Bombardier sued over Pinnacle CRJ crash
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Just what we need is another lawyer trying to sell 12 jurors a cock-and-bull story about how these two poor souls were assaulted by some killer piece of machinery.
Looking for a 500 fpm climb to max altitude by setting that in the autopilot and then not bothering to think what it meant to see the airspeed bleeding off ... what were those guys thinking of, anyway? Didn't anyone ever tell them not to use 'Vertical Speed' mode for extended climbs, for just this reason?
In a way, this lawsuit will now drag all their foolish mistakes out into the open to blacken their memories where otherwise they would have been decently left as just another safety case. Just wait for newspaper articles meant to show that we are all just 'cowboys.' Everyone will lose from this one.
In fact, I would assume the insurance company will be attempting to recover some of their costs from the dead crew's estates, as usually happens. What a mess!
Looking for a 500 fpm climb to max altitude by setting that in the autopilot and then not bothering to think what it meant to see the airspeed bleeding off ... what were those guys thinking of, anyway? Didn't anyone ever tell them not to use 'Vertical Speed' mode for extended climbs, for just this reason?
In a way, this lawsuit will now drag all their foolish mistakes out into the open to blacken their memories where otherwise they would have been decently left as just another safety case. Just wait for newspaper articles meant to show that we are all just 'cowboys.' Everyone will lose from this one.
In fact, I would assume the insurance company will be attempting to recover some of their costs from the dead crew's estates, as usually happens. What a mess!
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V/S is not a climb profile for this aircraft. Never has and unlikely ever will be.
The climb profile for most CRJ operators is 290/.70. Including Pinnacle.
So what's the problem?
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And on that topic Willie today's International Herald Tribune has a large report regarding what might be a similar fatal crash.
http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/01/.../venezuela.php
http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/01/.../venezuela.php
Investigators, who spoke on condition of anonymity because official statements are supposed to come from Venezuela, said that the plane appeared to react just as a 2002 Boeing service bulletin said an MD-82 would react after making a rapid climb from 31,000 feet to 33,000 feet, or 9,450 to 10,000 meters.
The investigators said records they had examined indicated that, after the plane reached 33,000 feet, the autopilot kept working for about six minutes to keep the craft flying at the proper altitude. When the autopilot could do no more, it abruptly shut off - as it is designed to do - and the crew was suddenly confronted with a jet that needed a larger dose of power and a steady hand to keep it flying.
Investigators said the crew apparently did not notice anything amiss, and may not have been familiar with the 2002 service directive.
As older jetliners are released by major airlines, they are often sold to countries in South America and Africa where training may be less profound than in Europe or the United States, and where such directives do not always reach everyone. The plane was built in 1986 by McDonnell Douglas, which later merged with Boeing.
A Nov. 22 interim official report from the Comité de Investigación de Acci-dentes Aéreos of Venezuela, approved by assisting investigation agencies in France, the United States and Colombia, did not mention the 2002 Boeing bulletin because it had not yet been discovered in the normal investigative process. The report did not reach any conclusions about what caused the crash of the twin-engine Boeing MD-82.
A 2002 Boeing bulletin warned that planes in the MD-80 family, including the one that crashed, should not be set on autopilot to climb at too high a rate. After leveling off, Boeing said, the engine power setting could be slightly too low, and "the airplane could decelerate into a stall warning before the autopilot trips off."
That can happen in such a subtle way, the bulletin said, that several minutes could go by while the autopilot is trying to compensate for deteriorating speed, and pilots might not notice until stall warnings suddenly begin sounding. The investigators said that while it was too early to draw any conclusions, that sounds very similar to what happened to the West Caribbean aircraft.
Investigators and aviation professionals, who said they could not be identified because of rules forbidding any information to be released except in official statements, said it was clear that whatever happened, the crew then took actions that would never allow the plane to recover.
The interim report contained a wealth of details from the plane's flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder, showing that the crew was incorrect in saying that the plane had experienced a "dual engine flameout," and that the crew took the opposite action to recover from an aircraft stall than action that is taught to every beginner pilot. That suggests that the crew did not recognize that the plane was, in effect, stalling.
According to evidence found in the wreckage, the crew pulled the control yoke back toward their chests as they went down, which would raise the nose and lower speed, preventing air from flowing over the wing properly.
The official report said that about 20 minutes before the crash, the plane made a routine climb from 31,000 feet to 33,000 feet. The engines were operating properly at that time, the report said.
About 90 seconds after the plane reached 33,000 feet, it began to slow down for reasons that are not clear. The plane's autopilot began to point the plane's nose up slightly in an effort to compensate for the slowing speed and keep the plane at 33,000 feet. During this time, both engines still appeared to be operating normally, the interim re-port said.
About eight minutes after first leveling at 33,000 feet, the autopilot disengaged and the plane began to descend. The autopilot is designed to disengage on its own if it cannot control an air-craft in extreme situations.
This was about three minutes and 30 seconds before impact. That means the plane was descending at an average of almost 10,000 feet a minute, almost a free fall. A controlled but rapid descent would be about 3,000 feet a minute.
The right engine went to idle shortly after the descent began, although there is no indication why, according to the interim report. It is possible the crew reduced the engine to idle for a moment while trying to troubleshoot their problem. Because of the problem with the flight data recorder, it is unclear what the power settings were on the left engine during this time, although both engines were turning at high speed later at the time of impact.
Almost a minute after the descent began, or two minutes and 46 seconds before impact, the loud stall warning sounded, according to the interim report which has been made public.
After a stall warning sounds, crews are trained to bring the nose of the plane down to allow the plane to gain speed. Stall warnings are designed to engage well before an actual stall, loudly warning the crew of the potential danger.
But the flight data recorder indicated that the crew kept pulling the control yoke backward, reaching a maximum 12 degree nose-up position and holding the yoke there all the way to the ground. The attention of air traffic controllers at Maracaibo was aroused by the crew's sudden and continuous requests for lower altitude.
"The flight crew states that they had a dual engine flameout when asked by ATC if they had a problem," the report said. ATC refers to air traffic control. That was one of the last reports from the plane.
The investigators said records they had examined indicated that, after the plane reached 33,000 feet, the autopilot kept working for about six minutes to keep the craft flying at the proper altitude. When the autopilot could do no more, it abruptly shut off - as it is designed to do - and the crew was suddenly confronted with a jet that needed a larger dose of power and a steady hand to keep it flying.
Investigators said the crew apparently did not notice anything amiss, and may not have been familiar with the 2002 service directive.
As older jetliners are released by major airlines, they are often sold to countries in South America and Africa where training may be less profound than in Europe or the United States, and where such directives do not always reach everyone. The plane was built in 1986 by McDonnell Douglas, which later merged with Boeing.
A Nov. 22 interim official report from the Comité de Investigación de Acci-dentes Aéreos of Venezuela, approved by assisting investigation agencies in France, the United States and Colombia, did not mention the 2002 Boeing bulletin because it had not yet been discovered in the normal investigative process. The report did not reach any conclusions about what caused the crash of the twin-engine Boeing MD-82.
A 2002 Boeing bulletin warned that planes in the MD-80 family, including the one that crashed, should not be set on autopilot to climb at too high a rate. After leveling off, Boeing said, the engine power setting could be slightly too low, and "the airplane could decelerate into a stall warning before the autopilot trips off."
That can happen in such a subtle way, the bulletin said, that several minutes could go by while the autopilot is trying to compensate for deteriorating speed, and pilots might not notice until stall warnings suddenly begin sounding. The investigators said that while it was too early to draw any conclusions, that sounds very similar to what happened to the West Caribbean aircraft.
Investigators and aviation professionals, who said they could not be identified because of rules forbidding any information to be released except in official statements, said it was clear that whatever happened, the crew then took actions that would never allow the plane to recover.
The interim report contained a wealth of details from the plane's flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder, showing that the crew was incorrect in saying that the plane had experienced a "dual engine flameout," and that the crew took the opposite action to recover from an aircraft stall than action that is taught to every beginner pilot. That suggests that the crew did not recognize that the plane was, in effect, stalling.
According to evidence found in the wreckage, the crew pulled the control yoke back toward their chests as they went down, which would raise the nose and lower speed, preventing air from flowing over the wing properly.
The official report said that about 20 minutes before the crash, the plane made a routine climb from 31,000 feet to 33,000 feet. The engines were operating properly at that time, the report said.
About 90 seconds after the plane reached 33,000 feet, it began to slow down for reasons that are not clear. The plane's autopilot began to point the plane's nose up slightly in an effort to compensate for the slowing speed and keep the plane at 33,000 feet. During this time, both engines still appeared to be operating normally, the interim re-port said.
About eight minutes after first leveling at 33,000 feet, the autopilot disengaged and the plane began to descend. The autopilot is designed to disengage on its own if it cannot control an air-craft in extreme situations.
This was about three minutes and 30 seconds before impact. That means the plane was descending at an average of almost 10,000 feet a minute, almost a free fall. A controlled but rapid descent would be about 3,000 feet a minute.
The right engine went to idle shortly after the descent began, although there is no indication why, according to the interim report. It is possible the crew reduced the engine to idle for a moment while trying to troubleshoot their problem. Because of the problem with the flight data recorder, it is unclear what the power settings were on the left engine during this time, although both engines were turning at high speed later at the time of impact.
Almost a minute after the descent began, or two minutes and 46 seconds before impact, the loud stall warning sounded, according to the interim report which has been made public.
After a stall warning sounds, crews are trained to bring the nose of the plane down to allow the plane to gain speed. Stall warnings are designed to engage well before an actual stall, loudly warning the crew of the potential danger.
But the flight data recorder indicated that the crew kept pulling the control yoke backward, reaching a maximum 12 degree nose-up position and holding the yoke there all the way to the ground. The attention of air traffic controllers at Maracaibo was aroused by the crew's sudden and continuous requests for lower altitude.
"The flight crew states that they had a dual engine flameout when asked by ATC if they had a problem," the report said. ATC refers to air traffic control. That was one of the last reports from the plane.
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the author of the md80 article is a fine writer, formerly from the Washington POST. I have spoken with him many times.
There have been many "boo boos" with people trying to fly planes too high and too high a weight. Yes an ISAPlus day makes it even worse.
I want to convey a funny story in a way. I went to interview for a pilot position with a very large freight company that seems to like to paint their planes BROWN ( I am sure you will get my drift).
Very nice guy from HR, former truck driver for the company and some A@#hole pilot guy from one of the joints that the newly forming flight division had hired to do their flying for them.
Anyway, pilot guy asked me what position I could handle. I said, I thought you would do it the normal way, FE/ FO, Capt. But I felt comfortable starting as a copilot.
He went balistic and said: do you think you could handle a DC8 upset at high altitude.
My answer was this: if you got into a jet upset at that altitude in a DC8, either something weird happened (extreme clear air turbulence for example) OR YOU WERE FLYING TOO HIGH FOR YOUR WEIGHT and shouldn't have been there in the first place.
The interview went downhill from there. BUT I am glad I didn't fly for them. Even though the money could have been great and I was getting in on the ground floor and could only go UP(S) from there. ;-)
Guys and Gals, don't fly so high...even DADELUS warned Icarus of flying too high!
I love hearing the following: "oh, let''s push the altitude limit so we can get OVER this thunderstorm"...famous last words I am sure!
[email protected]
"there are old pilots and bold pilots but no old bold pilots"
There have been many "boo boos" with people trying to fly planes too high and too high a weight. Yes an ISAPlus day makes it even worse.
I want to convey a funny story in a way. I went to interview for a pilot position with a very large freight company that seems to like to paint their planes BROWN ( I am sure you will get my drift).
Very nice guy from HR, former truck driver for the company and some A@#hole pilot guy from one of the joints that the newly forming flight division had hired to do their flying for them.
Anyway, pilot guy asked me what position I could handle. I said, I thought you would do it the normal way, FE/ FO, Capt. But I felt comfortable starting as a copilot.
He went balistic and said: do you think you could handle a DC8 upset at high altitude.
My answer was this: if you got into a jet upset at that altitude in a DC8, either something weird happened (extreme clear air turbulence for example) OR YOU WERE FLYING TOO HIGH FOR YOUR WEIGHT and shouldn't have been there in the first place.
The interview went downhill from there. BUT I am glad I didn't fly for them. Even though the money could have been great and I was getting in on the ground floor and could only go UP(S) from there. ;-)
Guys and Gals, don't fly so high...even DADELUS warned Icarus of flying too high!
I love hearing the following: "oh, let''s push the altitude limit so we can get OVER this thunderstorm"...famous last words I am sure!
[email protected]
"there are old pilots and bold pilots but no old bold pilots"
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Guys and Gals, don't fly so high...even DADELUS warned Icarus of flying too high!
if the book says it can go to FL410 then it should have gotten there safely with the patience of the crew
Placards and ridiculously low limitations only serve to hold the hands of pilots who are too lazy to learn their stuff.
As for your "shudder" at 3000', I have no idea what that one was unless it was maybe the spoilers getting popped at the same time. They are VERY effective, and have been known to startle pax due to the air burbling around them. I've spent a lot of time in the back as well as the pointy part of CRJ's (ALL models) and never experienced something like you describe.
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dear elliott moose:
the world of the internet sometimes does not convey things properly.
Let us both assume we wish safe flying for all.
as far as paying fuel bills, if that is your only concern then you may be misguided. also, in this very complex world of ATC routings, turbulence, wx, passenger comfort and the like I have noticed some interesting things.
One day I had to fly 5 legs in a DC9 unpressurized...10,000 and below. ON every leg I was below normal (altitude) fuel burn and ahead of schedule. WHY? ATC could give us direct at 10k and awful routing at normal altitudes.
Another day the turbulence was so bad at normal flight levels that I flew halfway from BWI to Florida at fl180. On schedule and over by only 300 pounds of fuel. Passengers enjoyed a comfortable flight.
If you think flying at high altitude is the only way to fly a jet, well that is a tiny bit closed minded. Of course if the only plane in the sky was yours, higher is usually better.
AS to the shudder, I hope that pilots of jets climbing out would not use spoilers...unless you mean roll augmentation spoilers. But that shudder was there, perhaps your experience has been a smoother one.
None of us will really know what happened to those poor guys. BUT, we as pilots must not jeopardize the safety of passengers, innocents on the ground and our crews by experimenting with the flight envelope. Safe and conservative is what airline pilots should be about.
Oh, and since you probably have the numbers and I don't. What buffet margin charts do you use 1.25 g's or 1.37 g's? just wondering.
safe flying
jon
the world of the internet sometimes does not convey things properly.
Let us both assume we wish safe flying for all.
as far as paying fuel bills, if that is your only concern then you may be misguided. also, in this very complex world of ATC routings, turbulence, wx, passenger comfort and the like I have noticed some interesting things.
One day I had to fly 5 legs in a DC9 unpressurized...10,000 and below. ON every leg I was below normal (altitude) fuel burn and ahead of schedule. WHY? ATC could give us direct at 10k and awful routing at normal altitudes.
Another day the turbulence was so bad at normal flight levels that I flew halfway from BWI to Florida at fl180. On schedule and over by only 300 pounds of fuel. Passengers enjoyed a comfortable flight.
If you think flying at high altitude is the only way to fly a jet, well that is a tiny bit closed minded. Of course if the only plane in the sky was yours, higher is usually better.
AS to the shudder, I hope that pilots of jets climbing out would not use spoilers...unless you mean roll augmentation spoilers. But that shudder was there, perhaps your experience has been a smoother one.
None of us will really know what happened to those poor guys. BUT, we as pilots must not jeopardize the safety of passengers, innocents on the ground and our crews by experimenting with the flight envelope. Safe and conservative is what airline pilots should be about.
Oh, and since you probably have the numbers and I don't. What buffet margin charts do you use 1.25 g's or 1.37 g's? just wondering.
safe flying
jon
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Elliot Moose points out a reality for this particular incident/accident.
This aircraft was at a weight acceptable for maintaining FL410 according to the BBD CL65 Cruise Perf Charts.
It's rumored, not fact, (yet) that the accident crew used V/S, and zoom climbs to "milk" their way to FL410.
As I've already said, you climb in IAS/Mach, not V/S, which for the CRJ is 290/.70
This ensures the advertised performance.
Sitting at FL410 and at M0.59, the accident crew must have thought the aircraft would simply accelerate to 0.74 'somehow' and found themselves instead, out of thrust, losing airspeed which resulted in a stall. Essentially, they got shaker and several pushes from the SPS.
Compounding the problem was their misuse of power during stall recovery which resulted in a core lock of one or both engines causing additional serious problems when they ran the in-flight relight QRH procedures.
It went downhill from there.
This aircraft was at a weight acceptable for maintaining FL410 according to the BBD CL65 Cruise Perf Charts.
It's rumored, not fact, (yet) that the accident crew used V/S, and zoom climbs to "milk" their way to FL410.
As I've already said, you climb in IAS/Mach, not V/S, which for the CRJ is 290/.70
This ensures the advertised performance.
Sitting at FL410 and at M0.59, the accident crew must have thought the aircraft would simply accelerate to 0.74 'somehow' and found themselves instead, out of thrust, losing airspeed which resulted in a stall. Essentially, they got shaker and several pushes from the SPS.
Compounding the problem was their misuse of power during stall recovery which resulted in a core lock of one or both engines causing additional serious problems when they ran the in-flight relight QRH procedures.
It went downhill from there.
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dear willie:
I am glad to see someone use the term, "zoom climb". I've flown with many people who didn't know what this meant. YIKES.
Sadly, I think your scenario is very close to the truth, whatever that finally is.
Sadly too that this crew had not read about a spirit airways MD80 that did the same thing...but the crew recovered.
A zoom climb at too heavy a weight, engines would not produce enough power to accelerate at the higher altitude. Mistakes abound by crew...BUT, they went to firewall power and got an emergency descent of about 6000' recovering to a semblance of normal cruise.
I only knew about this incident because a valued aviation reporter freind contacted me on behalf of a passenger on the flight in question. He wanted to understand what the HECK happened.
It makes sense for modern pilots to learn from the past mistakes of others and have their ''air sense" become alert when they start down the same path.
Conservative flying is the name of the game even if it costs a bit more in fuel prices.
If someone can, will they post the CVR transcript?
To the gentleman(On the Straight and Level?) who speaks of how marketing markets planes. I think you are spot on. I appreciate your candor in this. I have flown some 120 different kinds of planes and of those only perhaps 3 performed as well as the book said it would.
To all reading this thread, take a deep breath and give your self a huge margin in routine operations. While your BEAN COUNTERS may care about an extra 50 gallons of jet fuel used, YOUR PASSENGERS don't give a damn. They want a routine flight.
And if you ferry empty, resist the temptation to fool around in the plane. It is hard, but make the ferry flight routine and boring too.
I'll stand by my previous post regarding dadelus's warning to icarus...and clarify that it is not just altitude, but the whole performance envelope that should be managed with a conservative approach.
Imagine how much better Chicago Midway's recent Southwest over-run would have been handled with a more conservative attitude about performance (tailwind landings.) Even the NTSB said it would take 5300' to stop...and if you look at the approach charts the glideslope would give you just over 4900 feet to stop. The FEDS were right not to count reverse at the dawn of the jet age.
jon
I am glad to see someone use the term, "zoom climb". I've flown with many people who didn't know what this meant. YIKES.
Sadly, I think your scenario is very close to the truth, whatever that finally is.
Sadly too that this crew had not read about a spirit airways MD80 that did the same thing...but the crew recovered.
A zoom climb at too heavy a weight, engines would not produce enough power to accelerate at the higher altitude. Mistakes abound by crew...BUT, they went to firewall power and got an emergency descent of about 6000' recovering to a semblance of normal cruise.
I only knew about this incident because a valued aviation reporter freind contacted me on behalf of a passenger on the flight in question. He wanted to understand what the HECK happened.
It makes sense for modern pilots to learn from the past mistakes of others and have their ''air sense" become alert when they start down the same path.
Conservative flying is the name of the game even if it costs a bit more in fuel prices.
If someone can, will they post the CVR transcript?
To the gentleman(On the Straight and Level?) who speaks of how marketing markets planes. I think you are spot on. I appreciate your candor in this. I have flown some 120 different kinds of planes and of those only perhaps 3 performed as well as the book said it would.
To all reading this thread, take a deep breath and give your self a huge margin in routine operations. While your BEAN COUNTERS may care about an extra 50 gallons of jet fuel used, YOUR PASSENGERS don't give a damn. They want a routine flight.
And if you ferry empty, resist the temptation to fool around in the plane. It is hard, but make the ferry flight routine and boring too.
I'll stand by my previous post regarding dadelus's warning to icarus...and clarify that it is not just altitude, but the whole performance envelope that should be managed with a conservative approach.
Imagine how much better Chicago Midway's recent Southwest over-run would have been handled with a more conservative attitude about performance (tailwind landings.) Even the NTSB said it would take 5300' to stop...and if you look at the approach charts the glideslope would give you just over 4900 feet to stop. The FEDS were right not to count reverse at the dawn of the jet age.
jon
The company which operated the CRJ, Pinnacle, has reportedly turned the CRJ Initial Tng. program into a bear, and the fact that many pilots have quite limited experience makes it much more difficult to get through. The FAA must have turned the place inside out. But sometimes training departments can overreact.
Numerous pilots were fired by the Chief Pilot. I'm acquainted with a guy whose son was fired during training. At least numerous male pilots were fired. The female pilots "allegedly" receive more extra help. This from the wife of an IP at Pinnacle. A different sort of problem involved an unfortunate guy who paid many thousands of dollars in the well-known Gulfstream program. Infamous? The guy, whose case might not be uncommon, flew as B-1900 FO in Florida but rarely flew an instrument approach (how often was he allowed to fly, even in VMC?). That sad tale was related to me while walking up a DFW jetway by a Pinnacle CRJ IP.
Numerous pilots were fired by the Chief Pilot. I'm acquainted with a guy whose son was fired during training. At least numerous male pilots were fired. The female pilots "allegedly" receive more extra help. This from the wife of an IP at Pinnacle. A different sort of problem involved an unfortunate guy who paid many thousands of dollars in the well-known Gulfstream program. Infamous? The guy, whose case might not be uncommon, flew as B-1900 FO in Florida but rarely flew an instrument approach (how often was he allowed to fly, even in VMC?). That sad tale was related to me while walking up a DFW jetway by a Pinnacle CRJ IP.
Last edited by Ignition Override; 22nd Jan 2006 at 06:33.
This thread seems to have drifted into a continuation of the original thread which was started shortly after the crash and has been dormant for some months now. Same arguments being made. For the benefit of those who may not be aware, a public hearing was held by the NTSB June 13-15, 2005. At that time, a rather large body of investigatory work product was placed in the public docket and made available to the public on the NTSB website. Here is the link:
http://www.ntsb.gov/events/2005/Pinn...ts/default.htm
Many of you have examined the data made available there and it is apparent in the more informed posts. For those who have not read it, here is your chance to beef up on the facts as they were known back in June.
But back to subject of this thread. If a trial were held today, with pilots as jurors and the evidence was limited to the contents of the factual reports available now, I think the plaintiffs in this case would be awarded nothing more than human sympathy for their loss.
Fortunately for the legal profession, and to the detriment of society at large, this will never happen. Instead, highly skilled spin-doctors will be allowed to brow-beat lay jurors into a state of sympathetic numbness. If not effectively countered by a cogently presented factual analysis of the causal factors of the accident, then a complete trashing of the character and professionalism of the deceased pilots is the only other alternative. An ugly, uphill battle for the defense. I do not envy them in their task. No, the only good that can come from any of it is that lessons be learned by those who participate in the air transportation industry. Management, trainers and ordinary line pilots can all benefit from examining the root causes of this and any number of other "human factors" related tragedies.
Could the design of the aircraft or it's systems have contributed to the inability of the crew to recover from their self-induced emergency? Perhaps to some degree any airplane or system could be more Murphy-proof. But then, if history is any indication, that does tend to ensure the breeding of newer, better, ever more devious and pernicious Murphys! (apologies to anyone who happens to carry the Murphy name.) The point is that all aircraft must be operated with care and within a design flight envelope. It is up to pilots to do this. They didn't. Why not? I think that is the important question to be addressed. But the civil liability case is concerned with apportioning blame and assigning dollar amounts to the damages incurred by the plaintiffs. The only facts that matter are the ones the Jury chooses to give weight to in their deliberations. They may even award punitive damages if certain legal conditions exist. There is no way to further punish the individuals who had the most opportunity to prevent this accident. They paid the ultimate price for any transgressions committed during their joyride.
I am constantly reminded of the following statement: "Flying, while not inherently dangerous, is terribly unforgiving of any incapacity, carelessness or neglect." This was (to the best of my recollection) the caption inscribed below a picture I once saw of a '20s era biplane crashed and stuck in a lone tree in a fog shrouded field. Just one lone lapse in judgement is all it takes.
Best regards,
Westhawk
http://www.ntsb.gov/events/2005/Pinn...ts/default.htm
Many of you have examined the data made available there and it is apparent in the more informed posts. For those who have not read it, here is your chance to beef up on the facts as they were known back in June.
But back to subject of this thread. If a trial were held today, with pilots as jurors and the evidence was limited to the contents of the factual reports available now, I think the plaintiffs in this case would be awarded nothing more than human sympathy for their loss.
Fortunately for the legal profession, and to the detriment of society at large, this will never happen. Instead, highly skilled spin-doctors will be allowed to brow-beat lay jurors into a state of sympathetic numbness. If not effectively countered by a cogently presented factual analysis of the causal factors of the accident, then a complete trashing of the character and professionalism of the deceased pilots is the only other alternative. An ugly, uphill battle for the defense. I do not envy them in their task. No, the only good that can come from any of it is that lessons be learned by those who participate in the air transportation industry. Management, trainers and ordinary line pilots can all benefit from examining the root causes of this and any number of other "human factors" related tragedies.
Could the design of the aircraft or it's systems have contributed to the inability of the crew to recover from their self-induced emergency? Perhaps to some degree any airplane or system could be more Murphy-proof. But then, if history is any indication, that does tend to ensure the breeding of newer, better, ever more devious and pernicious Murphys! (apologies to anyone who happens to carry the Murphy name.) The point is that all aircraft must be operated with care and within a design flight envelope. It is up to pilots to do this. They didn't. Why not? I think that is the important question to be addressed. But the civil liability case is concerned with apportioning blame and assigning dollar amounts to the damages incurred by the plaintiffs. The only facts that matter are the ones the Jury chooses to give weight to in their deliberations. They may even award punitive damages if certain legal conditions exist. There is no way to further punish the individuals who had the most opportunity to prevent this accident. They paid the ultimate price for any transgressions committed during their joyride.
I am constantly reminded of the following statement: "Flying, while not inherently dangerous, is terribly unforgiving of any incapacity, carelessness or neglect." This was (to the best of my recollection) the caption inscribed below a picture I once saw of a '20s era biplane crashed and stuck in a lone tree in a fog shrouded field. Just one lone lapse in judgement is all it takes.
Best regards,
Westhawk
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Perhaps to some degree any airplane or system could be more Murphy-proof. But then, if history is any indication, that does tend to ensure the breeding of newer, better, ever more devious and pernicious Murphys! (apologies to anyone who happens to carry the Murphy name.)
Barit1:
I wish I could remember where I first heard it so I could give proper attribution. And I prefer the term "borrowed"!
Right you are. I find myself making a variation of this argument whenever I hear someone bashing a particular model of aircraft because of it's perceived shortcomings in range, speed or load carrying capabilities and feel the need to speak up. "In what ways would you have designed it differently?" I might ask. The response invariably describes another current model that meets with their specifications but is more expensive or has some other perceived shortcoming.
If this logic is applied to the design of the CRJ, one can see that this adaptation of the Challenger bizjet design does several things very well with relatively low cost per seat mile being it's most easily recognizable attribute. If making a rapid climb to FL410 was a design goal, they would have selected RR Tays or some engine other than the highly efficient airframe/engine matchup achieved with the CF-34. Even so, it can make 410 if it is flown correctly within it's performance limitations. Light weight, cool air and the stipulated climb profile will improve climb performance. You can't just point the nose at the sky and expect the airplane to comply! Even the F-15 will quit on you if you try to exceed it's design capabilities. It is a shame if the mishandling of an airplane by two pilots out of thousands is allowed to shape the perception of this airplane's design success. And more the shame if Bombardier are punished for the actions of said pilots. As previously stated, their punishment was total. On the other hand, Pinnacle has been and will continue to be the subject of intense scrutiny. I hope some good can come from it.
Best regards,
Westhawk
westhawk, you have stolen the line that I in turn stole from a respected mentor at least 30 years ago.
It is impossible to build the perfect machine - every design is the result of conscious or subconscious compromises. To get a little bit more of this, you give up a liitle bit of that.
If this logic is applied to the design of the CRJ, one can see that this adaptation of the Challenger bizjet design does several things very well with relatively low cost per seat mile being it's most easily recognizable attribute. If making a rapid climb to FL410 was a design goal, they would have selected RR Tays or some engine other than the highly efficient airframe/engine matchup achieved with the CF-34. Even so, it can make 410 if it is flown correctly within it's performance limitations. Light weight, cool air and the stipulated climb profile will improve climb performance. You can't just point the nose at the sky and expect the airplane to comply! Even the F-15 will quit on you if you try to exceed it's design capabilities. It is a shame if the mishandling of an airplane by two pilots out of thousands is allowed to shape the perception of this airplane's design success. And more the shame if Bombardier are punished for the actions of said pilots. As previously stated, their punishment was total. On the other hand, Pinnacle has been and will continue to be the subject of intense scrutiny. I hope some good can come from it.
Best regards,
Westhawk
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Weathawk et al - bollo% ye are talking out of what you sit on
Two guys who were licenced by the authorities, got into a plane which, performance wise, couldnt do anything near what it said on its tin - safely. In fact, it beggars belief that this ac was certified to operate at the flight levels that these two cowboys took it to without special training which nither officer had or were offered.
Realising this, there was a class A CYA (cover your ass) orchestrated by the authorties, with unprecendented "leakes" of precious RT from the doomed flight aimed only at discrediting the actions of the jocks and depicting them as juevineil joy riders. Tell me the last accidient that the public had black box info before the actual investigating team - I smelled a rat from day one and am surprised others havent too. You are being asked to focus on the irresponsibility of the crew (we are just having some fun) to detract from the fact that this ac just wasnt able for its certified FL. I have little respect for the actions of either of the men in this case but they took a perfectly servicable ac to a FL that it should have been able for but was ill equiped to deal with the very special aerodynamic circumstances that are at work there.
Test pilots testified at the time that this model had no place being above 35000 ft without the pilots having special training and as such, was a accidient waiting to happen if it did. Well we have had the accidient so could we now please bring the desk jockies that mis represented its capabilities brought to book and in particular the desk jockies who blindly accepted these figures, or more specifically, ignored the obvious deficiencies of the craft.
May they rest in peace.
Two guys who were licenced by the authorities, got into a plane which, performance wise, couldnt do anything near what it said on its tin - safely. In fact, it beggars belief that this ac was certified to operate at the flight levels that these two cowboys took it to without special training which nither officer had or were offered.
Realising this, there was a class A CYA (cover your ass) orchestrated by the authorties, with unprecendented "leakes" of precious RT from the doomed flight aimed only at discrediting the actions of the jocks and depicting them as juevineil joy riders. Tell me the last accidient that the public had black box info before the actual investigating team - I smelled a rat from day one and am surprised others havent too. You are being asked to focus on the irresponsibility of the crew (we are just having some fun) to detract from the fact that this ac just wasnt able for its certified FL. I have little respect for the actions of either of the men in this case but they took a perfectly servicable ac to a FL that it should have been able for but was ill equiped to deal with the very special aerodynamic circumstances that are at work there.
Test pilots testified at the time that this model had no place being above 35000 ft without the pilots having special training and as such, was a accidient waiting to happen if it did. Well we have had the accidient so could we now please bring the desk jockies that mis represented its capabilities brought to book and in particular the desk jockies who blindly accepted these figures, or more specifically, ignored the obvious deficiencies of the craft.
May they rest in peace.
Last edited by Ryan_not_fair; 22nd Jan 2006 at 23:45.
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there really seem to be two schools of thought...defenders of the plane and defenders of the crew.
I've been in flying 30 years. I had never heard of ''core lock'' before this crash.
also, I have used the phrase, "having a little fun" on the RT (that is radio telephone to you americans! (of which I am one))
during the time I was having a little fun, I wasn't exploring the flight envelope, I was flying the passengers over Niagra Falls enroute to Toronto.
I know the dc9 I used to fly had a dual engine flameout checklist and we even did glide landings ( both engines failed in the sim) to DCA (washington national airport)
jon
I've been in flying 30 years. I had never heard of ''core lock'' before this crash.
also, I have used the phrase, "having a little fun" on the RT (that is radio telephone to you americans! (of which I am one))
during the time I was having a little fun, I wasn't exploring the flight envelope, I was flying the passengers over Niagra Falls enroute to Toronto.
I know the dc9 I used to fly had a dual engine flameout checklist and we even did glide landings ( both engines failed in the sim) to DCA (washington national airport)
jon
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Two guys who were licenced by the authorities, got into a plane which, performance wise, couldnt do anything near what it said on its tin - safely
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Good observation j9. There are indeed two schools and I am clearly a defender of the crew. They got into an coffin which the defenders of the aircraft new it couldnt do what they said it could. Jesus, this is corporate manipulation gone mad. If you need special training to control an ac at fl410 then thats one thing. Why wasnt there an SOP preventing crew from going to or accepting a clearance to fl410 if they werent trained. The atc controller on the night was so surprised to have this a/c type requesting 410 that he remarked on it - no one had ever gone there before on his watch and he was surprised by it. I'm not defending the crew who were clearly pushing the envelope of there own capability but I am sure that they had blind confidence in the aircraft. I hold a licence to fly an a/c from one airport to another and approach the destination at the published minimums, but it dosent mean that I exercise that previlage at every opportunity. Infact, more often than not I decline it but when I opt to accept an approach into an airport which is operating at mins, I do so in the knowledge that a strip of asphelt will await me if I trust the instruments and fly the approach. There is no difference to this and expecting the a/c to behave as I was told it would during my type rating - these guys were lied to cause it didnt. . These guys were told that the a/c could do what they were asking of it and it clearly couldnt.
Sue the bastards for every penny
Sue the bastards for every penny
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Damn right. Its called PHYSICS. I presume you don't have a problem with the idea that a max certificated take off weight is often higher than the take off performance limited take off weight? So why do you have problem with the idea that a max certificated ceiling is not achievable on every flight? It's simple common sense and that common sense has been keeping people alive since Pontius was a pilot.