Concorde - UK Observer article
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The Observer article had the ring of truth to me.
The soot trail is pretty hard to ignore.
Are there SMC radar recordings or other evidence of the position of the AF B744 during the takeoff?
'homicide involuntaire' mais non, cordon sanitaire presumable.
The soot trail is pretty hard to ignore.
Are there SMC radar recordings or other evidence of the position of the AF B744 during the takeoff?
'homicide involuntaire' mais non, cordon sanitaire presumable.
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This report left me feeling cold. It is truly frightening. There are two points that spring to mind:
1. The accident report appears to be ignoring certain factors in the accident. In our increasingly litigious society this appears to happen more and more.
2. For once there is an excellent article written by a journalist in a newspaper, which is to be commended. It may not be completely correct (although it appears to be very close) but it is very well researched article which is written by someone who knows what they are talking about.
1. The accident report appears to be ignoring certain factors in the accident. In our increasingly litigious society this appears to happen more and more.
2. For once there is an excellent article written by a journalist in a newspaper, which is to be commended. It may not be completely correct (although it appears to be very close) but it is very well researched article which is written by someone who knows what they are talking about.
Guest
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It appears to me to be a series of human errors rather than just one catastrophic failure.
Why did the F/E shut down #2 without the captains order to do so? The article seems accurate, and this fact stands out.
Has this "Forget about the Captain" attitude permeated todays cockpits to the point that a F/E feels he can initiate such actions?
I know that when I was flying, had a F/E done this in my cockpit, he would never fly again, if I had anything to say about it.
Why did the F/E shut down #2 without the captains order to do so? The article seems accurate, and this fact stands out.
Has this "Forget about the Captain" attitude permeated todays cockpits to the point that a F/E feels he can initiate such actions?
I know that when I was flying, had a F/E done this in my cockpit, he would never fly again, if I had anything to say about it.
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I posted a bulletin from the BEA the other day in French, to pleas of 'Que?' from some of you. So here, with a very heavy health warning, it is in English: je pense
The absence of a spacer did not contribute to the Concorde accident on 25th July 2000
The interim report published by the (French AAIB) on the 3rd January 2001 stated that the stay situated on the junction of the undercarriage leg/truck on the left main gear of the stricken Concorde had not been refitted at the completion of a maintenance procedure. The extensive investigation within the framework of the enquiry can today conclude that this component did not contribute to the accident.
Taking this anomaly into account, the technical investigators asked themselves if the left gear could have become unbalanced, and perhaps was the origin of the divergent trajectory, an overheating of the wheels and an abnormally slow acceleration.
A study of the marks on the runway and an examination of the state of the tyres, as well as the trajectory calculated by the acceleration recorder by the FDR, shows that this scenario can be totally excluded.
- After the taxy into the runway and line up, when the crew initiated the ‘before take-off’ checklist and as part of it called the brake temperatures which were 150º (the temperature must exceed 220º for it to cause concern) . Furthermore it was the same on the right gear as on the left. The brake temperature was completely normal.
- During the take-off roll, the aircraft would have had a tendency to pull left if the left gear had created a spurious drag as the result of an unbalanced truck. Now the trajectory is straight up to the loss of No1 and No2 and no right input to the steering is seen. Indeed, only a few slight inputs to the left are visible up to V1 (150kt).
- The acceleration recorder by the FDR is 0.268g, which is the normal value for Concorde when it is at maximum all up weight. Furthermore, the investigation shows that, 34 sec after the beginning of take-off, the aircraft had passed 1200m and had attained a speed of 151kt. Now at a weight of 185t and in the conditions on the day, Concorde takes 1150m and achieves 150kt in 33 sec, as indicated in the preliminary report. The performance of the aeroplane had conformed to the theoretical values up to the destruction of tyre no 2 by the metal strip.
- Right up to the aircraft rolling over the metal strip, no remarks or reactions of the flight crew concerning any abnormal component of the aeroplane. The crew would not have undertaken, or continued with the take-off if they had the smallest doubt about the condition of the aircraft before line-up or before V1.
- The examination of the treads of tyres 5 and 6 (the rear wheels on the left truck) show no trace of abnormal wear. In particular, no lateral component, the normal consequence of scrape was shown. On the other hand, the first tyre traces on the runway after the accident are those of no2 tyre after its destruction by the metal strip.
Says very little to exclude a developing and uncontrollable veer to the left as a result of the partially reconstructed left gear if you ask me!
The absence of a spacer did not contribute to the Concorde accident on 25th July 2000
The interim report published by the (French AAIB) on the 3rd January 2001 stated that the stay situated on the junction of the undercarriage leg/truck on the left main gear of the stricken Concorde had not been refitted at the completion of a maintenance procedure. The extensive investigation within the framework of the enquiry can today conclude that this component did not contribute to the accident.
Taking this anomaly into account, the technical investigators asked themselves if the left gear could have become unbalanced, and perhaps was the origin of the divergent trajectory, an overheating of the wheels and an abnormally slow acceleration.
A study of the marks on the runway and an examination of the state of the tyres, as well as the trajectory calculated by the acceleration recorder by the FDR, shows that this scenario can be totally excluded.
- After the taxy into the runway and line up, when the crew initiated the ‘before take-off’ checklist and as part of it called the brake temperatures which were 150º (the temperature must exceed 220º for it to cause concern) . Furthermore it was the same on the right gear as on the left. The brake temperature was completely normal.
- During the take-off roll, the aircraft would have had a tendency to pull left if the left gear had created a spurious drag as the result of an unbalanced truck. Now the trajectory is straight up to the loss of No1 and No2 and no right input to the steering is seen. Indeed, only a few slight inputs to the left are visible up to V1 (150kt).
- The acceleration recorder by the FDR is 0.268g, which is the normal value for Concorde when it is at maximum all up weight. Furthermore, the investigation shows that, 34 sec after the beginning of take-off, the aircraft had passed 1200m and had attained a speed of 151kt. Now at a weight of 185t and in the conditions on the day, Concorde takes 1150m and achieves 150kt in 33 sec, as indicated in the preliminary report. The performance of the aeroplane had conformed to the theoretical values up to the destruction of tyre no 2 by the metal strip.
- Right up to the aircraft rolling over the metal strip, no remarks or reactions of the flight crew concerning any abnormal component of the aeroplane. The crew would not have undertaken, or continued with the take-off if they had the smallest doubt about the condition of the aircraft before line-up or before V1.
- The examination of the treads of tyres 5 and 6 (the rear wheels on the left truck) show no trace of abnormal wear. In particular, no lateral component, the normal consequence of scrape was shown. On the other hand, the first tyre traces on the runway after the accident are those of no2 tyre after its destruction by the metal strip.
Says very little to exclude a developing and uncontrollable veer to the left as a result of the partially reconstructed left gear if you ask me!
Guest
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Wasn't it suggested in the article that the absence of the spacer only became a factor after the tyre was damaged by the metal strip? Surely, the fact that the takeoff roll was essentially normal until the blow-out doesn't preclude the possibility that the absence of the spacer could have affected controllability after the event.
[This message has been edited by stagger (edited 19 May 2001).]
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capt waffoo
posted 19 May 2001 12:16
"..why it is that well qualified accident investigators either overlooked or dismissed.."
Er, perhaps because they are French???
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capt waffoo
posted 19 May 2001 12:16
"..why it is that well qualified accident investigators either overlooked or dismissed.."
Er, perhaps because they are French???
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You want to go dragging the investigators through the mud here? You think maybe they're involved in some cover-up of involuntary manslaughter?....
SHOW ME THE CONNECTION DAMN IT.
Don't just throw around those kinds of allegations around, based on hypothetical b.s.--there'll be enough of that crap to go around by non-aviation folks at their cocktail parties.
One of the main problems with a report like this is that there is no reaction from investigators. I don't give a damn what the people at Air France, BAe, Continental, CDG, or industry "experts" have to say about it.... I want each of these points addressed by the investigative team themselves--because they are the ONLY people who siftted through this evidence FIRSTHAND! That would have been the most responsible way to publish the report. All we've got here is an interesting report that pokes holes in an investigation; but it makes NO attempt to clarify why it is that these, seemingly, compelling peices of evidence were either not addressed or deemed irrelevant. That's pretty crucial, when at best--the working knowledge that everyone other than the investigative team has is secondhand--at best!
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I know the rest of you have all seen it before, but I saw the 'Discovery' programme about Koncordski for the first time last night.
The programme suggests quite plausibly that the French accident investigators colluded with the Ruskies to cover up the real reasons for the crash of the TU144 at the Paris Air Show in 1973.
I'm afraid it didn't fill me with confidence that they will be interested in learning (and disseminating) any real lessons from the Concorde tradegy.
The programme suggests quite plausibly that the French accident investigators colluded with the Ruskies to cover up the real reasons for the crash of the TU144 at the Paris Air Show in 1973.
I'm afraid it didn't fill me with confidence that they will be interested in learning (and disseminating) any real lessons from the Concorde tradegy.
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Sorry for digressing, but in response to the mail regarding the TU-144 crash, was that the allegations that the incident went thus :
o TU-144 Climbs away from runway, into low cloud. One of the pilots sees a French Air Force fighter, which had no clearence to be there, presumably sent as a "tail".
o TU-144 Captain pushes the nose down hard in order to avoid a collision, with the negative-G maneouver disrupting airflow over the intakes, and causing flameouts in (possibly) all four engines.
o TU-144 then assumes steep nose down attitude to maintain airspeed and attempt to relight the engines. However with hardly any altitude to work with subsequently suffers catastrophic airframe failure pulling severe G in the attempted recovery.
. . . from memory. I'm not exactly sure what the Russians stood to gain in covering up this incident, it's pretty apparent on the French side.
At least in the long run what was (at the time) considered to be a flaw in the TU-144 did not seem to harm public confidence in SSTs. I'm sure Concorde will weather this incident with equal aplomb when services resume.
Although I'm sure Boeing were wishing the fuel tank issue was terminal when they announced their "Sonic Cruiser". What seemed for a while to be the favourite for "fastest passenger carrier in the air" is set to trail a far distant second once again.
o TU-144 Climbs away from runway, into low cloud. One of the pilots sees a French Air Force fighter, which had no clearence to be there, presumably sent as a "tail".
o TU-144 Captain pushes the nose down hard in order to avoid a collision, with the negative-G maneouver disrupting airflow over the intakes, and causing flameouts in (possibly) all four engines.
o TU-144 then assumes steep nose down attitude to maintain airspeed and attempt to relight the engines. However with hardly any altitude to work with subsequently suffers catastrophic airframe failure pulling severe G in the attempted recovery.
. . . from memory. I'm not exactly sure what the Russians stood to gain in covering up this incident, it's pretty apparent on the French side.
At least in the long run what was (at the time) considered to be a flaw in the TU-144 did not seem to harm public confidence in SSTs. I'm sure Concorde will weather this incident with equal aplomb when services resume.
Although I'm sure Boeing were wishing the fuel tank issue was terminal when they announced their "Sonic Cruiser". What seemed for a while to be the favourite for "fastest passenger carrier in the air" is set to trail a far distant second once again.
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I'm inclined to go with Mriya225 on this one. While an interesting hypothesis, I do not believe that the missing spacer contributed to this accident in any significant way. The analysis of the speeds, times and distances along the runway tend to suggest that performance was not in any way inhibited until the aircraft hit the metal component.
What is of interest is the allegation that this crew disregarded an eight knot tailwind. Perhaps this needs looking into, but I find it hard to accept that professional investigators have dismissed such a fundamentally important issue, especially when it seems the suggestion is that there is some powerful political influence at work to make them do so.
I guess time will tell. But in the meantime I must say I find the article somewhat offensive, especially where it implies that the skipper was a natural born risk taker. I still have nothing but the greatest respect for that crew and nothing but utter sympathy for their impossible task in trying to make the unflyable fly.
I also happen to think that the early rotation may well have been a selfless act of stark heroism.
What is of interest is the allegation that this crew disregarded an eight knot tailwind. Perhaps this needs looking into, but I find it hard to accept that professional investigators have dismissed such a fundamentally important issue, especially when it seems the suggestion is that there is some powerful political influence at work to make them do so.
I guess time will tell. But in the meantime I must say I find the article somewhat offensive, especially where it implies that the skipper was a natural born risk taker. I still have nothing but the greatest respect for that crew and nothing but utter sympathy for their impossible task in trying to make the unflyable fly.
I also happen to think that the early rotation may well have been a selfless act of stark heroism.
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To consider that Boeing wished the Concorde fuel tank rupture a cause for the aircraft to be grounded terminally is an extremely unpleasant allegation.
Whilst other aerospace companies might stoop to such depths, there would be absolutely no reason for Boeing to do so. The Sonicruiser v. Megabus debate will centralise on whether people wish a short, convenient flight or whether they wish to be packed into a flying ocean liner with a few gimmicks designed to distract them from the terminal boredom of long range Airboos travel.
Whilst other aerospace companies might stoop to such depths, there would be absolutely no reason for Boeing to do so. The Sonicruiser v. Megabus debate will centralise on whether people wish a short, convenient flight or whether they wish to be packed into a flying ocean liner with a few gimmicks designed to distract them from the terminal boredom of long range Airboos travel.
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The real issue here is how performance was affected AFTER the aircraft sustained a puncture.
If the swerve to the left was purely caused by asymmetric thrust and nothing to do with the wheels being out of alignment then the spacer is irrelevant.
If on the other hand it was partly (mainly?) due to the wheels being out of alignment, that would suggest that the missing spacer contributed significantly, or even caused, the early rotation.
Since the immediate cause of the crash was loss of control at dangerously low airspeed this would in turn imply that the missing spacer was an important factor in the accident.
If the swerve to the left was purely caused by asymmetric thrust and nothing to do with the wheels being out of alignment then the spacer is irrelevant.
If on the other hand it was partly (mainly?) due to the wheels being out of alignment, that would suggest that the missing spacer contributed significantly, or even caused, the early rotation.
Since the immediate cause of the crash was loss of control at dangerously low airspeed this would in turn imply that the missing spacer was an important factor in the accident.
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Golden Monkey,
Also from memory, but I seem to recall the theory as suggesting the incentive for Russian acquiescence in the 'cover-up' was that the Concorde design would have survived such a manouveur (never could spell that word). I've no inside knowledge about whether or not this was indeed the case.
Also from memory, but I seem to recall the theory as suggesting the incentive for Russian acquiescence in the 'cover-up' was that the Concorde design would have survived such a manouveur (never could spell that word). I've no inside knowledge about whether or not this was indeed the case.
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I have also read the report, and consider it to be factual.
With one engine out, the aircraft is perfectly controllable down the runway, so I do not think that this could be the cause for the aircraft veering off to the left to the extent where it took out runway edge lighting.
The photographs of the tarmac clearly show that after the tyre deflated, the gear was oscillating either side of centre, which was, in my opinion, caused by the missing spacer and the (now) unbalanced bogie. I really cannot think of any other explanation as to why an aircraft with one engine out should be in danger of leaving the runway.
*IF* the full story ever gets out, and that's a big *IF*, I suggest that the missing spacer will be shown to have played a major role, if not THE major role in the tragic accident.
IMHO, of course.
With one engine out, the aircraft is perfectly controllable down the runway, so I do not think that this could be the cause for the aircraft veering off to the left to the extent where it took out runway edge lighting.
The photographs of the tarmac clearly show that after the tyre deflated, the gear was oscillating either side of centre, which was, in my opinion, caused by the missing spacer and the (now) unbalanced bogie. I really cannot think of any other explanation as to why an aircraft with one engine out should be in danger of leaving the runway.
*IF* the full story ever gets out, and that's a big *IF*, I suggest that the missing spacer will be shown to have played a major role, if not THE major role in the tragic accident.
IMHO, of course.
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Two Tun
With regard to your assertion as to controllability with one engine out, have you considered the tailwind factor and the resulting potential for delay in effective rudder authority.
Further, the photographs I have seen show no evidence of the gear "oscillating either side of centre" or of an unbalanced bogie.
And there are certainly other factors to consider such as premature rotation in a delta winged design.
Again I think it likely that the experts have considered all these factors and more. I for one will accept their finding.
With regard to your assertion as to controllability with one engine out, have you considered the tailwind factor and the resulting potential for delay in effective rudder authority.
Further, the photographs I have seen show no evidence of the gear "oscillating either side of centre" or of an unbalanced bogie.
And there are certainly other factors to consider such as premature rotation in a delta winged design.
Again I think it likely that the experts have considered all these factors and more. I for one will accept their finding.
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tilii, you said:
<<With regard to your assertion as to controllability with one engine out, have you considered the tailwind factor and the resulting potential for delay in effective rudder authority.>>
Yes, I have. On a 4 engined aircraft, the loss of one engine will not result in the loss of directional control.
<<Further, the photographs I have seen show no evidence of the gear "oscillating either side of centre" or of an unbalanced bogie.>>
I, however, have seen such photographs. Whilst the marks from the right hand gear are consistent with what you'd expect, the marks from the left hand gear show clear signs of an oscillation, possibly as much as 3 degrees either side of centre. Moreover, the marks on the runway would indicate that the oscillations are fairly rapid.
This would put sideways loads onto the remaining tyres as the tyres scrubbed the runway. This would cause a great deal of drag on the left hand side.
<<And there are certainly other factors to consider such as premature rotation in a delta winged design.>>
Premature rotation is not too good an idea, no matter what shape the wing is.
<<Again I think it likely that the experts have considered all these factors and more. I for one will accept their finding.>>
I, however, having spent 30 years in the industry, have a healthy amount of scepticism. I suspect that the final report will attempt to mitigate any responsibility on the part of Air France, and it will play down the roll that the missing spacer had in the (tragic) accident.
<<With regard to your assertion as to controllability with one engine out, have you considered the tailwind factor and the resulting potential for delay in effective rudder authority.>>
Yes, I have. On a 4 engined aircraft, the loss of one engine will not result in the loss of directional control.
<<Further, the photographs I have seen show no evidence of the gear "oscillating either side of centre" or of an unbalanced bogie.>>
I, however, have seen such photographs. Whilst the marks from the right hand gear are consistent with what you'd expect, the marks from the left hand gear show clear signs of an oscillation, possibly as much as 3 degrees either side of centre. Moreover, the marks on the runway would indicate that the oscillations are fairly rapid.
This would put sideways loads onto the remaining tyres as the tyres scrubbed the runway. This would cause a great deal of drag on the left hand side.
<<And there are certainly other factors to consider such as premature rotation in a delta winged design.>>
Premature rotation is not too good an idea, no matter what shape the wing is.
<<Again I think it likely that the experts have considered all these factors and more. I for one will accept their finding.>>
I, however, having spent 30 years in the industry, have a healthy amount of scepticism. I suspect that the final report will attempt to mitigate any responsibility on the part of Air France, and it will play down the roll that the missing spacer had in the (tragic) accident.
Guest
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Oh well, Two Tun, I guess you're entitled to your scepticism and your suspicion.
Come to think of it, in my 34 years in the industry I have accumulated a little of that as well. Probably healthy. However, I wonder why you make your last statement. What drives you to believe that there will be a cover-up?
[This message has been edited by tilii (edited 05 June 2001).]
Come to think of it, in my 34 years in the industry I have accumulated a little of that as well. Probably healthy. However, I wonder why you make your last statement. What drives you to believe that there will be a cover-up?
[This message has been edited by tilii (edited 05 June 2001).]
Guest
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tilii, you said:
<<However, I wonder why you make your last statement. What drives you to believe that there will be a cover-up?>>
Where does one start? Past history, for example the TU144 crash all those years ago? That's good for a starter.
I suspect that it *may* not be in the French national interest for the final report to reach the same conclusions that our gentleman writer from the Observer came to, which is also the same conclusion that me and most of my colleagues have also arrived at.
I'm not suggesting that the French will be duplicitous in all this, you understand. But they may be slightly economical with the facts and end up with a much more agreeable conclusion for the French government and Air France.
Just my humble opinion, you understand.
<<However, I wonder why you make your last statement. What drives you to believe that there will be a cover-up?>>
Where does one start? Past history, for example the TU144 crash all those years ago? That's good for a starter.
I suspect that it *may* not be in the French national interest for the final report to reach the same conclusions that our gentleman writer from the Observer came to, which is also the same conclusion that me and most of my colleagues have also arrived at.
I'm not suggesting that the French will be duplicitous in all this, you understand. But they may be slightly economical with the facts and end up with a much more agreeable conclusion for the French government and Air France.
Just my humble opinion, you understand.
Guest
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Scoop!
Top article, matey!
But looking at the soot on the runway photo I'm confused. The aircraft appears to be on the centreline where the fuel stain begins (unburned) then veers away from the centreline with the wing on fire and the engines presumably losing power.
Can you explain how the soot trail ties in with the 'skid-marks'?
Top article, matey!
But looking at the soot on the runway photo I'm confused. The aircraft appears to be on the centreline where the fuel stain begins (unburned) then veers away from the centreline with the wing on fire and the engines presumably losing power.
Can you explain how the soot trail ties in with the 'skid-marks'?
