Tenerife. March, 27th, 1977.
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Well, everyone has to have their first post, and this one is mine.
Here's some good reading from Pan Am's FO, Robert Bragg:
http://www.project-tenerife.com/nede...raggspeaks.htm
You'll need to scroll down a bit to get to the start of the Tenerife story. Anyway, here's one interesting point that I'm not sure has been mentioned so far...
Pan Am didn't even want to land at Los Rodeos to begin with, as they had the fuel to hold, and that's what Capt. Grubbs had Bragg request of ATC, who denied the request.
Thus, therein lay the first link of the accident chain; Spanish ATC making Pan Am land, when they could have waited upstairs instead.
Indeed, as it turned out, based on when Las Palmas re-opened, Grubbs had the right idea. He would have had sufficient reserves. Okay, if Las Palmas did not open soon enough he always could have then landed at Los Rodeos, but...
Grubbs wanted to avoid the mess on the ground to begin with.
There were so many links in this chain.
Lou
Here's some good reading from Pan Am's FO, Robert Bragg:
http://www.project-tenerife.com/nede...raggspeaks.htm
You'll need to scroll down a bit to get to the start of the Tenerife story. Anyway, here's one interesting point that I'm not sure has been mentioned so far...
Pan Am didn't even want to land at Los Rodeos to begin with, as they had the fuel to hold, and that's what Capt. Grubbs had Bragg request of ATC, who denied the request.
Thus, therein lay the first link of the accident chain; Spanish ATC making Pan Am land, when they could have waited upstairs instead.
Indeed, as it turned out, based on when Las Palmas re-opened, Grubbs had the right idea. He would have had sufficient reserves. Okay, if Las Palmas did not open soon enough he always could have then landed at Los Rodeos, but...
Grubbs wanted to avoid the mess on the ground to begin with.
There were so many links in this chain.
Lou
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ATC Watcher
I checked my files and, like you, I couldn't find any record of Meurs concurring with van Zanten that the runway was clear. I don't know where Stewart got that from.
Grongle
I don't agree with you that the ultimate reason for the Tenerife accident must remain a deep, dark mystery. We have many clues as to why van Zanten acted in the way he did. Of course, we might draw a conclusion that's completely wrong but I doubt it. Fundamentally, it was a lapse in airmanship. Given the wx, he should have checked, checked and checked again that he was clear to take off. I'm sure that was not the first time a pilot had commenced takeoff without clearance and not the last either. We can only hope that the same infraction will never have similar consequences.
Over the years since 1977, an impression has formed in many people's minds that van Zanten was an overbearing, arrogant commander who ran roughshod over his crew and attempted to take off over the protests of both his fellow-crewmembers. I think - I hope - that this thread has set the record straight, in part at least.
On the subject of my attitude toward cultural differences, I'm afraid you have the wrong end of the stick, Grongle. Alas, at age 68, I cannot pretend to be young but I suppose I can claim that I'm as young as I feel. I most certainly do believe that cultural differences contribute very much to the real world we live in. Actually, between you and me, I believe some cultures are superior to others but for God's sake, don't tell anyone, especially in oh-so-politically-correct, little old Canada. I just don't think that culture and cultural differences had anything to do with the Tenerife catastrophe, which I believe could have happened just as easily in Turin, Tokyo or Timbuktu. I'm reminded of the debate on PPRune following SQ006 in TPE and the SQ-bashers weighing in with diatribes on Asian cockpit culture resulting in a wrong turn off the taxiway - totally wide of the mark, as far as I was concerned. It was simply a mistake that none of the three crewmembers caught - and there were precious few outside indicators that they were lined up on a closed runway. There definitely are some parallels between Tenerife and SQ006.
Rockhound
I checked my files and, like you, I couldn't find any record of Meurs concurring with van Zanten that the runway was clear. I don't know where Stewart got that from.
Grongle
I don't agree with you that the ultimate reason for the Tenerife accident must remain a deep, dark mystery. We have many clues as to why van Zanten acted in the way he did. Of course, we might draw a conclusion that's completely wrong but I doubt it. Fundamentally, it was a lapse in airmanship. Given the wx, he should have checked, checked and checked again that he was clear to take off. I'm sure that was not the first time a pilot had commenced takeoff without clearance and not the last either. We can only hope that the same infraction will never have similar consequences.
Over the years since 1977, an impression has formed in many people's minds that van Zanten was an overbearing, arrogant commander who ran roughshod over his crew and attempted to take off over the protests of both his fellow-crewmembers. I think - I hope - that this thread has set the record straight, in part at least.
On the subject of my attitude toward cultural differences, I'm afraid you have the wrong end of the stick, Grongle. Alas, at age 68, I cannot pretend to be young but I suppose I can claim that I'm as young as I feel. I most certainly do believe that cultural differences contribute very much to the real world we live in. Actually, between you and me, I believe some cultures are superior to others but for God's sake, don't tell anyone, especially in oh-so-politically-correct, little old Canada. I just don't think that culture and cultural differences had anything to do with the Tenerife catastrophe, which I believe could have happened just as easily in Turin, Tokyo or Timbuktu. I'm reminded of the debate on PPRune following SQ006 in TPE and the SQ-bashers weighing in with diatribes on Asian cockpit culture resulting in a wrong turn off the taxiway - totally wide of the mark, as far as I was concerned. It was simply a mistake that none of the three crewmembers caught - and there were precious few outside indicators that they were lined up on a closed runway. There definitely are some parallels between Tenerife and SQ006.
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What If
What if KLM had taken off after PAA was clear of the runway, but prior to receiving actual takeoff clearance? Would ATC likely have filed charges? What might the penalty have been?
GB
GB
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I am curious as to why there hasn't been more debate about my statement at the end of post #92. We can speculate all we want as to the reasons why a 3 person crew allowed 300 plus tons of aircraft, people and fuel to accelerate down a runway into oblivion, but if the controller had not allowed the KLM aircraft to enter the runway or backtrack into a lined up position in the first place, this would never have happened. Sure the tower controller might have felt that he was further delaying an already delayed aircraft, and I get that sort of stuff thrown at me all the time, so what! We are only talking about 1 minute here, the difference between being lined up and awaiting take off clearance on a soon to be clean runway, or sitting at a holding point in a safe position. I would love to know what the real story behind the tower controllers actions are! One of my favourite sayings to the young locals I train here in Hong Kong is, "smell the rat".
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Didn't the KLM skipper while blocking everyone else in while parked, take on extra gas and delay the other departures? He could have picked up the extra gas down route but elected not to. And the weight penalty of the extra fuel extend the take off roll such that he might have cleared Pan Am if he hadn't chosen to take on the gas which wasn't necessary for getting out of Tenerife in the first place. If ever there wa a case of the holes of the swiss cheese lining up.......................
019360:
You mentioned the wonderful crew-coordination (CRM) which saved many lives on that DC-10 at Sioux City, IA.
Let's not forget those furiously busy pilots on the DHL A-300 who were well-aware of the United situation and somehow managed to return to the airport in Baghdad after the missile zapped all three hydraulic systems where the lines ran together in the left wing.
Rockhound:
A few years ago, this accident appeared on Rumours and News. Somebody claimed or suggested that the KLM Captain's experience, just before the disaster as either a simulator Instructor or Check Airman created a mentality whereby it was easier to believe that a real-world problem could be quickly solved and appeared less dangerous than it was in reality.
The contributor claimed that a 'sim. training': "reset the sim and do it again...". mindset could have led the Captain into a less cautious mindset in the real airplane. I really don't know if this could have been a factor at Tenerife. But in a simulator during rushed Initial or condensed Requal. Training, we quickly reset from one problem to the next, and often reset the spoiler handle, flaps, trim, bug speeds, EFCA bug etc with two sets of hands in order to expedite more takeoff situations, or sharpen a Cat 2 approach from just outside the OM/final approach segment. Due to a huge Instructor workload it sometimes is not clear to the Pilot Trainee whether a given takeoff training event is to be treated as "the real thing", or not.
But the blocked radio call at Tenerife was a critical factor and continues to be today, hundreds or more times per day. And this is just in crowded US airspace. At least dozens of times per hour at either ORD or ATL.
You mentioned the wonderful crew-coordination (CRM) which saved many lives on that DC-10 at Sioux City, IA.
Let's not forget those furiously busy pilots on the DHL A-300 who were well-aware of the United situation and somehow managed to return to the airport in Baghdad after the missile zapped all three hydraulic systems where the lines ran together in the left wing.
Rockhound:
A few years ago, this accident appeared on Rumours and News. Somebody claimed or suggested that the KLM Captain's experience, just before the disaster as either a simulator Instructor or Check Airman created a mentality whereby it was easier to believe that a real-world problem could be quickly solved and appeared less dangerous than it was in reality.
The contributor claimed that a 'sim. training': "reset the sim and do it again...". mindset could have led the Captain into a less cautious mindset in the real airplane. I really don't know if this could have been a factor at Tenerife. But in a simulator during rushed Initial or condensed Requal. Training, we quickly reset from one problem to the next, and often reset the spoiler handle, flaps, trim, bug speeds, EFCA bug etc with two sets of hands in order to expedite more takeoff situations, or sharpen a Cat 2 approach from just outside the OM/final approach segment. Due to a huge Instructor workload it sometimes is not clear to the Pilot Trainee whether a given takeoff training event is to be treated as "the real thing", or not.
But the blocked radio call at Tenerife was a critical factor and continues to be today, hundreds or more times per day. And this is just in crowded US airspace. At least dozens of times per hour at either ORD or ATL.
Last edited by Ignition Override; 3rd Apr 2007 at 04:45.
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Indeed I.Overide, (re your last paragraph) one would think that after all these years of technological advancement that has taken place in aviation, this Archiles heel of jammed transmissions would have been sorted out by now.
Last edited by Bedder believeit; 3rd Apr 2007 at 14:27.
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Simultaneous transmissions
You make the point the jammed or simultaneous transmissions have been a problem in the past, were a critical factor in the Tenerife accident and continue to this day, with increasing frequency of occurence as the sky has more aircraft operating therein. You are a pilot, and as such let me ask you a question. When you attempt a radio transmission and you hear a loud squeal do you ask the facility with whom you were attempting to communicate whether they received your transmission, or do you just say/think "two people were transmitting at once" and look into no further?
It is a problem, and one that has been around a long time. I had it happen to me many times. Why not just query the facility one was attempting to communicate with to determine if they received your transmission? Until the powers that be are willing to put enough money and effort into solving the problem it is something we pilots have to deal with. It does not make sense to me that neither KLM, Tenerife Control tower or even Pan American did not inquire into what was said by whom during the squeal. Especially in the Tenerife tragedy since all involved were uncertain of just about everything.
It is a problem, and one that has been around a long time. I had it happen to me many times. Why not just query the facility one was attempting to communicate with to determine if they received your transmission? Until the powers that be are willing to put enough money and effort into solving the problem it is something we pilots have to deal with. It does not make sense to me that neither KLM, Tenerife Control tower or even Pan American did not inquire into what was said by whom during the squeal. Especially in the Tenerife tragedy since all involved were uncertain of just about everything.
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Bedder beliveit
It was - past tense.
Indeed I.Overide, (re your last paragraph) one would think that after all these years of technoligical advancement that has taken place in aviation, this Archiles heel of jammed transmissions would have been sorted out by now.
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Forget: I won't get into a slanging match with you, I will leave that to Rocksy. I see the AIC is dated 1993, and looks just like good intentions to me. From the words that I see that Ignition Overide and Michael744 (whom I assume are both professional pilots), well, they both indicate that it is still a problem, and that is certainly my experience on a day to day basis. Do we have any Brit controllers here that would care to comment.
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Bedder believit.
What the Why does posting a publicly available AIC, completely relevent to the issue at hand, upset you? I'm genuinely baffled!
Forget: I won't get into a slanging match with you,
Why does posting a publicly available AIC, completely relevent to the issue at hand, upset you? I'm genuinely baffled!
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I would like to go even further than that. What is the issue at hand here? Figuring out what happened in an accident that occurred 30 years ago? People have received their doctorates based on this accident. The volume of written material about Tenerife is absolutely awesome. I have not read one iota here that adds anything to this body of work. I guess there is nothing happening in our current environment that is worth talking about.
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Bedder believit, I now (I think) see what your problem was. I said the problem was sorted out. And it was. That the solutions were never implemented is a different matter.
Bad analogy - but a little like head injuries from motor cycle crashes. The problem was solved years ago - but some countries still don't require crash hats.
And trust me on this, I have good reason to know a great deal about conflicting transmissions.
Bad analogy - but a little like head injuries from motor cycle crashes. The problem was solved years ago - but some countries still don't require crash hats.
And trust me on this, I have good reason to know a great deal about conflicting transmissions.
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Nardi Riviera posted an excellent synopsis of Tenerife from Airmanshiponline.com. In it, the author points out that progress (as of 1998, at least) in installing antiblocking devices to mitigate frequency congestion and simultaneous transmissions has been slow, despite the low cost of these devices.
Still Albatross
It's my understanding that van Zanten elected to refuel in Tenerife, rather than Las Palmas, in order to make better use of his time during an enforced stopover. Also, he didn't anticipate that Las Palmas would reopen as early as it did.
Otterman
You're right. Almost nothing new about Tenerife or the fallout from it has been revealed in this thread. At least, nothing that was not already known to those that read and digested investigators' reports and informed commentary on the accident. However, there are still a lot of people out there (inside and outside the industry) who have a very faulty impression of the accident. Maybe now there are one or two fewer.
Rockhound
Still Albatross
It's my understanding that van Zanten elected to refuel in Tenerife, rather than Las Palmas, in order to make better use of his time during an enforced stopover. Also, he didn't anticipate that Las Palmas would reopen as early as it did.
Otterman
You're right. Almost nothing new about Tenerife or the fallout from it has been revealed in this thread. At least, nothing that was not already known to those that read and digested investigators' reports and informed commentary on the accident. However, there are still a lot of people out there (inside and outside the industry) who have a very faulty impression of the accident. Maybe now there are one or two fewer.
Rockhound
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Michael744,
Since it was the Tower and PanAm that transmitted simultaneously neither would have hard the squeal and so they had no reason to believe their transmission had not been received. The squeal would have been heard only by the KLM crew, but they were then at the take-off roll, too busy to use the radio.
Since it was the Tower and PanAm that transmitted simultaneously neither would have hard the squeal and so they had no reason to believe their transmission had not been received. The squeal would have been heard only by the KLM crew, but they were then at the take-off roll, too busy to use the radio.
Otterman:
Maybe nothing is new, except for certain airports which have the (SMGS) low vis. taxi charts and special marked circles, and pulsing rows of lights with illuminated stopbars at hold short lines.
US major news network NBC had a short segment a few days ago which described the new c0ckpit equipment, able to display your position on the airport. The cost might be somewhat prohibitive.
But even if the NTSB talks the FAA ('Tombstone Agency') into requiring this for Part 121 (even for 135?) aircraft, it only seems to show where "our" aircraft is-but NOT where the other planes are, unlike TCAS displays on the IVSI.
A very alert and attentive USAirways crew was the last link in the chain several years ago when they studied their ground chart as they listened to a freight jet crew which was lost in fog and seemed to have wandered onto the wrong runway at Providence, R.I (PVD). The tower controller seemed unaware of the level of confusion in the other c0ckp1t, and where the aircraft was; he issued a takeoff clearance. The USAirways crew's assertive comments on the ground or tower frequency, and their REFUSAL to accept a takeoff clearance probably saved many lives . This is only what I can remember from a safety video we saw during annual training.
Check the 10-9 ground chart on PVD, if possible. MKE, MDW, HOU are not any better. CLE might be one of the worst.
Maybe nothing is new, except for certain airports which have the (SMGS) low vis. taxi charts and special marked circles, and pulsing rows of lights with illuminated stopbars at hold short lines.
US major news network NBC had a short segment a few days ago which described the new c0ckpit equipment, able to display your position on the airport. The cost might be somewhat prohibitive.
But even if the NTSB talks the FAA ('Tombstone Agency') into requiring this for Part 121 (even for 135?) aircraft, it only seems to show where "our" aircraft is-but NOT where the other planes are, unlike TCAS displays on the IVSI.
A very alert and attentive USAirways crew was the last link in the chain several years ago when they studied their ground chart as they listened to a freight jet crew which was lost in fog and seemed to have wandered onto the wrong runway at Providence, R.I (PVD). The tower controller seemed unaware of the level of confusion in the other c0ckp1t, and where the aircraft was; he issued a takeoff clearance. The USAirways crew's assertive comments on the ground or tower frequency, and their REFUSAL to accept a takeoff clearance probably saved many lives . This is only what I can remember from a safety video we saw during annual training.
Check the 10-9 ground chart on PVD, if possible. MKE, MDW, HOU are not any better. CLE might be one of the worst.
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for clarity
Ignition override,
In saying that nothing new is being mentioned, I thought it would be obvious I was talking about what this thread is about, “Tenerife. March, 27th, 1977”. What you are talking about is at best the third cousin, twice removed of what was causal to Tenerife. This accident has to be placed in its time and context. And what I wrote is, that this has occurred in spades during the past thirty years, it is all out there, and certainly doesn’t qualify as “news”.
The technology you are talking about wasn’t around at the time, and its development isn’t directly related to this accident (new thread maybe?). Our industry certainly has problems with runway incursions, and loss of situational awareness. The layout of some of the biggest airports in the USA make them very prone to these types of incidents. And most of these airports are operating at the outer reaches of their capacity. It is good that technology is ready or in the pipeline to take on this dangerous issue.
In Europe ground based radar at the major airport hubs is widespread. And Europe has much more experience with low visibility procedures. Signs are better and clearer at its major hubs. Lighting is of a much higher quality. CAT 3 is an absolute rarity in the USA. And I haven’t ever seen the no decision height (CATIIIb no DH) variant anywhere in the USA (might be there). It is common place over here.
Btw I fly the B777 with a full Class 3 EFB (Electronic Flight Bag), which has most of the technology that you mentioned (among them a moving airport map display). Our whole fleet from large to small is being prepared for retrofit (although it will take years to complete). So not everyone feels it is cost prohibitive.
I hope this post is clearer.
Greetings O.
In saying that nothing new is being mentioned, I thought it would be obvious I was talking about what this thread is about, “Tenerife. March, 27th, 1977”. What you are talking about is at best the third cousin, twice removed of what was causal to Tenerife. This accident has to be placed in its time and context. And what I wrote is, that this has occurred in spades during the past thirty years, it is all out there, and certainly doesn’t qualify as “news”.
The technology you are talking about wasn’t around at the time, and its development isn’t directly related to this accident (new thread maybe?). Our industry certainly has problems with runway incursions, and loss of situational awareness. The layout of some of the biggest airports in the USA make them very prone to these types of incidents. And most of these airports are operating at the outer reaches of their capacity. It is good that technology is ready or in the pipeline to take on this dangerous issue.
In Europe ground based radar at the major airport hubs is widespread. And Europe has much more experience with low visibility procedures. Signs are better and clearer at its major hubs. Lighting is of a much higher quality. CAT 3 is an absolute rarity in the USA. And I haven’t ever seen the no decision height (CATIIIb no DH) variant anywhere in the USA (might be there). It is common place over here.
Btw I fly the B777 with a full Class 3 EFB (Electronic Flight Bag), which has most of the technology that you mentioned (among them a moving airport map display). Our whole fleet from large to small is being prepared for retrofit (although it will take years to complete). So not everyone feels it is cost prohibitive.
I hope this post is clearer.
Greetings O.
Last edited by Otterman; 4th Apr 2007 at 09:32.
