aircraft crash in Stord, Norway
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Can somebody with better Norwegian than myself translate the headline
"- Kapteinen gikk inn i det brennende vraket
Forsøkte å redde passasjerene fra flammene"
in this link
http://www.vg.no/
and possibly the first bit of the connected article?
I think I've understood it, but don't want to comment on it before somebody confirms it.
"- Kapteinen gikk inn i det brennende vraket
Forsøkte å redde passasjerene fra flammene"
in this link
http://www.vg.no/
and possibly the first bit of the connected article?
I think I've understood it, but don't want to comment on it before somebody confirms it.
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"- Kapteinen gikk inn i det brennende vraket
Forsøkte å redde passasjerene fra flammene"
Means that the captain went into the burning wreck and tried to save the passengers from the flames
Forsøkte å redde passasjerene fra flammene"
Means that the captain went into the burning wreck and tried to save the passengers from the flames
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People I know tells me that he looked slightly high with a good overspeed when he approached RWY33, maybe it was only the 5-8 knots tailwind which made it look like this?
My point is, at a RWY with 1200 meters LDA with no overun whatsoever, the 146 is quite unforgiveable if you are slightly high, maybe a little high on IAS, a tailwind as in this case and a puncture after touchdown.
My point is, at a RWY with 1200 meters LDA with no overun whatsoever, the 146 is quite unforgiveable if you are slightly high, maybe a little high on IAS, a tailwind as in this case and a puncture after touchdown.
So the aircraft landed downwind?
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Maersk used to fly B735 daily (or 5 times a week, cannot remember now) to Vagar. Generally area layout there is quite similar to what is shown on Stord photos, but approach on Vagar is much worse.
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...but it looks like Vagar has some kind of emmergency breaking lane/exit from the runway.
Does anyone know if it has been used by large aircraft?
d. Close to RWY 13 and 31 areas with broken stones have been established. The diameter of the stones are from 20 to 100 MM. The stone layer depth range from
150 MM at the runway shoulder to 450 MM at the end of each area. The areas will be worked up twice a year to maintain a porous structure. Snowclearance and
deicing will not be carried out on the areas. The areas are not marked. Previous accidents indicate that braking effect can be expected only by blocking the
wheels. Damage to aircraft using the areas may be expected. Use of the areas take place solely on the operators own responsibility/
150 MM at the runway shoulder to 450 MM at the end of each area. The areas will be worked up twice a year to maintain a porous structure. Snowclearance and
deicing will not be carried out on the areas. The areas are not marked. Previous accidents indicate that braking effect can be expected only by blocking the
wheels. Damage to aircraft using the areas may be expected. Use of the areas take place solely on the operators own responsibility/
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Does anyone know if it has been used by large aircraft?
No one was hurt - but the plane was damaged.
Edit: See post #27 - it was in 1989 - not in the mid 90s.
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Vagar is recognized a demanding airport for commercial aircraft operations – 737 etc. One reason that the BAe146 was chosen is that is gives a greater safety margin – approach stability, landing distance, etc. The 737 operation required special approach speed profile and had limitations on the point of touchdown. The acceptable touchdown zone (very short – almost a square box) was marked with yellow boundaries; if the aircraft was not going to achieve a touchdown in the zone then a go around was flown.
The BAe146 operation did not require either the special speed profile or the landing box, however the box was retained to provide additional safety.
This is similar but not the same as BAe146/Avro RJ operations at LCY; there is a fixed distance marker which can be used (advisory) to define the end of the acceptable touchdown zone. From a previous post, the LCY operations have a required landing distance advantage from the steep approach. Vagar did not when I last visited. Although the NPA was steeper than normal it was not a precision system, thus there was no distance advantage; is there an ILS now?
It appears that Stord had none of the additional safety aspects of steep approach (landing distance) or landing box; neither apparently a suitable overrun area or protection.
A BAe146 'visited' the overrun protection area at Vagar on a previous occasion; the aircraft was not damaged. The incident was caused by a lift-dump / spoiler failure (possible crew error), the effect of which IIRC requires an increase of 40% in the landing distance. In most operations, such a failure after touchdown is not hazardous as the landing margin within the distance required and excess runway distance available enables the aircraft to be stopped safety. However, operations on a limited runway may not have all of this safety margin and the operating technique should be adjusted i.e. immediate high / max braking until all retardation devices are confirmed working. The point of change over can be defined by checking the margin (%) from the max allowed landing weight for the given conditions; if at any time it is 100% of MLW because the aircraft is distance limited (not often in the 146), then always use max brakes after touch down.
Avoid tailwinds, wet runways, and especially wet concrete runways
The BAe146 operation did not require either the special speed profile or the landing box, however the box was retained to provide additional safety.
This is similar but not the same as BAe146/Avro RJ operations at LCY; there is a fixed distance marker which can be used (advisory) to define the end of the acceptable touchdown zone. From a previous post, the LCY operations have a required landing distance advantage from the steep approach. Vagar did not when I last visited. Although the NPA was steeper than normal it was not a precision system, thus there was no distance advantage; is there an ILS now?
It appears that Stord had none of the additional safety aspects of steep approach (landing distance) or landing box; neither apparently a suitable overrun area or protection.
A BAe146 'visited' the overrun protection area at Vagar on a previous occasion; the aircraft was not damaged. The incident was caused by a lift-dump / spoiler failure (possible crew error), the effect of which IIRC requires an increase of 40% in the landing distance. In most operations, such a failure after touchdown is not hazardous as the landing margin within the distance required and excess runway distance available enables the aircraft to be stopped safety. However, operations on a limited runway may not have all of this safety margin and the operating technique should be adjusted i.e. immediate high / max braking until all retardation devices are confirmed working. The point of change over can be defined by checking the margin (%) from the max allowed landing weight for the given conditions; if at any time it is 100% of MLW because the aircraft is distance limited (not often in the 146), then always use max brakes after touch down.
Avoid tailwinds, wet runways, and especially wet concrete runways
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In another thread we used the expression "the holes in the cheese lining up".
Isn't this what happened here?
Limited LDA, known "difficult" airport.
Low ceiling.
Landing with a tailwind.
Coming in fairly fast, and touching down late.
Wet concrete runway.
Tyre burst at the wrong moment.
No overrun area.
None of them individually would have caused the accident.
All together ... another "aircraft that crashed before touchdown".
Isn't this what happened here?
Limited LDA, known "difficult" airport.
Low ceiling.
Landing with a tailwind.
Coming in fairly fast, and touching down late.
Wet concrete runway.
Tyre burst at the wrong moment.
No overrun area.
None of them individually would have caused the accident.
All together ... another "aircraft that crashed before touchdown".
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In another thread we used the expression "the holes in the cheese lining up".
Isn't this what happened here?
Limited LDA, known "difficult" airport.
Low ceiling.
Landing with a tailwind.
Coming in fairly fast, and touching down late.
Wet concrete runway.
Tyre burst at the wrong moment.
No overrun area.
None of them individually would have caused the accident.
All together ... another "aircraft that crashed before touchdown".
Isn't this what happened here?
Limited LDA, known "difficult" airport.
Low ceiling.
Landing with a tailwind.
Coming in fairly fast, and touching down late.
Wet concrete runway.
Tyre burst at the wrong moment.
No overrun area.
None of them individually would have caused the accident.
All together ... another "aircraft that crashed before touchdown".
METAR ENSO 100520Z 11006KT 9999 FEW025 10/10 Q1021
Rather nice weather actually. I guess they executed a visual approach (instrument approach require own navigation via STAR, or procedure turn overhead...). The runway (asphalt) was most likely dry, or possibly damp/wet after rain showers the previous evening.
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Recently, VG, a newspaper in Norway, released parts of a written log from one of the survivors.
I quote:
"A man... tried to open the emergency exit at the left side, but failed" (Door was trapped). -This must be the forward left exit, as he later writes that he exited through aft left exit.
"...I looked back, and saw the flame inferno (inside the cabin) rage about 4-5 meters from where we stood"
"Beside me stood a guy who tried to open the second (possibly the aft right) emergency exit."
"Only seconds after we were out of the plane, the flames shot out of the door."
As i see it, there were only a matter of seconds before the plane were fully lit on fire. Those who were unlucky enough to sit in front, died, as they couldn't escape. -The First Officer escaped through a window in the cockpit.
" Kenneth Palmér says that (his) colleagues... sat infront of the Atlantic Airways-machine. Both died."
Sad.
To those who are able to read Norwegian, here's the link to his story:
http://www.vg.no/pub/vgart.hbs?artid=134087
The confirmed deaths are 4, 12 survived.
-AnEvilTwiner, a norwegian citizen.
There could be some substance in what White Knight posted. For example at Samsun and Siirt there were no fatalities even though the aircraft were written off. In Puerto Williams there were 53 survivors even though the aircraft demolished a stone wall, the fatalities were due to drowning. 58 survived at Yinchuan at over 150 kts. 9 survived the CFIT accident in Zurich – a remarkable feat for that type of accident. Similarly, 5 survived CFIT at Diyarbakir. I suspect that there are few aircraft that could match this ‘success’ (survivors/total pax) together with a low accident rate – none of which involved the aircraft design or construction.
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VG excusive translated into English
Condolences to all those involved!
This translation of the VG article from a non-Norwegian (Danish native) - one or two words I am not entirely sure of.
________________________________________________
VG has been allowed to publish an excerpt from Kenneth’s personal log of the landing and the escape from the burning plane wreck.
On the dining room table in front of the experienced manager from Sandnes lies handwritten and detailed notes about his experiences of the drama minute by minute.
“Approx. half a minute after the landing I heard a bang (like a puncture). Straightaway, I leant forward. Then came two or three thumps with one second intervals as if the plane had traversed a small hole and bounced into the air afterwards”, he has noted.
Palmer’s opinion is that the pilot advanced the throttle on the left engine in an attempt to stabilise the plane.
“I looked out the window and saw that we were approaching the terrain on the left. Two thumps later we were over a hump, off the edge. Then I put my head on my knees again with my hands on my head. We were in the air for half a second before the first bang came from the body of the plane. I looked up. It was dark in the plane. Then another bang” he wrote in his log.
After the 3rd bang the plane came to rest. One engine was roaring loudly. And the 34 year old saw that fire/flames emerged from the outer engine of the left wing. The smell of burnt rubber spread in the cabin and the floor was glowing. Right over him the roof was torn off such that he could see the darkened sky.
Flames
-Everyone were calm and it went really quick. It was like watching the military, these were highly trained people moving towards the exit without signs of panic. My mind was blank, and we just did what we have been drilled to do through in safety briefings, said Palmér, who sat in the seat behind the left wing.
“”I took off the seat belt, climbed over the seatbacks towards the rear of the plane and saw someone at the right exit on the right hand side. A man in a white ?sweater? with dark dots tried to open the emergency exit on the left hand side. But it appeared to be stuck.”
He stood himself behind a colleague from IKM Testing, who was next to the 42 year old, who was the first out of the exit on the rear left hand side. According to Palmér the stewardess opened the door, but blocked it with one arm.
“He who was out first asked her why she blocked the exit. I did not hear her response. I noticed someone tapping me on the shoulder. It was Tor Arne, and about 3 to 4 meters away from him the flames were approaching fast”.
-Tor Arne shouted in my ear: jump out for f…, jump. Simultaneously, the front guy shouted: I have no f… time to wait and removed the arm of the stewardess. Then he and the next colleague jumped almost simultaneously.
After them Palmér jumped sensing Tor Arne Johannesen’s (33) hand on his shoulder. “Next to me was the man who had tried to open the other emergency exit. As I landed on my feet I noticed Tor Arne behind me. I rolled over with Tor Arne coming on top of me, crawling on all four about 5 meters down the slope to a thick tree”.
Kenneth Palmér commends stewardess Maibritt Magnussen (21) for opening the door so quickly.
- Only seconds after we evacuated, the flames were coming out of the door. I then went back to get her.
Palmér gave the stewardess support and went with his colleagues to a safe distance. He escaped with a ?kink? in his back, a broken breast bone and singed hairs on the back of his neck.
Sent SMS
He sent a text message to his mother at 07:37 and informed cohabitant Jane at 07:38. His mother was informed:
“Plane has crashed. I am OK”
Kenneth Palmér informs that his colleagues of nine years at IMK Testing, Jarle Reime (33), og Martin Charles Evertsen (25) were sat at the front of the Atlantic Airways-plane. Both perished.
- Now all my thoughts go out to those who died and their families. I think a lot of Jarle. What happened when he tried to escape and how long did it take? I think that several of those who did not make it out were in caught in shock, said Palmér to VG.
Reime was found dead at the rear of the plane, by the exit where at least 5 of the 12 had gathered seconds before the flames caught up with them.
This translation of the VG article from a non-Norwegian (Danish native) - one or two words I am not entirely sure of.
________________________________________________
VG has been allowed to publish an excerpt from Kenneth’s personal log of the landing and the escape from the burning plane wreck.
On the dining room table in front of the experienced manager from Sandnes lies handwritten and detailed notes about his experiences of the drama minute by minute.
“Approx. half a minute after the landing I heard a bang (like a puncture). Straightaway, I leant forward. Then came two or three thumps with one second intervals as if the plane had traversed a small hole and bounced into the air afterwards”, he has noted.
Palmer’s opinion is that the pilot advanced the throttle on the left engine in an attempt to stabilise the plane.
“I looked out the window and saw that we were approaching the terrain on the left. Two thumps later we were over a hump, off the edge. Then I put my head on my knees again with my hands on my head. We were in the air for half a second before the first bang came from the body of the plane. I looked up. It was dark in the plane. Then another bang” he wrote in his log.
After the 3rd bang the plane came to rest. One engine was roaring loudly. And the 34 year old saw that fire/flames emerged from the outer engine of the left wing. The smell of burnt rubber spread in the cabin and the floor was glowing. Right over him the roof was torn off such that he could see the darkened sky.
Flames
-Everyone were calm and it went really quick. It was like watching the military, these were highly trained people moving towards the exit without signs of panic. My mind was blank, and we just did what we have been drilled to do through in safety briefings, said Palmér, who sat in the seat behind the left wing.
“”I took off the seat belt, climbed over the seatbacks towards the rear of the plane and saw someone at the right exit on the right hand side. A man in a white ?sweater? with dark dots tried to open the emergency exit on the left hand side. But it appeared to be stuck.”
He stood himself behind a colleague from IKM Testing, who was next to the 42 year old, who was the first out of the exit on the rear left hand side. According to Palmér the stewardess opened the door, but blocked it with one arm.
“He who was out first asked her why she blocked the exit. I did not hear her response. I noticed someone tapping me on the shoulder. It was Tor Arne, and about 3 to 4 meters away from him the flames were approaching fast”.
-Tor Arne shouted in my ear: jump out for f…, jump. Simultaneously, the front guy shouted: I have no f… time to wait and removed the arm of the stewardess. Then he and the next colleague jumped almost simultaneously.
After them Palmér jumped sensing Tor Arne Johannesen’s (33) hand on his shoulder. “Next to me was the man who had tried to open the other emergency exit. As I landed on my feet I noticed Tor Arne behind me. I rolled over with Tor Arne coming on top of me, crawling on all four about 5 meters down the slope to a thick tree”.
Kenneth Palmér commends stewardess Maibritt Magnussen (21) for opening the door so quickly.
- Only seconds after we evacuated, the flames were coming out of the door. I then went back to get her.
Palmér gave the stewardess support and went with his colleagues to a safe distance. He escaped with a ?kink? in his back, a broken breast bone and singed hairs on the back of his neck.
Sent SMS
He sent a text message to his mother at 07:37 and informed cohabitant Jane at 07:38. His mother was informed:
“Plane has crashed. I am OK”
Kenneth Palmér informs that his colleagues of nine years at IMK Testing, Jarle Reime (33), og Martin Charles Evertsen (25) were sat at the front of the Atlantic Airways-plane. Both perished.
- Now all my thoughts go out to those who died and their families. I think a lot of Jarle. What happened when he tried to escape and how long did it take? I think that several of those who did not make it out were in caught in shock, said Palmér to VG.
Reime was found dead at the rear of the plane, by the exit where at least 5 of the 12 had gathered seconds before the flames caught up with them.
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AnEviltwinEr you might benefit from keeping an open mind on the issue.
There could be some substance in what White Knight posted. For example at Samsun and Siirt there were no fatalities even though the aircraft were written off. In Puerto Williams there were 53 survivors even though the aircraft demolished a stone wall, the fatalities were due to drowning. 58 survived at Yinchuan at over 150 kts. 9 survived the CFIT accident in Zurich – a remarkable feat for that type of accident. Similarly, 5 survived CFIT at Diyarbakir. I suspect that there are few aircraft that could match this ‘success’ (survivors/total pax) together with a low accident rate – none of which involved the aircraft design or construction.
There could be some substance in what White Knight posted. For example at Samsun and Siirt there were no fatalities even though the aircraft were written off. In Puerto Williams there were 53 survivors even though the aircraft demolished a stone wall, the fatalities were due to drowning. 58 survived at Yinchuan at over 150 kts. 9 survived the CFIT accident in Zurich – a remarkable feat for that type of accident. Similarly, 5 survived CFIT at Diyarbakir. I suspect that there are few aircraft that could match this ‘success’ (survivors/total pax) together with a low accident rate – none of which involved the aircraft design or construction.
My point was that the aircraft failed at most points.
First: Stop.
Second: Safety. Only one exit was confirmed working. Out of four! That gives a rather poor rate, 75 % of all the emergency exits got blocked. And, nothing externally blocked them. (The plane stopped with the belly down.) A thought tis that the four who were killed, would have a bigger chance to survive if they haw indeed Worked.
Third: Fire prevention. The fire started immediately, and spreaded like a... um... Something really fast. In fact, only seconds after the plane had stopped, the inferno begun.
Fourth: Integrity. Some here are claiming that the BAe146's frame integrity helped alot to the fact that so few were killed. I think they are wrong, because the plane didnt really go off that cliff at such a high speed. If it did, then it would have stopped alot futher down. Come on, every small commercial plane could, in theory do the same. (Clarification: not fall apart when impacting with the ground at such a low speed, after going off the edge of the runway.)
Hope this clears things a bit up. Yeah, I can be a bit cryptic at times.
-AnEvilTwinEr
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AAIB Norway stated that there is no evidence of a puncture as claimed by some passengers. No rubber found on the rwy.
Passengers have reported that the cres used differential thrust to steer the aircraft on the ground. Sounds strange to me.
Passengers have reported that the cres used differential thrust to steer the aircraft on the ground. Sounds strange to me.
AnEviltwinEr I think that you expect more from an aircraft in a crash situation than it would be certificated for.
1. If an aircraft overruns on to rocky terrain and descends a steep slope you would expect it to break. There is no pre-fire photographic evidence to support your view.
2. When structure is deformed, few exits in any aircraft type will work. Wait for the report to see if everyone was capable of escaping the fire – unconscious, broken bones, trapped, etc.
3. If you puncture a fuel tank and it is near a hot engine then you must expect a fire.
4. Let us wait until the report clarifies the overrun speed; even at 10 kts in a 30 ton aircraft there is a lot of energy to dissipate.
The primary issue is not the aircraft’s post crash integrity, it is preventing the crash, preventing the aircraft overrunning into hazardous terrain. The focus of the safety defences should be on these issues. Land and stop the aircraft safely on the runway or in the event of mishap / failure, provide an additional safety margin with an acceptable overrun area. If the latter is impractical then the airport / operator / pilot has to take additional precautions, e.g. no landings on a contaminated runway, no tailwinds, reduced weight, non normal operating procedure.
1. If an aircraft overruns on to rocky terrain and descends a steep slope you would expect it to break. There is no pre-fire photographic evidence to support your view.
2. When structure is deformed, few exits in any aircraft type will work. Wait for the report to see if everyone was capable of escaping the fire – unconscious, broken bones, trapped, etc.
3. If you puncture a fuel tank and it is near a hot engine then you must expect a fire.
4. Let us wait until the report clarifies the overrun speed; even at 10 kts in a 30 ton aircraft there is a lot of energy to dissipate.
The primary issue is not the aircraft’s post crash integrity, it is preventing the crash, preventing the aircraft overrunning into hazardous terrain. The focus of the safety defences should be on these issues. Land and stop the aircraft safely on the runway or in the event of mishap / failure, provide an additional safety margin with an acceptable overrun area. If the latter is impractical then the airport / operator / pilot has to take additional precautions, e.g. no landings on a contaminated runway, no tailwinds, reduced weight, non normal operating procedure.
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The pilots both survived.
The Capt wanted to talk to the press yesterday, but the company said no.
Why all this speculation when statements from the crew should be
coming shortly ?.Pax saying brakes failed etc.
Let's wait for the statements.....
The Capt wanted to talk to the press yesterday, but the company said no.
Why all this speculation when statements from the crew should be
coming shortly ?.Pax saying brakes failed etc.
Let's wait for the statements.....