Monarch & the Rock
Monarch & the Rock
Join Date: Oct 2005
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Even more, the report speaks of
vs.
stating nowhere that the aircraft flew directly over "the highest point on the land". Looking at the full report you'll see it didn't. But (over water) it was even lower than 2100ft, so maybe there's still a story in it?! 
The lowest altitude of the aircraft when over the land
The highest point on the land
Join Date: Oct 2001
Location: EGKK
Age: 42
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Let's not exaggerate the situation here "missed the Rock in GIB by 200 feet" is highly misleading, as the report states:
"The lowest altitude of the aircraft when over the land was 2,100 ft. The hghest point on the land, just south of the airfield, is 1,420 ft."
Just because the highest point on the land is 1,420ft, does not mean the aircraft was flying over that point at the time. Indeed if you look at the report (Figure 1), it was not.
"The lowest altitude of the aircraft when over the land was 2,100 ft. The hghest point on the land, just south of the airfield, is 1,420 ft."
Just because the highest point on the land is 1,420ft, does not mean the aircraft was flying over that point at the time. Indeed if you look at the report (Figure 1), it was not.
Join Date: Jul 2003
Location: Sussex, UK
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Surely the story itself is the fact that it turned right to the west of the rock rather than onto the runway heading and away to the East of the rock, at the point of the go around a turn to runway heading would heve resulted in this REALLY being a non event.
OA
OA
x12 why would you consider Gibraltar to be dangerous – the apes?
Many airports have unique operating hazards; these are identified and appropriate precautions taken.
In this incident, the crew encountered a set of circumstances that resulted in the aircraft not following the required flight path. Unfortunately, the AAIB appears not to have fully explored the circumstances – the human factors.
The focus of the report is on the need to maintain visual contact. In this incident, the first officer appears to have been head down and perhaps the Captain also when selecting FD off. Using the Reason/Dekker approach to organizational errors; then company SOPs could have prohibited the extraneous tasks. The frequency change could be made at a later point, and the need to switch off the FD for a visual approach has to be examined. This is classic threat and error management – avoid the error provoking situations.
Another consideration is the possibility that both crew members suffered a turning illusion. The aircraft was in a low bank angle turn and as the GA was commenced, the crew did not detect the continuing turn (“the commander considered that he was maintaining a constant heading”). This view could be supported in that the GA thrust was applied where the aircraft was apparently tracking north of the centreline (077), but then stabilised tracking south of the centreline (135) before ATC intervention, all headings approximate. Thus the ‘hold track’ GA function would have been expected to fly the aircraft on a more northerly track than that achieved (assuming a 077 hdg or there about, at GA selection).
A positive aspect is that this incident demonstrates the value of selecting EGPWS Terrain display for all approaches. Although this was fortunately not used due to timely ATC intervention, it provided another ‘in depth’ defensive layer which made the next threat visible (“… as the aircraft turned, noted high ground depicted on the left side of his HSI display”).
We should remind ourselves that a better understanding of an incident depends on our ability to assess why the conditions encountered by the crew (initial GA hdg) appeared normal to them at that time.
Many airports have unique operating hazards; these are identified and appropriate precautions taken.
In this incident, the crew encountered a set of circumstances that resulted in the aircraft not following the required flight path. Unfortunately, the AAIB appears not to have fully explored the circumstances – the human factors.
The focus of the report is on the need to maintain visual contact. In this incident, the first officer appears to have been head down and perhaps the Captain also when selecting FD off. Using the Reason/Dekker approach to organizational errors; then company SOPs could have prohibited the extraneous tasks. The frequency change could be made at a later point, and the need to switch off the FD for a visual approach has to be examined. This is classic threat and error management – avoid the error provoking situations.
Another consideration is the possibility that both crew members suffered a turning illusion. The aircraft was in a low bank angle turn and as the GA was commenced, the crew did not detect the continuing turn (“the commander considered that he was maintaining a constant heading”). This view could be supported in that the GA thrust was applied where the aircraft was apparently tracking north of the centreline (077), but then stabilised tracking south of the centreline (135) before ATC intervention, all headings approximate. Thus the ‘hold track’ GA function would have been expected to fly the aircraft on a more northerly track than that achieved (assuming a 077 hdg or there about, at GA selection).
A positive aspect is that this incident demonstrates the value of selecting EGPWS Terrain display for all approaches. Although this was fortunately not used due to timely ATC intervention, it provided another ‘in depth’ defensive layer which made the next threat visible (“… as the aircraft turned, noted high ground depicted on the left side of his HSI display”).
We should remind ourselves that a better understanding of an incident depends on our ability to assess why the conditions encountered by the crew (initial GA hdg) appeared normal to them at that time.
Join Date: Jul 2006
Location: A normal Northern Land, with Uncle Sam's anarchy to the south...
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Alf's post is a super summary.
The AAIB report does not criticise the MON crew, nor does it suggest GIB is inherently dangerous. Nor does the report suggest in any shape or form the operating crew were over the highest point of the land mass during the GA.
It does however make clear recommendations about the use of visual aids available at the field - which I am sure are eminently sensible, and comments on the operational procedure of MON having designated commanders handle aircraft on those sectors.
Nothing to get excited about, really - but an interesting discourse over procedure at one of the world's more interesting fields...
Am I correct in assuming, the UK RAF provide ATC cover at GIB ?
Lastly, you can see why the press would get excited about it...it is easy to manipulate the findings of the AAIB as "Big jet scrapes apes noses as pilot misses runway"....and something I hope all of us here on pprune and in the professional aviation community will go out of our collective ways to discourage and stop...
The AAIB report does not criticise the MON crew, nor does it suggest GIB is inherently dangerous. Nor does the report suggest in any shape or form the operating crew were over the highest point of the land mass during the GA.
It does however make clear recommendations about the use of visual aids available at the field - which I am sure are eminently sensible, and comments on the operational procedure of MON having designated commanders handle aircraft on those sectors.
Nothing to get excited about, really - but an interesting discourse over procedure at one of the world's more interesting fields...
Am I correct in assuming, the UK RAF provide ATC cover at GIB ?
Lastly, you can see why the press would get excited about it...it is easy to manipulate the findings of the AAIB as "Big jet scrapes apes noses as pilot misses runway"....and something I hope all of us here on pprune and in the professional aviation community will go out of our collective ways to discourage and stop...
Join Date: Oct 2001
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The usual accurate reporting from The Sun on this incident:
http://www.thesun.co.uk/article/0,,2-2006380165,00.html
http://www.thesun.co.uk/article/0,,2-2006380165,00.html
Below the Glidepath - not correcting
It would seem that the AAIB's work is largely redundant in view of that masterful piece of analysis from the Sun. Beats me how anyone here could even think of berating journo's.
Join Date: Jul 2006
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The Sun and Aviation Reporting
Here is the email address of the Sun's moron who wrote the article: -
[email protected]
I am about to email the dear chap/chapess and tell him/her/it my thoughts on his/her/its amazing piece of journalistic analysis.
Best make it words of one syllable or less, so he/she/it understands it.
Anyone else up for sending a note ?
[email protected]
I am about to email the dear chap/chapess and tell him/her/it my thoughts on his/her/its amazing piece of journalistic analysis.
Best make it words of one syllable or less, so he/she/it understands it.
Anyone else up for sending a note ?
Join Date: Jun 2001
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Is there any standard procedure for crews to inform ATC of a Go-around immediately the decision is made, or is the advice to 'Aviate, navigate, communicate'? If the MON crew had said they were going around at the time they increased thrust ( passing heading 077) the controller would have been able to give them a safe heading to pass to the north of the Rock. As it was, the first the controller knew of the Go-around decision was approximately ten seconds later, when he asked if the crew were still visual. By this stage the aircraft had turned further right to head directly for the Rock, and the stage was set for potential disaster. Thank goodness Mr Boeing put some good beefy engines on his 757's.
Incidentally, the AAIB report paints a rather benign picture of the terrain situation when it says simply that the lowest altitude of the aircraft over the land was 2,100ft, with the highest point on land being 1420ft. In reality it was a sh*tty night, an aircraft had got itself pointed straight at the Rock two miles ahead, and starting from an altitude of 550 feet it was just a question of faith as to whether the climb gradient was going to be steeper than the slope of the west face of the Rock. It was not a pleasant experience - the talkdown controller said he thought he was talking to a dead man.
Incidentally, the AAIB report paints a rather benign picture of the terrain situation when it says simply that the lowest altitude of the aircraft over the land was 2,100ft, with the highest point on land being 1420ft. In reality it was a sh*tty night, an aircraft had got itself pointed straight at the Rock two miles ahead, and starting from an altitude of 550 feet it was just a question of faith as to whether the climb gradient was going to be steeper than the slope of the west face of the Rock. It was not a pleasant experience - the talkdown controller said he thought he was talking to a dead man.