Comair CRJ crash in Kentucky
I'm in one of those moods
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could anyone reasonably expect an old airport with a new taxi way, & recent construction to facilitate pilots getting lost?
The Reverend
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jondc9, no need to remind me that airplanes are equiped with operating lights. Even though I retired 7 years ago from the 747 fleet, I still remember those lights in my 18,000+ hours of jet flight operations. Perhaps the instrument lighting was inoperative on the aircraft so they couldn't see the 40degree difference of runway heading when they lined up.
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Below the Glidepath - not correcting
Lot of discussion about what the controller did or did not do, or did or did not see. The Detroit 1990 collision was a result of one aircraft getting lost in fog and encroaching the active. It simply illustrates the point that the ground controller was not necessarily required to see the aircraft, just know where they were.
Excuse the caps (NTSBs, not mine)
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?e...12X24751&key=2
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
LACK OF PROPER CREW COORDN, INCLUDING VIRTUAL REVERSAL OF ROLES BY THE DC-9 PLTS, WHICH LED TO THEIR FAILURE TO STOP TAXIING & ALERT GND CTLR OF THEIR POSITIONAL UNCERTAINTY IN A TIMELY MANNER BFR & AFTER INTRUDING ONTO THE ACTIVE RWY. CONTRIBUING TO CAUSE OF ACDNT WERE (1) DEFICIENCIES IN ATC SVCS PROVIDED BY DETROIT TWR, INCLUDING FAILURE OF GND CTLR TO TAKE TIMELY ACTN TO ALERT LCL CTLR TO PSBL RWY INCURSION, INADQT VIS OBS, FAILURE TO USE PROGRESSIVE TAXI INSTRNS IN LOW-VIS CONDS, & ISSUANCE OF INAPPROPRIATE & CONFUSING TAXI INSTRNS COMPOUNDED BY INADQ BACKUP SUPERVISION FOR LEVEL OF EXPERIENCE OF STAFF ON DUTY; (2) DEFICIENCIES IN SURFACE MARKINGS, SIGNAGE & LGTG AT ARPT & FAILURE OF FAA SURVEILLANCE TO DETECT OR CORRECT ANY OF THESE DEFICIENCIES; (3) FAILURE OF NORTHWEST AIRLINES TO PROVIDE ADQT COCKPIT RESOURCE MAN- AGEMENT TRNG TO LINE AIRCREWS. CONTRIBUTING TO FATALITIES WAS INOPERABILITY OF DC-9 INTERNAL TAILCONE RLS MECHANISM. CONTRIBUTING TO NUMBER & SEVERITY OF INJURIES WAS FAILURE OF CREW OF DC-9 TO PROPERLY EXECUTE THE PSGR EVACUATION.
Excuse the caps (NTSBs, not mine)
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?e...12X24751&key=2
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
LACK OF PROPER CREW COORDN, INCLUDING VIRTUAL REVERSAL OF ROLES BY THE DC-9 PLTS, WHICH LED TO THEIR FAILURE TO STOP TAXIING & ALERT GND CTLR OF THEIR POSITIONAL UNCERTAINTY IN A TIMELY MANNER BFR & AFTER INTRUDING ONTO THE ACTIVE RWY. CONTRIBUING TO CAUSE OF ACDNT WERE (1) DEFICIENCIES IN ATC SVCS PROVIDED BY DETROIT TWR, INCLUDING FAILURE OF GND CTLR TO TAKE TIMELY ACTN TO ALERT LCL CTLR TO PSBL RWY INCURSION, INADQT VIS OBS, FAILURE TO USE PROGRESSIVE TAXI INSTRNS IN LOW-VIS CONDS, & ISSUANCE OF INAPPROPRIATE & CONFUSING TAXI INSTRNS COMPOUNDED BY INADQ BACKUP SUPERVISION FOR LEVEL OF EXPERIENCE OF STAFF ON DUTY; (2) DEFICIENCIES IN SURFACE MARKINGS, SIGNAGE & LGTG AT ARPT & FAILURE OF FAA SURVEILLANCE TO DETECT OR CORRECT ANY OF THESE DEFICIENCIES; (3) FAILURE OF NORTHWEST AIRLINES TO PROVIDE ADQT COCKPIT RESOURCE MAN- AGEMENT TRNG TO LINE AIRCREWS. CONTRIBUTING TO FATALITIES WAS INOPERABILITY OF DC-9 INTERNAL TAILCONE RLS MECHANISM. CONTRIBUTING TO NUMBER & SEVERITY OF INJURIES WAS FAILURE OF CREW OF DC-9 TO PROPERLY EXECUTE THE PSGR EVACUATION.
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The Lexington CRJ Accident
I have nothing new to add to the mixture of serious opinion and crass conjecture expressed here (why didn't the AT Controller keep his aeroplane spotter eyes on the aircraft about to take off and ignore all other facets of his job!!). However, I have just received an e-mail from the US regarding a fairly high time aviator with a good knowledge of the set up at Lexington. Much of what he says has been aired by the more level headed posters but there are one or two fresh aspects which you might like to read. Like the bangs that were heard probably being engine stalls as the throttles were firewalled.
"I live in Lexington and have thirty years of airline experience flying in and out of LEX. Here is what I think happened:
The two runways in question share the same common run-up area. The extended taxiway to the correct runway, runway 22 was closed due to construction. It has always been difficult to tell between the two runways when you are taxiing out. The natural thing to do is to take the wrong one. It is just there and you are always tempted to take it.
When I flew out of LEX we always checked each other at least three times to make sure we were taking the correct runway. We checked the chart, we checked to make sure the correct runway number was at the end and we always double checked the FMS generated moving map.
Most FMS systems will have a warning called "runway dissimularity" pop up in agenta when your position at takeoff doesn't match the runway you programmed into the computer. This would not happen at LEX since you are
virtually in the same spot when you take either runway.
It was also raining at the time of takeoff and dark. The control tower opens
at 6am (because we are, after all, all about saving money) and only has one
controller on duty at that time. He or she has to: run ground control,
clearance delivery, approach control and departure control. The one
controller also has to program the ATIS and make the coffee. He or she
probably cleared comair to take off and then put their head back down to do
a chore or work another airplane.
Taking the runway, the comair guy would put the power up and wouldn't
realize they were on the wrong runway until they were about 70% down the
pike. Too late to safely abort so he probaby decided to try and continue the
takeoff.
This is when the eye witnesses heard a series of explosions and thought the
plane blew up in the air. Didn't happen -- what they heard and saw were
compressor stalls of probably both engines. The pilot no doubt pushed the
throttles all the way up and that demand to the engines combined with the
steep pitch attitude cut off enough air to the intakes to cause the
compressor stalls -- which, by the way, made them even more doomed. Less
power.
They stalled or simply hit one of the large hills to the west of the airport
and came to a stop. Everybody on board was probably injured but alive. Then, a second or two later the post-crash fire began. With the darkness and the fact that most of them had broken legs, pelvises and backs they literally burned alive. Not smoke inhalation. They really actually burned to death.
BTW, comair and the press will tell you what a great plane the RJ is. This
is a total lie. The Canadair RJ was designed to be an executive barge, not
an airliner. They were designed to fly about ten times a month, not ten
times a day. They have a long history of mechanical design shortfalls. I've
flown on it and have piloted it. It is a steaming, underpowered piece of s**t. It never had enough power to get out of its own way and this situation
is exactly what everybody who flies it was afraid of.
The senior member of the crew had about five and a half years of total jet
experience. The copilot less. They had minimum training (to save money --
enjoy that discount ticket!) and were flying a minimally equipped pos on
very short rest. The layover gets in about 10pm the night before. They
report for pick-up at 4:30am.
I'm sorry if I sound bitter but this is exactly the direction the entire
airline industry is going. Expect to see bigger more colorful crashes in the
future. I have 20,000 of heavy jet flying time and am type rated in the 727, 757, 767, 777, DC-8, DC-9 and L-1011."
Not my views folks, but worth considering.
_______________________________________________
"I live in Lexington and have thirty years of airline experience flying in and out of LEX. Here is what I think happened:
The two runways in question share the same common run-up area. The extended taxiway to the correct runway, runway 22 was closed due to construction. It has always been difficult to tell between the two runways when you are taxiing out. The natural thing to do is to take the wrong one. It is just there and you are always tempted to take it.
When I flew out of LEX we always checked each other at least three times to make sure we were taking the correct runway. We checked the chart, we checked to make sure the correct runway number was at the end and we always double checked the FMS generated moving map.
Most FMS systems will have a warning called "runway dissimularity" pop up in agenta when your position at takeoff doesn't match the runway you programmed into the computer. This would not happen at LEX since you are
virtually in the same spot when you take either runway.
It was also raining at the time of takeoff and dark. The control tower opens
at 6am (because we are, after all, all about saving money) and only has one
controller on duty at that time. He or she has to: run ground control,
clearance delivery, approach control and departure control. The one
controller also has to program the ATIS and make the coffee. He or she
probably cleared comair to take off and then put their head back down to do
a chore or work another airplane.
Taking the runway, the comair guy would put the power up and wouldn't
realize they were on the wrong runway until they were about 70% down the
pike. Too late to safely abort so he probaby decided to try and continue the
takeoff.
This is when the eye witnesses heard a series of explosions and thought the
plane blew up in the air. Didn't happen -- what they heard and saw were
compressor stalls of probably both engines. The pilot no doubt pushed the
throttles all the way up and that demand to the engines combined with the
steep pitch attitude cut off enough air to the intakes to cause the
compressor stalls -- which, by the way, made them even more doomed. Less
power.
They stalled or simply hit one of the large hills to the west of the airport
and came to a stop. Everybody on board was probably injured but alive. Then, a second or two later the post-crash fire began. With the darkness and the fact that most of them had broken legs, pelvises and backs they literally burned alive. Not smoke inhalation. They really actually burned to death.
BTW, comair and the press will tell you what a great plane the RJ is. This
is a total lie. The Canadair RJ was designed to be an executive barge, not
an airliner. They were designed to fly about ten times a month, not ten
times a day. They have a long history of mechanical design shortfalls. I've
flown on it and have piloted it. It is a steaming, underpowered piece of s**t. It never had enough power to get out of its own way and this situation
is exactly what everybody who flies it was afraid of.
The senior member of the crew had about five and a half years of total jet
experience. The copilot less. They had minimum training (to save money --
enjoy that discount ticket!) and were flying a minimally equipped pos on
very short rest. The layover gets in about 10pm the night before. They
report for pick-up at 4:30am.
I'm sorry if I sound bitter but this is exactly the direction the entire
airline industry is going. Expect to see bigger more colorful crashes in the
future. I have 20,000 of heavy jet flying time and am type rated in the 727, 757, 767, 777, DC-8, DC-9 and L-1011."
Not my views folks, but worth considering.
_______________________________________________
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I have 20,000 of heavy jet flying time and am type rated in the 727, 757, 767, 777, DC-8, DC-9 and L-1011.
Here's another view of this "expert"'s post:
Subject: this circulated opinion
To anyone who read this pilot's original message (below):
I am sorry to see one airline pilot, especially one evidently from Delta ...
my airline .... circulate a piece that at once is both inaccurate and
attacking of other airline pilots (and everyone else in sight). Did these
guys screw up? It appears they did. Have we all made similar mistakes ....
but through luck and chance avoided such a horrible fate. I believe most of
us would have to say, "yes".
It is interesting to note that, at various points, he faults the airport
layout, the FAA staffing, the aircraft, the crew, and the airline's training
program.
He writes:
I was also the station liason for Lexington for ten years
Such a position was voluntary, and held little meaning at Delta. Most
(cannot speak for this pilot) who volunteered did so in order to gain jump
seat privileges in and out of the station prior to our gaining the JS
contractually. It gained one no more experience, if as much, with an airport
than simply flying in and out as a working pilot.
The extented [sic]taxiway to the correct runway, runway 28 was closed due to onstruction.
Those who use the airport, or did in the distant past, realize that 22 was
the correct, long runway to which they were taxiing.
It has always been difficult to tell between the two runways when you are taxiing out. The natural thing to do is to take the wrong one.
While the 2 runways do originate very close to the same point, being easy to
mistake is not the same as "difficult to tell between" them. Having flown
out of LEX many times, I do not believe that it is "natural" to take the
wrong one.
The control tower opens at 6am
It certainly used to .... some time ago. According to my Jepps, however, it
is now open 24 hours. According to the news accounts and the NTSB briefing I
heard yesterday, this particular controller had come on duty at 2330 the
night before, and was nearing the end of his shift.
He or she probably cleared comair to take off and then put their head back
down to do a chore or work another airplane.
Exactly as described in the media.
Taking the runway, the comair guy would put the power up and wouldn't realize they were on the wrone [sic] runway until they were about 70% down
the pike.
Probably what happened .... but certainly not inevitable as implied here.
The author himself states that it is routine to check compass heading prior
to take off. He can't seem to decide whether to blame the airport or the
pilots.
Didn't happen -- what they heard and saw were compressor stalls of probably both engines.
Interesting and possible: but speculation none the less. In fact, the entire
next paragraph is simply speculation, as opposed to any kind of "expert"
analysis .... as he later offers to any takers.
It is a steaming, underpowered piece of s**t.
I guess that's a technical term.
The senior member of the crew had about five and a half years of total jet experience.
This is a glass house issue if ever there was one. Just prior to 9/11, Delta
had 5 year captains on the MD88 .... ones who had spent part of that 5 years
on the engineer's panel. That 5 years could easily have represented the
total of his jet time, too .... as DL was hiring many civilian trained
pilots. I'm sure Piedmont had such junior captains in their heyday, also ...
and we could see it again in the future. To cite it as a safety issue is to
eat our own young.
They had minimum training
And which of our own airlines provides "extra" training above the FAA
requirement?
flying .... on very short rest. The layover gets in about 10pm the nightbefore. They report for pick-up at 4:30am.
While the first news reports I saw described this as the "normal layover
pattern" for CMR LEX crews .... subsequent reports established for this
specific instance that the crew had arrived at the LEX layover the previous
afternoon.
email me if you need an off the record so-called expert
Quoted without comment.
I have 20,000 of heavy jet flying time and am type rated in the 727, 757, 767, 777, DC-8, DC-9 and L-1011.
The claim of 20K hours of "heavy jet" time simply makes me curious. I can't
dispute it since I don't know this pilot. However, in my 29 years at DL, I
found it possible for a pilot to accumulate total hours approaching 20,000
... but certainly not all in heavy jets, since the big ones tend to go to
the more senior pilots, and no one is senior all the time. Having spent
enough time to gain type ratings in the DC9 & B727 ... and flying the B757
some of the time as all DL 75/76 pilots do, then he spent at least a little
of his career in decidedly non-heavy jets.
Just food for thought,
Kim Welch
Also a retired DL pilot
To anyone who read this pilot's original message (below):
I am sorry to see one airline pilot, especially one evidently from Delta ...
my airline .... circulate a piece that at once is both inaccurate and
attacking of other airline pilots (and everyone else in sight). Did these
guys screw up? It appears they did. Have we all made similar mistakes ....
but through luck and chance avoided such a horrible fate. I believe most of
us would have to say, "yes".
It is interesting to note that, at various points, he faults the airport
layout, the FAA staffing, the aircraft, the crew, and the airline's training
program.
He writes:
I was also the station liason for Lexington for ten years
Such a position was voluntary, and held little meaning at Delta. Most
(cannot speak for this pilot) who volunteered did so in order to gain jump
seat privileges in and out of the station prior to our gaining the JS
contractually. It gained one no more experience, if as much, with an airport
than simply flying in and out as a working pilot.
The extented [sic]taxiway to the correct runway, runway 28 was closed due to onstruction.
Those who use the airport, or did in the distant past, realize that 22 was
the correct, long runway to which they were taxiing.
It has always been difficult to tell between the two runways when you are taxiing out. The natural thing to do is to take the wrong one.
While the 2 runways do originate very close to the same point, being easy to
mistake is not the same as "difficult to tell between" them. Having flown
out of LEX many times, I do not believe that it is "natural" to take the
wrong one.
The control tower opens at 6am
It certainly used to .... some time ago. According to my Jepps, however, it
is now open 24 hours. According to the news accounts and the NTSB briefing I
heard yesterday, this particular controller had come on duty at 2330 the
night before, and was nearing the end of his shift.
He or she probably cleared comair to take off and then put their head back
down to do a chore or work another airplane.
Exactly as described in the media.
Taking the runway, the comair guy would put the power up and wouldn't realize they were on the wrone [sic] runway until they were about 70% down
the pike.
Probably what happened .... but certainly not inevitable as implied here.
The author himself states that it is routine to check compass heading prior
to take off. He can't seem to decide whether to blame the airport or the
pilots.
Didn't happen -- what they heard and saw were compressor stalls of probably both engines.
Interesting and possible: but speculation none the less. In fact, the entire
next paragraph is simply speculation, as opposed to any kind of "expert"
analysis .... as he later offers to any takers.
It is a steaming, underpowered piece of s**t.
I guess that's a technical term.
The senior member of the crew had about five and a half years of total jet experience.
This is a glass house issue if ever there was one. Just prior to 9/11, Delta
had 5 year captains on the MD88 .... ones who had spent part of that 5 years
on the engineer's panel. That 5 years could easily have represented the
total of his jet time, too .... as DL was hiring many civilian trained
pilots. I'm sure Piedmont had such junior captains in their heyday, also ...
and we could see it again in the future. To cite it as a safety issue is to
eat our own young.
They had minimum training
And which of our own airlines provides "extra" training above the FAA
requirement?
flying .... on very short rest. The layover gets in about 10pm the nightbefore. They report for pick-up at 4:30am.
While the first news reports I saw described this as the "normal layover
pattern" for CMR LEX crews .... subsequent reports established for this
specific instance that the crew had arrived at the LEX layover the previous
afternoon.
email me if you need an off the record so-called expert
Quoted without comment.
I have 20,000 of heavy jet flying time and am type rated in the 727, 757, 767, 777, DC-8, DC-9 and L-1011.
The claim of 20K hours of "heavy jet" time simply makes me curious. I can't
dispute it since I don't know this pilot. However, in my 29 years at DL, I
found it possible for a pilot to accumulate total hours approaching 20,000
... but certainly not all in heavy jets, since the big ones tend to go to
the more senior pilots, and no one is senior all the time. Having spent
enough time to gain type ratings in the DC9 & B727 ... and flying the B757
some of the time as all DL 75/76 pilots do, then he spent at least a little
of his career in decidedly non-heavy jets.
Just food for thought,
Kim Welch
Also a retired DL pilot
Last edited by Airbubba; 4th Sep 2006 at 16:05.
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Airbubba on Lexington
I have just had an object lesson in not repeating information that may be of doubtful origin! My apologies to you Airbubba and anyone else who read my post if the information was incorrect. I received the article from a friend who had re-posted in good faith. The article had what I assumed were typos which I corrected ( R/W 22 for 28 for example!). I also left out the information on the "liason officer for ten years" to avoid any possibility of identification. I suppose some of it may have been correct but I shouldn't have recirculated what is probably no more than a rumour. We live and learn.
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Interestingly, I received a private e-mail from a friend last night, containing the same ignorant rant which BoF quotes. Here was my reply:
"While many of these comments are generally true for the industry, there are several items that are factually wrong in this case.
This crew had over 24 hrs rest in LEX.
The Capt. taxied out to the wrong runway - 26 (not 28) because he has the nosewheel tiller at the left seat.. Rwy 26 was unlit - and it was an hour before dawn. He then turned it over to the right-seater for takeoff. The copilot was 9 years older than the Captain - not sure if he had more jet time.
I have not heard any reports that the aircraft made it into the air at all. With a dark runway, they tore through two fences and left tire tracks in the grass before hitting a birm(s) which broke up the aircraft. It might have bounced into the air after one of these collisions, which could have caused enough energy release to ignite the fire.
All this is from NTSB preliminary briefings.
Will "jamming" the throttles cause the CF34 to stall? I doubt it - although a high AOA might.
BTW, the Bombardier/Canadair RJ is a best-seller because it has an very good operational record. It's been around 20 years and still in production, for good reason."
IF (and that's a big if) this heavy captain still flies for a major carrier, he has forgotten the "check and doublecheck" rule. I just hope he is lucky enought to draw competent FO's.
"While many of these comments are generally true for the industry, there are several items that are factually wrong in this case.
This crew had over 24 hrs rest in LEX.
The Capt. taxied out to the wrong runway - 26 (not 28) because he has the nosewheel tiller at the left seat.. Rwy 26 was unlit - and it was an hour before dawn. He then turned it over to the right-seater for takeoff. The copilot was 9 years older than the Captain - not sure if he had more jet time.
I have not heard any reports that the aircraft made it into the air at all. With a dark runway, they tore through two fences and left tire tracks in the grass before hitting a birm(s) which broke up the aircraft. It might have bounced into the air after one of these collisions, which could have caused enough energy release to ignite the fire.
All this is from NTSB preliminary briefings.
Will "jamming" the throttles cause the CF34 to stall? I doubt it - although a high AOA might.
BTW, the Bombardier/Canadair RJ is a best-seller because it has an very good operational record. It's been around 20 years and still in production, for good reason."
IF (and that's a big if) this heavy captain still flies for a major carrier, he has forgotten the "check and doublecheck" rule. I just hope he is lucky enought to draw competent FO's.
Rather than web search I'll asked the experts. What engines does the RJ have and are they not FADEC controlled? If yes then jamming throttles to the fire wall doesn't do a thing other than request full thrust. A compressor stall is thus only likey to be caused by high AOA is it not?
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The engines on an RJ are hydro-mechanically controlled, not FADEC. Pushing the throttles past the takeoff N1 set point WILL increase thrust, basically firewalling the engines. I don't know whether compressor stall/surge is a significant risk at power settings above takeoff power.
The precise types are CF34-3A1 and -3B1; it sounds like this aircraft had the lower thrust -3A1s (based on NTSB comments about "lower thrust engines"), but I don't KNOW that for sure.
The precise types are CF34-3A1 and -3B1; it sounds like this aircraft had the lower thrust -3A1s (based on NTSB comments about "lower thrust engines"), but I don't KNOW that for sure.
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jondc9, no need to remind me that airplanes are equiped with operating lights. Even though I retired 7 years ago from the 747 fleet, I still remember those lights in my 18,000+ hours of jet flight operations. Perhaps the instrument lighting was inoperative on the aircraft so they couldn't see the 40degree difference of runway heading when they lined up.
I knew what you meant Hotdog......trying to pin this on the Controller is reprehensible....When the results are published I would bet my licence on the "factors" being shared. As my old boss told me years ago "Air traffic are never entirely blameless"(said with heavy irony for our American friends
)
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Am I alone in thinking that the action of pre-flighting the wrong aircraft could have had a significant impact on this incident?
For the last 25 years I have been sitting in the back of simulators and in aircraft jump seats carrying out recurrent checks and line checks. I have noticed that if the first thirty minutes of a check goes well then the remainder of the flight tends to be relaxed with few errors. However, if the first thirty minutes goes badly, with a major mistake being made then the mistakes tend to multiply
Airclues
For the last 25 years I have been sitting in the back of simulators and in aircraft jump seats carrying out recurrent checks and line checks. I have noticed that if the first thirty minutes of a check goes well then the remainder of the flight tends to be relaxed with few errors. However, if the first thirty minutes goes badly, with a major mistake being made then the mistakes tend to multiply
Airclues
Another one actually happened today - We had smoke in the cabin during preflight (a recirc. fan stalled). It turned out to be a non-event, but it made a great damage to my concentration for the following flight - I just felt I was out of the loop... I can imgine the distraction and rush the Comair crew experinced after preflighting a wrong a/c - thid MUST have been a significant factor...
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Just some points on the equipment fitted to CRJs.
From around 1996 all CRJ-100/200s have been fitted with -B engines but it is possible to derate them to the -A rating & take the improved time between overhauls. This is done by program pin on the Electronic Engine Control that provides N1 control once above 57%. The EICAS must also be programmed to the same derate. As stated, basic control for starting & at lower N1s is by hydro-mechanical means. RJ-700 & -900s have larger engines that do have full FADECs.
Cockpit displays are all CRT-based Rockwell-Collins Proline 4 series (thus no cockpit lighting per se needed to see the Heading). There are a total of 6, in order: PFD1,MFD1, ED1, ED2, MFD2 & PFD2. As in most glass cockpits, either MFD can be switched to be either a PFD or EICAS display in case of failure.
From around 1996 all CRJ-100/200s have been fitted with -B engines but it is possible to derate them to the -A rating & take the improved time between overhauls. This is done by program pin on the Electronic Engine Control that provides N1 control once above 57%. The EICAS must also be programmed to the same derate. As stated, basic control for starting & at lower N1s is by hydro-mechanical means. RJ-700 & -900s have larger engines that do have full FADECs.
Cockpit displays are all CRT-based Rockwell-Collins Proline 4 series (thus no cockpit lighting per se needed to see the Heading). There are a total of 6, in order: PFD1,MFD1, ED1, ED2, MFD2 & PFD2. As in most glass cockpits, either MFD can be switched to be either a PFD or EICAS display in case of failure.
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No argument from me. Now I'm not in the "let's hang the ATCO" camp, but if there were causal factors they must be identified and rectified. In the US that almost certainly means a deep-pockets lawsuit.
Was the Lexington Airport in an unsafe condition that day, and was the FAA guilty of complicity and/or lack of oversight ? Not an excuse for the crew's error but just maybe a reason.
Was the Lexington Airport in an unsafe condition that day, and was the FAA guilty of complicity and/or lack of oversight ? Not an excuse for the crew's error but just maybe a reason.
The Reverend
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An accident like this could easily and cheaply be avoided in the future at airports with limited visibility of take off position from the control tower, by installing CCTV cameras at the T/O points, with monitors in the tower; in the absence of taxy way coloured lighting. Better than a big X, IMHO.
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fropilot
you mention TCAS/ATC and not looking out the window.
That would be against regulations and common sense as TCAS and ATC (for the most part using secondary radar) requires TRANSPONDER to be on...sometimes that doesn't happen.
Witness recent glider/jet mid air near Carson city nevada.
j
you mention TCAS/ATC and not looking out the window.
That would be against regulations and common sense as TCAS and ATC (for the most part using secondary radar) requires TRANSPONDER to be on...sometimes that doesn't happen.
Witness recent glider/jet mid air near Carson city nevada.
j
I've only made a few posts so I don't feel the need to order a Personal Title and help support PPRuNe
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Moderators, can we please have a break from this incessant diversion from the thread topic? We appear to have a few individuals who are so addicted to the sound of their own voices that they will harp on ad nauseum about issues that are not relevant and take the tread into territory that just ruins it for those of us who are interested in what caused this accident.
We appear to have the likes of jondc9 who cannot resist putting his twopennethworth in and then harping on about how the tower controller must share some responsibility in this tragic accident. We all know jondc9 is a retired has-been who is a self-proclaimed 'expert' whilst those of us who are still in the job see him as a 'jack of all trades and master of none'.
Perhaps it is time we had some sort of accreditation or reputation system on here so that the rest of us who read these threads will know who is posting at least has some credibility and isn't just another egomaniac who craves the limelight. It is such a pity when posts by the likes of Captain Airclues who, for those of us thatt know him, has a huge amount of experience and makes valid points that appear to have been ignored by the media which are then submerged by the arguments of self-proclaimed experts (NOT) about whether the tower controller should be sharing responsibility.
If this crew did, as reported, do a pre-flight on the wrong a/c and then had to repeat it all again on a different a/c with the associated embarrasment/anger and more importantly rush to get an on-time departure together with the circadian effects of a very early start then that is a much more important factor than having an argument about whether the tower controller should share any responsibility for the fact that the crew took off on the wrong runway.
No doubt the the NTSB investigation and final report will take into account any contributing factors to this accident but from what I have read on here from real controllers (not pseudo-experts who proclaim to have knowledge of everything but mastery of none) they do not have to watch the a/c until it is but a speck on the horizon disappearing into cloud or whatever. Much more important is why did this crew mistakenly take off from the wrong runway and what was their mind-set, what clues did they ignore or miss and at what stage did they realise their error and what decision processes led them to continue?
We appear to have the likes of jondc9 who cannot resist putting his twopennethworth in and then harping on about how the tower controller must share some responsibility in this tragic accident. We all know jondc9 is a retired has-been who is a self-proclaimed 'expert' whilst those of us who are still in the job see him as a 'jack of all trades and master of none'.
Perhaps it is time we had some sort of accreditation or reputation system on here so that the rest of us who read these threads will know who is posting at least has some credibility and isn't just another egomaniac who craves the limelight. It is such a pity when posts by the likes of Captain Airclues who, for those of us thatt know him, has a huge amount of experience and makes valid points that appear to have been ignored by the media which are then submerged by the arguments of self-proclaimed experts (NOT) about whether the tower controller should be sharing responsibility.
If this crew did, as reported, do a pre-flight on the wrong a/c and then had to repeat it all again on a different a/c with the associated embarrasment/anger and more importantly rush to get an on-time departure together with the circadian effects of a very early start then that is a much more important factor than having an argument about whether the tower controller should share any responsibility for the fact that the crew took off on the wrong runway.
No doubt the the NTSB investigation and final report will take into account any contributing factors to this accident but from what I have read on here from real controllers (not pseudo-experts who proclaim to have knowledge of everything but mastery of none) they do not have to watch the a/c until it is but a speck on the horizon disappearing into cloud or whatever. Much more important is why did this crew mistakenly take off from the wrong runway and what was their mind-set, what clues did they ignore or miss and at what stage did they realise their error and what decision processes led them to continue?
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dear cargo boy
I have indicted the system and not this particular controller. Read previous posts carefully.
With a name like cargo boy, have you ever had the responsiblity of flying passengers?
perhaps our common language has confused our communication. twopennethworth?
and sir, if you are not an expert in aviation, how do you make your living in aviation?
j
I have indicted the system and not this particular controller. Read previous posts carefully.
With a name like cargo boy, have you ever had the responsiblity of flying passengers?
perhaps our common language has confused our communication. twopennethworth?
and sir, if you are not an expert in aviation, how do you make your living in aviation?
j
Last edited by jondc9; 5th Sep 2006 at 12:01.