Airline pilots 'lack skills to handle emergencies'
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Goforfun--
It may be of interest to you that just a few years ago a certain South Asian airline (with wide-body aircraft)requested their Training Captains to ensure that all of the F/O's had adequate hand-flying skills, and this included the London TMA. These were guys with around 1500 hours total flying time, and when the training was complete, they had no dificulity at all with the exercise. And, the NFP was not all that overworked.
Why then do you, with presumably a lot more flying experience, find it so difficult? Or undesirable?
It may be of interest to you that just a few years ago a certain South Asian airline (with wide-body aircraft)requested their Training Captains to ensure that all of the F/O's had adequate hand-flying skills, and this included the London TMA. These were guys with around 1500 hours total flying time, and when the training was complete, they had no dificulity at all with the exercise. And, the NFP was not all that overworked.
Why then do you, with presumably a lot more flying experience, find it so difficult? Or undesirable?
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Nice one, David! 
Actually, I think it's more a case that the overwhelming majority of people here recognise the underlying truth of the article even if there were some errors in it (including one which I'm most surprised wasn't picked up where it was inferred that the A310 had a common rating to the A320); with the vocal minority on their usual 'journo hunt'.
Actually, I think it's more a case that the overwhelming majority of people here recognise the underlying truth of the article even if there were some errors in it (including one which I'm most surprised wasn't picked up where it was inferred that the A310 had a common rating to the A320); with the vocal minority on their usual 'journo hunt'.
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Quite so David.
I have to admit that I spottted the remark about pushing a button wasn't attributed to you, and indeed didn't infer it was in my original post. However it was a good controversial comment, and in true journalistic fashion I reasoned that the facts shouldn't get in the way of a bloody good thread.
Having said that the ensuing debate has produced some interesting points and highlighted some intertesting attitudes. Carry on chaps.
I have to admit that I spottted the remark about pushing a button wasn't attributed to you, and indeed didn't infer it was in my original post. However it was a good controversial comment, and in true journalistic fashion I reasoned that the facts shouldn't get in the way of a bloody good thread.
Having said that the ensuing debate has produced some interesting points and highlighted some intertesting attitudes. Carry on chaps.
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Marko Ramius
You said:
The Guvnor was partially right in what he says. To add a little more, I must say I found it a little surprising to read that pilots of the experience level referred to in the AAIB report apparently had some considerable difficulty with understanding that the aircraft's attitudes were persistently in direct opposition to manual control inputs (e.g right turn and right-roll aileron deflection despite left rudder input). Naturally, this is explained by the unacknowledged, and uncorrected, AP1 selection, but it does not explain why the crew took so long to understand this. In fact, it is not clear from the report whether they ever understood until after the flight was successfully concluded.
Again, it is important that all should understand that I do not in any sense point a finger at these pilots. I can, of course, imagine what this crew suffered during those few ghastly minutes and I would never wish to find myself similarly challenged. Further, I am not a contributor to simple 'pilot error' theory and one of my favourite books is 'Pilot Error' which advances the theory that there is essentially no such thing because all human factors accidents can be traced to a causal chain of failure, usually of the entire system that places the human in these predicaments in the first instance.
[ 17 August 2001: Message edited by: tilii ]
You said:
The incident has nothing at all to do with basic flying skills. I do not see its relevence in this discussion.
Again, it is important that all should understand that I do not in any sense point a finger at these pilots. I can, of course, imagine what this crew suffered during those few ghastly minutes and I would never wish to find myself similarly challenged. Further, I am not a contributor to simple 'pilot error' theory and one of my favourite books is 'Pilot Error' which advances the theory that there is essentially no such thing because all human factors accidents can be traced to a causal chain of failure, usually of the entire system that places the human in these predicaments in the first instance.
[ 17 August 2001: Message edited by: tilii ]
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The 'truth' may be out here on pprune but the fact remains that the article maintains the myth about how effortless a task it is to operate a modern airliner.
Mr Learmount if your message to the society was not denigrating pilots and their skills, the article fails by a mile to convey these views to the reader.How then can you say the message was well reported? People will remember the absurd paragraph about the 'go button' and not much else, because thats what they believe already.I don't think it builds your credibility as an expert at all.These are complex issues that are not easily explained, articles such as this do not help.
I think that for the ultra long haul pilots there can be a problem with currency and handling practise.All the others only have themselves to blame if they don't practise occasionally - NOT in the London TMA.As 411A said, by the end of their training they could do it without a problem - What about the first time they tried, I could easily be the poor sod a thousand above!
By the way the GF pilot misjudged the approach in the first place, which he then failed to correct either manually or on automatics.Some of the best pilots I have flown with were not exceptional handlers, but their brainpower kept them out of trouble.
By the way good onya for at least answering direct here on pprune.
Mr Learmount if your message to the society was not denigrating pilots and their skills, the article fails by a mile to convey these views to the reader.How then can you say the message was well reported? People will remember the absurd paragraph about the 'go button' and not much else, because thats what they believe already.I don't think it builds your credibility as an expert at all.These are complex issues that are not easily explained, articles such as this do not help.
I think that for the ultra long haul pilots there can be a problem with currency and handling practise.All the others only have themselves to blame if they don't practise occasionally - NOT in the London TMA.As 411A said, by the end of their training they could do it without a problem - What about the first time they tried, I could easily be the poor sod a thousand above!
By the way the GF pilot misjudged the approach in the first place, which he then failed to correct either manually or on automatics.Some of the best pilots I have flown with were not exceptional handlers, but their brainpower kept them out of trouble.
By the way good onya for at least answering direct here on pprune.
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Guvnor,
I know what you are saying that its the systems that keep the aircraft in the air, when managed by the pilot, and one cannot operate fully without the other. But you are taking it a little out of context. The mulitiple failures you talk of are statistically very rare, and indeed unlikely. The systems are very necessary and are in all forms of aircraft, and their malfunction could cause a similar outcome. If in a PA28 that lost the linkage to the elevator, most pilots would struggle to maintain control.
In fact you can take this kind of conversation out of aviation. At the end of the day, if you are travelling downhill on a peddle cycle at 30mph, and the frame breaks (a very unlikely, but not implausible failure) you are similarly fooked! Lets face it, there's a risk involved in every single activity.
The whole issue of safety in modern airlines is risk management - risk and cost are indirectly proportional to one another, and you have to balance the two the best you can. With your business venture, I think this is something you of all people should understand; the need to return a profit while keeping the operation as safe as possible.
Anyway back to the thread. With regard to manual flying in the london TMA, I don't think its a bad thing. As long as both of you can recognise overload and stick the autopilot back in if you start to make a balls of it! If you can't do it at a demanding time, you'll never improve... I think there has been one or two similar threads like this before!
I think the fact that airline pilots now have less chance to practice the traditional flying skills, yet can still use them at a demanding time with a high degree of success is probably a credit to them, and the aircraft design. However, more handling practice is never a bad thing!
By the way guv, have you stole my username for your signature?
I know what you are saying that its the systems that keep the aircraft in the air, when managed by the pilot, and one cannot operate fully without the other. But you are taking it a little out of context. The mulitiple failures you talk of are statistically very rare, and indeed unlikely. The systems are very necessary and are in all forms of aircraft, and their malfunction could cause a similar outcome. If in a PA28 that lost the linkage to the elevator, most pilots would struggle to maintain control.
In fact you can take this kind of conversation out of aviation. At the end of the day, if you are travelling downhill on a peddle cycle at 30mph, and the frame breaks (a very unlikely, but not implausible failure) you are similarly fooked! Lets face it, there's a risk involved in every single activity.
The whole issue of safety in modern airlines is risk management - risk and cost are indirectly proportional to one another, and you have to balance the two the best you can. With your business venture, I think this is something you of all people should understand; the need to return a profit while keeping the operation as safe as possible.
Anyway back to the thread. With regard to manual flying in the london TMA, I don't think its a bad thing. As long as both of you can recognise overload and stick the autopilot back in if you start to make a balls of it! If you can't do it at a demanding time, you'll never improve... I think there has been one or two similar threads like this before!
I think the fact that airline pilots now have less chance to practice the traditional flying skills, yet can still use them at a demanding time with a high degree of success is probably a credit to them, and the aircraft design. However, more handling practice is never a bad thing!
By the way guv, have you stole my username for your signature?
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Not being a check airman I am not in the business of teaching but inclined only to help the F/Os when asked, or when otherwise operationally necessary.
Remembering my frustrations with a few captains who always tried to lead and micro manage their F/Os' performance, I am mindful of not becoming a left seat bully.
My F/Os are entitled to develop their own technique. Most are eager to the challenge of hand flying the jet below FL 100. But some consistently hug the A/P for everything, including Autoland, regardless of IMC or VMC. Their prerogative!
Remembering my frustrations with a few captains who always tried to lead and micro manage their F/Os' performance, I am mindful of not becoming a left seat bully.
My F/Os are entitled to develop their own technique. Most are eager to the challenge of hand flying the jet below FL 100. But some consistently hug the A/P for everything, including Autoland, regardless of IMC or VMC. Their prerogative!
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Whats_it_doing_now - you're absolutely right; these incidents are statistically very rare (as indeed is the chance of being involved in any sort of an major aircraft incident) but the fact remains that they still do occur.
And again, you're right - there's no way that every possible scenario, no matter how wild, can be catered for in training.
However, my point was this - when the unexpected (and untrained for) happens; whether that's the loss of all hydraulics following the disintegration of one of your engines; or suddenly having your engines flame out; or having half your fuselage disappear it's the pilots with the first rate flying skills and above all the experience that will be likely to get the aircraft and its occupants down in as few pieces as possible.
Which is why I can't understand those that ant pilots to hang up their hats at 55. That wealth of experience will be lost to the younger guys who have not flown DC3s; 707s or CL44s - perhaps the aircraft are no longer relevant in today's high-tech noise sensitive environment, but the skills required to operate the aircraft and keep them flying most certainly are.
PS - does a beer (or two) take care of the user name/signature copyright issue?
And again, you're right - there's no way that every possible scenario, no matter how wild, can be catered for in training.
However, my point was this - when the unexpected (and untrained for) happens; whether that's the loss of all hydraulics following the disintegration of one of your engines; or suddenly having your engines flame out; or having half your fuselage disappear it's the pilots with the first rate flying skills and above all the experience that will be likely to get the aircraft and its occupants down in as few pieces as possible.
Which is why I can't understand those that ant pilots to hang up their hats at 55. That wealth of experience will be lost to the younger guys who have not flown DC3s; 707s or CL44s - perhaps the aircraft are no longer relevant in today's high-tech noise sensitive environment, but the skills required to operate the aircraft and keep them flying most certainly are.
PS - does a beer (or two) take care of the user name/signature copyright issue?
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29th December 2000 BA2069 incident. The aircraft was recovered using text book and simulator recovery methods.
When the chips were down the flight crew Capt William Hagan, SFO Phil Watson (at the controls at the time) and SFO Richard Webb certainly knew what to do for which I for one am eternally grateful as I would not be posting this now!!
When the chips were down the flight crew Capt William Hagan, SFO Phil Watson (at the controls at the time) and SFO Richard Webb certainly knew what to do for which I for one am eternally grateful as I would not be posting this now!!
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On the other hand, this might be useful ammo against all those NIMBYs who want to stop budding PICs out there from learning their trade.....
Like, get down to your local airfield and do some real flying in your spare time.
Like, get down to your local airfield and do some real flying in your spare time.
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A LOT OF TRUTH -
In the American system, the FAA refuses to implement CRM in the cockpit, hence we have such as AA-1420 and Alaska-261.
In the typical American carrier, the pilots are told that the operations manual suffices for the regulations and the provisions of the Operating Specifications - and the unions go along with it.
That gives us Alaska-506 type incidents.
The American carriers are getting quite famous for being able to cover up a high percentage of incidents, so the 'word' never gets out when a generic problem such as electrical fires becomes a major threat.
The American cabin crews and pilots are very poorly trained to evacuate an aircraft, hence we have incidents such as the American Airlines flight attendant getting killed.
In all of the blatant safety issues - nobody in all of America either knows or cares.
A typical American type-rating is 12 hours of training in a simulator. How much professionalism versus resourcefulness can one expect out of the American pilots?
Check -
www.webpak.net/~skydream/
- for a sampling of the 'rule' versus the theory of the situation. It gets worse, not better, by the day.
In the American system, the FAA refuses to implement CRM in the cockpit, hence we have such as AA-1420 and Alaska-261.
In the typical American carrier, the pilots are told that the operations manual suffices for the regulations and the provisions of the Operating Specifications - and the unions go along with it.
That gives us Alaska-506 type incidents.
The American carriers are getting quite famous for being able to cover up a high percentage of incidents, so the 'word' never gets out when a generic problem such as electrical fires becomes a major threat.
The American cabin crews and pilots are very poorly trained to evacuate an aircraft, hence we have incidents such as the American Airlines flight attendant getting killed.
In all of the blatant safety issues - nobody in all of America either knows or cares.
A typical American type-rating is 12 hours of training in a simulator. How much professionalism versus resourcefulness can one expect out of the American pilots?
Check -
www.webpak.net/~skydream/
- for a sampling of the 'rule' versus the theory of the situation. It gets worse, not better, by the day.
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Porky, there are a few posters on this site who are already posting from Alpha Centauri... 
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Skydrifter quotes ...
"In the typical American carrier, the pilots are told that the operations manual suffices for the regulations and the provisions of the Operating Specifications - and the unions go along with it. That gives us Alaska 506 type incidents...."
Skydrifter: There is a little statement in our operations manual on Page ONE and it says something to the effect that:
"...Procedures, Regulations, Operating Specifications and Company Policies may not issue explicit guidance for all cases or inflight events. This manual is not intended to limit the captain's Emergency Authority or to constrain good judgement and common sense...."
In the AK-506 incident the crew obviously had performed their preflight checklist in a negligent manner as both had failed to check and to set the pressure bleed switches to the "On" positions. Missed first during the preliminary set-up "flow" and missed again during the actual reading of the checklist.
But that's not the reason why the pilots were crucified.
The serious lack of crew judgement was when they continued the flight and climbed to FL
410 after oxygen masks had dropped and had been used by passengers.
Once the masks had dropped the integrity of the oxygen supply was breached and neither the cabin crew nor the cockpit crew could positively assertain how much oxygen, if any, would be available for the remainder of the flight.
Although the copilot questioned the captain about returning to PDX, he was not assertive enough to influence the captain's bad decision to continue the flight, and of all things, to climb to FL410.
"In the typical American carrier, the pilots are told that the operations manual suffices for the regulations and the provisions of the Operating Specifications - and the unions go along with it. That gives us Alaska 506 type incidents...."
Skydrifter: There is a little statement in our operations manual on Page ONE and it says something to the effect that:
"...Procedures, Regulations, Operating Specifications and Company Policies may not issue explicit guidance for all cases or inflight events. This manual is not intended to limit the captain's Emergency Authority or to constrain good judgement and common sense...."
In the AK-506 incident the crew obviously had performed their preflight checklist in a negligent manner as both had failed to check and to set the pressure bleed switches to the "On" positions. Missed first during the preliminary set-up "flow" and missed again during the actual reading of the checklist.
But that's not the reason why the pilots were crucified.
The serious lack of crew judgement was when they continued the flight and climbed to FL
410 after oxygen masks had dropped and had been used by passengers.
Once the masks had dropped the integrity of the oxygen supply was breached and neither the cabin crew nor the cockpit crew could positively assertain how much oxygen, if any, would be available for the remainder of the flight.
Although the copilot questioned the captain about returning to PDX, he was not assertive enough to influence the captain's bad decision to continue the flight, and of all things, to climb to FL410.
