Ryanair & Air Arran Bomb Threat Diversions to PIK (merged)
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I'm sure the people on board were mighty upset to be held there for an extended period of time, but there are more chilling scenarios.
rudekid, you are welcome to leave this site and return to your more grown up one.
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Once on the ground at Prestwick or Stansted, you effectively hand the situation over to the experts, who are trained, equiped and ready to deal with such a situation.
What are they waiting for? ....
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old,not bold
The definition of an aircraft in flight is from the point where the doors are shut in preperation for take off, until the point where they are opened to allow disembrakation.
Police do have the authority to take over in these circumstances. A criminal offence has been committed, they are the prime agency for the investigation of crime in the UK, and therefore as your aircraft is a scene of crime, yes, they can detain anyone on board while it's investigated.
I don't know that it was Police that preveted the pax getting off in these 2 cases. Nor do I know what PIK's preoccedures are for it. My own experence was pre 9/11 and at LHR. I can say that this type of thing is not unusal though. In genral we allowed the pax off. Althouh a VS captain once gave u8s no option and popped the chutes before we got there.
Thats not to say I disagree with your sentiment. But, the decision on a threat is not made by Police, it is for the airline management to do so. Most airlines have a threat assesessor, sometimes it's thier secuirty branch sometimes it's just a manager. But they code the threat as they see fit, sometimes they take advice from Police and sometimes not.
Police officers based at airports tend to have a very good knowladge of terrorism, and that extends a great deal further then the Irish form.
What concerns me, and it appears a few others on here, is right hand and left hand and neither knowing what the others are up too, nor why they are doing it.
Scrammbling the QRA? Why? how where they going to defuse a device? They weren't. But thats a decision made by the RAF. Do they talk to Police? It appears not in these 2 cases. It certainly wasn't the case when I Policed LHR. They just did it.
On landing, the crews in these 2 cases don't seem to understand why they were kept on the aircraft. Someone could and should have told them. There could wel have been good reason, although what it was I have no idea.
So perhaps the questions are being addressed in the wrong way and at the wrong people. The DfT, CAA, MOD and ACPO maybe need to get thier collective heads together and sort the mess out.
It doesn't really matter who has what power at the end of the day, it is better if everyone understands and knows what part they, and each other play.
The definition of an aircraft in flight is from the point where the doors are shut in preperation for take off, until the point where they are opened to allow disembrakation.
Police do have the authority to take over in these circumstances. A criminal offence has been committed, they are the prime agency for the investigation of crime in the UK, and therefore as your aircraft is a scene of crime, yes, they can detain anyone on board while it's investigated.
I don't know that it was Police that preveted the pax getting off in these 2 cases. Nor do I know what PIK's preoccedures are for it. My own experence was pre 9/11 and at LHR. I can say that this type of thing is not unusal though. In genral we allowed the pax off. Althouh a VS captain once gave u8s no option and popped the chutes before we got there.
Thats not to say I disagree with your sentiment. But, the decision on a threat is not made by Police, it is for the airline management to do so. Most airlines have a threat assesessor, sometimes it's thier secuirty branch sometimes it's just a manager. But they code the threat as they see fit, sometimes they take advice from Police and sometimes not.
Police officers based at airports tend to have a very good knowladge of terrorism, and that extends a great deal further then the Irish form.
What concerns me, and it appears a few others on here, is right hand and left hand and neither knowing what the others are up too, nor why they are doing it.
Scrammbling the QRA? Why? how where they going to defuse a device? They weren't. But thats a decision made by the RAF. Do they talk to Police? It appears not in these 2 cases. It certainly wasn't the case when I Policed LHR. They just did it.
On landing, the crews in these 2 cases don't seem to understand why they were kept on the aircraft. Someone could and should have told them. There could wel have been good reason, although what it was I have no idea.
So perhaps the questions are being addressed in the wrong way and at the wrong people. The DfT, CAA, MOD and ACPO maybe need to get thier collective heads together and sort the mess out.
It doesn't really matter who has what power at the end of the day, it is better if everyone understands and knows what part they, and each other play.
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Rudekid,if you substitute "aircraft" with,"cinema","Pub","Police HQ"in this scenario what is the first thing the public need to be doing??
(Clue...Get out.)
Your post perfectly illustrates how rational thought and common sense go out the window as soon as the words aviation and security are uttered in the same breath these days.
Shoot to kill marksmen,risk analysis,need to know,security "experts"
Bollox! get out dummy.
(Clue...Get out.)
Your post perfectly illustrates how rational thought and common sense go out the window as soon as the words aviation and security are uttered in the same breath these days.
Shoot to kill marksmen,risk analysis,need to know,security "experts"
Bollox! get out dummy.
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rudekid, I initially thought you were one of those rather secretive, silly securocrats who just hints at special and secret knowledge (which just cannot be revealed), but then you said:
Of course, now that you say that I am fully reassured that all - despite appearances - was well under control. I shall retire to sleep well in the knowledge that a person with you superior knowledge and mature disposition deigned to visit us here to deliver this reassurance. I hope that I will be followed by others who erred in their ways and who will also wish to acknowledge their debt to you.
The decision to detain them would not have been taken if the situation did not warrant it.
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Once on the ground at Prestwick or Stansted, you effectively hand the situation over to the experts, who are trained, equiped and ready to deal with such a situation.
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Thanks for the predictably puerile responses from certain individuals.
For some who need it, patronising tone intended...
Unlike a cinema, pub or police HQ, an aircraft is a highly mobile target. it is also at it's most vulnerable when airborne. All of the security decisions come down to a risk analysis. Whether you regard this as worthwhile or not, it's done to put the minimum number of people at risk. Once the aircraft is on the ground, the greatest risk to the majority of passengers is over. I'm not suggesting that all risk is removed, however the difficulty of onloading enough explosive onto an aircraft to cause major loss of life ONCE ON THE GROUND places this scenario in a significantly lower threat band. To suggest that we shouldn't take these things seriously is patently ridiculous. I would rather have every incident treated in the same way, inconvenience or not.
Without knowing the exact threat scenario, it is difficult to give a picture perfect answer. The security service personnel will have fitted the worst case scenario to the case until further intelligence information came to light. You are faced with some simple logistical issues prior to gaining the required intel. Once the aircraft has landed, it would need to taxi to the dedicated incident bay-requires time. You need to assemble your personnel, who will not be all on immediate standby at the incident location-requires time. As you have set yourself for the default worst case scenario you will require a military CT unit, who will need to be called to standby and arrive by helicopter-takes time. Background checks on the passengers will be run-takes time. When, and only when, all this and more is in place can properly informed decisions be taken.
A well intentioned, but ill informed Captain ordering an evacuation immediately after landing may remove one potentially harmful scenario. It also opens up a whole load of other equally deadly options. Controlling a scenario like this requires a great deal of prior planning and manpower. Do you have any ideas of the numbers of people involved in an Op like this. It's a frighteningly small number, especially in the early stages.
On receipt of all the information, this decision looks deceptively easy to take, get the pax off ASAP. This is called hindsight! However, multiple terrorists, shooters, suicide vests, hostage scenario all present a vastly different operational arena.
How would you guys have called it, with your vast knowledge of counter-terrorost operations?
Regards
RK
PS I'm not hinting at secret information to try and sound clever. Release of classified is simply an offense under the OSA and something I'm not prepared to do. All the information here is available open source.
For some who need it, patronising tone intended...
Unlike a cinema, pub or police HQ, an aircraft is a highly mobile target. it is also at it's most vulnerable when airborne. All of the security decisions come down to a risk analysis. Whether you regard this as worthwhile or not, it's done to put the minimum number of people at risk. Once the aircraft is on the ground, the greatest risk to the majority of passengers is over. I'm not suggesting that all risk is removed, however the difficulty of onloading enough explosive onto an aircraft to cause major loss of life ONCE ON THE GROUND places this scenario in a significantly lower threat band. To suggest that we shouldn't take these things seriously is patently ridiculous. I would rather have every incident treated in the same way, inconvenience or not.
Without knowing the exact threat scenario, it is difficult to give a picture perfect answer. The security service personnel will have fitted the worst case scenario to the case until further intelligence information came to light. You are faced with some simple logistical issues prior to gaining the required intel. Once the aircraft has landed, it would need to taxi to the dedicated incident bay-requires time. You need to assemble your personnel, who will not be all on immediate standby at the incident location-requires time. As you have set yourself for the default worst case scenario you will require a military CT unit, who will need to be called to standby and arrive by helicopter-takes time. Background checks on the passengers will be run-takes time. When, and only when, all this and more is in place can properly informed decisions be taken.
A well intentioned, but ill informed Captain ordering an evacuation immediately after landing may remove one potentially harmful scenario. It also opens up a whole load of other equally deadly options. Controlling a scenario like this requires a great deal of prior planning and manpower. Do you have any ideas of the numbers of people involved in an Op like this. It's a frighteningly small number, especially in the early stages.
On receipt of all the information, this decision looks deceptively easy to take, get the pax off ASAP. This is called hindsight! However, multiple terrorists, shooters, suicide vests, hostage scenario all present a vastly different operational arena.
How would you guys have called it, with your vast knowledge of counter-terrorost operations?
Regards
RK
PS I'm not hinting at secret information to try and sound clever. Release of classified is simply an offense under the OSA and something I'm not prepared to do. All the information here is available open source.
Last edited by rudekid; 17th Apr 2006 at 22:36.
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Total CANT!
How many counter terror agents does it take to read a note.
Mobile target - its not a target - if it has explosives on it its a missile.
Risk to majority - stop pizzing about in the air and land the sodding thing.
vulnerable when a/b - as above
Stop reading Clancy and bog off to Iraq theres a good chap
How many counter terror agents does it take to read a note.
Mobile target - its not a target - if it has explosives on it its a missile.
Risk to majority - stop pizzing about in the air and land the sodding thing.
vulnerable when a/b - as above
Stop reading Clancy and bog off to Iraq theres a good chap
Ahh Mr. Rudekid, (adopting patronising tone) perhaps the family of Mr. Menendez should take comfort in the fact that he was murdered as a direct result of your highly sophisticated counter terror capability and your vast knowledge of these matters.
I would have thought that in a dedicated counter terror facility it would be relatively simple to remove at least the majority of passengers from the dangers of suicide vests and suchlike without exposing the rest of the community or folk such as your good self to any further risk.
The phrases, get out, walk over there, sit down, don't move and shut up untill we are ready for you come to mind.
It shouldn't take more than a squad of ten, some colored lines painted on the tarmac and (considering English Weather) perhaps an open covered area and a few chairs.
And P.S., if you want a p*ssing competition I've signed the offical secrets act at least five times.
I would have thought that in a dedicated counter terror facility it would be relatively simple to remove at least the majority of passengers from the dangers of suicide vests and suchlike without exposing the rest of the community or folk such as your good self to any further risk.
The phrases, get out, walk over there, sit down, don't move and shut up untill we are ready for you come to mind.
It shouldn't take more than a squad of ten, some colored lines painted on the tarmac and (considering English Weather) perhaps an open covered area and a few chairs.
And P.S., if you want a p*ssing competition I've signed the offical secrets act at least five times.
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Rudeboy
one more thing, if counter terror chiefs only give their minions one procedure, you can bet your life it's not because it's best but they think its all you can remember!
rswipe
one more thing, if counter terror chiefs only give their minions one procedure, you can bet your life it's not because it's best but they think its all you can remember!
rswipe
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So if there's a bomb threat on, say a London Tube train, why the difference in SOPs ?? Stations, trains, and streets would be cleared as quickly as they could be, make no mistake.
The problem here is one of the authorities making. They don't explain the needs and requirements they are placing on aircraft bomb alerts. Saying that they will pass this through company 'need to know' networks is no earthly use to the majority of crews or the public affected. They are possibly in fear of their lives, most likely being given little or no coherent information from the 'authorities' and yet they are expected to sit on an aircraft which may or may not be about to experience an explosion. In the same way that pax won't sit dumb with a 'hijack' situation after 9/11, would it be any surprise if an evacuation was started without an approval from anyone in officialdom ??
As for the officer who starts pumping his MP9 ammo in to the evacuating masses, he'd better have a damn good lawyer !!!
The problem here is one of the authorities making. They don't explain the needs and requirements they are placing on aircraft bomb alerts. Saying that they will pass this through company 'need to know' networks is no earthly use to the majority of crews or the public affected. They are possibly in fear of their lives, most likely being given little or no coherent information from the 'authorities' and yet they are expected to sit on an aircraft which may or may not be about to experience an explosion. In the same way that pax won't sit dumb with a 'hijack' situation after 9/11, would it be any surprise if an evacuation was started without an approval from anyone in officialdom ??
As for the officer who starts pumping his MP9 ammo in to the evacuating masses, he'd better have a damn good lawyer !!!
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issi noho
Sadly, it's a target if you're a terrorist.
You're presuming of course that you have instant and complete knowledge of the threat to the aircraft from reading a note. The note was read by the cabin/aircrew. It wouldn't have been read by anyone else for quite some time.
Thanks for the advice, I'll gladly stick to reading Clancy and go back to the dust bowl if you promise to keep up with your written english lessons. My what a big boy you are...
Sunfish
Take the point on the Menendez case. From what I have read, a lot of very serious errors occurred. Not sighted on the intricacies of it except what is in the public domain. Will be interesting to read the results of any inquiry.
Sadly, our (and I mean UK PLC) CT capability is nowhere near as big and as capable as we would like to think and things are constantly evolving. Despite being considered amongst the best prepared and trained countries in the world, there are many interfaces between different organisations which could be resolved more effectively. It should be as you suggest, simple. The reality is a damn sight more difficult and unpredictable.
Hence, my default position. Treat the threat as worst case, within the manpower/capability you have in place. It would be nigh on impossible to ramp-up the security screen once a breech had occurred. It does, as I have already commented, place additional people at increased risk for a period of time, as in this case. However, with hindsight, it is very easy to be critical of an area which very few have visibility of.
Sadly, a squad of ten and some painted lines doesn't quite cut the mustard. It would take more than that just to man the telephones to political Lord's and masters!
Radar
Hopefully, noone starts pumping ammunition into anyone. However, if there was an unplanned and unbriefed evacuation from the aircraft ordered by the Captain, an additional and unneccessary risk factor would be created. Do you think that the Captain would be similarly investigated for his actions? I think both sides should have a good lawyer!
The issue with differing SOPs is valid. However I suspect at a static event, for example a cinema, the criteria post Jul 05 may not be as clear cut as you believe. Thank you for your considered, non insulting response!
Sadly, it's a target if you're a terrorist.
You're presuming of course that you have instant and complete knowledge of the threat to the aircraft from reading a note. The note was read by the cabin/aircrew. It wouldn't have been read by anyone else for quite some time.
Thanks for the advice, I'll gladly stick to reading Clancy and go back to the dust bowl if you promise to keep up with your written english lessons.
My what a big boy you are...Sunfish
Take the point on the Menendez case. From what I have read, a lot of very serious errors occurred. Not sighted on the intricacies of it except what is in the public domain. Will be interesting to read the results of any inquiry.
Sadly, our (and I mean UK PLC) CT capability is nowhere near as big and as capable as we would like to think and things are constantly evolving. Despite being considered amongst the best prepared and trained countries in the world, there are many interfaces between different organisations which could be resolved more effectively. It should be as you suggest, simple. The reality is a damn sight more difficult and unpredictable.
Hence, my default position. Treat the threat as worst case, within the manpower/capability you have in place. It would be nigh on impossible to ramp-up the security screen once a breech had occurred. It does, as I have already commented, place additional people at increased risk for a period of time, as in this case. However, with hindsight, it is very easy to be critical of an area which very few have visibility of.
Sadly, a squad of ten and some painted lines doesn't quite cut the mustard. It would take more than that just to man the telephones to political Lord's and masters!
Radar
Hopefully, noone starts pumping ammunition into anyone. However, if there was an unplanned and unbriefed evacuation from the aircraft ordered by the Captain, an additional and unneccessary risk factor would be created. Do you think that the Captain would be similarly investigated for his actions? I think both sides should have a good lawyer!
The issue with differing SOPs is valid. However I suspect at a static event, for example a cinema, the criteria post Jul 05 may not be as clear cut as you believe. Thank you for your considered, non insulting response!
Last edited by rudekid; 17th Apr 2006 at 23:19.
rudekid wrote...
Perhaps, but it is not at all clear that they in fact have the right to detain all passengers on board.
If a passenger or crewmember decides they wish to leave the aircraft it is not clear on what legal basis they could prevent them.
In contrast there is legislation giving the captain this power, isn't there? If it is necessary for the safety of the flight?
The security services have every right to treat all passengers on board this aircraft as potential criminals.
If a passenger or crewmember decides they wish to leave the aircraft it is not clear on what legal basis they could prevent them.
In contrast there is legislation giving the captain this power, isn't there? If it is necessary for the safety of the flight?
Eight Gun Fighter
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How I laughed. rudeboy could have checked my profile and would have discovered I do not claim to be flight crew and with a little more research found out I never have. Does a couple of hours flying a Cessna count for anything? However, I suspect I have more years in the aviation industry than he has spent breathing and have some lnowledge of police response capabilities in emerging situations.. It takes a while to get assembled, briefed and get the Landrovers started (where the hell is my left boot?) and for me as a pax that time is better spent away from the problem taking in the sunshine and exercising self-preservation techniques.
Just what does a "tactical bus driver" do laddy? I used to drive buses in a younger life - never had to attack anyone with one.
Just what does a "tactical bus driver" do laddy? I used to drive buses in a younger life - never had to attack anyone with one.
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Very Unlikely
Originally Posted by 747loadie
re Bomb Alerts on TWO Irish Aircraft in the past week. Presumably both aircraft had been on DUB recently - I believe notes were found on board on RETURN flights to Eire.
Has anyone thought it may be the work of some prankster on the ground in DUB who is doing this during servicing?
Has anyone thought it may be the work of some prankster on the ground in DUB who is doing this during servicing?
Loadies don't get into the cabin very often, there's too much else to do on short turnrounds.
FR self handle, Aer Arran are handled by Sky Handling, so completely different sets of loadies responsible for the aircraft.
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Originally Posted by Irish Steve
AS , (among MANY other things) a former loadie at DUB, this is unlikely, for several reasons.
Loadies don't get into the cabin very often, there's too much else to do on short turnrounds.
FR self handle, Aer Arran are handled by Sky Handling, so completely different sets of loadies responsible for the aircraft.
Loadies don't get into the cabin very often, there's too much else to do on short turnrounds.
FR self handle, Aer Arran are handled by Sky Handling, so completely different sets of loadies responsible for the aircraft.
ARREST THE CLEANERS!!!
But what are their demands? Dysons!
this is an interesting subject even from the perspective of a humble passenger and occasional private pilot.
The Australian Aviation Transport Security Act, and the associated regulations appear to make it clear that there exist what are called "Compliance Control directions and Incident Control directions" that would in theory allow the authorities to direct the aircraft and its passengers to do whatevr the authorities require.
There are however two let outs to the huge penalties for disobeying a control direction.
(1) If a person (eg the pilot) has a reasonable excuse.
(2) There exists a blanket defence that I will reproduce below:
"10A General defences
Decisions of pilot in command
(1) A person does not commit an offence against this Act if:
(a) a physical element of the offence exists (whether directly or
indirectly) because the pilot in command of an aircraft
engaged in conduct in the operation or control of the aircraft;
and
(b) without the existence of that physical element the person
would not commit the offence; and
(c) the pilot engaged in the conduct to protect the safety or
security of:
(i) the aircraft; or
(ii) the aircraft’s cargo; or
(iii) a person (whether on board the aircraft or not); or
(iv) another aircraft; or
(v) an airport, or an airport facility or other installation
within an airport; and
(d) the conduct was reasonable in the circumstances.
Note: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matters in
subsection (1) (see subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code)."
So it seems that at least over here, if you had a bomb threat and you smelt something burning, you would be justified in ignoring an incident direction and get everyone out.
I am not a lawyer. I hope this helps, and I would be surprised if the British Acts didn't have a similar provision.
The Australian Aviation Transport Security Act, and the associated regulations appear to make it clear that there exist what are called "Compliance Control directions and Incident Control directions" that would in theory allow the authorities to direct the aircraft and its passengers to do whatevr the authorities require.
There are however two let outs to the huge penalties for disobeying a control direction.
(1) If a person (eg the pilot) has a reasonable excuse.
(2) There exists a blanket defence that I will reproduce below:
"10A General defences
Decisions of pilot in command
(1) A person does not commit an offence against this Act if:
(a) a physical element of the offence exists (whether directly or
indirectly) because the pilot in command of an aircraft
engaged in conduct in the operation or control of the aircraft;
and
(b) without the existence of that physical element the person
would not commit the offence; and
(c) the pilot engaged in the conduct to protect the safety or
security of:
(i) the aircraft; or
(ii) the aircraft’s cargo; or
(iii) a person (whether on board the aircraft or not); or
(iv) another aircraft; or
(v) an airport, or an airport facility or other installation
within an airport; and
(d) the conduct was reasonable in the circumstances.
Note: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matters in
subsection (1) (see subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code)."
So it seems that at least over here, if you had a bomb threat and you smelt something burning, you would be justified in ignoring an incident direction and get everyone out.
I am not a lawyer. I hope this helps, and I would be surprised if the British Acts didn't have a similar provision.
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If l`m overstating the case please tell me, but twice in three days with tabloid exposure ?
Maybe you didn`t pick up what happened, too local.
Twice a scribble appeared from a checked cabin claiming a bomb on board.
All involved lost 24hrs+ and serious hassle.
My point is that if you have people claiming bombs in the bag alongside them going through security - and they still do - how easy is it to be anonymous and and claim the scribble in the inflight mag is a real threat.
Maybe you didn`t pick up what happened, too local.
Twice a scribble appeared from a checked cabin claiming a bomb on board.
All involved lost 24hrs+ and serious hassle.
My point is that if you have people claiming bombs in the bag alongside them going through security - and they still do - how easy is it to be anonymous and and claim the scribble in the inflight mag is a real threat.