Flight Intl. raises qs. about IAA and Ryanair
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Flight Intl. raises qs. about IAA and Ryanair
Flight International: 24/01/06
Only human
Low-cost carriers have created an operating model that is changing the way short haul works. But it has never been critically examined.
The Irish Aviation Authority (IAA) has the task of overseeing an air transport phenomenon that is unlike anything else. It is also a phenomenon that is changing the face of short- and medium-haul scheduled commercial operations. No prizes for guessing that the subject is Ryanair.
It is the fact that Ryanair has gone back to the drawing board with the model of how airlines should operate that the travelling public has incomparably low scheduled fares, and the airline makes a healthy profit from doing so. Significantly, in its 20 years of operation Ryanair has suffered no accidents.
Ryanair cannot be compared with its original role model, Southwest Airlines: Southwest is culturally all-American and logistically all-domestic. Ryanair is Irish-registered, but has hubs all over Europe and employees of most European Union nationalities, cultures and mother tongues. Its headquarters and one of its operating units is based in Ireland, but Dublin is not the group’s largest hub. It may be domestic in the EU sense, but that is much more complex than being all-American.
Add to this the fact that Ryanair is a fast-growing, very large airline and the only comparable carrier anywhere is EasyJet.
Meanwhile, the influence of the likes of Ryanair and EasyJet in Europe and Southwest in the USA has been considerable. They are role models for numerous burgeoning operations working the same basic example, and they are forcing the traditional scheduled carriers to imitate – while maintaining a semblance of product differentiation – the type of short-haul operation they run.
These new carriers are subject to exactly the same kind of safety and economic oversight as their “legacy carrier” peers. That is as it should be, but there is an issue here. The operating model that is changing the short-haul world has never been subjected to academic scrutiny or a total audit, even though the type of operation is so different. So why should it be subjected to study? Low-cost carrier operating cycles have the same components as those of any other airline, but faster if possible. No nonsense at any stage, and turnarounds like a formula one pitstop.
Great stuff. But different, and no-one seems to have asked whether this difference is worthy of scrutiny in its own right. The IAA flies route checks with Ryanair, looks over its operating manuals and practices and is satisfied – even impressed – by what it sees. That is still not the same as checking out an unfamiliar operating model as a whole. The traditional airlines are the devils the aviation authorities know, but now the agencies are using a traditional template to measure a revolutionary model. And the traditional carriers are moving to the low-cost operating model, not the other way around.
There is no suggestion here that the basic low-cost model needs to change, but the oversight methods and mindset needs to be brought up to date.
Why now, and why Ryanair? There are several reasons: Ryanair is now a mature operation that has worked out how it does things, so it is a stable business model – a fixed rather than a moving target. And all the vibes coming from the big low-cost carriers indicate that the target for an operating review should be human-factors centred rather than the traditional checks on manuals and adherence to standard operating procedures. Human factors are more difficult to check, to measure, and more difficult to prove, but most accidents are caused by human factors.
In the last year Ryanair aircraft faced two anomalous approaches that came close to ending in tears. In one of them the Irish Air Accident Investigation Unit ventured that the pilot flying’s out-of-character conduct was the result of stresses outside – but related to – the workplace: in the other, an internal investigation by Ryanair concluded that a bereavement had affected the captain’s capacity. Meanwhile a Ryanair pilot’s demotion after refusing to fly extra sectors at the end of his rostered duty day is being examined in the courts. Safety experts always talk of the iceberg model for incidents and accidents: the accidents are the tip, the incidents are the bulk of the iceberg and the indicators that it is time to look for trends.
The bereavement-related incident is to be investigated by the Italian ANSV. Now the IAA should lead the world by commissioning an academic study of the human factors of low- cost operations.
Flight International: 24/01/06
Ryanair lapse sparks safety spat
Airline’s failure to send 737 incident report to Irish authorities delays Italian investigation by four months.
The Italian authorities are launching an investigation into a series of flawed approaches flown into Rome by the crew of a Ryanair Boeing 737-800. The controversial incident has prompted the Irish Airline Pilots Association (IALPA) to question whether Ireland has an adequate safety oversight system in place.
Italian air accident investigation agency ANSV’s decision to investigate comes four months after the 7 September 2005 incident because, it claims, it has only just been handed details by the Irish Air Accident Investigation Unit (AAIU). Read the précis here.
Ryanair’s internal report on the Rome Ciampino airport-bound 737 – the only investigation carried out so far – refers to the crew’s “almost complete loss of situational awareness, both lateral and vertical”, while attempting a diversion to Rome Fiumicino because of storms at Ciampino, ascribing this to high workload in turbulent weather and failure to follow standard operating procedures.
The airline informed the Irish Aviation Authority (IAA) and the AAIU that the event had occurred, but Ryanair chief executive Michael O’Leary admits that the carrier “screwed up” by failing to send them the final draft of its report.
The report says that, when the captain repeatedly failed to capture the instrument landing system on approach to Fiumicino, the co-pilot became concerned. “The first officer repeatedly prompted the captain to ensure he was not suffering some form of partial incapacitation, and when he realised that the aircraft was now in a potentially unsafe situation he urged the aircraft [sic] to perform a go-around, pulled back on the control column and advanced the thrust levers, but he did not assume control from the captain,” it says.
The captain had suffered the death of his young son a few days before the Düsseldorf-Ciampino flight, but had gone back on duty without notifying flight operations. Since then, says the report, existing instructions in the operations manual “for anyone who finds themselves in this situation” have been clarified.
The AAIU has previously reported that on 21 July last year a Ryanair crew carried out “an irrational and inexplicable” steep approach to land at Stockholm Skavsta airport, touching down at 180kt (330km/h) in the wrong configuration (Flight International, 11-17 October 2005). The agency attributed the pilot’s behaviour to stress related to family concerns.
Capt Evan Cullen, head of IALPA, says of the Ryanair Ciampino flight report: “There has been an excessive tendency to criticise the pilots without attempting to understand the situation. The report quotes no information from the flight data recorder [FDR].” O’Leary says the pilots had not “pulled” the data from the FDR at the time, and the report uses information from the aircraft’s operational flight data monitoring unit.
Cullen says: “While not commenting on any particular incident or airline, there is no doubt that the safety margins in Irish aviation have been eroded. The important question is whether we have in place the regulatory oversight system to alert us when the safety margin has been eroded to an unsafe extent.”
The IAA says it “routinely audits Ryanair’s line operations from the flightdeck and training standards, and follows up and investigates reported incidents in a systematic manner”.
DAVID LEARMOUNT / LONDON
Only human
Low-cost carriers have created an operating model that is changing the way short haul works. But it has never been critically examined.
The Irish Aviation Authority (IAA) has the task of overseeing an air transport phenomenon that is unlike anything else. It is also a phenomenon that is changing the face of short- and medium-haul scheduled commercial operations. No prizes for guessing that the subject is Ryanair.
It is the fact that Ryanair has gone back to the drawing board with the model of how airlines should operate that the travelling public has incomparably low scheduled fares, and the airline makes a healthy profit from doing so. Significantly, in its 20 years of operation Ryanair has suffered no accidents.
Ryanair cannot be compared with its original role model, Southwest Airlines: Southwest is culturally all-American and logistically all-domestic. Ryanair is Irish-registered, but has hubs all over Europe and employees of most European Union nationalities, cultures and mother tongues. Its headquarters and one of its operating units is based in Ireland, but Dublin is not the group’s largest hub. It may be domestic in the EU sense, but that is much more complex than being all-American.
Add to this the fact that Ryanair is a fast-growing, very large airline and the only comparable carrier anywhere is EasyJet.
Meanwhile, the influence of the likes of Ryanair and EasyJet in Europe and Southwest in the USA has been considerable. They are role models for numerous burgeoning operations working the same basic example, and they are forcing the traditional scheduled carriers to imitate – while maintaining a semblance of product differentiation – the type of short-haul operation they run.
These new carriers are subject to exactly the same kind of safety and economic oversight as their “legacy carrier” peers. That is as it should be, but there is an issue here. The operating model that is changing the short-haul world has never been subjected to academic scrutiny or a total audit, even though the type of operation is so different. So why should it be subjected to study? Low-cost carrier operating cycles have the same components as those of any other airline, but faster if possible. No nonsense at any stage, and turnarounds like a formula one pitstop.
Great stuff. But different, and no-one seems to have asked whether this difference is worthy of scrutiny in its own right. The IAA flies route checks with Ryanair, looks over its operating manuals and practices and is satisfied – even impressed – by what it sees. That is still not the same as checking out an unfamiliar operating model as a whole. The traditional airlines are the devils the aviation authorities know, but now the agencies are using a traditional template to measure a revolutionary model. And the traditional carriers are moving to the low-cost operating model, not the other way around.
There is no suggestion here that the basic low-cost model needs to change, but the oversight methods and mindset needs to be brought up to date.
Why now, and why Ryanair? There are several reasons: Ryanair is now a mature operation that has worked out how it does things, so it is a stable business model – a fixed rather than a moving target. And all the vibes coming from the big low-cost carriers indicate that the target for an operating review should be human-factors centred rather than the traditional checks on manuals and adherence to standard operating procedures. Human factors are more difficult to check, to measure, and more difficult to prove, but most accidents are caused by human factors.
In the last year Ryanair aircraft faced two anomalous approaches that came close to ending in tears. In one of them the Irish Air Accident Investigation Unit ventured that the pilot flying’s out-of-character conduct was the result of stresses outside – but related to – the workplace: in the other, an internal investigation by Ryanair concluded that a bereavement had affected the captain’s capacity. Meanwhile a Ryanair pilot’s demotion after refusing to fly extra sectors at the end of his rostered duty day is being examined in the courts. Safety experts always talk of the iceberg model for incidents and accidents: the accidents are the tip, the incidents are the bulk of the iceberg and the indicators that it is time to look for trends.
The bereavement-related incident is to be investigated by the Italian ANSV. Now the IAA should lead the world by commissioning an academic study of the human factors of low- cost operations.
Flight International: 24/01/06
Ryanair lapse sparks safety spat
Airline’s failure to send 737 incident report to Irish authorities delays Italian investigation by four months.
The Italian authorities are launching an investigation into a series of flawed approaches flown into Rome by the crew of a Ryanair Boeing 737-800. The controversial incident has prompted the Irish Airline Pilots Association (IALPA) to question whether Ireland has an adequate safety oversight system in place.
Italian air accident investigation agency ANSV’s decision to investigate comes four months after the 7 September 2005 incident because, it claims, it has only just been handed details by the Irish Air Accident Investigation Unit (AAIU). Read the précis here.
Ryanair’s internal report on the Rome Ciampino airport-bound 737 – the only investigation carried out so far – refers to the crew’s “almost complete loss of situational awareness, both lateral and vertical”, while attempting a diversion to Rome Fiumicino because of storms at Ciampino, ascribing this to high workload in turbulent weather and failure to follow standard operating procedures.
The airline informed the Irish Aviation Authority (IAA) and the AAIU that the event had occurred, but Ryanair chief executive Michael O’Leary admits that the carrier “screwed up” by failing to send them the final draft of its report.
The report says that, when the captain repeatedly failed to capture the instrument landing system on approach to Fiumicino, the co-pilot became concerned. “The first officer repeatedly prompted the captain to ensure he was not suffering some form of partial incapacitation, and when he realised that the aircraft was now in a potentially unsafe situation he urged the aircraft [sic] to perform a go-around, pulled back on the control column and advanced the thrust levers, but he did not assume control from the captain,” it says.
The captain had suffered the death of his young son a few days before the Düsseldorf-Ciampino flight, but had gone back on duty without notifying flight operations. Since then, says the report, existing instructions in the operations manual “for anyone who finds themselves in this situation” have been clarified.
The AAIU has previously reported that on 21 July last year a Ryanair crew carried out “an irrational and inexplicable” steep approach to land at Stockholm Skavsta airport, touching down at 180kt (330km/h) in the wrong configuration (Flight International, 11-17 October 2005). The agency attributed the pilot’s behaviour to stress related to family concerns.
Capt Evan Cullen, head of IALPA, says of the Ryanair Ciampino flight report: “There has been an excessive tendency to criticise the pilots without attempting to understand the situation. The report quotes no information from the flight data recorder [FDR].” O’Leary says the pilots had not “pulled” the data from the FDR at the time, and the report uses information from the aircraft’s operational flight data monitoring unit.
Cullen says: “While not commenting on any particular incident or airline, there is no doubt that the safety margins in Irish aviation have been eroded. The important question is whether we have in place the regulatory oversight system to alert us when the safety margin has been eroded to an unsafe extent.”
The IAA says it “routinely audits Ryanair’s line operations from the flightdeck and training standards, and follows up and investigates reported incidents in a systematic manner”.
DAVID LEARMOUNT / LONDON
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Irish Commissioner for Aviation Regulation moving on
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Missing the point?
What Mr. Learmount effectively says is that things do not happen in a vacuum. Maybe, finally, the IAA et al will examine the less-than-tangible factors and/or pressures facing the pilots who operate within the part of the industry that apparently is under the most commercial pressure.
Our good friend, Capt. Hairy-Camel (how many hours do you have left?), has already said that the "premise of universal and omnipotent oversight in such a pan European operation is ludicrous, frankly."
What an odd opinion from a fellow professional! It is precisely within operations with less than universal (rather than omnipotent) oversight, where less than scrupulous persons can extract extra pressure on individuals because the oversight is lacking. How could a professional pilot not wish to strive to achieve the highest level of oversight?
The Rome, Skavsta and Beauvais incidents have been discussed elsewhere. What the AAIU said in 2004 was: "The modern day commercial aviation concept of repetitive short sector flights with rapid turnarounds, coupled with the commercial pressures associated with ground handling at high activity airports makes for a continued high pressure environment for the flight crews."
What the AAIU did NOT say is that the operators should primarily establish a situation where the pressures listed within the above quote should ever impact on any flight crew such that the operation is degraded to a potentially dangerous level.
The IAA not only regulates licence-holders, but the operators. The IAA has a responsibility to licence-holders to adequately regulate the operators to prevent cultures establishing in any operation which could compromise safety. Unfortunately the IAA is silent in the latter regard.
After all, if the Ryanair operation is as we are led to believe, won't a comprehensive academic study of all factors (including human) of low-cost operations prove the point for Leo?
Our good friend, Capt. Hairy-Camel (how many hours do you have left?), has already said that the "premise of universal and omnipotent oversight in such a pan European operation is ludicrous, frankly."
What an odd opinion from a fellow professional! It is precisely within operations with less than universal (rather than omnipotent) oversight, where less than scrupulous persons can extract extra pressure on individuals because the oversight is lacking. How could a professional pilot not wish to strive to achieve the highest level of oversight?
The Rome, Skavsta and Beauvais incidents have been discussed elsewhere. What the AAIU said in 2004 was: "The modern day commercial aviation concept of repetitive short sector flights with rapid turnarounds, coupled with the commercial pressures associated with ground handling at high activity airports makes for a continued high pressure environment for the flight crews."
What the AAIU did NOT say is that the operators should primarily establish a situation where the pressures listed within the above quote should ever impact on any flight crew such that the operation is degraded to a potentially dangerous level.
The IAA not only regulates licence-holders, but the operators. The IAA has a responsibility to licence-holders to adequately regulate the operators to prevent cultures establishing in any operation which could compromise safety. Unfortunately the IAA is silent in the latter regard.
After all, if the Ryanair operation is as we are led to believe, won't a comprehensive academic study of all factors (including human) of low-cost operations prove the point for Leo?
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firstly i'm no fan of David Learmount however this article is indeed well thought out and deserves consideration. The fact that Ryan air is mentioned is acedemic as this behavior is starting to become more comon in the low cost sector and I believe that it will get much worse before it gets better.The ryan air incidents are only the tip of the ice berg as some one has already said. Ryan Air and easyjet can at least afford to spend money on saftey but this ability is being squeezed every day by fly by night operators poping up all over the place. The next problem that is facing us is the corperate greed culture which is becoming more of an epidemic than "Bird flu".
Middle management types are being blinded by the potential of ludicrusly high bonus's to keep the operation cost effective whilst the commercial people are constantly lowering the prices to be competative against the "start-up of the week carrier". the frightening thing is that if the largest and most profitable loco's are starting to fail what chance do the bottom feeders have!
As far as the IAA goes I do not believe they have the resources to police a pan european carrier the size of Ryan air today, and quite frankly Spain and some of the new Eastern block Authorities have even less chance. In short its begining to get very scary in European skys these days.
Traffic is increasing at an alarming rate whilst the infastructure and support systems are crumbling around us!!
Middle management types are being blinded by the potential of ludicrusly high bonus's to keep the operation cost effective whilst the commercial people are constantly lowering the prices to be competative against the "start-up of the week carrier". the frightening thing is that if the largest and most profitable loco's are starting to fail what chance do the bottom feeders have!
As far as the IAA goes I do not believe they have the resources to police a pan european carrier the size of Ryan air today, and quite frankly Spain and some of the new Eastern block Authorities have even less chance. In short its begining to get very scary in European skys these days.
Traffic is increasing at an alarming rate whilst the infastructure and support systems are crumbling around us!!
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Flt International raises questions about Ryanair and IAA
The real subject in question should be the attitude of the IAA and Ryanair.
David L says that the IAA are "satisfied - even impressed" by the Ryanair operation. That is NOT the impression I got when I last spoke to the IAA about Ryanair (no - I am not a jounalist).
I raised particular safety points with the IAA, for instance, inadequate cabin briefings, incorrect safety cards for the type of aircraft, missing seat belts, seats that would not lock in the upright position etc. That, plus the Stansted fire incident certaihly should not give any cause for satisfaction within the IAA and indeed I was told that Ryanair are subjected to far more checks than, "average" - which in itself tells a story.
When we read about other instances concerning the flight crew, then I am certainly not satisfied with the operation of Ryanair, however now as a passenger, I have the choice of carrier.
David L says that the IAA are "satisfied - even impressed" by the Ryanair operation. That is NOT the impression I got when I last spoke to the IAA about Ryanair (no - I am not a jounalist).
I raised particular safety points with the IAA, for instance, inadequate cabin briefings, incorrect safety cards for the type of aircraft, missing seat belts, seats that would not lock in the upright position etc. That, plus the Stansted fire incident certaihly should not give any cause for satisfaction within the IAA and indeed I was told that Ryanair are subjected to far more checks than, "average" - which in itself tells a story.
When we read about other instances concerning the flight crew, then I am certainly not satisfied with the operation of Ryanair, however now as a passenger, I have the choice of carrier.
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Originally Posted by minuteman
The IAA not only regulates licence-holders, but the operators. The IAA has a responsibility to licence-holders to adequately regulate the operators to prevent cultures establishing in any operation which could compromise safety. Unfortunately the IAA is silent in the latter regard.
Pushing things/people to their stuctural/physical limits on a continuous basis can NOT be safe/healthy in the long term! Obviously doing a reduced thrust take off is more important to some airlines than wearing out their flight crews. After all, replacing an engine is expensive, whereas a pilot can be easily replaced by TRSS or a DE captain!
Last edited by Doug the Head; 29th Jan 2006 at 14:45.
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I don't even know why they call it "discretion" at times. It's hardly discretionary if you are doing it under duress (as in many cases).
It's probably about time it's properly recognised by the authorities that the current FTL schemes aren't exactly working to minimise fatigue, and something is done about it.
It's probably about time it's properly recognised by the authorities that the current FTL schemes aren't exactly working to minimise fatigue, and something is done about it.
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Doug, may I say, thank you, I haven't been called a spotty teenager in about 30 years. In my experiance crews generally tell you why they won't go into discretion without being asked. There is, and has never been pressure or demand to discress from Ops, you don't want to, fine. The part where you state " Pushing things/people to their stuctural/physical limits on a continuous basis can NOT be safe/healthy"
Ops doesn't make the Schedule, we, like you, have to work within it, with your help, and you, I hope with ours. You are more than welcome to come into ops anytime you like and see how we work and approach problems.
Finally, let me say, the right to exercise Discretion is the commanders, not mine or my spotty co workers here in orangeland, and as far as I am aware everybody in here knows that, if you know different I would be interested to hear.
Thanks
PP
Ops doesn't make the Schedule, we, like you, have to work within it, with your help, and you, I hope with ours. You are more than welcome to come into ops anytime you like and see how we work and approach problems.
Finally, let me say, the right to exercise Discretion is the commanders, not mine or my spotty co workers here in orangeland, and as far as I am aware everybody in here knows that, if you know different I would be interested to hear.
Thanks
PP
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I think the spotty teenager remark is out of order. I have many criticisms of the easyJet terms and conditions but have to say that I have never felt pressure from anyone in operations or crewing to use my discretion.
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pp,
Sorry, perhaps my remark as a bit too harsch. I know that you guys/gals don´t do the planning, but my point simply was that these LoCo airlines plan everything so tightly (looks good on paper and therefore good for the manager´s share options ) and then let the flight crews and NMC sort out the mess on a day to day basis.
I think that the point of this thread is the fragmentation of the various European Aviation Agencies, the multiple cultural aspects involved and the impact of the LoCo model on aviation safety.
Unfortunately JAR-OPS/FCL failed to create a level playing field across Europe and many LoCo airlines are exploiting this weakness.
Sorry, perhaps my remark as a bit too harsch. I know that you guys/gals don´t do the planning, but my point simply was that these LoCo airlines plan everything so tightly (looks good on paper and therefore good for the manager´s share options
) and then let the flight crews and NMC sort out the mess on a day to day basis.I think that the point of this thread is the fragmentation of the various European Aviation Agencies, the multiple cultural aspects involved and the impact of the LoCo model on aviation safety.
Unfortunately JAR-OPS/FCL failed to create a level playing field across Europe and many LoCo airlines are exploiting this weakness.
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For the record, I thought that the Flight Editorial was excellent. Reasoned, careful and on target, what more can one ask for? It points a finger where the finger needs to be pointed and asks the correct questions.
I was expecting a more widespread reaction than we have seen, especially considering the numbers of contributors to the many Ryanair threads we have seen in recent years. Wrong again. Maybe it was too long for people to read! Or is it just that everyone felt it was so good that there is nothing more to say?
I was expecting a more widespread reaction than we have seen, especially considering the numbers of contributors to the many Ryanair threads we have seen in recent years. Wrong again. Maybe it was too long for people to read! Or is it just that everyone felt it was so good that there is nothing more to say?
I think David Learmount has been working towards the coal face of this problem for a few years. He's getting pretty close to understanding some of the problems pilots face. It's difficult for an outsider to fully empathise with the pilot and his problems.
He needs to work closely on the best form of words to get the problem into the public eye.
I shall watch with interest where the story goes from here.
He needs to work closely on the best form of words to get the problem into the public eye.
I shall watch with interest where the story goes from here.
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David Learmount has written a sensible reasoned article which merely questions whether the current safety oversight system which has generally served European Aviation (at least in norhtern Europe) fairly well over the years, is in need of overhaul in the current climate.
Numerous people including IALPA have questioned the IAA's apparent lack of backbone in critically examining Ryanair's operation in the past few years. In fact the most recent one is the best example of just how poor it actually is. (in passing, the UK CAA is probably no better).
Certainly both Easyjet and Ryanair have changed the face of European aviation forever with Ryanair at the front in this regard. This has brought enormous benefits to the travelling public and ahs generated big profits for both carriers. For sure the professionals, crews, ops staff and regulators are aware of increased pressures in keeping to very tight schedules with minimal crews and maximum utilisation in order to keep costs down. These pressures impinge on everyone and unless we first of all acknowledge that they exist then there is little prospect of there being any adequate response from the regulators.
We hear true stories of a Ryanair Captain being demoted for refusing to operate extra sectors (not for not going into discretion) and others of Captains from the same company dojng very strange things in the aircraft, apparently with at least the tacit agreement of the F/O. Taking both situations together, there is at least a grain of evidence that there might be a problem.
Add to that, multiple bases, various nationalities (many of the cabin crew have little or only basic English), varying cultural issues and you have a mix that at least requires some degree of attention from the regulators. EASA cannot stand idly by until there actually IS an accident before acting to examine this matter. If they find that all is fine, then at least they will have done their statutory duty. If they stand back and do nothing just watch the writs fly when the inevitable occurs.
A Captain friend in Ryanair tells me that the Chief Pilot now spends most of his time going from base to base on SOP talks. While this is commendable in itself it shows that either
a) Ryanair is very pro-active in dealing with their multi-cultural, multi-base mix or
b) he's concerned about standards and is trying keep a lid on things.
From everything one hears about this company I somehow doubt that it's the former. Only one person in Ryanair ever makes any real decisions and it isn't the Chief Pilot nor is it the current 'Accountable' Manager. How can the IAA accept as "Accountable" a Manager who doesn't call the shots?
Flight is to be commended for the article. Funny how quiet LHC is now! But he'll be back soon I'll bet with a 'reasoned' diatribe on why pan-European safety oversight is neither required nor appropriate (for Ryanair of course).
Numerous people including IALPA have questioned the IAA's apparent lack of backbone in critically examining Ryanair's operation in the past few years. In fact the most recent one is the best example of just how poor it actually is. (in passing, the UK CAA is probably no better).
Certainly both Easyjet and Ryanair have changed the face of European aviation forever with Ryanair at the front in this regard. This has brought enormous benefits to the travelling public and ahs generated big profits for both carriers. For sure the professionals, crews, ops staff and regulators are aware of increased pressures in keeping to very tight schedules with minimal crews and maximum utilisation in order to keep costs down. These pressures impinge on everyone and unless we first of all acknowledge that they exist then there is little prospect of there being any adequate response from the regulators.
We hear true stories of a Ryanair Captain being demoted for refusing to operate extra sectors (not for not going into discretion) and others of Captains from the same company dojng very strange things in the aircraft, apparently with at least the tacit agreement of the F/O. Taking both situations together, there is at least a grain of evidence that there might be a problem.
Add to that, multiple bases, various nationalities (many of the cabin crew have little or only basic English), varying cultural issues and you have a mix that at least requires some degree of attention from the regulators. EASA cannot stand idly by until there actually IS an accident before acting to examine this matter. If they find that all is fine, then at least they will have done their statutory duty. If they stand back and do nothing just watch the writs fly when the inevitable occurs.
A Captain friend in Ryanair tells me that the Chief Pilot now spends most of his time going from base to base on SOP talks. While this is commendable in itself it shows that either
a) Ryanair is very pro-active in dealing with their multi-cultural, multi-base mix or
b) he's concerned about standards and is trying keep a lid on things.
From everything one hears about this company I somehow doubt that it's the former. Only one person in Ryanair ever makes any real decisions and it isn't the Chief Pilot nor is it the current 'Accountable' Manager. How can the IAA accept as "Accountable" a Manager who doesn't call the shots?
Flight is to be commended for the article. Funny how quiet LHC is now! But he'll be back soon I'll bet with a 'reasoned' diatribe on why pan-European safety oversight is neither required nor appropriate (for Ryanair of course).
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Go not quietly into that good blight.
A Captain friend in Ryanair tells me that the Chief Pilot now spends most of his time going from base to base on SOP talks.
While this is commendable in itself it shows that either
a) Ryanair is very pro-active in dealing with their multi-cultural, multi-base mix or
b) he's concerned about standards and is trying keep a lid on things.
a) Ryanair is very pro-active in dealing with their multi-cultural, multi-base mix or
b) he's concerned about standards and is trying keep a lid on things.
It points a finger where the finger needs to be pointed and asks the correct questions.
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Leo Hairy Camel (correctly) quotes me as saying:
and then goes on to reply to minuteman (in somewhat menacing terms). Either he thinks we (minuteman and myself) are one and the same person, or he is confused. (As I recall it, Leo has also said that minuteman is the President of IALPA - but I may have got that wrong).
All of this is fascinating for a "line pilot". Minuteman is going to hear from Leo in the very near future ..... I hope we will all be told - by one of them at least - exactly what ensues.
It [the Flight Editorial] points a finger where the finger needs to be pointed and asks the correct questions.
All of this is fascinating for a "line pilot". Minuteman is going to hear from Leo in the very near future ..... I hope we will all be told - by one of them at least - exactly what ensues.
Join Date: Aug 2000
Location: In my skin
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I have had a lot of discussions on how to evaluate an oversight system.
I have come to the conclusion that there are too many parameters that need to be controlled, in a free-market economy, where the rules are set by local politics and were a dysfunctional court system is the only watchdog.
Fixing one parameter might crystallize the other two to a certain degree.
A minimum amount of funds should be fixed and clearly visible in the balance sheets“as dictated by law “for those issues that have strictly to do with operation, training and maintenance. The same amount for every Airline in Europe taken into account the magnitude of it’s operations.
In other words; certain safety related issues urgently need to be protected from the relentless market forces.
This needs to be done at European level and every JAA member CAA should be granted the authority for cross border checking.
Non European Airlines that fly into Europe or even across should comply with European duty time restrictions on those sectors.
To expedite this process I suggest that JAA accepts the FAR rules and get on with it.
I have come to the conclusion that there are too many parameters that need to be controlled, in a free-market economy, where the rules are set by local politics and were a dysfunctional court system is the only watchdog.
Fixing one parameter might crystallize the other two to a certain degree.
A minimum amount of funds should be fixed and clearly visible in the balance sheets“as dictated by law “for those issues that have strictly to do with operation, training and maintenance. The same amount for every Airline in Europe taken into account the magnitude of it’s operations.
In other words; certain safety related issues urgently need to be protected from the relentless market forces.
This needs to be done at European level and every JAA member CAA should be granted the authority for cross border checking.
Non European Airlines that fly into Europe or even across should comply with European duty time restrictions on those sectors.
To expedite this process I suggest that JAA accepts the FAR rules and get on with it.