Close call at Kastrup/Copenhagen
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http://www.irlgov.ie/tec/aaiu/2001Re.../2001-0010.htm FDR readouts should count as facts IMHO:
At 3.5 miles from touchdown and 1 minute 17 seconds to run, the autopilot was disengaged. The barometric height was 1966 ft, RADALT was 1110 ft, CAS was 162 kt and the heading read 219°magnetic. Manual control was initiated but the autothrottle remained engaged and in speed mode. Ceilings were reported as 1800 ft AGL with good visibility, and the approach was continued visually. From this point to touchdown, the aircraft was below the glideslope, ranging from 0.32ddm (3.6 dots) to twice that amount 2.5 seconds before touchdown.
At 1000 ft AGL, the speed selected was at 155 kt or (V ref+12), and remained at that value until touchdown. The actual approach was flown at an average speed of about 163 kt, but excursions of 150 kt to 173 kt were recorded due to gusts and turbulence. Strong headwinds were indicated on the initial approach and decent, but by the time the aircraft was at 700 ft radio altitude, the headwind component had largely vanished. The gusts, turbulence, and variable crosswinds contributed to continuous oscillations in all parameters, particularly pitch attitude.
At 0.6 miles and 14.4 seconds to go to touchdown the “glideslope” warning sounded. The barometric height was now 1016 ft and the RADALT was 186 ft. The CAS registered 160kt with an aircraft heading of 233° magnetic. The “glideslope” warning was again repeated as the aircraft was still below the glideslope.
At 1000 ft AGL, the speed selected was at 155 kt or (V ref+12), and remained at that value until touchdown. The actual approach was flown at an average speed of about 163 kt, but excursions of 150 kt to 173 kt were recorded due to gusts and turbulence. Strong headwinds were indicated on the initial approach and decent, but by the time the aircraft was at 700 ft radio altitude, the headwind component had largely vanished. The gusts, turbulence, and variable crosswinds contributed to continuous oscillations in all parameters, particularly pitch attitude.
At 0.6 miles and 14.4 seconds to go to touchdown the “glideslope” warning sounded. The barometric height was now 1016 ft and the RADALT was 186 ft. The CAS registered 160kt with an aircraft heading of 233° magnetic. The “glideslope” warning was again repeated as the aircraft was still below the glideslope.
Ut Sementem Feeceris
I don't understand how the barometric heights and the RADALT's can differ so much. The approach to 22L is over water (the sea) so how can there be a difference of 850 feet between the two? Last time I went to EKCH the runway was about 30 feet above sea level and about 500m from the shoreline!
At 0.6D you must be just about still over the water, so 186' RA is probably about 150' above threshold ..... perhaps a tad low
If they then landed at the 30/12 intersection they must have flown level at approx 150 feet for about a mile
A4
At 0.6D you must be just about still over the water, so 186' RA is probably about 150' above threshold ..... perhaps a tad low
If they then landed at the 30/12 intersection they must have flown level at approx 150 feet for about a mile
A4
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[QUOTE=JEP;2911075]Being only an amateur with PPL but having 42 year experience with danish language let me add a few things from the report:
- The Sterling was hot and high due to other traffic behind it.
QUOTE]
Not correct. He was permitted to keep up high speed on the approach. Otherwise he would have had to reduce to 250 kts below FL100.
"Heads down" played a mojor effect on behalf of all parties in this incident.
The approaching aircraft performed a visusal app, using auto-throttle and armed the auto-pilot to intercept ILS 22L. This caused the engines to spool up, and the aircraft commenced a climb as auto-pilot captured the glidepath inside 4 NM. 737-drivers: Is this "how to do it)?
- The Sterling was hot and high due to other traffic behind it.
QUOTE]
Not correct. He was permitted to keep up high speed on the approach. Otherwise he would have had to reduce to 250 kts below FL100.
"Heads down" played a mojor effect on behalf of all parties in this incident.
The approaching aircraft performed a visusal app, using auto-throttle and armed the auto-pilot to intercept ILS 22L. This caused the engines to spool up, and the aircraft commenced a climb as auto-pilot captured the glidepath inside 4 NM. 737-drivers: Is this "how to do it)?
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Doesnt realy matter if there was traffic behind him. There is no excuse other that a few extrem emergencies, that warrant to continue an unstabilized approach and fly over an aircraft that has passed the stop bars, to land long. None.
I am sure this fellow and his willing FO are not flying anymore. Thats reackless endangerment.
I am sure this fellow and his willing FO are not flying anymore. Thats reackless endangerment.
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[QUOTE=Ladusvala;2909258]Relaxjet, I don´t agree with you, this doesn´t happend to anybody.
Not stabilized at 200´ due to flaps... that´s just to much.
Of course, I didn`t mind that to be not stabilized at 200 RA, can happend to anybody. I was talking about mind fixation on landing and the ability to recognise this situation. Pilot is just fellow human, and to fix to some particular aim is natural for man. The point is to be able to recognize this OR to have somebody in the cockpit who will recognize, if you as PF (doing not the right thing) are not able to do so.
Problem is when there are two which are not aware of the situation.
Man, this is quite common in accident reports, isn`t it?
Not stabilized at 200´ due to flaps... that´s just to much.
Of course, I didn`t mind that to be not stabilized at 200 RA, can happend to anybody. I was talking about mind fixation on landing and the ability to recognise this situation. Pilot is just fellow human, and to fix to some particular aim is natural for man. The point is to be able to recognize this OR to have somebody in the cockpit who will recognize, if you as PF (doing not the right thing) are not able to do so.
Problem is when there are two which are not aware of the situation.
Man, this is quite common in accident reports, isn`t it?
Pegase Driver
Doesnt realy matter if there was traffic behind him. There is no excuse other that a few extrem emergencies, that warrant to continue an unstabilized approach and fly over an aircraft that has passed the stop bars, to land long. None.
I am sure this fellow and his willing FO are not flying anymore. Thats reackless endangerment.
I am sure this fellow and his willing FO are not flying anymore. Thats reackless endangerment.
I was told Denmark has one of the best safety management system in the world and they even have a unique legislation passed that no-one will be prosecuted for reporting incidents.
An this is an incident right ?
If I was in charge of Safyety in Denmark I would spend far more time trying to find out what are the hidden causes that caused this to happen rather that crucifying in public 2 pilots.
For instance, has possibly the recent takeover of Sterling changed some things inside the company ?
That sorts of things would be interesting to investigate.
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Interesting to see that those poor pilots caught in this mess should fear more from their fellow colleagues than from the authorities.
I was told Denmark has one of the best safety management system in the world and they even have a unique legislation passed that no-one will be prosecuted for reporting incidents.
An this is an incident right ?
If I was in charge of Safyety in Denmark I would spend far more time trying to find out what are the hidden causes that caused this to happen rather that crucifying in public 2 pilots.
For instance, has possibly the recent takeover of Sterling changed some things inside the company ?
That sorts of things would be interesting to investigate.
I was told Denmark has one of the best safety management system in the world and they even have a unique legislation passed that no-one will be prosecuted for reporting incidents.
An this is an incident right ?
If I was in charge of Safyety in Denmark I would spend far more time trying to find out what are the hidden causes that caused this to happen rather that crucifying in public 2 pilots.
For instance, has possibly the recent takeover of Sterling changed some things inside the company ?
That sorts of things would be interesting to investigate.
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I was told Denmark has one of the best safety management system in the world and they even have a unique legislation passed that no-one will be prosecuted for reporting incidents.
An this is an incident right ?
An this is an incident right ?
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Re #25
I was just quoting the report:
The report states on page 2; the 3rd paragraph - "Due to subsequent traffic inbound EKCH, the pilots on (Sterling Aircraft) were instructed by the approach controller to maintain a high airspeed during descend and approach" (own translation).
I thought it could explain why the crew had their mind set on getting down and out of the way. Of course it does not justify landing without clearance, etc
I was just quoting the report:
The report states on page 2; the 3rd paragraph - "Due to subsequent traffic inbound EKCH, the pilots on (Sterling Aircraft) were instructed by the approach controller to maintain a high airspeed during descend and approach" (own translation).
I thought it could explain why the crew had their mind set on getting down and out of the way. Of course it does not justify landing without clearance, etc
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JEP
Only a fool would land from an approach in a jet like the 737 if the approach is still not stable by 200 feet. Most sensible airlines adopt the policy that if the approach is not stable at 500ft then you must go-around. As for landing deep of the approach it is equally as stupid!
These guys should be wearing spurs!
Only a fool would land from an approach in a jet like the 737 if the approach is still not stable by 200 feet. Most sensible airlines adopt the policy that if the approach is not stable at 500ft then you must go-around. As for landing deep of the approach it is equally as stupid!
These guys should be wearing spurs!
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10 points to Jack Pot for the summary.
I think we all must agree that there were at least three contributing parts. It will be very interesting to read why they all did such a "lousy job" that night.
I think we all must agree that there were at least three contributing parts. It will be very interesting to read why they all did such a "lousy job" that night.
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The approaching aircraft performed a visusal app, using auto-throttle and armed the auto-pilot to intercept ILS 22L. This caused the engines to spool up, and the aircraft commenced a climb as auto-pilot captured the glidepath inside 4 NM. 737-drivers: Is this "how to do it)?
3.1.9
The 737 Flight Crew Training Manual (FCTM), Reference C, page 2.8, states: “when in manual flight, manual thrust control is recommended”. The approach was flown using autothrottle while in manual flight, contrary to the FCTM recommendation
The 737 Flight Crew Training Manual (FCTM), Reference C, page 2.8, states: “when in manual flight, manual thrust control is recommended”. The approach was flown using autothrottle while in manual flight, contrary to the FCTM recommendation
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Yes ATC Watcher....maybe the poor captain was traumatized in childhood, which 30 years later led him to be afraid of taking command.
In my book (and the FOM) he broke several safety gates, eventually getting 20' from an aircraft. There is no excuse. It was with intent, since the judged his skills to be superior to the average bloke, who would have to G/A.
He took a COMMAND decision to continue. That warrants punishment.
In my book (and the FOM) he broke several safety gates, eventually getting 20' from an aircraft. There is no excuse. It was with intent, since the judged his skills to be superior to the average bloke, who would have to G/A.
He took a COMMAND decision to continue. That warrants punishment.
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From the control tower I have seen so many scheduled arrivals make a 8alls up of a visual approach. e.g.
A 747 bouncing after touch-down after a staggeringly incompetent hand flown final approach path.
Captains’ requesting orbits at 4NM final after getting the height wrong, and then treating 200+ passengers to a guided tour of the undershoot area.
Other, equally big boys, lining up on the parallel taxiway and then enquiring in a haughty voice " xxxx Tower are you landing on 34L or 34R this morning”, when there is patently only one runway.
Traffic landing so deep into the runway that they are cordially invited back to the spot landing competition at the weekend.
The list is endless so it’s no surprise to an air traffic controller that this sort of incident can manifest itself. Thank goodness it happened in Denmark where they will investigate the “system” and not the hapless controller/pilot.
A 747 bouncing after touch-down after a staggeringly incompetent hand flown final approach path.
Captains’ requesting orbits at 4NM final after getting the height wrong, and then treating 200+ passengers to a guided tour of the undershoot area.
Other, equally big boys, lining up on the parallel taxiway and then enquiring in a haughty voice " xxxx Tower are you landing on 34L or 34R this morning”, when there is patently only one runway.
Traffic landing so deep into the runway that they are cordially invited back to the spot landing competition at the weekend.
The list is endless so it’s no surprise to an air traffic controller that this sort of incident can manifest itself. Thank goodness it happened in Denmark where they will investigate the “system” and not the hapless controller/pilot.
