Another very close ORD near hit.
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Another very close ORD near hit.
Near-collision on O'Hare runwayBy Jon Hilkevitch
Tribune transportation reporter
Published July 24, 2006, 3:08 PM CDT
A United Airlines passenger jet departing O'Hare International Airport on Sunday night lifted off over the top of a Boeing 747 cargo plane that moments earlier landed on a crossing runway, and the two aircraft missed colliding by about 300 feet, the Federal Aviation Administration said today.
The FAA blamed controller error for the runway incursion — the fifth incident this year at O'Hare involving planes occupying the same runway or in violation of separation standards.
Sunday's incident occurred about 10 p.m. when United flight 1015, a Boeing 737 bound for Denver, was cleared by the O'Hare air-traffic control tower for takeoff from runway 27 Left, said FAA spokesman Tony Molinaro.
A 747 freighter operated by Atlas Air was rolling out after landing on runway 14 Right and it crossed the intersection with runway 27 Left where the United plane was taking off, Molinaro said.
It was not clear whether the United pilot lifted off early to avoid hitting the Atlas Air cargo plane, but the FAA said the two planes came within 300 feet of each other.
The National Transportation Safety Board will send investigators to O'Hare on Tuesday to interview the pilots and examine the flight data recorders and cockpit voice recorders aboard both aircraft, said safety board spokesman Keith Holloway.
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How long can this continue without much worse consequences? The FAA controllers in major centers are pushing the limit in terms of movements and mistakes will continue to happen. Either the system needs an upgrade or traffic needs to be capped.
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http://www.wfaa.com/sharedcontent/dw...1.17acda0.html
Lighting the way
A program tested at D/FW could help prevent deadly runway accidents - if it receives funding
11:20 AM CDT on Sunday, July 16, 2006
By SUDEEP REDDY / The Dallas Morning News
WASHINGTON – Many aviation officials consider it the most dangerous part of a plane trip: moving across a runway just as another aircraft is taking off.
The U.S. averages almost one runway incursion a day, creating the potential for serious accidents. Ground collisions between commercial airliners have been among the deadliest plane disasters. Pilots and safety officials are watching a program at Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport, the primary test bed for preventing such runway incidents.
The system uses a series of computerized lights embedded along a runway to signal pilots. It's more useful than the way they now get information – by looking out a cockpit window or relying on controllers.
A year into tests at D/FW, the Runway Status Lights program has won broad support from pilots and airport officials. But with funding constraints at the Federal Aviation Administration, the program may not expand fast enough to prevent another serious accident.
Incursions represent "a highly dangerous situation," said Capt. William Mino of the Allied Pilots Association, the union for American Airlines Inc. "The chance of loss of life is so great that any of them is too many."
Since 1990, the National Transportation Safety Board has included stopping runway incursions as one of its five "most wanted" aviation safety improvements. The independent agency, which makes safety recommendations to the FAA, wants pilots to get immediate warnings of possible ground collisions instead of waiting on air traffic controllers.
Airports in Boston, New York and Las Vegas have experienced high-profile near-collisions since last summer, prompting heightened attention from safety officials.
In the incident at Las Vegas' McCarran International Airport, a controller confused two departure aircraft and cleared an Air Canada jet just as an America West plane was taking off.
The America West pilot later said he was 100 feet above the Air Canada plane as he passed over it, according to the NTSB. (America West is now part of US Airways Group Inc.)
The worst runway incursion occurred in March 1977, when a KLM Boeing 747 attempting to take off from Tenerife in the Canary Islands collided with a Pan Am 747 coming from the other end of the runway. The crash, the deadliest in commercial aviation, killed 574 people.
How it works
At D/FW, Runway 18L/36R features the series of red lights embedded in the runway, flush with the pavement.
If another plane is crossing a runway, "takeoff hold" lights illuminate to warn pilots to stop their departure. If a runway is unsafe for entry or crossing because a plane is taking off, runway entrance lights illuminate to warn pilots to stay away.
The system operates for every plane moving across the runway, not just when someone has made an error, said Jonathan Bernays, assistant group leader for surveillance systems at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Lincoln Laboratory.
That means the system must be able to process as many as 3,000 light activation commands a day for a busy runway – one that operates up to 20 hours a day, with 50 takeoffs or landings an hour, at several intersections.
"If all we had to do was turn on one light every few minutes, it would be trivial," Mr. Bernays said. "What's hard about the status lights is doing it right every time."
The takeoff hold lights have been in place for four months. They're the second phase of the safety lights program that launched in March 2005 after two years of engineering and software testing.
The runway entrance lights were initially intended for a three-month evaluation.
But after an "overwhelmingly positive" reaction during initial testing, the program has remained in place, said Jaime Figueroa, the FAA's surface systems manager in Washington.
"The response has been very positive, from pilots, air traffic controllers and airport operators alike," Mr. Figueroa said.
But the system hasn't been flawless. Some pilots have been reported to taxi over illuminated lights. Other concerns remain about pilots seeing the lights go off and moving ahead without clearance from a controller, though officials say that properly trained pilots have handled the system well.
'Layered defense'
The system's designers are quick to note that the lights were never meant to be a first-line defense but a tool that helps in case of human error.
"We have a very low tolerance for accidents," said Mr. Bernays. "You need a layered defense. The expectation of this program is it provides an independent backup to all of the procedures and training that currently give us a very safe system."
The program's cost for one runway at D/FW was $2 million, though other sites could be less. The San Diego airport is launching its own lights test program using a different surface radar.
When the program might expand beyond there is unclear. The FAA is revamping its funding structure to implement key technology upgrades and has fallen short on plans to expand other surveillance infrastructure.
Meanwhile, airport officials and pilots in Boston, Chicago and Los Angeles are interested. The FAA even hosted a Japanese delegation interested in the safety lights technology, Mr. Figueroa said.
Pilots and safety officials say they're hopeful that the program will attract the funding needed.
The U.S. had 324 incursions in the fiscal year that ended last fall, including three close calls between commercial jets that were deemed the most serious, according to FAA data. That figure has dropped from 424 incursions in 2000.
"We are working hard and making progress, but we are not there yet," FAA administrator Marion Blakey told a Senate panel last fall.
The D/FW test grew out of more than a decade of efforts to build an effective warning system for pilots.
MIT researchers, working with the FAA, sought to use marine radar technology for a pilot warning system in the early 1990s. The project, tested at Boston Logan International Airport, had too many false alarms and was discontinued until new surface surveillance systems could be deployed.
D/FW Airport has been the test bed for other aviation systems, including one to help pilots and controllers predict the weather planes would fly through. As the nation's third-busiest airport, D/FW is a top candidate for such projects.
The airport invested in the advanced technology at the beginning of this decade as part of a broader construction effort. The system, which gives controllers a comprehensive view of planes on the ground, also provides the foundation for the runway lights program.
E-mail [email protected]
Ground Safety
To help reduce near-collisions on the ground, the Federal Aviation Administration is:
•Providing more educational information to pilots, airlines, mechanics and others who work with aircraft.
•Standardizing rules on airport surface operations.
•Reworking runway markings and signs so they can be more easily seen.
•Testing automated lighting systems.
SOURCES: Air Line Pilots Association; Federal Aviation Administration
Online at: http://www.wfaa.com/sharedcontent/dw...1.17acda0.html
Lighting the way
A program tested at D/FW could help prevent deadly runway accidents - if it receives funding
11:20 AM CDT on Sunday, July 16, 2006
By SUDEEP REDDY / The Dallas Morning News
WASHINGTON – Many aviation officials consider it the most dangerous part of a plane trip: moving across a runway just as another aircraft is taking off.
The U.S. averages almost one runway incursion a day, creating the potential for serious accidents. Ground collisions between commercial airliners have been among the deadliest plane disasters. Pilots and safety officials are watching a program at Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport, the primary test bed for preventing such runway incidents.
The system uses a series of computerized lights embedded along a runway to signal pilots. It's more useful than the way they now get information – by looking out a cockpit window or relying on controllers.
A year into tests at D/FW, the Runway Status Lights program has won broad support from pilots and airport officials. But with funding constraints at the Federal Aviation Administration, the program may not expand fast enough to prevent another serious accident.
Incursions represent "a highly dangerous situation," said Capt. William Mino of the Allied Pilots Association, the union for American Airlines Inc. "The chance of loss of life is so great that any of them is too many."
Since 1990, the National Transportation Safety Board has included stopping runway incursions as one of its five "most wanted" aviation safety improvements. The independent agency, which makes safety recommendations to the FAA, wants pilots to get immediate warnings of possible ground collisions instead of waiting on air traffic controllers.
Airports in Boston, New York and Las Vegas have experienced high-profile near-collisions since last summer, prompting heightened attention from safety officials.
In the incident at Las Vegas' McCarran International Airport, a controller confused two departure aircraft and cleared an Air Canada jet just as an America West plane was taking off.
The America West pilot later said he was 100 feet above the Air Canada plane as he passed over it, according to the NTSB. (America West is now part of US Airways Group Inc.)
The worst runway incursion occurred in March 1977, when a KLM Boeing 747 attempting to take off from Tenerife in the Canary Islands collided with a Pan Am 747 coming from the other end of the runway. The crash, the deadliest in commercial aviation, killed 574 people.
How it works
At D/FW, Runway 18L/36R features the series of red lights embedded in the runway, flush with the pavement.
If another plane is crossing a runway, "takeoff hold" lights illuminate to warn pilots to stop their departure. If a runway is unsafe for entry or crossing because a plane is taking off, runway entrance lights illuminate to warn pilots to stay away.
The system operates for every plane moving across the runway, not just when someone has made an error, said Jonathan Bernays, assistant group leader for surveillance systems at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Lincoln Laboratory.
That means the system must be able to process as many as 3,000 light activation commands a day for a busy runway – one that operates up to 20 hours a day, with 50 takeoffs or landings an hour, at several intersections.
"If all we had to do was turn on one light every few minutes, it would be trivial," Mr. Bernays said. "What's hard about the status lights is doing it right every time."
The takeoff hold lights have been in place for four months. They're the second phase of the safety lights program that launched in March 2005 after two years of engineering and software testing.
The runway entrance lights were initially intended for a three-month evaluation.
But after an "overwhelmingly positive" reaction during initial testing, the program has remained in place, said Jaime Figueroa, the FAA's surface systems manager in Washington.
"The response has been very positive, from pilots, air traffic controllers and airport operators alike," Mr. Figueroa said.
But the system hasn't been flawless. Some pilots have been reported to taxi over illuminated lights. Other concerns remain about pilots seeing the lights go off and moving ahead without clearance from a controller, though officials say that properly trained pilots have handled the system well.
'Layered defense'
The system's designers are quick to note that the lights were never meant to be a first-line defense but a tool that helps in case of human error.
"We have a very low tolerance for accidents," said Mr. Bernays. "You need a layered defense. The expectation of this program is it provides an independent backup to all of the procedures and training that currently give us a very safe system."
The program's cost for one runway at D/FW was $2 million, though other sites could be less. The San Diego airport is launching its own lights test program using a different surface radar.
When the program might expand beyond there is unclear. The FAA is revamping its funding structure to implement key technology upgrades and has fallen short on plans to expand other surveillance infrastructure.
Meanwhile, airport officials and pilots in Boston, Chicago and Los Angeles are interested. The FAA even hosted a Japanese delegation interested in the safety lights technology, Mr. Figueroa said.
Pilots and safety officials say they're hopeful that the program will attract the funding needed.
The U.S. had 324 incursions in the fiscal year that ended last fall, including three close calls between commercial jets that were deemed the most serious, according to FAA data. That figure has dropped from 424 incursions in 2000.
"We are working hard and making progress, but we are not there yet," FAA administrator Marion Blakey told a Senate panel last fall.
The D/FW test grew out of more than a decade of efforts to build an effective warning system for pilots.
MIT researchers, working with the FAA, sought to use marine radar technology for a pilot warning system in the early 1990s. The project, tested at Boston Logan International Airport, had too many false alarms and was discontinued until new surface surveillance systems could be deployed.
D/FW Airport has been the test bed for other aviation systems, including one to help pilots and controllers predict the weather planes would fly through. As the nation's third-busiest airport, D/FW is a top candidate for such projects.
The airport invested in the advanced technology at the beginning of this decade as part of a broader construction effort. The system, which gives controllers a comprehensive view of planes on the ground, also provides the foundation for the runway lights program.
E-mail [email protected]
Ground Safety
To help reduce near-collisions on the ground, the Federal Aviation Administration is:
•Providing more educational information to pilots, airlines, mechanics and others who work with aircraft.
•Standardizing rules on airport surface operations.
•Reworking runway markings and signs so they can be more easily seen.
•Testing automated lighting systems.
SOURCES: Air Line Pilots Association; Federal Aviation Administration
Online at: http://www.wfaa.com/sharedcontent/dw...1.17acda0.html
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I used 36R for T/O at DFW the other day with the new embedded lights operational. As we were holding in position, they crossed a 757 upfield and the lights immedialty turned red and it would have been impossible for us not to note that takeoff would have been unsafe.
A most reassuring system for those occasional 300/300/300 RVR takeoffs.
A most reassuring system for those occasional 300/300/300 RVR takeoffs.
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One has to wonder what the FAA Management are prepared to accept before decisively acting. I fear I know the answer already.
The staffing levels at most of the FAA Centres, TRACONS are WAY under establishment levels. The FAA response is to conduct witch hunts and refuse to negotiate a contract for its controllers. You can well imagine what this morale booster is doing for the understaffed and overworked that remain - and all rapdily approach retirement age.
A sorry state of affairs thanks to the politicking of Marion Blakey and her conservative stooges.
The staffing levels at most of the FAA Centres, TRACONS are WAY under establishment levels. The FAA response is to conduct witch hunts and refuse to negotiate a contract for its controllers. You can well imagine what this morale booster is doing for the understaffed and overworked that remain - and all rapdily approach retirement age.
A sorry state of affairs thanks to the politicking of Marion Blakey and her conservative stooges.
Stuff like this is why my company, and my previous, refuse to be involved in any LAHSO or SIRO.
Land And Hold Short Operations/Simultaneous Intersecting Runway Operations
Land And Hold Short Operations/Simultaneous Intersecting Runway Operations
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<<It's more useful than the way they now get information – by looking out a cockpit window or relying on controllers.>>
That saddens me. I worked for 21 years in Heathrow Tower and never experienced a runway incursion. The only "near" ones I had were one or two caused by pilots but, luckily, I was able to stop them in time. If runway incursions caused by ATC are increasing then something is drastically wrong with controller training.
I've mentioned this elsewhere.... but I don't know how the tower controllers work at ORD but is their system foolproof? One US facility I saw on TV appeared to have no regimented system of representing the runways movements to the controllers - the controller working the runway just held a strip for each aircraft in his hand. At Heathrow, and other UK airports, each runway is represented by a flight-progress strip bay in front of the controllers. Each aircraft is represented by a FPS which can be moved in that bay; as an aircraft is cleared to land or take off the strip is emphatically moved to the bottom of the bay. If the runway is blocked in any way either a red blocker strip is placed in the bottom slot in the bay or, if the obstruction is caused by another aircraft the strip for that aircraft is placed in the bay such that other movements cannot take place while it is there. I've used that system successfully in a variety of "crossing runway" configurations and single-runway operations. Its isn't rocket science but it damned well works.
The light system appears to be similar to the reds and greens which have been in use for many years at Heathrow, albeit only during fog and at night. Under those conditions, if an aircraft is crossing a runway red stop bars are illuminated across the runway as protection. It's not precisely like the system mentioned above, but it wouldn't take much to change it. But how much better it would be for the ATC systems to work every time so that pilot confidence could be restored and workload reduced...
That saddens me. I worked for 21 years in Heathrow Tower and never experienced a runway incursion. The only "near" ones I had were one or two caused by pilots but, luckily, I was able to stop them in time. If runway incursions caused by ATC are increasing then something is drastically wrong with controller training.
I've mentioned this elsewhere.... but I don't know how the tower controllers work at ORD but is their system foolproof? One US facility I saw on TV appeared to have no regimented system of representing the runways movements to the controllers - the controller working the runway just held a strip for each aircraft in his hand. At Heathrow, and other UK airports, each runway is represented by a flight-progress strip bay in front of the controllers. Each aircraft is represented by a FPS which can be moved in that bay; as an aircraft is cleared to land or take off the strip is emphatically moved to the bottom of the bay. If the runway is blocked in any way either a red blocker strip is placed in the bottom slot in the bay or, if the obstruction is caused by another aircraft the strip for that aircraft is placed in the bay such that other movements cannot take place while it is there. I've used that system successfully in a variety of "crossing runway" configurations and single-runway operations. Its isn't rocket science but it damned well works.
The light system appears to be similar to the reds and greens which have been in use for many years at Heathrow, albeit only during fog and at night. Under those conditions, if an aircraft is crossing a runway red stop bars are illuminated across the runway as protection. It's not precisely like the system mentioned above, but it wouldn't take much to change it. But how much better it would be for the ATC systems to work every time so that pilot confidence could be restored and workload reduced...
Originally Posted by Halfnut
The system uses a series of computerized lights embedded along a runway to signal pilots. It's more useful than the way they now get information – by looking out a cockpit window or relying on controllers.
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A program tested at D/FW could help prevent deadly runway accidents
This isn't news!! I was writing about Runway Status Lights seven years ago - how many goddamn tests do you need to do?!
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source: http://www.aero-news.net/EmailArticl...1-a7c5a19e4a7d
says the FAA...says aero-news.net...
...The FAA says the 737 was cleared for take-off from Runway 27 Left at about 10:00 pm Sunday night as the jumbo freighter was cleared to cross the active.
The result? They missed each other... but only by about 300-feet. In fact, the United 737 took off over the top of the 747.
At this point, the FAA isn't sure whether the crew aboard United Flight 1015 rotated early to avoid the Atlas freighter.
In any case... the FAA blames controller error, the direction the agency is also leaning towards in two other incidents that occurred in March, including an incident in which two planes came as close as 100 feet.
The result? They missed each other... but only by about 300-feet. In fact, the United 737 took off over the top of the 747.
At this point, the FAA isn't sure whether the crew aboard United Flight 1015 rotated early to avoid the Atlas freighter.
In any case... the FAA blames controller error, the direction the agency is also leaning towards in two other incidents that occurred in March, including an incident in which two planes came as close as 100 feet.
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I haven't read the whole of 'Halfnut's' quote, but if the system relies on manual selection of 'runway active' rather than 100% reliable automatic movement sensors that work in all wx conditions along every runway we are no further along since it appears to be human error in ATC that caused this.
I have never used LAHSO, but how on earth can you be certain that an a/c is definitely going to be able to stop short?
I have never used LAHSO, but how on earth can you be certain that an a/c is definitely going to be able to stop short?
Originally Posted by BOAC
I have never used LAHSO, but how on earth can you be certain that an a/c is definitely going to be able to stop short?
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More like 9700-9900ft, though I didn't find the exact figure yet (e.g. look at the end of the parallel 14L with 10005ft length). Anyway, I don't think LAHSO played a role in that one (see my last post).
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Door's:
Its simple, the cargo ramp that Atlas uses is at the END of rwy14, southwest edge of the ORD airport.
And I've never heard of a heavey operator that'd land and hold short.
If you don't roll past 27L on rwy14 you'll wait forever to cross 27L on the taxiway.
Its simple, the cargo ramp that Atlas uses is at the END of rwy14, southwest edge of the ORD airport.
And I've never heard of a heavey operator that'd land and hold short.
If you don't roll past 27L on rwy14 you'll wait forever to cross 27L on the taxiway.
Paxing All Over The World
The Dallas Morning News, via Halfnut
The technical translation of that is: Not enough people have died yet. Unfortunately, nothing else will change the situation. The 'capping' of traffic is certainly not going to happen.
Turning to the origins of this situation ... (bearing in mind that I am simply a UK based Pax) when did training start to slip? Is this linked to the 1981 strike and the reaction of the US govt/FAA to PATCO? My reason for raising this is that, the decline of a skilled trade does not happen over night and the fault line will run long and deep. If we do not understand where the 'earthquake' started, then we cannot hope to plot the way it will develop and thus, how we can minimise damage. Politicians (which includes the FAA as it is a govt agency) will want to say, "We have moved on" and all that other stuff but, I suspect, that we have not.
But with funding constraints at the Federal Aviation Administration, the program may not expand fast enough to prevent another serious accident.
Turning to the origins of this situation ... (bearing in mind that I am simply a UK based Pax) when did training start to slip? Is this linked to the 1981 strike and the reaction of the US govt/FAA to PATCO? My reason for raising this is that, the decline of a skilled trade does not happen over night and the fault line will run long and deep. If we do not understand where the 'earthquake' started, then we cannot hope to plot the way it will develop and thus, how we can minimise damage. Politicians (which includes the FAA as it is a govt agency) will want to say, "We have moved on" and all that other stuff but, I suspect, that we have not.
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Originally Posted by Whaledog
Door's:
Its simple, the cargo ramp that Atlas uses is at the END of rwy14, southwest edge of the ORD airport.
And I've never heard of a heavey operator that'd land and hold short.
If you don't roll past 27L on rwy14 you'll wait forever to cross 27L on the taxiway.
Its simple, the cargo ramp that Atlas uses is at the END of rwy14, southwest edge of the ORD airport.
And I've never heard of a heavey operator that'd land and hold short.
If you don't roll past 27L on rwy14 you'll wait forever to cross 27L on the taxiway.
27L has 6600 feet from take off position to edge of 14R so dought if the captain ever saw the 747 since they were at least 300 feet high at that point for that short of a flight to Denver. Maybe the FO saw it.
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Intersecting runways but two separate frequencies
Atlas cleared to land about 9 miles out - full length 14R. United held in position on 27L - then cleared for take off - two separate frequencies, a point that has driven me mad about ORD ops for years . When you are on 27L first third or so, you cannot see traffic landing/rolling out 14R. My understanding is that this was closest one yet of the five or so this year. Kudos to UAL Cap.
. When you are on 27L first third or so, you cannot see traffic landing/rolling out 14R. My understanding is that this was closest one yet of the five or so this year. Kudos to UAL Cap.