not all airliners are Airbus 320 fleet types - in fact, most are not. Nevertheless, there it is - a blend of academia, intelligently conceived and applied, and intelligently comprehended and implemented, (where worthy, which, see above), and good design such as the Airbus (with which I heartily agree with you having flown and instructed on the 319/320/330/340 types for many thousands of hours) is the best recipe for safe flight. I believe that an unquestioned disdain for academia and it's products and place in aviation is a significant mistake but that is a personal view again which needs no defence here. The marketplace of ideas and perhaps the statistics have already independantly voted.
Best,
PJ2
Quote:
Tired poorly trained pilots can still kill people, hi tech or no
True, but at a rate, and in parts of the world, where it seems 'acceptable'.
Quote:
FOQA/FDM
A bit airy-fairy but a useful tool to keep folk worried about doing anything out of the ordinary.
Quote:
ASRs
Quite airy-fairy, although correctly used, the system can have significant impact in reducing, for example, ramp events (which are very costly).
Quote:
LOSA
The most airy-fairy of the group you put forward, but a great place for wannabe academics to pretend that they aren't dull, boring pilots. (I think I got that the right way round...)
Tired poorly trained pilots can still kill people, hi tech or no
True, but at a rate, and in parts of the world, where it seems 'acceptable'.
Quote:
FOQA/FDM
A bit airy-fairy but a useful tool to keep folk worried about doing anything out of the ordinary.
Quote:
ASRs
Quite airy-fairy, although correctly used, the system can have significant impact in reducing, for example, ramp events (which are very costly).
Quote:
LOSA
The most airy-fairy of the group you put forward, but a great place for wannabe academics to pretend that they aren't dull, boring pilots. (I think I got that the right way round...)
Would you stop work on "aviation safety" at the aircraft-design stage then? What are your views on the role of the regulator, and of individual airline policies and procedures, including SOPs both in and beyond the cockpit?
I ask because in one approach, unacceptable risk is (so your line of thought appears to suggest), designed out of the system whereas in the latter approach, some level of risk, acceptable or otherwise, is assumed to always be present and so programs are designed to highlight such areas so something can be done to mitigate risk-made-visible.
The notion that the rate of fatal accidents is somehow more acceptable in Africa than "elsewhere" depends upon who's views you are invoking. I doubt if either ICAO, IATA or even the FSF would concur with your opinion. The only logical conclusion one may draw from the observation is then, perhaps the Africans themselves accept the fatality rate as somehow "inevitable"? Is this more of a political observation than a tactical one? Either way, the point requires clarification.
I note a strong disdain for the work of "academics, pretenders or otherwise". I don't know how one actually comes to define "a wannabe" from a genuine academic but if I pursue that, this thread will likely be moved!
I think suspending judgement in favour of curiosity is better approach, and is always a healthy attitude but only on the basis of the work produced - if it's poor work, (and there is a lot of it around and there are a lot of guys out there stumping ideas and selling books. I note however that the snake-oil doesn't survive very long), then academia needs to hear about it. Otherwise, dismissing "academics" for the sake of it is simply an irrational prejudice and not worthy of further discussion. I doubt if that's what you meant but that is for you to clarify, not me. For sure there are charlatans everywhere in all walks. One's notions must either withstand the marketplace of ideas or they must fail on their own merit (despite individual attitudes towards either profession). That goes for pilots and academics alike, although results of anyone "pretending to the throne" as pilots are clearly more serious. The business has a way of winnowing, as you likely know.For me, and this will not come as a shock I am sure, I see a partnership between knowledge and design. Some here have said it differently - bad pilots still kill people regardless of how push-buttony, CRT'd and Idiot-proofed the craft their flying is. Not sure if you fly the Airbus product but that airplane will still very nicely and smoothly fly you into the ground. Are you a fan then of auto-go-arounds, auto-TCAS interventions and auto-CFIT responses? My assumption is that you are, for if you are not then there is indeed a limit to which design and automation will intercede in flight path control beyond the crew's authority and which then will clearly point to data-gathering, risk-management and human intervention responses.
FWIW, I find your challenge very interesting indeed as one place to find either justifications for, or the true criticisms (and change) of, any such "airy-fairy" work particularly in aviation where very expensive fluff does not belong, is from these very observations. Just because something is complex, has a long history and is the creation of and subject of many academic works does not automatically imbue them with the royal jelly.
But I will leave you with one example and you can either take it from there or I will assume you weren't serious in the first place and was just having fun with the remarks made: -Don Bateman, the inventor, (literally) of GPWS and later EGPWS, has almost certainly, (although I don't have the exact numbers), single-handedly saved more lives from his chair in academia than the Airbus design itself. That's obviously a guess but I think it's a pretty good one, given that most airliners have Don's invention and perhaps even EGPWS but not all airliners are Airbus 320 fleet types - in fact, most are not. Nevertheless, there it is - a blend of academia, intelligently conceived and applied, and intelligently comprehended and implemented, (where worthy, which, see above), and good design such as the Airbus (with which I heartily agree with you having flown and instructed on the 319/320/330/340 types for many thousands of hours) is the best recipe for safe flight. I believe that an unquestioned disdain for academia and it's products and place in aviation is a significant mistake but that is a personal view again which needs no defence here. The marketplace of ideas and perhaps the statistics have already independantly voted.
Best,
PJ2
PJ2
You seem to have accepted and understood one posters invented word "airy-fairy" and together have cornered this thread into a one on one match between somewhat unequal backgrounds.
Not preferring to step into a sparring match between only two people I'll just sit this one out until I see something productive to discuss.
You seem to have accepted and understood one posters invented word "airy-fairy" and together have cornered this thread into a one on one match between somewhat unequal backgrounds.
Not preferring to step into a sparring match between only two people I'll just sit this one out until I see something productive to discuss.