Iberia Captain fired

[pilspain]

An Iberia Airline Captain has been fired. That Captain is a member of the spanish pilot union and a leader involved with airline safety, key of the Air Safety Comision at Sepla Union.
Since year 2002 the airline tried to fire him as he was involved in forcing the fixing of the Airbus A320 cargo bays, has they were not able to sustain a fire and maintain them isolted to able the fire extinguishing system to work.
Last January he was assigned a 320 with a MEL C Fire detection Loop inoperative since two months ago. He also detected another problem during his preflight check related withthe pax calling system.
He requested to have the loop fixed before the flight.
The Iberia lawers called him and told him to fly with the two months inoperative loop to avoid to be punished. Iberia Operation Director ordered maintenance not to answer the airplane technical log book and not to perform any maintenance on the airplane.
The Captain decided to wait for the maintenance answer and was inmediately dismissed as captain. Later on, he was fired from Iberia.
On June 22nd, the trial judge assigned for that firing stated that the Captain procedures were right and that he is a good profesional that defended the safety, The judge attacked the Iberia procedures but stated that the Captain could be fired if Iberia payed him some amount of money.
So, now in Spain, if a Captain follows the international regulations and is forced to fly with a NO GO, that Captain will be fired if he doesn´t comply with the airline order.
So we face a dangerous condition: Captains prefer to risk the flight and kill his crewmembers and pax just to maintain his job.
Iberia airplanes are now poorly maintained. I would be advisable that the national authorities check Iberia airliners and actuate according to their findings.
Civil Aviation Authorithy in Spain, the ones that should warrant the safety, just declines and even try to fired the Civil Aviation Inspectors that suggested their Director to forbid inmediatly the airline operations.
Bad stuff indeed.
Pilspain

[Rosta Change!]

Is this the reason BCN was closed today?

All I heard was that Iberia staff were sitting on the runway!! How true that was I don't know, but this ruling is very worrying indeed!

[Phoenix71]

Hands high for this captain... You've done very, very well. I really pity a company that has to go through "procedures" like this to keep their airplanes moving. Lousy, ****ty and completely unsafe. Who the he*= has been flying the plane for that long, without ORDERING the loop to be fixed a.s.a.p.

I'm sorry the guy lost his job... But I'm sure that other airlines around the world would appreciate a captain like this.

[el @]

pilspain, the story repeats itself. see if you can p2p yourself "Whisky Romeo Zulu", the Argentinean movie about the 1999 LAPA crash. The Captain involved went thru exactly the same vexations an mobbing until forced to leave the company. At least he had the relief to have been able to tell the world the story as it happened, and to play himself in the movie.

[Check Airman]

Well done Captain!!! A true role model to all of us.

But i'm confused. He's there to make sure the plane is safe. If he has declared the airplane is not airworthy, he cannot legally fly the plane. Since when do paper pushers determine if an airplane is safe? That is the first responsibility of the PIC. Shouldn't firing him be illegal? I think that as pilots, we need to take an immediate stand against this crap.

[pilspain]

Barcelona today

Originally Posted by Rosta Change!

Is this the reason BCN was closed today?

All I heard was that Iberia staff were sitting on the runway!! How true that was I don't know, but this ruling is very worrying indeed!

The reason for Barcelona today is related with the fact that until now, the handling at that airport was always assigned to Iberia. Now the handling has been asigned to Globalia. So, around 900 Iberia handling employees can lose their job and they have decided this morning to block the full airport in a severe strike. They have even broken the keys of all the vehicles they have used to block the runways, to make it more difficult the removing of them.
Pilspain

[Sunfish]

Thank you for your post. Iberia is now added to my ever lengthening "No fly" list purely on safety grounds.

[Dream Land]

I applaud what this captain did, if Iberia is so broke as to put off this type of safety improvement, what else are they using the MEL for, doesn't sound like an airline I'd want my family on.

[James T. Kirk]

Yep, Iberia’s now on my avoid list. No member of my family is going to fly with them and I shall spread the word that it’s an accident waiting to happen amongst my friends and colleagues too.

Thanks for the heads up.

Kirk out…..

[Lou Scannon]

I believe that Iberia has a code share with British Airways. Perhaps BA should be asked if they approve of the seemingly appalling standards of maintenance that their partner employs.

Will BA Balpa offer any support to this Iberia captain?

[NigelOnDraft]

I hate to put a contrary view... and the details are not 100% clear from the original post. However, Fire Detection Loops aften have sufficient redundancy to allow MEL despatch with 1 U/S, and the MEL will specify how long it may be U/S. In my company, some apparently significant MEL items may go 120 days before required to be repaired. Sometimes with appropriate restrictions e.g. compartment to be left empty. It might be "mad" to routinely have to leave baggage behind, but that is the Mgmt's decision.
Naturally, the Captain not only has the right to refuse to accept an MEL deferrment, but indeed is obliged to actively consider whether it is acceptable to him for flight etc. However, in this day and age, it is fairly routine to have numerous MEL items, and to "refuse" I would usually need some further considerations i.e. the MEL items combined become unacceptable, there are special circumstances (e.g. weather) etc. Multiple irrational refusals will certainly awake the Mgmt machine
As I say, the individual circs of this incident are not clear, and I would be interested in (but have no right to) knowing further details. However, to whip a Sun newspaper type paedophile campaign against Iberia seems somewhat excessive... since on the evidence presented above, my company (and many others) routinely fly aircraft around with similar defects...
NoD

[Dream Land]

NIGAL, we appreciate all views, the point I think you are missing is the fact that this cargo compartment in the states is already a cat "D" for obvious reasons to all of us.

[NigelOnDraft]

Dreamland - please expand. Your post adds to the "confusion", because in my company, [and the UK (?) Airbus (?)] Cat D means allowable 120 days, the Cat C quoted above in my company would mean 10 days...
I have frequently flown with U/S Fire Detection Loops - both Engine and Cargo Cmpt. I cannot recall the exact restrictions, but there is either appropriate redundancy or precautions required to make me happy - don't worry - I do check
NoD

[susoal]

Originally Posted by Rosta Change!

Is this the reason BCN was closed today?

All I heard was that Iberia staff were sitting on the runway!! How true that was I don't know, but this ruling is very worrying indeed!

No, it was not. The Iberia staff wants the company to guaranteed their jobs in writing, and the fact that it will remain the 4th airline to operate into BCN.

I guess they feel the dangers of the new Clickair

[crewbag]

A320 MEL

Here an extract of the A320 MEL.
In the thread i did not understand if the faulty equipment was referred to the detectors, which are connected to the loops, or to the fire bottle.
Forward and Aft cargo compartments have the same procedure and the rectification interval varies from C (within 10 days) to D (120 days). So is for the bottle(s) and the faulty equipments need to be placard in the cockpit.
I'm sure that the Captain had valid reasons to refuse the flight , but what i find somehow a little abnormal, is the company refusing to fix the faulty equipment and ordering so to the engineers . If something would have happened, how would have felt the engineer responsible for that airplane?!
That said, i do not think that i will avoid to fly Iberia. I'm sure that most of the pilots in Iberia will behave responsibly according to the situation.
Boycotting Iberia, in the worth case, may lead to more job losses, mainly concerning responsible employees.

MEL A320 REV 27 SEQ 105

MINIMUM EQUIPMENT LIST FIRE PROTECTION

26-16 CARGO COMPARTMENT SMOKE DETECTION

16-01 Smoke Detector in FWD Cargo Compartment

D 2 0 a) Both detectors in the cavity may be
inoperative provided the FWD cargo
compartment is empty.

- or -

C 2 0 b) Except for ER operations, both
detectors in the cavity may be
inoperative.

- or -

C 2 0 c) Both detectors in the cavity may be
inoperative provided proper liner
condition is checked before each
flight.

Note : Failure of a single detector in a
cavity is indicated by a MAINTENANCE
message on ECAM STATUS page.
Refer to MEL 26-00-01*

*MAINTENANCE MESSAGE
DISPLAYED ON ECAM STATUS
PAGE

00-01 SDCU C Dispatch with this MAINTENANCE

message displayed on ECAM STATUS

page is granted.

CARGO COMPARTMENT FIRE EXTINGUISHING

23-01 Agent
A) Bottle

D 1 0 * a) May be inoperative provided cargo
compartments are empty or do not
contain inflammable or combustible
materials.

- or -

C 1 0 * b) Except for ER operations, may be
inoperative.

- or -

C 1 0 * c) May be inoperative provided cargo
compartments liners integrity is
checked before each flight.

[pilspain]

Originally Posted by NigelOnDraft

I hate to put a contrary view... and the details are not 100% clear from the original post. However, Fire Detection Loops aften have sufficient redundancy to allow MEL despatch with 1 U/S, and the MEL will specify how long it may be U/S. In my company, some apparently significant MEL items may go 120 days before required to be repaired. Sometimes with appropriate restrictions e.g. compartment to be left empty. It might be "mad" to routinely have to leave baggage behind, but that is the Mgmt's decision.
Naturally, the Captain not only has the right to refuse to accept an MEL deferrment, but indeed is obliged to actively consider whether it is acceptable to him for flight etc. However, in this day and age, it is fairly routine to have numerous MEL items, and to "refuse" I would usually need some further considerations i.e. the MEL items combined become unacceptable, there are special circumstances (e.g. weather) etc. Multiple irrational refusals will certainly awake the Mgmt machine
As I say, the individual circs of this incident are not clear, and I would be interested in (but have no right to) knowing further details. However, to whip a Sun newspaper type paedophile campaign against Iberia seems somewhat excessive... since on the evidence presented above, my company (and many others) routinely fly aircraft around with similar defects...
NoD

The ENG2 fire detector loop A was inoperative since november 19th 2005.
The Captain complained on January 4th and the aircraft was sent to Madrid to be fixed. Once at Madrid and instead of fixing it, it was sent into Bilbao and got another MEL extension because the airplane was not at Madrid. Then, en January 5th, the plane was assigned again to the fired Captain at Jerez airport, who requested the Loop to be fixed.
In January the 6th, another Captain positioned the plane to Madrid with maintenance compromise to fix the plane inmediatly. Another joke, an hour later the plane was flying with pax.
January 11th, maintenance crossed the cables from loop A into Fire Detector Unit FDU being the result a loop A fault to be displayed as Loop B fault. The Loop A Mel C was closed as fixed !. Besides, once the first Captain flying that A320 reported the failute of loop B, maintenance reported the failure january the 12th. Then, they diferred the loop B changing the date and stating that loop B was failing since December the 25th. So, that way the airline was statiog that ENG 2 loop A was inoperative until it was ¨fixed¨ january the 11th. Loop B was inoperative between December the 25th until January the 13th. Just calculate the time that the airline, trying to hiden the truth, did consider that both engine loops were inoperative.
The result, Captain. No maintenance or Operationes responsables.
I will post the reports of the two Civil aviation Inspectors taht requested Iberia operations tio be stopped. The Civil Aviation Director is now pursuing those two Inspectors because they were informing agianst the interests and Iberia image.

[NigelOnDraft]

Thanks for the extra details... It is always illuminating to review the "history" to establish "how" MEL items are cleared, or shifted between sides, even aircraft These facts do alter my preception...
NoD

[crewbag]

So what exactly was u/s?

Fire and Overheat Detection and Extinguishing system for the engines or Smoke Detection and Extinguishing for the cargo compartments?
I guess that it is not really the point of the thread, but anyway, here also the MEL for the Engines fire protection.
In this case the rectification interval is C, 10 days!

26-12 ENGINE FIRE AND OVERHEAT DETECTION

12-01 Fire Detection System

A) Detection Loop A
C 2 0 Except for ER operations beyond 120
minutes, one may be inoperative on each
engine provided :
1) Associated detection loop B is
operative, and
2) The engine fire test is made before
each flight.

B) Detection Loop B
C 2 0 Except for ER operations beyond 120
minutes, one may be inoperative on each
engine provided the engine fire test is
made before each flight.

[Fargoo]

Firstly , I am apalled that a member of flight crew should be fired for requesting a long standing defect to be fixed sooner rather than later.
There are however a few parts of this thread that need tidying up.

MEL restrictions can be extended with permision of the Aviation Authority of the operator. When this happens it is generally extended once and once only for the initial defferment peroid (ie you have a CAT C 10 day defferment, you get another 10 days on the extension).
For this to happen you have to have an extrememly good reason such as lack of spare parts.

Secondly, there is also in the Airbus TSM for engine fire detection a procedure whereby the wiring for the fire loops is swapped at a terminal block in the pylon for troubleshooting purposes. This is normally done when the fault is intermittant and picked up on the post flight report. Swapping the wiring allows for isolation of a particular loop on that engine.
This should not be done purely to change the message displayed and fob off the defect as a new defect on a different loop

Just some info that may make certain points clear.
Fargoo

[Fargoo]

Iberia Operation Director ordered maintenance not to answer the airplane technical log book and not to perform any maintenance on the airplane.

Also, this I findly highly unlikely.