Pilots safer than ever - Study
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: Confusio Helvetica
Posts: 311
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I must have ranted too long, and my response got eaten. Here's the short version:
I don't think anyone's read the study just yet. All we've got is an abstract from a journal with an editorial seeking submissions.
We can certainly all poke holes in the idea of it. IO might want to point out all the things that don't result in an accident or incident report, and we can concede that; the problem is, if they don't result in something measurable, we can't measure it.
More seriously, as PBL suggests, it's a zero-sum game. Just as everyone dies from something, so the the change in one cause of death will be marked by another. If we cure cancer, we'll see articles decrying the "worsening epidemic of heart disease." If half the population gets wiped out by plague next year, we'll see boasting of how we're winning the battle against AIDS, cancer and heart disease (rather than just the battle against Old Age). So, if one of the factors decreases or increases, the others are affected.
The third problem comes from NA's suggestion that the criteria have changed. Now, his particular statements strike me as being completely false:
I'm not sure that's any more true then than it is now. In societies sufficiently secular where Acts of God are relegated to a sideshow, most of the players in an accident are legally well represented. Individual screwups by pilots are the exception, and they're also an exception to the payout. But they play differently around the world. Some cultures and governments resist the belief that their pilots could make mistakes or commit airborne murder-suicides. And others see a payout from a foreign airline or manufacturer as a good thing.
The pressures on the investigations that produce the report vary by time, culture and government, and they vary considerably. They don't "even out in the wash", and quantitative analyses cannot control for them very well. That's why quantitative analysis of historical data needs to be viewed with suspicion.
As for the other claims:
I think you'll find this is the case before 1983 too, where the handling of ground crews who were unable to read the instructions on how to close cargo doors was looked at, the maintenance record scrutinized, even the arguments in Ops duly noted and considered.
Again, many would disagree. What about a TWA B747 that crashed after take-off in New York? Journalists seeded their reports with false information and criticized investigators widely.
Even leaving apart the questionable notion that media coverage has "improved", that "improvement" does not necessarily imply that it's more accurate.
This is just ludicrous. 20 years ago in developed countries, flying "standby" did not mean flying "Standing Room"
Technological progress does not mean improved conditions. EGPWS and TCAS may help, but the same cockpit automation removed the FE. More precise data and calculations might help, but the same computers allow for peak efficiency of duty rosters, load factors and equipment. And minimum rest cycles were not originally designed to be regular work conditions.
Oh, and speaking of which, ODB: your article needs some sources to it. I also question some of the figures. While it's not disputed that someone operating fatigued can function like someone with a BAC of .05%, nobody functions with a BAC of .8%. Nice cat, though.
I don't think anyone's read the study just yet. All we've got is an abstract from a journal with an editorial seeking submissions.
We can certainly all poke holes in the idea of it. IO might want to point out all the things that don't result in an accident or incident report, and we can concede that; the problem is, if they don't result in something measurable, we can't measure it.
More seriously, as PBL suggests, it's a zero-sum game. Just as everyone dies from something, so the the change in one cause of death will be marked by another. If we cure cancer, we'll see articles decrying the "worsening epidemic of heart disease." If half the population gets wiped out by plague next year, we'll see boasting of how we're winning the battle against AIDS, cancer and heart disease (rather than just the battle against Old Age). So, if one of the factors decreases or increases, the others are affected.
The third problem comes from NA's suggestion that the criteria have changed. Now, his particular statements strike me as being completely false:
Back in those days, there was still a kind of corruption that said: "blame the dead, save the live ones". They blamed anyone who was most convenient to blame, mostly the pilots if they happened to be dead.
The pressures on the investigations that produce the report vary by time, culture and government, and they vary considerably. They don't "even out in the wash", and quantitative analyses cannot control for them very well. That's why quantitative analysis of historical data needs to be viewed with suspicion.
As for the other claims:
Also the method of investigations has changed: now investigators look at the chain of events that brings to the crash and reconstructs the whole flight, down to the pre flight events. This has proven to be very helpful in reducing accident factors.
Improved media coverage has played an important role in pushing investigators to undertake full investigations to determine the real causes of crashes.
A good example is the Bijlmerramp case, an EL-AL B747 that crashed after take-off in Amsterdam. Journalists found out that investigators were seeding their reports with false information and criticized them widely.
A good example is the Bijlmerramp case, an EL-AL B747 that crashed after take-off in Amsterdam. Journalists found out that investigators were seeding their reports with false information and criticized them widely.
Even leaving apart the questionable notion that media coverage has "improved", that "improvement" does not necessarily imply that it's more accurate.
Most hull-losses occured in the last years happened in emerging countries that have aviation standards that developped countries had 20 years ago.
That is mainly because they can't afford to have the same, modern equipment, and to have the same maintenance standards.
That is mainly because they can't afford to have the same, modern equipment, and to have the same maintenance standards.
Also, I would like to add that though the modern computer systems do not make any decisions, they take over many tasks from the pilots so that these can concentrate more on the decisions they need to make. Add to that, they assist pilots in decision-making by giving them precise data through faster, more precise calculations.
Oh, and speaking of which, ODB: your article needs some sources to it. I also question some of the figures. While it's not disputed that someone operating fatigued can function like someone with a BAC of .05%, nobody functions with a BAC of .8%. Nice cat, though.
Those are excellent points made by you guys (and gals).
As DingerX pointed out, the so-called authorities only understand and care about (?) what can be measured, quantified, and avoiding blame, especially if the metal tube carries live passengers instead of freight.
In the corporate sense, this has led to unacceptable outsourcing of maintenance and de-icing services. Never mind the constant 20-minute delays after departure time in order to load bags (no higher rate/overtime pay-people go home).
Happy New Year. Enjoy the salty Spaetzl and warm Gluhwein
. Ade.
As DingerX pointed out, the so-called authorities only understand and care about (?) what can be measured, quantified, and avoiding blame, especially if the metal tube carries live passengers instead of freight.
In the corporate sense, this has led to unacceptable outsourcing of maintenance and de-icing services. Never mind the constant 20-minute delays after departure time in order to load bags (no higher rate/overtime pay-people go home).
Happy New Year. Enjoy the salty Spaetzl and warm Gluhwein
. Ade.
Join Date: Mar 2005
Location: southeast
Posts: 420
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I refer to L337's post on page 1 - I couldn't agree more - spot on IMHO. Increased 'productivity' on the part of flightcrew is undoubtedly leading to increased pilot fatigue. This problem is going to bite someone in the arse very hard, v soon..........Many of the excellent posts have alluded to all the positive changes (both technological and human-related) that have affected the 'industry' over recent years - I think the 'fatigue' issue will more and more act as counterbalance to all these other undoubted improvements which have contributed to increased flight safety.A Happy and SAFE New Year to you all! 
PS Got home last night around 6pm after 6 days on. In bed at 10pm, woke this morning at 11am! Fatigue a problem? You decide!
PS Got home last night around 6pm after 6 days on. In bed at 10pm, woke this morning at 11am! Fatigue a problem? You decide!
Join Date: Sep 2000
Location: Bielefeld, Germany
Posts: 955
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Originally Posted by sidthesexist
I think the 'fatigue' issue will more and more act as counterbalance to all these other undoubted improvements which have contributed to increased flight safety
I understand (from the colleague who did it) that the first serious attention to these physical human factors issues in incidents was paid in the NTSB investigation into the 1985 China Air Lines upset over the Pacific off the coast of California. You can read the report on the Compendium on my WWW site (and a lot of other places now).
It took a long time to get going, though. There was of course some research, indeed some very good work, going on at places such as the DLR aerospace medicine place in Cologne, and NASA Ames. But getting it "on the radar" was another issue.
Then I was asked about what I knew by the chief safety pilot of a major European carrier about a decade ago, whom I had encountered on a Viennese television talk show (answer: nothing, but I will try to find out). So it was on at least some people's radar at that time.
Then came Little Rock. Now, it's on everybody's radar. Duty time limits, as you are likely now aware, are a significant regulatory issue. Fatigue was already No.2 on the NTSB "Most Wanted" list 5 years ago.
So I don't necessarily agree that it is going to take over as the party pooper. Objects with big blips on the radar screen tend to get meticulously vectored. Not necessarily solved, but held within limits.
We could just solve that whole problem, as well as other "pilot error" causes, by moving to passenger UAVs. Anyone here go for that?
PBL
Last edited by PBL; 1st Jan 2008 at 12:21. Reason: speling
Having worked on a number of similar studies I can only tell you that the most important lesson is to define the taxonomy or data collection definitions in such a way that they lead from an input to a useful output.
It does no good to place raw undefined data in front of people whose vision is only of the clouds in the sky without the experience to define the weather.
The first thing that comes to mind is questions about objectiveness of the data collection boundaries and how much subjectiveness is included i.e. by sampling opinions rather than defined definitions of on-off switches in the data.
Having no particular insight into the subject report I only have a question mark here and not yet an opinion.
On the other hand I deplore the premature release of data that has not been analyized by professional safety experts to the level of pointing at updating wide ranging recommendations for improvement in the bottom line which is less accidents/incidents.
If this study doesn't meet the criteria for advancing safety recommendations and at the same time leaves both the public and the professionals confused then NASA may have difficulty in getting funding in the future.
It does no good to place raw undefined data in front of people whose vision is only of the clouds in the sky without the experience to define the weather.
The first thing that comes to mind is questions about objectiveness of the data collection boundaries and how much subjectiveness is included i.e. by sampling opinions rather than defined definitions of on-off switches in the data.
Having no particular insight into the subject report I only have a question mark here and not yet an opinion.
On the other hand I deplore the premature release of data that has not been analyized by professional safety experts to the level of pointing at updating wide ranging recommendations for improvement in the bottom line which is less accidents/incidents.
If this study doesn't meet the criteria for advancing safety recommendations and at the same time leaves both the public and the professionals confused then NASA may have difficulty in getting funding in the future.
Join Date: Sep 2000
Location: Bielefeld, Germany
Posts: 955
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
lomapaseo,
I think the study being talked about on the thread is something to be published in the journal Aviation, Space and Enviromental Medicine 79(1) in Jan 2008.
It seems to me as if your comment is directed to the previously-suppressed NASA study of pilot experience that Administrator Griffin was recently asked by Congress to make available.
Am I right?
PBL
I think the study being talked about on the thread is something to be published in the journal Aviation, Space and Enviromental Medicine 79(1) in Jan 2008.
It seems to me as if your comment is directed to the previously-suppressed NASA study of pilot experience that Administrator Griffin was recently asked by Congress to make available.
Am I right?
PBL
Duty time limits, as you are likely now aware, are a significant regulatory issue. Fatigue was already No.2 on the NTSB "Most Wanted" list 5 years ago.
So I don't necessarily agree that it is going to take over as the party pooper. Objects with big blips on the radar screen tend to get meticulously vectored. Not necessarily solved, but held within limits
So I don't necessarily agree that it is going to take over as the party pooper. Objects with big blips on the radar screen tend to get meticulously vectored. Not necessarily solved, but held within limits
An airline crew in a Canadian-registered airliner can legally be on duty for up to 23 hours. It's actually twenty hours but an "unforseen circumstances" definition in the regs permits crews to "decide for themselves" if they wish to continue. You may guess what airlines do with that freedom.
The twenty-hour limit is permitted if the aircraft is fitted with an SAE-specified bunk (most are not therefore legal), and prone rest is possible, and there is a third crew member. There is no regulatory mention or requirement of a fourth crew member.
While lobbying parliaments and congress has some effect, airline pilots have been forced into changing flight time and duty regs principally through collective agreements, spending negotiating dollars on coming to terms with lax duty day regulation in Canada. Under the heading of "regulatory impact", the CARs (Canadian Air Regs) duty day limits are what the ATAC, with the support of IATA, were able to lobby (negotiate) for and implement on behalf of the airlines during the initial move to the CARs in 1996, (a time, incidentally, when a great deal was already understood regarding human performance and fatigue levels).
Regardless of length of duty day and keeping the above regulatory provision for a third crew member on long-haul operations, a fourth crew-member is only the result of a private, collective agreement between airline and association and where it has occurred was extremely difficult and contentious.
Crews are left improving safety not through lobbied regulatory reform but through collective agreements, an entirely inappropriate arena for such limitations. Duty days for most airline pilots in Canada are lower than these CARs limits because pilots' associations, not airline managements, comprehend the safety risks in high fatigue levels. Long Haul Operations are not dealt with in the CARs except as described.
"Fatigue" issues may be on the radar of some and are the subject of many studies and papers, (I've seen Drew Dawson's work and discussed with him during presentations the notions of using FDA information to assist in studies - much would have to be done to design/facilitate such a study), the subject remains like talking about the weather - nothing is done about it. While it may be polemical to state that Canada is the Monrovia of the flight time - duty day regulatory world, there is no sign whatsoever that Canada's flight time/duty day regulations are to change any time soon - the ATAC lobby is too strong.
Even though we know differently (and I have done enough Hong Kong - Vancouver's with only 3 crew members to know), the difficulty in most cases is, before the accident, "fatigue" is not a demonstrable impediment to safe flight regardless of individual pre-flight details. There is no causal link which can demonstrate with the same strength of an MEL item, higher risk and the clear need for mitigation. Such support must come from knowledge already gained and, as lomapaseo states correctly, turned into a meaningful outcome. There is always the "unforseen circumstances" escape clause and there is always pressure to use it.
Unlike FDA Programs which may point to trends of increasing risk, no such "program" or technology (despite some promising entries) exists which may indicate that a pilot or a crew is sufficiently fatigued that action is required - it is a nebulous "human factor" and remains in the kicking-tin area rather than in pre-emptive areas of flight safety work. "Successful" approaches to commercial viability and fatigue risk management mean that crews keep flying until there is an incident or accident - the only measure of "proof" even today.
So yes, it is taking a long time to recognize fatigue as a real factor in accidents and government regulatory bodies and industry are becoming "more aware" but from where I sit, there is not the slightest sign of steps towards practical recognition and subsequent mitigation in terms of regulatory support and change.
Last edited by PJ2; 1st Jan 2008 at 18:16.
Join Date: Dec 2007
Location: France
Posts: 481
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
...and without being able to download the crash-protected 'individual fatigue recorder' fitted inside the craniumn of every pilot involved in an incident or accident, there's no reason to expect a change. 
Join Date: Sep 2000
Location: Bielefeld, Germany
Posts: 955
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
frontlefthamster,
Actually, I think there is reason. 20 years ago, people knew nothing about fatigue as a psychophysical phenomenon, which it is, and treated it as a matter of pilot self-discipline, which it is not.
Any realisation of reality makes it much harder for anyone (airlines, regulators, investigators) to persist with the old habits based on illusion.
PBL
Actually, I think there is reason. 20 years ago, people knew nothing about fatigue as a psychophysical phenomenon, which it is, and treated it as a matter of pilot self-discipline, which it is not.
Any realisation of reality makes it much harder for anyone (airlines, regulators, investigators) to persist with the old habits based on illusion.
PBL
Join Date: Dec 2007
Location: France
Posts: 481
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Peter, it's impossible to test for human fatigue in the meaningful way in which fatigue in structures was researched after the Comet crashes, so I hold much less hope than you do in this regard.
Given the designed-in weaknesses in modern aircraft (eg the B737-NG flight deck alerting systems), I think there are worlds to cover before human fatigue is properly addressed, especially as the costs (to operators) of addressing it are astronomical. Pilotless aircraft will, of course, solve the problem, but only if there is fuel to run them on.
Given the designed-in weaknesses in modern aircraft (eg the B737-NG flight deck alerting systems), I think there are worlds to cover before human fatigue is properly addressed, especially as the costs (to operators) of addressing it are astronomical. Pilotless aircraft will, of course, solve the problem, but only if there is fuel to run them on.
Join Date: Sep 2000
Location: Bielefeld, Germany
Posts: 955
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
flh,
That is a good and well-phrased point, and you may very well be right.
I suddenly feel nervous. I was joking, and I find myself hoping that you are. Caught at my own game!
PBL
it's impossible to test for human fatigue in the meaningful way in which fatigue in structures was researched after the Comet crashes, so I hold much less hope than you do in this regard.
Pilotless aircraft will, of course, solve the problem
PBL
Pilotless aircraft – why not?
I am sceptical that pilots per se are ‘safer’; yet the industry by common standards is safer – with fewer fatalities and generally a positive public perception.
If the industry is to continue its progress to safer operations – a necessity based on public perception and traffic growth then a pilotless aircraft might be a viable solution, particularly if we are approaching a practical limit in constraining human error, the dominant contribution to accidents.
At least one manufacturer considered - what if - a fully automated aircraft could be ‘operated’ by just one crew, which with a high level of visual technology would also enable a windowless craft enabling weight saving in addition to reduced operating cost.
The limiting factor was judged to be the public perception of safety. However, given that this consideration was made some 10 years ago and that the management of human error is approaching the limit of cost effectiveness, then a windowless single crew, 'automatic' aircraft might be a viable solution and a stepping stone towards a pilotless aircraft.
Accident analyses focus on what pilots do not do very well. But if we look at the industry from an alternative view, can we identify what pilots do well – what is so essential in a future automated operation that they, pilots, could not be removed from an aircraft.
We should not be constrained by today’s technology, think 10-15 years hence with the use of highly reliable autonomous systems, operating to the current ‘human’ regulatory limits.
Why would we need pilots in such a future scenario?
If the industry is to continue its progress to safer operations – a necessity based on public perception and traffic growth then a pilotless aircraft might be a viable solution, particularly if we are approaching a practical limit in constraining human error, the dominant contribution to accidents.
At least one manufacturer considered - what if - a fully automated aircraft could be ‘operated’ by just one crew, which with a high level of visual technology would also enable a windowless craft enabling weight saving in addition to reduced operating cost.
The limiting factor was judged to be the public perception of safety. However, given that this consideration was made some 10 years ago and that the management of human error is approaching the limit of cost effectiveness, then a windowless single crew, 'automatic' aircraft might be a viable solution and a stepping stone towards a pilotless aircraft.
Accident analyses focus on what pilots do not do very well. But if we look at the industry from an alternative view, can we identify what pilots do well – what is so essential in a future automated operation that they, pilots, could not be removed from an aircraft.
We should not be constrained by today’s technology, think 10-15 years hence with the use of highly reliable autonomous systems, operating to the current ‘human’ regulatory limits.
Why would we need pilots in such a future scenario?
Registered User **
Join Date: Nov 2007
Location: Tokyo, Japan
Posts: 149
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
BAAA has just released 2007 figures:
2007 has been the year with the least aviation accidents since ... 1963.
Here's the press release, only available in French:
2007 has been the year with the least aviation accidents since ... 1963.
Here's the press release, only available in French:
- Le nombre d'accidents d'avions survenus dans le monde en 2007 se monte à 136, soit 28 de moins qu'en 2006. Ce taux d'accidents s'avère être le plus faible depuis 1963 ! Au niveau du nombre de victimes, il baisse de 25% par rapport à 2006 et demeure le taux le plus faible depuis 2004 avec 965 décès. 2007 demeure ainsi parmi les plus sécuritaires de ces 50 dernières années. Quelques incidents n'ayant entraîné aucune perte humaine sont encore dans l'attente des décisions des opérateurs et assureurs.
- 32% des accidents se sont produits en Amérique du Nord contre 23% en Asie, 14% en Afrique, 10% en Amérique du Sud, 10% en Europe, 9% en Amérique centrale et 1% en Océanie.
- En 2007, on a enregistré 34 accidents aux Etats-Unis contre 10 au Canada, 8 en République Démocratique du Congo, 5 en Colombie et en Indonésie.
- En ce qui concerne les types de vol, on a relevé 33 accidents survenus lors de vols de ligne, 25 accidents lors de vols cargo, 17 accidents lors de vols charters ainsi que 14 accidents lors de vols de positionnement. Ont également été relevés des accidents lors de vols sanitaires, de surveillance, d'essai, gouvernementaux et humanitaires..
- Parmi les 136 avions perdus, 100 (74%) étaient de type turbopropulseur ou à pistons contre 36 (26%) de type jet. Le constructeur européen Airbus a enregistré la perte de 4 appareils (un A300, deux A320 et un A340) contre 8 pour Boeing (huit 737). On enregistre également la perte de 12 Antonov, 17 Beechcraft, 6 Canadair, 24 Cessna (19 turbopropulseurs et 5 jet), 9 De Havilland Canada, 3 Douglas, 4 Embraer, 2 Learjet, 2 Illiouchine, 6 Let, 2 Lockheed, 3 McDonnell Douglas, 6 Piper, 5 Rockwell, un Tupolev et un Yakovlev.
- Aucun accident majeur n'a été relevé en Europe en 2007, ce qui tend à confirmer que ce continent demeure parmi les plus sécuritaires.
- En 2007, 3 accidents ont entraîné la mort de plus de 100 personnes, 2 accidents ont fait entre 50 et 100 morts, 5 accidents ont fait entre 20 et 50 morts, 5 accidents ont fait entre 10 et 19 morts, 10 accidents ont fait entre 6 et 10 morts, 55 accidents ont fait entre 1 et 5 morts et 56 accidents n'ont fait aucune victime.
- La chute d'un Airbus A320 de TAM Brasil à Sao Paulo le 17 juillet s'avère être l'accident le plus meurtrier survenu dans le monde en 2007 avec un bilan de 199 morts. Viennent ensuite la chute d'un Boeing 737-800 des Kenya Airways à Douala le 5 mai avec 114 morts et la chute d'un Boeing 737-400 d'Adamair le 1er janvier au large d'Ujung Pandang avec 102 morts.
Registered User **
Join Date: Nov 2007
Location: Tokyo, Japan
Posts: 149
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The Flightglobal version: http://www.flightglobal.com/articles...w-in-2007.html
I am not going to discuss all theories you have posted (and you did have some good points), but this is an example illustrating one of my points:
The worst accident of the year was the TAM Linhas Aereas Airbus A320 landing disaster at Sao Paulo Congonhas airport which killed 187 on board and 12 on the ground.
Apart from that crash and a Tu-134landing accident at Samara airport, Russia that killed six of its 57 passengers, all the accidents involving passenger aircraft took place in third-world economies or aircraft registered in them.
This is just ludicrous. 20 years ago in developed countries, flying "standby" did not mean flying "Standing Room"
The worst accident of the year was the TAM Linhas Aereas Airbus A320 landing disaster at Sao Paulo Congonhas airport which killed 187 on board and 12 on the ground.
Apart from that crash and a Tu-134landing accident at Samara airport, Russia that killed six of its 57 passengers, all the accidents involving passenger aircraft took place in third-world economies or aircraft registered in them.
