Swiss Air 111
There has been a lot of speculation by professional aircrews and others alike, but the consensus is (and I believe the report states this, but not sure), that given the swift propagation of the fire, the flight was doomed from the start. I believe the time from the first declaration of a PAN to impact was around 22 minutes but I'd have to check*. Getting the aircraft down, slowed then configured for 06 (a LOC BC) would be a very demanding set of circumstances at best and with the conditions the crew faced (inability to see or perhaps even remain in the cockpit due to fire), likely impossible. The question then becomes one of a "controlled" ditching which may or may not have been a possibility but again, nighttime, no electrics, no flight instruments, (I suspect like all other a/c I've flown, there's no IVSI in the standby group) smoke/fire....
*have checked:
Time SR111 checked in with Moncton, 0:58:18Z
Time of the PAN call, 01:14:18
Time out of FL254 (for FL250), 01:18:34
Time at 30nm to 06 at YHZ (still at FL250), 01:19:53
Time of autopilot disconnect, 01:24:38
Time that emergency is declared, 01:24:56
Time of last transmission, 01:25:49
Time of impact, 01:31
*have checked:
Time SR111 checked in with Moncton, 0:58:18Z
Time of the PAN call, 01:14:18
Time out of FL254 (for FL250), 01:18:34
Time at 30nm to 06 at YHZ (still at FL250), 01:19:53
Time of autopilot disconnect, 01:24:38
Time that emergency is declared, 01:24:56
Time of last transmission, 01:25:49
Time of impact, 01:31
Last edited by PJ2; 23rd May 2007 at 16:58.
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They could have disconnected all of the generators and the fire would have stopped. I think the crew did everything by the book but the procecure left all of the circuits powered.
Why can't we let the pilots shut everything down. They would all be alive today if we had checklists allowing them to shut everything down. Then slowly build it back up.
Why can't we let the pilots shut everything down. They would all be alive today if we had checklists allowing them to shut everything down. Then slowly build it back up.
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Smoke/fumes Removal
Interesting tapes
There is another discussion going on over in "terms and endearments" wrt DHL and a high occurence of fumes in the flight deck...
DANNY (or other moderator) that thread really deserves to be "headlined" here...just delete the juvenile stuff from the company man....it really is an important topic
Not sure about the MD 11 QRH/NNC...but Boeing categorically states "LAND AT THE NEAREST SUITABLE AIRPORT" in its smoke/fumes removal checklist (something the DHL guys could do, to push their point/protect their health)
Looks like the SR guys had this "in mind" but weren't pressing it at the time (long checklists, I hear)...nice to hear the thomsonfly guys recently said "MAYDAY MAYDAY MAYDAY" at the outset, and no-one was in any confusion as to their status...SR declared a PAN and later "an emergency"...but listening to it all, it didn't seem ATC really understood the predicament they were in..until too late
There is another discussion going on over in "terms and endearments" wrt DHL and a high occurence of fumes in the flight deck...
DANNY (or other moderator) that thread really deserves to be "headlined" here...just delete the juvenile stuff from the company man....it really is an important topic
Not sure about the MD 11 QRH/NNC...but Boeing categorically states "LAND AT THE NEAREST SUITABLE AIRPORT" in its smoke/fumes removal checklist (something the DHL guys could do, to push their point/protect their health)
Looks like the SR guys had this "in mind" but weren't pressing it at the time (long checklists, I hear)...nice to hear the thomsonfly guys recently said "MAYDAY MAYDAY MAYDAY" at the outset, and no-one was in any confusion as to their status...SR declared a PAN and later "an emergency"...but listening to it all, it didn't seem ATC really understood the predicament they were in..until too late
remote;
Re "nice to hear the thomsonfly guys recently said "MAYDAY MAYDAY MAYDAY" at the outset, and no-one was in any confusion as to their status..."
FWIW, it's my understanding that in Japan the PAN call won't get the attention or consideration of ATC and that the only call that will is the Mayday call. Absolutely, the Thomsonfly crew did the right thing.
bubbers44;
Disconnecting the generators may or may not have stopped the fire. I don't think the point at which the fire became self-sustaining (kapton and insulation-fed) is known. I understand from one source that the MD11 Smoke of Unknown Origin checklist by shutting down airflow to the cabin (aft of the fire source) actually reversed the airflow so that the smoke and fire progressed forward, to the cockpit. Perhaps some MD11 crews here can comment on this.
Idle Thrust;
The ATC transcript was widely available on the internet very shortly after the accident and is so now.
Not every accident report has (or should) include the ATC or CVR transcript and the veracity of the report should not be judged on such absence.
Re "nice to hear the thomsonfly guys recently said "MAYDAY MAYDAY MAYDAY" at the outset, and no-one was in any confusion as to their status..."
FWIW, it's my understanding that in Japan the PAN call won't get the attention or consideration of ATC and that the only call that will is the Mayday call. Absolutely, the Thomsonfly crew did the right thing.
bubbers44;
Disconnecting the generators may or may not have stopped the fire. I don't think the point at which the fire became self-sustaining (kapton and insulation-fed) is known. I understand from one source that the MD11 Smoke of Unknown Origin checklist by shutting down airflow to the cabin (aft of the fire source) actually reversed the airflow so that the smoke and fire progressed forward, to the cockpit. Perhaps some MD11 crews here can comment on this.
Idle Thrust;
The ATC transcript was widely available on the internet very shortly after the accident and is so now.
Not every accident report has (or should) include the ATC or CVR transcript and the veracity of the report should not be judged on such absence.
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SR declared a PAN and later "an emergency"...but listening to it all, it didn't seem ATC really understood the predicament they were in..until too late
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11 July 1973 Varig 707 couldn't make it into Orly because of thick black smoke, started in a rear lavatory; the captain opened his window and landed on a field with his head outside to see.
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An AFCB would have likely saved the day.
There is new technology that can be retrofitted to most commercial aircraft called arc fault circuit breakers. (AFCBs) These things have been around awhile and proven in terrestrial use (120/220V 50/60Hz - just the thing for this old house) but the 400Hz AC and 28VDC aircraft systems have been a challenge for developers.
New-design aircraft (like the 787, pending FAA approval) will have this protection built in for many circuits. The newest C-130 (Lockheed Martin) and F-22 Raptor (Boeing/Lockheed Martin) use similar devices that can cutoff current within milliseconds of arc detection. These units can also provide protection from fuel vapour ignition due to electrical faults. They differ from the standard AFCB in that their current path is all electronic.
A study completed in 2005 by the FAA on AFCBs can be reviewed here.
5MB PDF ~180 pages. Ground and flight testing was in the Atlantic City, NJ tech center's 727.
While the AFCBs were not perfect in the FAA tests, they have great promise.*
The "electronic AFCBs" installed in military aircraft are already in their second generation.
US stats:
300+ cockpit smoke incidents in civilian aircraft reported every year.
12+ USN aircraft losses or serious damage caused by arcing in the last decade.
1000+ electrical failures attributed to arcing yearly within the Navy's airborne fleet.
*Added: AFCBs available now include an indication of whether the trip was due to arc detection or current overload.
New-design aircraft (like the 787, pending FAA approval) will have this protection built in for many circuits. The newest C-130 (Lockheed Martin) and F-22 Raptor (Boeing/Lockheed Martin) use similar devices that can cutoff current within milliseconds of arc detection. These units can also provide protection from fuel vapour ignition due to electrical faults. They differ from the standard AFCB in that their current path is all electronic.
A study completed in 2005 by the FAA on AFCBs can be reviewed here.
5MB PDF ~180 pages. Ground and flight testing was in the Atlantic City, NJ tech center's 727.
While the AFCBs were not perfect in the FAA tests, they have great promise.*
The "electronic AFCBs" installed in military aircraft are already in their second generation.
US stats:
300+ cockpit smoke incidents in civilian aircraft reported every year.
12+ USN aircraft losses or serious damage caused by arcing in the last decade.
1000+ electrical failures attributed to arcing yearly within the Navy's airborne fleet.
*Added: AFCBs available now include an indication of whether the trip was due to arc detection or current overload.
Last edited by vapilot2004; 24th May 2007 at 12:50.
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Having worked with TSBC, and lost colleagues in this unfortunate tragedy, I would like to post a quick word as I see a lot of info that seems to stem from hearsay and some of the 'stories' and 'expert opinions' that got circulated at the time.
-Generators off to stop fire- one must not confuse ignition (electrical sparks/arcing event) and the actual burning/smoldering/consumption of material (in this case to a great extent Mylar 'fire proof'insulation/lining).
Once the material is burning, as was the case, it is only smothering it with agent and cooling that will stop further fire/smoldering. Obviously eliminating the ignition source is also high on the priority list.
-making orbits to dump iso landing- if you read the report, and I can confirm, this was not the case. The fact is, despite a rapid descent they were too high and too heavy for a night BB app/landing into an unfamiliar airport. 70Nm from FL350. The 16 minutes till total electrical failure (from initial perception of 'smoke'), seems long but when played out in the SIM against the timeline with all there was to do, is shockingly short.
The crew took an almost imediate decision NOT to continue over the NAT, they also very rapidly took up the ATCOs proposal to go to Halifax iso Boston. This, on what initially was, only a whisp of smoke and odour. There was no other indication of the gravity of the event. They asked the F galley FA if she had smoke or any indications regularily, to which her answer was always no!
The actual path of fire and smoke was up and over the ceiling of F classs ultimately as far as the C galley before certain events (duct capping destruction) changed the air circulation and brought heat/smoke and fire forward again.
I would like to break away from the conception that they were in a 'rut' with respect to procedures and didn't think out of the box. As mentioned above they very rapidly altered their initial plan (was there an event before this?) and handled safely and appropriately but never suspecting the massive fire that ultimately destroyed the electrical system and very probably cascaded into the cockpit in the final phase.
It is noteworthy that after the loss of electrical power, the ATC radar tracks SR111 for approx 5minutes in a right turn back around to line up for RWY06, extension of Flaps to 15 and shutdown of engine 2 (spurious fire warnings?!) until the ultimate roll-over.
I honestly think it fair to state that this was the absolute nightmare non-survivable scenario, and will remain a watershed accident, and investigation, in aviation history.
As a reminder, a few months after this event a US airline L1011 suffered a cockpit overhead panel fire. However, with a crew of three, day VFR conditions over the continental US the outcome was so different as to be lost in the catalogue of aviation incidents. (NB. IFALPA/USALPA presented the crew with an award for outstanding airmanship).
ICAO did a survey of fire-smoke incidents: 14-18minutes is your life expectancy if its for real.
As to the thread- I cannot see the point of releasing the tapes and will not listen to them...... too close for comfort.
Hoping to shed some light on events and not forget our colleagues,
best regards to all
MB
-Generators off to stop fire- one must not confuse ignition (electrical sparks/arcing event) and the actual burning/smoldering/consumption of material (in this case to a great extent Mylar 'fire proof'insulation/lining).
Once the material is burning, as was the case, it is only smothering it with agent and cooling that will stop further fire/smoldering. Obviously eliminating the ignition source is also high on the priority list.
-making orbits to dump iso landing- if you read the report, and I can confirm, this was not the case. The fact is, despite a rapid descent they were too high and too heavy for a night BB app/landing into an unfamiliar airport. 70Nm from FL350. The 16 minutes till total electrical failure (from initial perception of 'smoke'), seems long but when played out in the SIM against the timeline with all there was to do, is shockingly short.
The crew took an almost imediate decision NOT to continue over the NAT, they also very rapidly took up the ATCOs proposal to go to Halifax iso Boston. This, on what initially was, only a whisp of smoke and odour. There was no other indication of the gravity of the event. They asked the F galley FA if she had smoke or any indications regularily, to which her answer was always no!
The actual path of fire and smoke was up and over the ceiling of F classs ultimately as far as the C galley before certain events (duct capping destruction) changed the air circulation and brought heat/smoke and fire forward again.
I would like to break away from the conception that they were in a 'rut' with respect to procedures and didn't think out of the box. As mentioned above they very rapidly altered their initial plan (was there an event before this?) and handled safely and appropriately but never suspecting the massive fire that ultimately destroyed the electrical system and very probably cascaded into the cockpit in the final phase.
It is noteworthy that after the loss of electrical power, the ATC radar tracks SR111 for approx 5minutes in a right turn back around to line up for RWY06, extension of Flaps to 15 and shutdown of engine 2 (spurious fire warnings?!) until the ultimate roll-over.
I honestly think it fair to state that this was the absolute nightmare non-survivable scenario, and will remain a watershed accident, and investigation, in aviation history.
As a reminder, a few months after this event a US airline L1011 suffered a cockpit overhead panel fire. However, with a crew of three, day VFR conditions over the continental US the outcome was so different as to be lost in the catalogue of aviation incidents. (NB. IFALPA/USALPA presented the crew with an award for outstanding airmanship).
ICAO did a survey of fire-smoke incidents: 14-18minutes is your life expectancy if its for real.
As to the thread- I cannot see the point of releasing the tapes and will not listen to them...... too close for comfort.
Hoping to shed some light on events and not forget our colleagues,
best regards to all
MB
Here in Canada sample portions of the tape ( Declaration of a PAN and Declaration of an emergency) have been plyed on television news.
I must say I was shocked and embarrassed. If I felt that someone had done less than their best or been incompetent and the tapes had been played to show it, then that would have been important news but the Swissair pilots appeared to behave with ultimate professionalism and the controllers were concerned, cool, and did their job. It seems to me that the news organisations, who were the appellants in the appeal, just wanted an extra day in the sun. It was not that they just wanted to know, for the sake of certanty, it was that they wanted to play the tapes on air for gain. Frankly disgusting and voyeuristic.
I must say I was shocked and embarrassed. If I felt that someone had done less than their best or been incompetent and the tapes had been played to show it, then that would have been important news but the Swissair pilots appeared to behave with ultimate professionalism and the controllers were concerned, cool, and did their job. It seems to me that the news organisations, who were the appellants in the appeal, just wanted an extra day in the sun. It was not that they just wanted to know, for the sake of certanty, it was that they wanted to play the tapes on air for gain. Frankly disgusting and voyeuristic.
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Thanks for that post MB. Again I'm sure that the release of the tapes are in connection with the outstanding verdict of the Swissair trail for whatever reasons.
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Swissair trail?
Hi N380UA,
I guess you meant trial rather than trail? I don't know why the authorities in Canada would react to a court case in Switzerland though.
What is important - and I myself have also been very involved in a Swissair smoke in cockpit case and the subsequent rewriting of the checklist (including in flight smoke simulation using smoke generators to test removal techniques) - is that all the smoke cases should be openly documented and learned from. Swissair made a teaching video tape of the results of "our" MD-80 case but kept it to themselves for instance. I never agreed with that. It even led to different fleet philosophy within the airline. The same thing (keeping it quiet) seems to be happening in the case of the SAS and other recent smoke events.
Every event is different. There is no standard case. You may well have to improvise as Bubbers says. The basic principles are known about at least since the Canadian DC-9 event mentioned by Puddljmpr, where I believe a faulty toilet flushing mechanism was reset several times, a toilet door was opened, allowing fresh air in to a smouldering fault, the cabin crew talked about a fire when it was initially a smoke case, the flight stayed up way too long and a flashover occured when the cabin doors were finally opened on the ground.
These principles are, amongst others:
Have a readable checklist in large print on the outside cover of the QRM / emergency checklist with a warning to descend as first item. The print size may be reduced for procedures after smoke dispersal / removal.
Descend as soon as possible
Land at nearest Site (might not neccessarily most suitable etc. airfield) if no improvement
The turning off one side and waiting type of procedure is cr@p - turn everything off and slowly build up again to get a more rapid response
Get maximum cooperation with the cabin crew
Use the goggles and O2 and keep cleaning them and the windows (you would be amazed how much smoke dust gets on them)
Be prepared for continued poor conditions (in the case of the MD-80 the fault was in the Nr 1 line from the battery to the em Pwr switch, which remained powered through an unreacheable and untaught about CB in the "cellar")
Expect the worst (fire) and act accordingly.
As for the use of hearing two poor doomed guys doing their best (and Martin Baker is quite right - the fire would have got to the uncontrollable stage quite a few miles out on a straight in, in the case of SR111) I can't see how it helps - except possibly as a dire warning to all concerned to take smoke seriously.
We have had contributers talking about RTB due smoke as "non-event" a couple of times recently. If they now realise that it is the biggest, worst event that can happen, maybe some good will come of this.
FC.
I guess you meant trial rather than trail? I don't know why the authorities in Canada would react to a court case in Switzerland though.
What is important - and I myself have also been very involved in a Swissair smoke in cockpit case and the subsequent rewriting of the checklist (including in flight smoke simulation using smoke generators to test removal techniques) - is that all the smoke cases should be openly documented and learned from. Swissair made a teaching video tape of the results of "our" MD-80 case but kept it to themselves for instance. I never agreed with that. It even led to different fleet philosophy within the airline. The same thing (keeping it quiet) seems to be happening in the case of the SAS and other recent smoke events.
Every event is different. There is no standard case. You may well have to improvise as Bubbers says. The basic principles are known about at least since the Canadian DC-9 event mentioned by Puddljmpr, where I believe a faulty toilet flushing mechanism was reset several times, a toilet door was opened, allowing fresh air in to a smouldering fault, the cabin crew talked about a fire when it was initially a smoke case, the flight stayed up way too long and a flashover occured when the cabin doors were finally opened on the ground.
These principles are, amongst others:
Have a readable checklist in large print on the outside cover of the QRM / emergency checklist with a warning to descend as first item. The print size may be reduced for procedures after smoke dispersal / removal.
Descend as soon as possible
Land at nearest Site (might not neccessarily most suitable etc. airfield) if no improvement
The turning off one side and waiting type of procedure is cr@p - turn everything off and slowly build up again to get a more rapid response
Get maximum cooperation with the cabin crew
Use the goggles and O2 and keep cleaning them and the windows (you would be amazed how much smoke dust gets on them)
Be prepared for continued poor conditions (in the case of the MD-80 the fault was in the Nr 1 line from the battery to the em Pwr switch, which remained powered through an unreacheable and untaught about CB in the "cellar")
Expect the worst (fire) and act accordingly.
As for the use of hearing two poor doomed guys doing their best (and Martin Baker is quite right - the fire would have got to the uncontrollable stage quite a few miles out on a straight in, in the case of SR111) I can't see how it helps - except possibly as a dire warning to all concerned to take smoke seriously.
We have had contributers talking about RTB due smoke as "non-event" a couple of times recently. If they now realise that it is the biggest, worst event that can happen, maybe some good will come of this.
FC.
Thanks for your reply, Martin Baker. I have read the report, and it clearly debunks many myths about the accident which are apparantly still being propagated, even in this thread. The analysis in the report is clear on the fact that this accident was simply not survivable.
The very idea that this crew would have been alive had they not followed the procedures has been proven wrong in the analysis, but apparantly some posters in this thread haven't bothered to read the facts before venting their opinions. The accident surely made a good case for re-designing electrical smoke/fire procedures, but that wouldn't have saved this crew when the Mylar was already burning.
The very idea that this crew would have been alive had they not followed the procedures has been proven wrong in the analysis, but apparantly some posters in this thread haven't bothered to read the facts before venting their opinions. The accident surely made a good case for re-designing electrical smoke/fire procedures, but that wouldn't have saved this crew when the Mylar was already burning.
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I can agree with many opinions in this thread, but don't see anything negative in making public the tapes. In every catastrophy, we find publications of voices and pictures, where available. Why doesn't anyone oppose against tapes made public from firemen in the world trade tower? They also did their best, they also were in a dire situation. They also died in fullfilling their mission.
When listening to this tape, I do not try to blame them, I read rational and important clues for this accident and for any similar in the future.
Dani
When listening to this tape, I do not try to blame them, I read rational and important clues for this accident and for any similar in the future.
Dani
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Konichiwa FC, genki desu ka? long time no hear … you ought to come by for some BEvERage again soon.
Thanks for the correction, indeed I meant trial. Like I said I don’t have the foggiest what those tapes could have to do with Swissair trial. I just think it’s a funny coincidence that they would be aired right now. As it was pointed out, there is nothing new to gain from listening to the actual ATC recording. It all has been on transcripts already, published and scrutinized within our industry.
That is why the trial is all I can come up with as a reason for airing those tapes…what ever reason evades me. The only other option is as MM said "satisfy some voyeuristic and obscene desire to hear the last words of the unfortunate pilots about to die". I'm not sure if this is mainstream worthy enough to put it up in such a manner though.
Thanks for the correction, indeed I meant trial. Like I said I don’t have the foggiest what those tapes could have to do with Swissair trial. I just think it’s a funny coincidence that they would be aired right now. As it was pointed out, there is nothing new to gain from listening to the actual ATC recording. It all has been on transcripts already, published and scrutinized within our industry.
That is why the trial is all I can come up with as a reason for airing those tapes…what ever reason evades me. The only other option is as MM said "satisfy some voyeuristic and obscene desire to hear the last words of the unfortunate pilots about to die". I'm not sure if this is mainstream worthy enough to put it up in such a manner though.
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xetroV
You said the experts said if the pilots had shut off the source of the electrical feeding the entertainment system it wouldn't have affected the outcome? Who said this? What expert? I have stopped many electrical fires by pulling the plug.
You said the experts said if the pilots had shut off the source of the electrical feeding the entertainment system it wouldn't have affected the outcome? Who said this? What expert? I have stopped many electrical fires by pulling the plug.
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Also have you noticed if a wire is cherry red like a cigarette lighter it keeps burning stuff around it but if you take electricity away from it now becomes a class A fire that can be doused with water or any other fire repellent of any kind. Your experts probably didn't consider that the flight attendants could have put out a fire that wasn't being fed by electricity. If people insist on keeping everything fully powered up we will probably revisit this disaster again. I chose not to but everyone has to decide how dear the checklist is to them.
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bubbers44,
You may have noticed people already said that no two fires are quite the same.
If you can actually SEE a red-hot wire AND know what circuit it's connected to, you are already very lucky.... you might have a chance.
I'm in the "pull every CB you can and put it down NOW" camp.
You may have noticed people already said that no two fires are quite the same.
If you can actually SEE a red-hot wire AND know what circuit it's connected to, you are already very lucky.... you might have a chance.
I'm in the "pull every CB you can and put it down NOW" camp.
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Shutting down all the generators does the same thing. A lot easier than pulling hundreds of CB's. Why do we need all of these circuits? If survival is critical shut everything down with two buttons then sort it out. Enjoy the view for a while then if you feel friscky turn a bus on.
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Originally Posted by bubbers44
Shutting down all the generators does the same thing.
Still, don't forget the +28 batteries....