Ryanair pilot demoted after incident
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Dave,
I agree with you. One should have to answer for something like that. I guess what didn't come across clearly in my post is the fact that I truly believe that we as pilots should keep the pressure on each other to operate in a responsible manner. As I said, in the mind of the public we are all viewed as one. Accountability and peer pressure can be used as a valuable tool in enhancing safety. We just have to avoid the crass and personal attacks that one sometimes see on this site.
I agree with you. One should have to answer for something like that. I guess what didn't come across clearly in my post is the fact that I truly believe that we as pilots should keep the pressure on each other to operate in a responsible manner. As I said, in the mind of the public we are all viewed as one. Accountability and peer pressure can be used as a valuable tool in enhancing safety. We just have to avoid the crass and personal attacks that one sometimes see on this site.
Yet again the CVR is not available. Advances in technology make the production of a CVR that has say a 30-day memory straightforward compared to when the regulations for these were formulated. How many years before the blindingly obvious is mandated.
It doesn't have to be of the fully crashproof/fireproof type, the existing duration is probably fine for one of these in parallel, but just a normal recorder.
I don't see in the accident report whether they were on schedule or behind time, and if so by how much. It would be useful to indicate that.
It doesn't have to be of the fully crashproof/fireproof type, the existing duration is probably fine for one of these in parallel, but just a normal recorder.
I don't see in the accident report whether they were on schedule or behind time, and if so by how much. It would be useful to indicate that.
Warning Toxic!
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Let's be careful over our use of the words accident and incident. There was no damage other than to professional pride, and nobody was hurt, nothing broken. Safety systems operated correctly. It was no more than an 'incident'.
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Its a very clear cut case. The Captain did two things wrong (procedurely at least) and that was firstly he made a bad command decision by not GOING AROUND. Secondly he decided to orbit but not only that but orbit with LANDING FLAP.
That in itself is a clear breach of SOP.
Nobody cares that he cocked up the approach - who hasnt. Its what he did once he realised it all was going horribly wrong that put him back in the right seat.
Lesson - GO AROUND is always an option.
That in itself is a clear breach of SOP.
Nobody cares that he cocked up the approach - who hasnt. Its what he did once he realised it all was going horribly wrong that put him back in the right seat.
Lesson - GO AROUND is always an option.
With the greatest of respect, I note that the captain had 11,780 hours.
Nothing is said about the experience of the co pilot.
I wonder how the pilots reached the conclusion that they were not fatigued and I wonder what steps the investigating authority took before they agreed that this assertion was fact?
The cause is quoted as:
Now why would a pilot of this experience level do this?
Nothing is said about the experience of the co pilot.
At a later debrief neither pilot considered fatigue a factor in this event.
The cause is quoted as:
This serious incident was precipitated by the PF not adhering to the Operators explicit SOP’s in the two approaches to RWY 17 and also by not conforming to established CRM principles in relation to the PNF.
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If a highly experienced pilot were downgraded from left to right would this not in turn create the potential for some rather unsual CRM based on the fact he is likely to be far more experienced that the lefty ?
Based on the fact that CRM was poor previously when in command I can see that it could be magnified further when sitting on the other side.
Just a thought.
P.S I am sure the individual concerned is a great guy and I hope he gets the remedial training and opportunity to learn from this.
Based on the fact that CRM was poor previously when in command I can see that it could be magnified further when sitting on the other side.
Just a thought.
P.S I am sure the individual concerned is a great guy and I hope he gets the remedial training and opportunity to learn from this.
Last edited by F900EX; 1st Feb 2007 at 19:54.
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jetsy
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Dutchjock
I simply made a statement to Sunfish's post:
The info I provided on the f/o's experience is actually available in the "summary" section of the report.
Absolutely not!!
So far I refrained from making any comments on the issue.
Let me just say this: I agree with the airline decision. Too bad for the captain and the actions he chose. He's going to have to live with the consequence.
I find F900EX observation quite an interesting one. With that many hours behind the belt he will not be happy on the right....
Lesson(s) learned, you think?
I simply made a statement to Sunfish's post:
With the greatest of respect, I note that the captain had 11,780 hours.Nothing is said about the experience of the co pilot.
Do you mean having 8000 hrs gives a commander the right to ignore is (inexperienced) f/o AND his sop's???
So far I refrained from making any comments on the issue.
Let me just say this: I agree with the airline decision. Too bad for the captain and the actions he chose. He's going to have to live with the consequence.
I find F900EX observation quite an interesting one. With that many hours behind the belt he will not be happy on the right....
Lesson(s) learned, you think?
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Sunfish - I think the real world is slightly different from the one you percieve in this case.
Regarding fatigue it reads to me you are looking/hoping they were fatigued so as to prove a point about FR roster/pattern etc. The answer to your question about fatigue is we as pilots self regulate ourselves everyday in our decision to go to work and the crew established they were not fatigued probably the same way you establish your not fatigued before a duty. Why doubt them.
As for an 11000 hour plus Captain doing what he did. You make an assumption there is something special about having 11000hrs. Maybe he slipped through the net. Turned on the charm/CRM for a Line Check then went back to his old ways. Maybe he has been getting away with it for years and got found out. Who knows....
As an instructor I have very quickly learned that what hours is written on a piece of paper is not necessarily an indicator of performance/ability.
In the past I have been guilty of showing too much respect based on hours on paper. Have stepped onto the plane and have been shocked by what has been demonstrated.
This case is clear to me. Any Ops Manual serves two purposes. One it provides us with guidance and secondly if we follow its pages 'it' protects us from the company.
Our friend in Ryanair deviated from it and and the minute he did that he lost his protection and found himself without a leg to stand on.
Regarding fatigue it reads to me you are looking/hoping they were fatigued so as to prove a point about FR roster/pattern etc. The answer to your question about fatigue is we as pilots self regulate ourselves everyday in our decision to go to work and the crew established they were not fatigued probably the same way you establish your not fatigued before a duty. Why doubt them.
As for an 11000 hour plus Captain doing what he did. You make an assumption there is something special about having 11000hrs. Maybe he slipped through the net. Turned on the charm/CRM for a Line Check then went back to his old ways. Maybe he has been getting away with it for years and got found out. Who knows....
As an instructor I have very quickly learned that what hours is written on a piece of paper is not necessarily an indicator of performance/ability.
In the past I have been guilty of showing too much respect based on hours on paper. Have stepped onto the plane and have been shocked by what has been demonstrated.
This case is clear to me. Any Ops Manual serves two purposes. One it provides us with guidance and secondly if we follow its pages 'it' protects us from the company.
Our friend in Ryanair deviated from it and and the minute he did that he lost his protection and found himself without a leg to stand on.
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It's not because Ryan Air are loco
Everyone makes mistakes, some admit to it and other's do not. As pilots we need a certain amount of humility, and when we are unable to exercise this then that is when the person in the other seat should start to worry.
As mentioned before, the greatest worry isn't that this incident occured, instead that once it had been recognised a valid crew member was in effect disregarded, company SOP's were ignored and the initial chain was allowed to build potentially leading to disaster.
I don't believe it has to do with the fact that this airline is lo-cost. Easy Jet are lo-cost yet they have a very good safety culture. It stems from the corporate culture of this airline; how they view their workforce, have treated individuals in the past, have a relatively high turnover of pilots compared to other airline's of the same size, call in contract pilots when Ryan air pilots need time off because they have flown too many hours.
The situation is not condusive to any from of stability, and unfortunately with all these variables, safety along with a few other aspects will suffer. It is interesting that Ryanair have had numerous incidents in the past, as i'm sure other airlines have had and will continue to do so. But to have 'quite a few' is either unlucky or a sign of a more serious underlying issue. What exactly is the IAA doing to correct this?
As mentioned before, the greatest worry isn't that this incident occured, instead that once it had been recognised a valid crew member was in effect disregarded, company SOP's were ignored and the initial chain was allowed to build potentially leading to disaster.
I don't believe it has to do with the fact that this airline is lo-cost. Easy Jet are lo-cost yet they have a very good safety culture. It stems from the corporate culture of this airline; how they view their workforce, have treated individuals in the past, have a relatively high turnover of pilots compared to other airline's of the same size, call in contract pilots when Ryan air pilots need time off because they have flown too many hours.
The situation is not condusive to any from of stability, and unfortunately with all these variables, safety along with a few other aspects will suffer. It is interesting that Ryanair have had numerous incidents in the past, as i'm sure other airlines have had and will continue to do so. But to have 'quite a few' is either unlucky or a sign of a more serious underlying issue. What exactly is the IAA doing to correct this?
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Not withstanding the fact that demotion is over six months behind the times. But just a simple question... do you think if the captain followed the published missed approach, he would have been demoted? I mean that's why they have such procedures to keep airplanes above the ground outside the airports... out of contact with the chief pilot, pilots from losing their airmen certificates, and I gues the most imortant... survive another day to fly again. The number of hours an airman has should not be equated to his or her level of judgement.
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Missed Approach Or Go Around?
Why should the pilot making a visual approach follow the missed approach procedure which is designed to safely take the aircraft (in IMC) back to a position from which it can recommence an approach after not making visual contact with the ground at DH/A or the MAP?
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The purpose of any follow-up action after an occurrence (occurrence to me sounds less then an incident or accident, but what's in a name) should be aimed at correcting the cause of the occurrence. Punitive action is in my opinion acceptable, but only in case of gross negligence (continueation after becomming aware of negligence, e.g. neglecting a GPWS) or in willfull misconduct (e.g. making a low pass over your girlfriends house)
Any such punitive action should be taken in such a manner that integrety is preserved (e.g. union represetation in the investigating body) and consideration to the crew's cooperation in the investigation. If in this situation the pilot failed to follow his/her fellow pilots advice I think it touches gross negligence, also it indicates that the PNF needs some additional assertiveness training. (training is not a form of punitive action)
Not following SOP's is a finding and not a conclusion, any good investigation must find out why the crew/pilot did not follow the SOP's.
Finally any occurrence investigation should remain free of the blame culture and clear accepted guidelines must be set so that the punitive follow-up does not "interfear" with an objective investigation.
I'd be interested to get some feedback on this from you fellow pilots!
Nick
Any such punitive action should be taken in such a manner that integrety is preserved (e.g. union represetation in the investigating body) and consideration to the crew's cooperation in the investigation. If in this situation the pilot failed to follow his/her fellow pilots advice I think it touches gross negligence, also it indicates that the PNF needs some additional assertiveness training. (training is not a form of punitive action)
Not following SOP's is a finding and not a conclusion, any good investigation must find out why the crew/pilot did not follow the SOP's.
Finally any occurrence investigation should remain free of the blame culture and clear accepted guidelines must be set so that the punitive follow-up does not "interfear" with an objective investigation.
I'd be interested to get some feedback on this from you fellow pilots!
Nick
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Sorry, I'm a bit jet-lagged, but it seems to me that this incident is serious but not as serious as some RYR-haters might think.
1. I think it's a perfect decision to do a circling after a missed approach. In fact, an aborted approach is always a go around, even if you don't add full go-around thrust. I guess the altitude he had chosen was way too low. Otherwise, no problem at all. I know that there are lots of airports around where you have circling minimas 500 ft AGL.
2. I don't know RYR's SOPs, so I can't judge the fact that he left the flaps in landing configuration. Let me just state that other aircraft types - Airbus! - requires you to do the circling in landing configuration (flaps 3 or 4 and gear down), at least the official AI procedures.
3. What he *did* wrong in my opinion is that he didn't chose a normal circuit: abeam threshold, time check, 25-40 sec out, base turn, start descent, initiate configuration, set up for a good landing. This has to be a circling or a circuit, not a 360 orbit, then it's perfect.
I'm surprised that the incident report isn't based on these general rules. Neighter a height of 500ft nor a decision to make a circling is basically something wrong. It was a poor executed one.
Dani
1. I think it's a perfect decision to do a circling after a missed approach. In fact, an aborted approach is always a go around, even if you don't add full go-around thrust. I guess the altitude he had chosen was way too low. Otherwise, no problem at all. I know that there are lots of airports around where you have circling minimas 500 ft AGL.
2. I don't know RYR's SOPs, so I can't judge the fact that he left the flaps in landing configuration. Let me just state that other aircraft types - Airbus! - requires you to do the circling in landing configuration (flaps 3 or 4 and gear down), at least the official AI procedures.
3. What he *did* wrong in my opinion is that he didn't chose a normal circuit: abeam threshold, time check, 25-40 sec out, base turn, start descent, initiate configuration, set up for a good landing. This has to be a circling or a circuit, not a 360 orbit, then it's perfect.
I'm surprised that the incident report isn't based on these general rules. Neighter a height of 500ft nor a decision to make a circling is basically something wrong. It was a poor executed one.
Dani
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If you follow SOPs and the OPS manual then, the Chief Pilot CAN defend you! If you dont he cannot! It is wrong to say that if you follow SOPs that that will protect you from the company.
Ryanairs CP is THE fairest CP you could get and he always gives a pilot that has [I]helped[I]himself (ie by trying to do a good job) a second chance (if allowed by the IAA). This sometimes involves retraining, phsycological help (as with the Rome incident) or a chance in a different role within the airline. I have witnessed dozens of positive outcomes and supported cases, dozens.
If you decide to cover up your incident, tell the CP one story, the AAIU another and they all disagree with the FDR, then $%ck you cos you deserve to be demoted! (Not the Cork case).
I am sick of the politics of this airline interfering with the bloody good job us pilots do daily. Remove the word Ryanair from this thread and watch how all the bloody do gooders would change their tunes.
And for all you plonkers that seem to think your airlines are bullet proof and incapable of screwing up this badly, dream on!
PS You wouldnt believe the cover ups that go on in some of the so called best airlines out there.
Ryanairs CP is THE fairest CP you could get and he always gives a pilot that has [I]helped[I]himself (ie by trying to do a good job) a second chance (if allowed by the IAA). This sometimes involves retraining, phsycological help (as with the Rome incident) or a chance in a different role within the airline. I have witnessed dozens of positive outcomes and supported cases, dozens.
If you decide to cover up your incident, tell the CP one story, the AAIU another and they all disagree with the FDR, then $%ck you cos you deserve to be demoted! (Not the Cork case).
I am sick of the politics of this airline interfering with the bloody good job us pilots do daily. Remove the word Ryanair from this thread and watch how all the bloody do gooders would change their tunes.
And for all you plonkers that seem to think your airlines are bullet proof and incapable of screwing up this badly, dream on!
PS You wouldnt believe the cover ups that go on in some of the so called best airlines out there.
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Hey guys,
I just registered when I read this topic.I am one of 3 PPL'S who witnessed this incident, all 3 of us agree it was reckless flying.
We were inbound from our trip and were routed to dunkettle for approach to 25 EICK. We were on radar freq. and noted the 737 ask for visual approach to 17. On handover to tower freq. we were told we were no.2 to the737. We were on a base leg for 25 this stage mabey 5 miles out, and became visual with the 737 on finals 17. I was right seat and commented that it seemed very high, both agreed and the feeling was that maybe it was a training flight and was just making an approach only.
Upon hearing "cleared to land" for the 737 we were all quite surprised, we were now on finals 25 maybe 4 miles and fully visual with the 737, it was now obvious to us that he was way to high for landing and became concerned as he still continued his approach, They finally called a go around at an estimate 40 feet and from here on in, it became unreal. They made an early right turn out with high degree of bank at about 250- 300 feet and kept the turn going for a very tight downwind.
We then asked ATC should we continue our approach and were told yes and maybe expect orbit short final. At this stage the 737 did what became a descending base final with a severe angle of bank (estimate 80 degrees) and this time it appeared very low, it was a frighting sight and we were very concerned for it. We were about 150-200 feet short finals with left seat working our landing, when rear seat and I witnessed 737's port wing almost straight up and so low that no fuselage was visable. Left seat asked if we should orbit but a concerned sounding controller cleared us to land but land short and stop. Left seat made a very shortfield landing indeed and stopped.
All 3 of us were braced expecting bang of 737 impacting hill north of threshold 17 (long seconds indeed). 737 ( now having to climb to make runway) landed touching down just before intersection (relief) was cleared for back track and given a stand number. No comment of "did you have fun"by controller was said.... It seemed to us from 737's r/t (his english was not impressive) and flying that they were not familar with the airfield and were possibly first time in........All 3 of us agreed that, even for a light aircraft this would be unaceptable ...But for a 737 jetliner with passengers it was reckless to the extreme.
I agree alot of pilots make mistakes (big english airline co. in particular) but seeing it first hand makes you wonder who some of these pilots are and how and where they were even certified.
I just registered when I read this topic.I am one of 3 PPL'S who witnessed this incident, all 3 of us agree it was reckless flying.
We were inbound from our trip and were routed to dunkettle for approach to 25 EICK. We were on radar freq. and noted the 737 ask for visual approach to 17. On handover to tower freq. we were told we were no.2 to the737. We were on a base leg for 25 this stage mabey 5 miles out, and became visual with the 737 on finals 17. I was right seat and commented that it seemed very high, both agreed and the feeling was that maybe it was a training flight and was just making an approach only.
Upon hearing "cleared to land" for the 737 we were all quite surprised, we were now on finals 25 maybe 4 miles and fully visual with the 737, it was now obvious to us that he was way to high for landing and became concerned as he still continued his approach, They finally called a go around at an estimate 40 feet and from here on in, it became unreal. They made an early right turn out with high degree of bank at about 250- 300 feet and kept the turn going for a very tight downwind.
We then asked ATC should we continue our approach and were told yes and maybe expect orbit short final. At this stage the 737 did what became a descending base final with a severe angle of bank (estimate 80 degrees) and this time it appeared very low, it was a frighting sight and we were very concerned for it. We were about 150-200 feet short finals with left seat working our landing, when rear seat and I witnessed 737's port wing almost straight up and so low that no fuselage was visable. Left seat asked if we should orbit but a concerned sounding controller cleared us to land but land short and stop. Left seat made a very shortfield landing indeed and stopped.
All 3 of us were braced expecting bang of 737 impacting hill north of threshold 17 (long seconds indeed). 737 ( now having to climb to make runway) landed touching down just before intersection (relief) was cleared for back track and given a stand number. No comment of "did you have fun"by controller was said.... It seemed to us from 737's r/t (his english was not impressive) and flying that they were not familar with the airfield and were possibly first time in........All 3 of us agreed that, even for a light aircraft this would be unaceptable ...But for a 737 jetliner with passengers it was reckless to the extreme.
I agree alot of pilots make mistakes (big english airline co. in particular) but seeing it first hand makes you wonder who some of these pilots are and how and where they were even certified.
I call you back
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Hey guys,
I just registered when I read this topic.I am one of 3 PPL'S who witnessed this incident, all 3 of us agree it was reckless flying.
We were inbound from our trip and were routed to dunkettle for approach to 25 EICK. We were on radar freq. and noted the 737 ask for visual approach to 17. On handover to tower freq. we were told we were no.2 to the737. We were on a base leg for 25 this stage mabey 5 miles out, and became visual with the 737 on finals 17. I was right seat and commented that it seemed very high, both agreed and the feeling was that maybe it was a training flight and was just making an approach only.
Upon hearing "cleared to land" for the 737 we were all quite surprised, we were now on finals 25 maybe 4 miles and fully visual with the 737, it was now obvious to us that he was way to high for landing and became concerned as he still continued his approach, They finally called a go around at an estimate 40 feet and from here on in, it became unreal. They made an early right turn out with high degree of bank at about 250- 300 feet and kept the turn going for a very tight downwind.
We then asked ATC should we continue our approach and were told yes and maybe expect orbit short final. At this stage the 737 did what became a descending base final with a severe angle of bank (estimate 80 degrees) and this time it appeared very low, it was a frighting sight and we were very concerned for it. We were about 150-200 feet short finals with left seat working our landing, when rear seat and I witnessed 737's port wing almost straight up and so low that no fuselage was visable. Left seat asked if we should orbit but a concerned sounding controller cleared us to land but land short and stop. Left seat made a very shortfield landing indeed and stopped.
All 3 of us were braced expecting bang of 737 impacting hill north of threshold 17 (long seconds indeed). 737 ( now having to climb to make runway) landed touching down just before intersection (relief) was cleared for back track and given a stand number. No comment of "did you have fun"by controller was said.... It seemed to us from 737's r/t (his english was not impressive) and flying that they were not familar with the airfield and were possibly first time in........All 3 of us agreed that, even for a light aircraft this would be unaceptable ...But for a 737 jetliner with passengers it was reckless to the extreme.
I agree alot of pilots make mistakes (big english airline co. in particular) but seeing it first hand makes you wonder who some of these pilots are and how and where they were even certified.
I just registered when I read this topic.I am one of 3 PPL'S who witnessed this incident, all 3 of us agree it was reckless flying.
We were inbound from our trip and were routed to dunkettle for approach to 25 EICK. We were on radar freq. and noted the 737 ask for visual approach to 17. On handover to tower freq. we were told we were no.2 to the737. We were on a base leg for 25 this stage mabey 5 miles out, and became visual with the 737 on finals 17. I was right seat and commented that it seemed very high, both agreed and the feeling was that maybe it was a training flight and was just making an approach only.
Upon hearing "cleared to land" for the 737 we were all quite surprised, we were now on finals 25 maybe 4 miles and fully visual with the 737, it was now obvious to us that he was way to high for landing and became concerned as he still continued his approach, They finally called a go around at an estimate 40 feet and from here on in, it became unreal. They made an early right turn out with high degree of bank at about 250- 300 feet and kept the turn going for a very tight downwind.
We then asked ATC should we continue our approach and were told yes and maybe expect orbit short final. At this stage the 737 did what became a descending base final with a severe angle of bank (estimate 80 degrees) and this time it appeared very low, it was a frighting sight and we were very concerned for it. We were about 150-200 feet short finals with left seat working our landing, when rear seat and I witnessed 737's port wing almost straight up and so low that no fuselage was visable. Left seat asked if we should orbit but a concerned sounding controller cleared us to land but land short and stop. Left seat made a very shortfield landing indeed and stopped.
All 3 of us were braced expecting bang of 737 impacting hill north of threshold 17 (long seconds indeed). 737 ( now having to climb to make runway) landed touching down just before intersection (relief) was cleared for back track and given a stand number. No comment of "did you have fun"by controller was said.... It seemed to us from 737's r/t (his english was not impressive) and flying that they were not familar with the airfield and were possibly first time in........All 3 of us agreed that, even for a light aircraft this would be unaceptable ...But for a 737 jetliner with passengers it was reckless to the extreme.
I agree alot of pilots make mistakes (big english airline co. in particular) but seeing it first hand makes you wonder who some of these pilots are and how and where they were even certified.