Comair CRJ crash in Kentucky
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Please don't try to equate flying your Cherokee with the responsibilities of the two RJ pilots, they are both very busy during this time of the flight, add to that the time of day and new taxi procedures that began a week prior, if only it was as simple as doing a mag check and pouring the coals to it.
D.L.
D.L.
The poster draws our attention to a basic piece of airmanship that is taught in flight school for the same reasons that we check our controls and configuration before we depart.
The fact that he drives a Cherokee seems irrelevant, the check takes less than 5 seconds and whilst I appreciate that this is a busy phase (a) what is the potential cost of not checking and (b) a Cherokee driver is also busy and has only one pair of eyes, less training and less capable equipment.
I think you should reconsider your comments.
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Team wins or team loses
As a former Health and Safety Committee rep for AFA at Midway, I hope that you'll allow me to weigh in here on the LEX situation.
It is really important to not conclude a reason and let the NTSB do their job. Obviously they will be focusing on TWR communications and CVR conversation, as well as CRM. D
But I can surmise that after boarding the wrong aircraft and prepping it for takeoff, then switching, with a full flight, this crew had very little time to get settled before takeoff, and whether overtly by the ground crew/boarding personnel or subconsciously feeling guilty, would have rushed a little to get the flight out on time. We don't know yet.
That said, did ComAir radio right before with some comment or give them connecting flight info, thus distracting the crew ? Did the TWR then come on and say "cleared for takeoff" right after? Maybe the pilots had a few words and just didn't get along. That we don't know either.
That said, all I know is that it takes a team to win and a team to lose--but after my experience of flying in and out of boonie airports and then to O'Hare, can you imagine a gate/concourse controller or TWR controller at O'Hare not watching taxiing traffic. That's just not in the realm. The LAX controller in the USAir accident about 20 years ago sure got the boot when she cleared a general aviation aircraft onto an active runway, instead of asking it to hold. If there had been someone watching, that wouldn't have happened either.
Maybe the pilot's unions should start asking questions like why isn't FAA requiring TWR controllers to look at taxiing traffic until they're on a takeoff roll or requiring, no exceptions, a runway number response before takeoff at airports. That's part of being on the team and it seems logical to me. And I don't want to hear "well, that's not part of the job..." Like someone said, it's that additional set of eyes.
Finally, I flew with a Captain at Midway whose terrific CRM extended to the cabin, and during icy weather asked us to check the ice markers/ribbons on the wings of the MD82's/83/87, which I was more than happy to comply. Obviously this is an example of good teamwork, as well.
My condolences to the families of the passengers, the crew, people of ComAir, as well as those in aviation--everyone feels awful when this happens.
It is really important to not conclude a reason and let the NTSB do their job. Obviously they will be focusing on TWR communications and CVR conversation, as well as CRM. D
But I can surmise that after boarding the wrong aircraft and prepping it for takeoff, then switching, with a full flight, this crew had very little time to get settled before takeoff, and whether overtly by the ground crew/boarding personnel or subconsciously feeling guilty, would have rushed a little to get the flight out on time. We don't know yet.
That said, did ComAir radio right before with some comment or give them connecting flight info, thus distracting the crew ? Did the TWR then come on and say "cleared for takeoff" right after? Maybe the pilots had a few words and just didn't get along. That we don't know either.
That said, all I know is that it takes a team to win and a team to lose--but after my experience of flying in and out of boonie airports and then to O'Hare, can you imagine a gate/concourse controller or TWR controller at O'Hare not watching taxiing traffic. That's just not in the realm. The LAX controller in the USAir accident about 20 years ago sure got the boot when she cleared a general aviation aircraft onto an active runway, instead of asking it to hold. If there had been someone watching, that wouldn't have happened either.
Maybe the pilot's unions should start asking questions like why isn't FAA requiring TWR controllers to look at taxiing traffic until they're on a takeoff roll or requiring, no exceptions, a runway number response before takeoff at airports. That's part of being on the team and it seems logical to me. And I don't want to hear "well, that's not part of the job..." Like someone said, it's that additional set of eyes.
Finally, I flew with a Captain at Midway whose terrific CRM extended to the cabin, and during icy weather asked us to check the ice markers/ribbons on the wings of the MD82's/83/87, which I was more than happy to comply. Obviously this is an example of good teamwork, as well.
My condolences to the families of the passengers, the crew, people of ComAir, as well as those in aviation--everyone feels awful when this happens.
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Headline News has just reported on TV that the pilots originally entered and powered up the wrong a/c that morning, and were notified by ground crew of their mistake. AND that the controller was also short of sleep, as little as two hours.
This should not be about assigning the blame, but about assessing the causes.
These guys were all responsible for their own actions, yes, but not for the rostering or scheduling that may have left them without the resources to do their job with the alertness that it required, thus putting them in a position to fail, both in the air and on the ground.
All around fatigue seems to be the common denominator; no amount of training or personnel will alleviate accidents if everyone is half asleep.
This should not be about assigning the blame, but about assessing the causes.
These guys were all responsible for their own actions, yes, but not for the rostering or scheduling that may have left them without the resources to do their job with the alertness that it required, thus putting them in a position to fail, both in the air and on the ground.
All around fatigue seems to be the common denominator; no amount of training or personnel will alleviate accidents if everyone is half asleep.
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Sure, the Captain is ultimately responsible but at times ATC has to share part of that responsibility. When someone is being radar-vectored in IMC he can't be totally responsible 'cos he can't see what's happening outside.
On a number of occasions during my time at Heathrow I saw potentially dangerous situations saved by ATC: Several occasions when undercarriages were not lowered; once when an aircraft lined up with the adjacent main road in poor visibility.... again when an aircraft positioned itself visually to the wrong runway.... and if I had a pound for every aircraft approaching the old rwy 23 that started turning towards Notholt... These were no big deals. For one of the undercarriage affairs the controller got an air ticket from the airline, otherwise it was part of the job.
At the start of my career it was beaten into me (literally in those days) to a) check the runway visually before issuing a clearance, b) watch all take-offs until they were safely airborne and c) watch all landers throughout the flare and roll-out. I don't think it's written down anywhere in the UK, it's just the ATC version of "good airmanship", passed down from training officer to student, who later becomes a training officer, etc. I really feel for the controller in this incident but why I keep wondering why did he have to turn away and do admin at a critical time during such a quiet spell? It only takes a minute for a jet to line up and get airborne..
On a number of occasions during my time at Heathrow I saw potentially dangerous situations saved by ATC: Several occasions when undercarriages were not lowered; once when an aircraft lined up with the adjacent main road in poor visibility.... again when an aircraft positioned itself visually to the wrong runway.... and if I had a pound for every aircraft approaching the old rwy 23 that started turning towards Notholt... These were no big deals. For one of the undercarriage affairs the controller got an air ticket from the airline, otherwise it was part of the job.
At the start of my career it was beaten into me (literally in those days) to a) check the runway visually before issuing a clearance, b) watch all take-offs until they were safely airborne and c) watch all landers throughout the flare and roll-out. I don't think it's written down anywhere in the UK, it's just the ATC version of "good airmanship", passed down from training officer to student, who later becomes a training officer, etc. I really feel for the controller in this incident but why I keep wondering why did he have to turn away and do admin at a critical time during such a quiet spell? It only takes a minute for a jet to line up and get airborne..
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Sure, the Captain is ultimately responsible but at times ATC has to share part of that responsibility. When someone is being radar-vectored in IMC he can't be totally responsible 'cos he can't see what's happening outside.
On a number of occasions during my time at Heathrow I saw potentially dangerous situations saved by ATC: Several occasions when undercarriages were not lowered; once when an aircraft lined up with the adjacent main road in poor visibility.... again when an aircraft positioned itself visually to the wrong runway.... and if I had a pound for every aircraft approaching the old rwy 23 that started turning towards Notholt... These were no big deals. For one of the undercarriage affairs the controller got an air ticket from the airline, otherwise it was part of the job.
At the start of my career it was beaten into me (literally in those days) to a) check the runway visually before issuing a clearance, b) watch all take-offs until they were safely airborne and c) watch all landers throughout the flare and roll-out. I don't think it's written down anywhere in the UK, it's just the ATC version of "good airmanship", passed down from training officer to student, who later becomes a training officer, etc. I really feel for the controller in this incident but why I keep wondering why did he have to turn away and do admin at a critical time during such a quiet spell? It only takes a minute for a jet to line up and get airborne..
On a number of occasions during my time at Heathrow I saw potentially dangerous situations saved by ATC: Several occasions when undercarriages were not lowered; once when an aircraft lined up with the adjacent main road in poor visibility.... again when an aircraft positioned itself visually to the wrong runway.... and if I had a pound for every aircraft approaching the old rwy 23 that started turning towards Notholt... These were no big deals. For one of the undercarriage affairs the controller got an air ticket from the airline, otherwise it was part of the job.
At the start of my career it was beaten into me (literally in those days) to a) check the runway visually before issuing a clearance, b) watch all take-offs until they were safely airborne and c) watch all landers throughout the flare and roll-out. I don't think it's written down anywhere in the UK, it's just the ATC version of "good airmanship", passed down from training officer to student, who later becomes a training officer, etc. I really feel for the controller in this incident but why I keep wondering why did he have to turn away and do admin at a critical time during such a quiet spell? It only takes a minute for a jet to line up and get airborne..
Thats the point i was trying to get across but you've phrased it much better.
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Just a few thoughts on the debate above:
Brit50483's suggestion (page 9-ish) seems the most plausible to me. Neither pilot had been to LEX since the taxiways were reconfigured, and the over-90deg turn from what's now the end of the usable taxiway onto 26 is quite similar to the over-90deg turn from the end of the former taxiway onto 22. Seems a very easy mistake to make in the dark, in a busy cockpit, if the signage was less than absolutely perfect.
But the lighting thing puzzles me. This accident was an hour before sunrise, so it would've been almost dark - probably 'nautical twilight' in which you can see the horizon but not much more. Is it common practice to take off from an unlit runway in those conditions? If you can't look into the middle distance to see where the runway goes, you can't see that it isn't there. The aircraft's own lights would only illuminate a few hundred feet at best.
One last thing: Does anyone have a diagram that shows the location of the tower in relation to the runway thresholds? Without that it's hard to know how easy it would've been for ATC to spot the mistake in the dark.
Just uninformed thought from a one-time PPL..
Brit50483's suggestion (page 9-ish) seems the most plausible to me. Neither pilot had been to LEX since the taxiways were reconfigured, and the over-90deg turn from what's now the end of the usable taxiway onto 26 is quite similar to the over-90deg turn from the end of the former taxiway onto 22. Seems a very easy mistake to make in the dark, in a busy cockpit, if the signage was less than absolutely perfect.
But the lighting thing puzzles me. This accident was an hour before sunrise, so it would've been almost dark - probably 'nautical twilight' in which you can see the horizon but not much more. Is it common practice to take off from an unlit runway in those conditions? If you can't look into the middle distance to see where the runway goes, you can't see that it isn't there. The aircraft's own lights would only illuminate a few hundred feet at best.
One last thing: Does anyone have a diagram that shows the location of the tower in relation to the runway thresholds? Without that it's hard to know how easy it would've been for ATC to spot the mistake in the dark.
Just uninformed thought from a one-time PPL..
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It has a shoulder making it appear as wide as the main runway; and the main runway dips (meaning that most of it is out of view and therefore both would appear as short as each other).
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Thanks Hawk, I'd been looking at the pics posted in the thread and neglected to click on that link. Looks like the correct position and the fatal position would've been pretty much in the same direction viewed from the tower.
Last edited by Beanbag; 31st Aug 2006 at 10:39. Reason: Hit 'submit' too soon
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Final 3 Greens,
If it had been the Cherokee driver departing, there may not have been an accident, life in the front end of a sophisticated craft like the RJ is not that simple, no disrespect intended, reviewing my memory banks, I can't honestly remember checking my heading prior to beginning any recent takeoff rolls, SOP for my company is to use the taxi chart while taxiing, following signage etc., I am fairly certain upon arriving at the approach end, that I am at the proper runway, now when I was a Cherokee driver I checked the DG only because I wanted it to be accurate after takeoff, not really to reaffirm I was at the proper runway.
HEATHROW DIRECTOR, well said, exactly how I feel.
D.L.
If it had been the Cherokee driver departing, there may not have been an accident, life in the front end of a sophisticated craft like the RJ is not that simple, no disrespect intended, reviewing my memory banks, I can't honestly remember checking my heading prior to beginning any recent takeoff rolls, SOP for my company is to use the taxi chart while taxiing, following signage etc., I am fairly certain upon arriving at the approach end, that I am at the proper runway, now when I was a Cherokee driver I checked the DG only because I wanted it to be accurate after takeoff, not really to reaffirm I was at the proper runway.
HEATHROW DIRECTOR, well said, exactly how I feel.
D.L.
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D'oh!
It is 'reckless' and not 'wreckless.' Anyway, the F O is in hospital in critical condition; what, you want to go pull out the drips, perhaps?
Relax, he's probably in enough trouble and pain already without the need for any mean-spirited, half-educated people to have to intervene. We call that 'Jungle Justice' in Africa and it's not all that highly thought of even there.
Relax, he's probably in enough trouble and pain already without the need for any mean-spirited, half-educated people to have to intervene. We call that 'Jungle Justice' in Africa and it's not all that highly thought of even there.
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MrSlapFace, Please make your first post your last.
From Avwebflash
"[The controller] expected the flight to take off from Runway 22," according to Debbie Hersman, of the NTSB. "He said the pilots didn't seem confused or disoriented" when he talked to them. The CRJ hit the grass off the end of the runway but then became airborne and was starting to climb when it crashed into trees. The jet reached a speed of 158 mph. The lone survivor of the crash, co-pilot James Polehinke, was at the controls, but it was the flight's captain, Jeffrey Clay, who had taxied the aircraft into position, the NTSB said. Clay then handed off the controls to Polehinke for takeoff. It was about an hour before sunrise, and Runway 26 was not lit, but the longer runway, 22, did have lights on, the NTSB said. Polehinke had landed at the airport two nights earlier, when the lights on Runway 22 were out of service, according to Reuters, but other reports said neither pilot had landed there since changes to the taxi routes in the last week or so. In the last two years, Clay had been at Lexington six times and Polehinke 10 times. Both pilots apparently had adequate off-duty time prior to the flight -- Polehinke had arrived in Lexington at 2 a.m. on Saturday, and Clay arrived at 3:30 p.m. The crew initially boarded the wrong aircraft when they checked in at 5:15 Sunday morning, the NTSB said, but were soon redirected to the correct airplane.
As of yesterday, Polehinke was still unconscious but no longer in a coma. He suffered numerous broken bones but was not burned. His condition remains critical, doctors said. Polehinke, 44, was hired by Comair in March 2002. Clay, 35, had been with the company since November 1999. On Monday night, crash investigators taxied a CRJ-100 around the airport for several hours, trying to get the same view that the pilots would have had.
From Avwebflash
"[The controller] expected the flight to take off from Runway 22," according to Debbie Hersman, of the NTSB. "He said the pilots didn't seem confused or disoriented" when he talked to them. The CRJ hit the grass off the end of the runway but then became airborne and was starting to climb when it crashed into trees. The jet reached a speed of 158 mph. The lone survivor of the crash, co-pilot James Polehinke, was at the controls, but it was the flight's captain, Jeffrey Clay, who had taxied the aircraft into position, the NTSB said. Clay then handed off the controls to Polehinke for takeoff. It was about an hour before sunrise, and Runway 26 was not lit, but the longer runway, 22, did have lights on, the NTSB said. Polehinke had landed at the airport two nights earlier, when the lights on Runway 22 were out of service, according to Reuters, but other reports said neither pilot had landed there since changes to the taxi routes in the last week or so. In the last two years, Clay had been at Lexington six times and Polehinke 10 times. Both pilots apparently had adequate off-duty time prior to the flight -- Polehinke had arrived in Lexington at 2 a.m. on Saturday, and Clay arrived at 3:30 p.m. The crew initially boarded the wrong aircraft when they checked in at 5:15 Sunday morning, the NTSB said, but were soon redirected to the correct airplane.
As of yesterday, Polehinke was still unconscious but no longer in a coma. He suffered numerous broken bones but was not burned. His condition remains critical, doctors said. Polehinke, 44, was hired by Comair in March 2002. Clay, 35, had been with the company since November 1999. On Monday night, crash investigators taxied a CRJ-100 around the airport for several hours, trying to get the same view that the pilots would have had.
Last edited by forget; 31st Aug 2006 at 12:38.
Gross Error Checks
The point this lowly Cherokee driver was trying to put across (referring back to post #239), without for one moment wishing to suggest a level of qualification or experience that matches an ATPL, nor an aeroplane as complex and "proceedurally" demanding as a CRJ, was that the wholly instinctive gross error check should be ones savior ... and if you have to put some slower and more careful thinking into the process to help it along so be it.
All the tools and visual clues were present (or absent) to have avoided this terrible occurrence.
What seems to me to have happened is that the aeroplane was a number of paces ahead of the pilots, who hadn't mentally caught up with it. I was always taught never to let that happen, stop on the taxiway, fly an orbit but catch up and get ahead.
My argument (certainly not confined to piloting) is to continually be alert, check, recheck and question and be sure you are in the right place doing the right thing at the right time. If your brain doesn't automatically flag up something untoward, you have to train yourself to be constantly questioning.
Isn't that what a safety culture is all about ???
I referred to 2 previous and well publicised accidents where a glaringly obvious error was made but overlooked by everybody in the loop.
HD ... that is exactly what we DO expect from ATC but is that perceived safety net part of what stops us constantly checking that we KNOW we are safe ?
All the tools and visual clues were present (or absent) to have avoided this terrible occurrence.
What seems to me to have happened is that the aeroplane was a number of paces ahead of the pilots, who hadn't mentally caught up with it. I was always taught never to let that happen, stop on the taxiway, fly an orbit but catch up and get ahead.
My argument (certainly not confined to piloting) is to continually be alert, check, recheck and question and be sure you are in the right place doing the right thing at the right time. If your brain doesn't automatically flag up something untoward, you have to train yourself to be constantly questioning.
Isn't that what a safety culture is all about ???
I referred to 2 previous and well publicised accidents where a glaringly obvious error was made but overlooked by everybody in the loop.
HD ... that is exactly what we DO expect from ATC but is that perceived safety net part of what stops us constantly checking that we KNOW we are safe ?
Last edited by Dave Gittins; 1st Sep 2006 at 08:57.
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Exceptionally well put. As I am about to retire and I look back over many years of flying, I can say that it can happen to anyone at any time.
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I feel that nowadays there is a tendancy to 'over depend' on the assistance of fellow professionals, such as ATC and on our generally splendid, modern, reliable equipment. There is, of course, a heck of a lot of good in such reliance and it's surely saved thousands of lives over the years.
On the other hand it's made the job a great deal more comfortable, less mentally involving and much more routine which IMHO can tend to lead crews into making 'gross error' mistakes such as the one that lead to this tragedy.
This remains a dangerous business, made safe by engineers, procedure and ATCers to name but a few. I for one will redouble my efforts not to fall into a similar poo-trap.
On the other hand it's made the job a great deal more comfortable, less mentally involving and much more routine which IMHO can tend to lead crews into making 'gross error' mistakes such as the one that lead to this tragedy.
This remains a dangerous business, made safe by engineers, procedure and ATCers to name but a few. I for one will redouble my efforts not to fall into a similar poo-trap.
It is not uncommon to have one controller on Tower duty (depending on size and expected movements at the given airport). However, in the past they were assisted by Air Traffic Control Assistants who, among other things, took care of the many "administrative" controller tasks leaving the controller the time to concentrate on CONTROLLING. In the past years the beancounters have progressively reduced or done away entirely with Assistants, adding to controller workload. The same applies to Area Control Centers.