A late-ish stabilisation
who actually can fly a short approach in a skilled manner
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I don't think flapping your wings at 100ft to get on the centreline is a very skilled manoeuvre. Doesn't impress me much!
Might be grumpy Roger, but not sure I would be quite termed an old man yet.
Rocking your wings at 100 ft to get stabilised is not a sign of superior piloting. Watch the airshow guys do it & it is a slick fluid movement just prior to landing. What has been described is a pilot who has overestimated his/her own ability!
Whichever way it has no place in professional airline operations. If a pilot wants to trump up their ego, go buy a Pitts!
Rocking your wings at 100 ft to get stabilised is not a sign of superior piloting. Watch the airshow guys do it & it is a slick fluid movement just prior to landing. What has been described is a pilot who has overestimated his/her own ability!
Whichever way it has no place in professional airline operations. If a pilot wants to trump up their ego, go buy a Pitts!
For those who think stabilised approaches are a bad thing, an excerpt from the manufacturers memo regarding the Iberia A340 accident in Quito.
The CVR records confirm the crew intent was initially to follow the ILS until sufficient visual references were available, then to leave the Glide Slope to visually capture and follow the PAPI path and use the full runway for landing.
The approach was performed with both AP1&2 engaged in LOC and GLIDE track modes, A/THR engaged in managed speed mode. Till touchdown, A/THR maintained the VAPP. For final approach, the aircraft was configured to land (gear down, auto-brake set to HIGH, ground spoilers armed, flaps fully extended). Landing weight was 249t, Vapp 151 kt. Given the altitude and the tailwind, the True Air Speed was 181kt and the Ground Speed 189kt.
While AP 1+2 were engaged, the aircraft remained stabilized on the LOC and GLIDE.
Runway 35 was in sight just prior to minimum, DA(H) being 9850ft(652ft).
AP 1+2 were disconnected at the minimum. The PF applied nose-down stick inputs to reach the PAPI flight path. This resulted into an increased rate of descent above 1400ft/mn between 450ft and 150ft radio-altitude. The GPWS "SINK RATE" warning was triggered at 270ft radio-altitude, it was followed by transient nose-up inputs from the PF.
The "SINK RATE" warning was triggered again below 50ft AGL.
The touch-down occurred at about 200m after the full runway threshold (remaining distance was 2920 m).
The landing was extremely hard (more than 3g vertical acceleration, about 19ft/sec 1100ft/mn), which lead to:
- Breakage of the lower articulation link of both Main Landing Gear (MLG);
- Abrupt derotation of both bogie beams;
- Burst at impact of all 4 MLG front wheels;
- And damage of the wiring looms of RH and LH boogie proximity sensors that are
used to detect the GROUND condition hence allowing engine thrust reversers deployment.
The approach was performed with both AP1&2 engaged in LOC and GLIDE track modes, A/THR engaged in managed speed mode. Till touchdown, A/THR maintained the VAPP. For final approach, the aircraft was configured to land (gear down, auto-brake set to HIGH, ground spoilers armed, flaps fully extended). Landing weight was 249t, Vapp 151 kt. Given the altitude and the tailwind, the True Air Speed was 181kt and the Ground Speed 189kt.
While AP 1+2 were engaged, the aircraft remained stabilized on the LOC and GLIDE.
Runway 35 was in sight just prior to minimum, DA(H) being 9850ft(652ft).
AP 1+2 were disconnected at the minimum. The PF applied nose-down stick inputs to reach the PAPI flight path. This resulted into an increased rate of descent above 1400ft/mn between 450ft and 150ft radio-altitude. The GPWS "SINK RATE" warning was triggered at 270ft radio-altitude, it was followed by transient nose-up inputs from the PF.
The "SINK RATE" warning was triggered again below 50ft AGL.
The touch-down occurred at about 200m after the full runway threshold (remaining distance was 2920 m).
The landing was extremely hard (more than 3g vertical acceleration, about 19ft/sec 1100ft/mn), which lead to:
- Breakage of the lower articulation link of both Main Landing Gear (MLG);
- Abrupt derotation of both bogie beams;
- Burst at impact of all 4 MLG front wheels;
- And damage of the wiring looms of RH and LH boogie proximity sensors that are
used to detect the GROUND condition hence allowing engine thrust reversers deployment.
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Nah, he's just showing superior airmanship with a late 'duck under' manouevre.
Tankengine - the point is that the Iberia crew deliberately departed from the stabilised approach in order to try to put the aircraft down earlier, got too great a RoD and crashed the thing into the runway. If they'd stuck with the stable approach this would just have been another unremarkable flight.
Tankengine - the point is that the Iberia crew deliberately departed from the stabilised approach in order to try to put the aircraft down earlier, got too great a RoD and crashed the thing into the runway. If they'd stuck with the stable approach this would just have been another unremarkable flight.
Tankeng,
What about the fact they purposely destabilised an approach, and the aircraft is now in pieces. Being stabilised is not just about being ok at the relevant gate. It lasts until the aircraft is under control on the runway.
What about the fact they purposely destabilised an approach, and the aircraft is now in pieces. Being stabilised is not just about being ok at the relevant gate. It lasts until the aircraft is under control on the runway.
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Hans solo you have no idea about Quito....if u follow the ILS GP it brings you to half the runway...all the aircrafts must forget the GP on minimums and sink the aircraft to follow the PAPI lights, wich will bring you to the threshold.
The problem was that doing that after 9 or 10 hours of flight, with not a sunny day and with an A340-600 is not an easy deal....
The problem was that doing that after 9 or 10 hours of flight, with not a sunny day and with an A340-600 is not an easy deal....
Trash du Blanc
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Quito is exactly what I'm talking about.
And I've been in there many times, MD-11 and DC-10, almost always at night.
If all you do on all your normal approaches is click off the autopilot at 500', I would argue you are absolutely not qualified to go into Quito.
That last minute PAPI descent requires maximum skill and control, a feel for pitch-power-airspeed, and a good visual scan. Your aviator skills need to be sharp and bright. And I would add - taken out of the toolbox early. No way would I click off the autopilot at 600' on THAT approach - that's like sitting down to a piano and banging out flight of the bumblebee without even cracking your knuckles.....
And I've been in there many times, MD-11 and DC-10, almost always at night.
If all you do on all your normal approaches is click off the autopilot at 500', I would argue you are absolutely not qualified to go into Quito.
That last minute PAPI descent requires maximum skill and control, a feel for pitch-power-airspeed, and a good visual scan. Your aviator skills need to be sharp and bright. And I would add - taken out of the toolbox early. No way would I click off the autopilot at 600' on THAT approach - that's like sitting down to a piano and banging out flight of the bumblebee without even cracking your knuckles.....
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hand Solo,
Ever been to Quito?!
Obviously not, or you would know that ducking under the ILS to follow the PAPI is the only way to land a heavy safely at that airport. Any airline that doesn't let their pilots "fly" the plane has no business there. It was a very demanding day with a considerable tailwind, rain and IB is now investigating wether windshear was a factor.
Flying skills are getting eroded more and more, on a perfect sunny day, I notice more and more aircraft following the ILS instead of just asking a visual with a 3nm. final. And that does NOT enhance safety, it reduces it.
Ever been to Quito?!
Obviously not, or you would know that ducking under the ILS to follow the PAPI is the only way to land a heavy safely at that airport. Any airline that doesn't let their pilots "fly" the plane has no business there. It was a very demanding day with a considerable tailwind, rain and IB is now investigating wether windshear was a factor.
Flying skills are getting eroded more and more, on a perfect sunny day, I notice more and more aircraft following the ILS instead of just asking a visual with a 3nm. final. And that does NOT enhance safety, it reduces it.
The Cooler King
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milesofftarget
Sorry to hear that you have been attacked by PM. This is just typical of the way threads that start out with tentative data and speculation, end up as mud slinging matches and probably with sods being thrown by some who have never been out of their armchairs.
I may not agree totally with the ins and outs of a "stabilised" approach, however, aviation is supposed to be a gentleman's career. At least it was when I was growing up and looking up to those I aspired to be.
A cull is required around here and has been for a while now.
Sorry to hear that you have been attacked by PM. This is just typical of the way threads that start out with tentative data and speculation, end up as mud slinging matches and probably with sods being thrown by some who have never been out of their armchairs.
I may not agree totally with the ins and outs of a "stabilised" approach, however, aviation is supposed to be a gentleman's career. At least it was when I was growing up and looking up to those I aspired to be.
A cull is required around here and has been for a while now.
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Don't fret, Farrell, this is what MoT sent me...unsolicited
Seems the numpty is alive and kicking, in the form of...MoT
411A
Oh dear, you too 411A. If you read my post carefully you will see what I mean..... don't need TCAS to recognise a 737 200m away....numpty!
I suspect that most of your colleagues may actually call you 911 !With an attitude like that they'll be calling the emergency services on to standby as you walk up the aircraft steps !
Interesting that it's our north American friends that think that flying is a manual skill.
Too much testosterone, too little gray stuff perhaps.
Just a thought.
MoT
Oh dear, you too 411A. If you read my post carefully you will see what I mean..... don't need TCAS to recognise a 737 200m away....numpty!
I suspect that most of your colleagues may actually call you 911 !With an attitude like that they'll be calling the emergency services on to standby as you walk up the aircraft steps !
Interesting that it's our north American friends that think that flying is a manual skill.
Too much testosterone, too little gray stuff perhaps.
Just a thought.
MoT
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"Calm, measured, restrained, polite, professional" are a few of the adjectives many would use to describe airline pilots.
Are you guys representative of your profession as a whole?
Are you guys representative of your profession as a whole?
Chris777;
Don't confuse passion and bluntness with irrationality.
It is these qualities, along with other "milder" forms of communications, skill and experience, that keeps the business safe. In today's bottom-line-driven airline industry the few that put that priority first including operations people are always looked at askance as perhaps not being "members of the team". It is against such outlandish thinking driven as it is by purely commercial pressures and priorities, that airline pilots must constantly fight.
Instead, be thankful there is the passion, the willingness to engage and disagree, even "substantially", among professional airmen. The only difference is, we have taken the unusual step of actually discussing that which motivates us most strongly, in a public forum. An even more blunt and passionate dialogue almost certainly exists in private among all professionals and not just airline pilots. We at the pointy end know this best and know that even as unpleasant and unseemly as it appears to non-pilots or non-professional airmen, it is the shortest route to the best answer in aviation. Bluntness is a skill like any other and it is honed here every day.
PJ2
Don't confuse passion and bluntness with irrationality.
It is these qualities, along with other "milder" forms of communications, skill and experience, that keeps the business safe. In today's bottom-line-driven airline industry the few that put that priority first including operations people are always looked at askance as perhaps not being "members of the team". It is against such outlandish thinking driven as it is by purely commercial pressures and priorities, that airline pilots must constantly fight.
Instead, be thankful there is the passion, the willingness to engage and disagree, even "substantially", among professional airmen. The only difference is, we have taken the unusual step of actually discussing that which motivates us most strongly, in a public forum. An even more blunt and passionate dialogue almost certainly exists in private among all professionals and not just airline pilots. We at the pointy end know this best and know that even as unpleasant and unseemly as it appears to non-pilots or non-professional airmen, it is the shortest route to the best answer in aviation. Bluntness is a skill like any other and it is honed here every day.
PJ2
OCEAN et al, re #50, you should re read the Airbus report on the Quito accident.
Although the ILS at Quito has a displaced origin, it still provides a landing distance of 2610m (not half way down the runway). The operator used the reduced distance to calculate the landing performance. Note that the ILS charts and PAPI information at Quito is inconsistent with world standards.
The report suggests that the crew deliberately flew a duck under maneuver (unstabilized) even though it was not necessary for the conditions. This could be due to misconceptions about the planning or hearsay of other’s practices (as in this thread) which in regulatory terms are incorrect.
However, we should continue to be cautious, an approach to a displaced ILS origin provides opportunity for error, particularly as it appears attractive to use the full length of runway. At Quito the tailwind may have contributed to the high rate of decent, which together with a higher than usual VS due to the altitude (even higher GS) the pilot’s recognition for the flare point could have been a demanding task.
The link between Quito and this thread is in stabilization and the ability to detect change from the established norm.
If an operation routinely requires a steep curved approach due to terrain or other constraint, then a crew’s proficiency can be sufficiently high to enable routine operations. The difference between this and more standard approaches is that the steep curved approach has less margin for error than a stabilized straight in approach would have. Where non stabilized operations are the norm any additional risk can be mitigated with crew training, proficiency, or limitation, often resulting from the operation being semi routine e.g. 5.5 deg @ LCY.
One objective of the stabilized approach concept is to provide ‘a norm’ at the centre of the safety envelope, which enable crews to detect any changes which might add risk to the operation.
When flying an unstable steep / curved approach the crew can be exposed to opportunities for error, particularly as the norm might be a changing flight path to start with. The risks could be even higher due to the increased physical and mental workload which pilot’s might not be familiar with.
In situations where pilots are reluctant to fly a stabilized approach, or unable to detect flight-path errors, then an alerting warning is required. This should come from the pilot monitoring, but there are situations where s/he cannot detect the change (illusion, rapid windshear), or they suffer aspects of human behavior resulting in no communication. In these instances, technology (installation of alerting systems) should be used to reinstate the required level of safety degraded by human weakness e.g. EGPWS, SAM (#51).
For info – related issues of NPA vs Precision approaches, see the new Airbus Briefing Note - Industry Safety Initiative -
From Non-Precision to Precision-like Approaches.
P2J
Although the ILS at Quito has a displaced origin, it still provides a landing distance of 2610m (not half way down the runway). The operator used the reduced distance to calculate the landing performance. Note that the ILS charts and PAPI information at Quito is inconsistent with world standards.
The report suggests that the crew deliberately flew a duck under maneuver (unstabilized) even though it was not necessary for the conditions. This could be due to misconceptions about the planning or hearsay of other’s practices (as in this thread) which in regulatory terms are incorrect.
However, we should continue to be cautious, an approach to a displaced ILS origin provides opportunity for error, particularly as it appears attractive to use the full length of runway. At Quito the tailwind may have contributed to the high rate of decent, which together with a higher than usual VS due to the altitude (even higher GS) the pilot’s recognition for the flare point could have been a demanding task.
The link between Quito and this thread is in stabilization and the ability to detect change from the established norm.
If an operation routinely requires a steep curved approach due to terrain or other constraint, then a crew’s proficiency can be sufficiently high to enable routine operations. The difference between this and more standard approaches is that the steep curved approach has less margin for error than a stabilized straight in approach would have. Where non stabilized operations are the norm any additional risk can be mitigated with crew training, proficiency, or limitation, often resulting from the operation being semi routine e.g. 5.5 deg @ LCY.
One objective of the stabilized approach concept is to provide ‘a norm’ at the centre of the safety envelope, which enable crews to detect any changes which might add risk to the operation.
When flying an unstable steep / curved approach the crew can be exposed to opportunities for error, particularly as the norm might be a changing flight path to start with. The risks could be even higher due to the increased physical and mental workload which pilot’s might not be familiar with.
In situations where pilots are reluctant to fly a stabilized approach, or unable to detect flight-path errors, then an alerting warning is required. This should come from the pilot monitoring, but there are situations where s/he cannot detect the change (illusion, rapid windshear), or they suffer aspects of human behavior resulting in no communication. In these instances, technology (installation of alerting systems) should be used to reinstate the required level of safety degraded by human weakness e.g. EGPWS, SAM (#51).
For info – related issues of NPA vs Precision approaches, see the new Airbus Briefing Note - Industry Safety Initiative -
From Non-Precision to Precision-like Approaches.
P2J
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I rode jump seat a few years ago in an RJ 1011 - we made what can only be called a classic 180 from downwind to AMM rwy 09R, rolling to wings level right over the numbers, and touchdown 3 sec. later.
A joy to behold. It was a well-practiced manuver, obviously.
A joy to behold. It was a well-practiced manuver, obviously.