Cypriot airliner crash - the accident and investigation
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The Cypriot investigation continues with testimony from the former Civial Aviation official [from Cyprus Mail online edition of today]:
Former civil aviation official claims gross negligence
By Elias Hazou
A FORMER official with Civil Aviation yesterday fingered the department for apathy and lack of professional ethos, saying these played a big part in last year’s crash of a Cypriot airliner.
Charalambos Hadjigeorgiou, ex-director of the Civil Aviation’s licensing department-turned whistleblower, was testifying to a committee of inquiry in Nicosia tasked with finding liability for the disaster that cost the lives of 121 people.
In its second day of proceedings, the committee, headed by former Supreme Court judge Panayiotis Kallis, heard claims that negligence was the order of the day in the corridors of Civil Aviation, the department whose job it is to ensure air safety.
Not one to pull any punches, Hadjigeorgiou named persons in key positions who carried out their duties negligently and in a slipshod manner.
The department was characterised by an absence of discipline, he claimed.
And even though the many problems – such as insufficient manpower – were known to the people in charge and often brought up at meetings, nothing was done to remedy the situation.
For example, a proposal to hire more staff fell by the wayside.
But more alarmingly, Hadjigeorgiou accused, no in-flight checks were ever carried out aboard the ill-fated Boeing 737, despite repeated incidents of falling temperatures inside the cabin.
On Monday, a stewardess told the committee that the aircraft had experienced some problems during a flight to London just one day before the crash. She said ice had accumulated on the cabin door, adding that passengers had been complaining that they were cold, forcing the pilot to switch on the heating, adding that a funny noise could be heard during take off and landing.
It has also transpired that on the fateful day, the last man to have had contact with the pilot of the plane was an unqualified stand-in, as the proper official had been on night-shift duty.
Hadjigeorgiou also alleged that Civil Aviation was biased in favour of Helios Airways at the expense of other airlines.
For instance, he said, charter firm Eurocypria had on one occasion asked for permission to hire two American aviators, but their request was denied. By contrast, Helios had no problem hiring five pilots, even though they did not have EU licences, Hadjigeorgiou maintained.
Worse, Hadjigeorgiou said, Civil Aviation was deliberately misleading EU air safety authorities by painting a rosy picture of the department, when that was anything but.
In one case, he had personally asked permission to set up a helicopter school based at Paphos airport, and his request was immediately granted. At the time – around August 2003 – Hadjigeorgiou was not even employed at Civil Aviation. Yet this did not stop officials there from passing him off as the head of the ‘new unit’, giving a false and exaggerated impression of his position.
This was done to con foreign air safety authorities into thinking that Cyprus’ Civil Aviation was a robust organisation, he claimed.
Hadjigeorgiou’s indictments were promptly seized upon by the victims’ relatives, who said their worst fears were coming true.
Nicolas Yiasoumis, who heads a committee representing the aggrieved relatives, yesterday described Hadjigeorgiou’s statements as “a most official… confirmation of the problems we suspected [with Civil Aviation].
“It’s sad because the department was burying its head in the sand. To this day, they are plagued by the same problems,” Yiasoumis said.
Civil Aviation is just one of the organisations the relatives are blaming for the disaster. Manufacturers Boeing are also being sued in the United States for a string of alleged construction flaws on the 737-300.
“Those in responsible positions need to feel the weight of the chairs they’re sitting on…they must realise this is not just another desk job,” added Yiasoumis.
The report on the causes of the crash is due out sometime next month. It is believed that a combination of decompression problems and pilot errors caused the plane to fly unpiloted for almost three hours before running out of fuel and crashing just north of Athens.
One mystery that continues to baffle is why the pilots continued their ascent beyond 10,000 feet, evidently ignoring a possible decompression warning that sounded just minutes into the flight.
Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006
Former civil aviation official claims gross negligence
By Elias Hazou
A FORMER official with Civil Aviation yesterday fingered the department for apathy and lack of professional ethos, saying these played a big part in last year’s crash of a Cypriot airliner.
Charalambos Hadjigeorgiou, ex-director of the Civil Aviation’s licensing department-turned whistleblower, was testifying to a committee of inquiry in Nicosia tasked with finding liability for the disaster that cost the lives of 121 people.
In its second day of proceedings, the committee, headed by former Supreme Court judge Panayiotis Kallis, heard claims that negligence was the order of the day in the corridors of Civil Aviation, the department whose job it is to ensure air safety.
Not one to pull any punches, Hadjigeorgiou named persons in key positions who carried out their duties negligently and in a slipshod manner.
The department was characterised by an absence of discipline, he claimed.
And even though the many problems – such as insufficient manpower – were known to the people in charge and often brought up at meetings, nothing was done to remedy the situation.
For example, a proposal to hire more staff fell by the wayside.
But more alarmingly, Hadjigeorgiou accused, no in-flight checks were ever carried out aboard the ill-fated Boeing 737, despite repeated incidents of falling temperatures inside the cabin.
On Monday, a stewardess told the committee that the aircraft had experienced some problems during a flight to London just one day before the crash. She said ice had accumulated on the cabin door, adding that passengers had been complaining that they were cold, forcing the pilot to switch on the heating, adding that a funny noise could be heard during take off and landing.
It has also transpired that on the fateful day, the last man to have had contact with the pilot of the plane was an unqualified stand-in, as the proper official had been on night-shift duty.
Hadjigeorgiou also alleged that Civil Aviation was biased in favour of Helios Airways at the expense of other airlines.
For instance, he said, charter firm Eurocypria had on one occasion asked for permission to hire two American aviators, but their request was denied. By contrast, Helios had no problem hiring five pilots, even though they did not have EU licences, Hadjigeorgiou maintained.
Worse, Hadjigeorgiou said, Civil Aviation was deliberately misleading EU air safety authorities by painting a rosy picture of the department, when that was anything but.
In one case, he had personally asked permission to set up a helicopter school based at Paphos airport, and his request was immediately granted. At the time – around August 2003 – Hadjigeorgiou was not even employed at Civil Aviation. Yet this did not stop officials there from passing him off as the head of the ‘new unit’, giving a false and exaggerated impression of his position.
This was done to con foreign air safety authorities into thinking that Cyprus’ Civil Aviation was a robust organisation, he claimed.
Hadjigeorgiou’s indictments were promptly seized upon by the victims’ relatives, who said their worst fears were coming true.
Nicolas Yiasoumis, who heads a committee representing the aggrieved relatives, yesterday described Hadjigeorgiou’s statements as “a most official… confirmation of the problems we suspected [with Civil Aviation].
“It’s sad because the department was burying its head in the sand. To this day, they are plagued by the same problems,” Yiasoumis said.
Civil Aviation is just one of the organisations the relatives are blaming for the disaster. Manufacturers Boeing are also being sued in the United States for a string of alleged construction flaws on the 737-300.
“Those in responsible positions need to feel the weight of the chairs they’re sitting on…they must realise this is not just another desk job,” added Yiasoumis.
The report on the causes of the crash is due out sometime next month. It is believed that a combination of decompression problems and pilot errors caused the plane to fly unpiloted for almost three hours before running out of fuel and crashing just north of Athens.
One mystery that continues to baffle is why the pilots continued their ascent beyond 10,000 feet, evidently ignoring a possible decompression warning that sounded just minutes into the flight.
Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006
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Continuation of testimony of the former Cyprus Aviation official [from today's Cyprus Mail online edition]:
Civil Aviation in the dock in Helios probe
By Elias Hazou
FRESH allegations were brought up yesterday against Civil Aviation before the committee of inquiry that is looking into responsibility for last August’s Helios air disaster.
Former CA official Charalambos Hadjigeorgiou picked up right where he left off on Tuesday, painting a picture of a corrupt department interested only in keeping up appearances.
Without mincing his words, Hadjigeorgiou cited one compelling anecdote after another to show the CA was cutting corners when it came to air safety – and in the process fooling the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA).
As a member of the JAA (Joint Aviation Authorities), Cyprus is obliged to maintain common safety regulatory standards and procedures. But the reality was very different, Hadjigeorgiou claimed.
But even more alarmingly, the CA was affording Helios Airways – the airline in the spotlight –preferential treatment.
In one instance, Helios asked to lease a plane from Egypt. Even though no airworthiness tests were carried out on the aircraft, the CA granted Helios a licence to fly it, he claimed.
According to Hadjigeorgiou, a team of CA officials had travelled to Egypt to inspect the plane, but for some reason never got to actually see it. Nevertheless, on their return to Cyprus they approved the licence.
Hadjigeorgiou said this was just one example of being blindsided by his colleagues: he himself did not make the trip, nor was he kept informed on the case.
“I heard it from the news,” he said.
But more drama unfolded before the cameras at the committee hearing yesterday, when its chairman Panayiotis Kallis unveiled official correspondence regarding the “Egyptian incident”.
Kallis presented a letter by the Transport Ministry’s permanent secretary Makis Constantinides, who was asking for clarifications about the trip.
The response from the former deputy director of Civil Aviation was that the department had received verbal instructions from Transport Minister Harris Thrassou to accommodate Helios.
The revelation caused uproar in the room, with the victims’ relatives wasting no time in calling for the minister’s resignation.
But their demands were swiftly brushed aside later in the day, when Government Spokesman Christodoulos Pashardis cautioned against a trial by media.
Seen as a stool pigeon by his ex-colleagues, Hadjigeorgiou said the CA pulled out all the stops to convince EASA that it was up to scratch. One allegedly dodgy practice was for the department to replenish manpower for its SRU (Safety Regulation Unit) from the broader civil service, especially whenever an inspection was imminent.
That was done, Hadjigeorgiou contended, to keep European air safety authorities off the CA’s back.
At that point, Kallis asked him what was behind these attempts to trick EASA.
“Personal interests were at stake,” Hadjigeorgiou replied, hinting at politics and clash of personalities within the department.
Speaking to reporters after the hearing adjourned for the day, the victims’ relatives were livid with the allegations of gross negligence.
“It seems Mr Thrasou was trying to expedite the lease [of the Egyptian plane] and save money. I don’t understand why Mr Thrasou is so keen to help Helios,” said Nicolas Yiasoumis, who heads a committee representing the relatives.
“As far as the plane that crashed is concerned, it was a flying coffin that killed 121 souls,” he added.
To the families and friends of those who perished aboard the Boeing 737, the Transport Ministry is, by association, also responsible for the tragedy.
Yesterday’s deliberations before the committee of inquiry served to fuel speculation that Helios and Civil Aviation were in cahoots, in the sense the two jointly tried to sweep under the rug glaring safety omissions.
In this climate of recriminations and raging passions, every bit of information that comes out has tended to be hyped up and blown out of proportion, and this even before the release of the final report into what caused the crash.
Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006
Civil Aviation in the dock in Helios probe
By Elias Hazou
FRESH allegations were brought up yesterday against Civil Aviation before the committee of inquiry that is looking into responsibility for last August’s Helios air disaster.
Former CA official Charalambos Hadjigeorgiou picked up right where he left off on Tuesday, painting a picture of a corrupt department interested only in keeping up appearances.
Without mincing his words, Hadjigeorgiou cited one compelling anecdote after another to show the CA was cutting corners when it came to air safety – and in the process fooling the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA).
As a member of the JAA (Joint Aviation Authorities), Cyprus is obliged to maintain common safety regulatory standards and procedures. But the reality was very different, Hadjigeorgiou claimed.
But even more alarmingly, the CA was affording Helios Airways – the airline in the spotlight –preferential treatment.
In one instance, Helios asked to lease a plane from Egypt. Even though no airworthiness tests were carried out on the aircraft, the CA granted Helios a licence to fly it, he claimed.
According to Hadjigeorgiou, a team of CA officials had travelled to Egypt to inspect the plane, but for some reason never got to actually see it. Nevertheless, on their return to Cyprus they approved the licence.
Hadjigeorgiou said this was just one example of being blindsided by his colleagues: he himself did not make the trip, nor was he kept informed on the case.
“I heard it from the news,” he said.
But more drama unfolded before the cameras at the committee hearing yesterday, when its chairman Panayiotis Kallis unveiled official correspondence regarding the “Egyptian incident”.
Kallis presented a letter by the Transport Ministry’s permanent secretary Makis Constantinides, who was asking for clarifications about the trip.
The response from the former deputy director of Civil Aviation was that the department had received verbal instructions from Transport Minister Harris Thrassou to accommodate Helios.
The revelation caused uproar in the room, with the victims’ relatives wasting no time in calling for the minister’s resignation.
But their demands were swiftly brushed aside later in the day, when Government Spokesman Christodoulos Pashardis cautioned against a trial by media.
Seen as a stool pigeon by his ex-colleagues, Hadjigeorgiou said the CA pulled out all the stops to convince EASA that it was up to scratch. One allegedly dodgy practice was for the department to replenish manpower for its SRU (Safety Regulation Unit) from the broader civil service, especially whenever an inspection was imminent.
That was done, Hadjigeorgiou contended, to keep European air safety authorities off the CA’s back.
At that point, Kallis asked him what was behind these attempts to trick EASA.
“Personal interests were at stake,” Hadjigeorgiou replied, hinting at politics and clash of personalities within the department.
Speaking to reporters after the hearing adjourned for the day, the victims’ relatives were livid with the allegations of gross negligence.
“It seems Mr Thrasou was trying to expedite the lease [of the Egyptian plane] and save money. I don’t understand why Mr Thrasou is so keen to help Helios,” said Nicolas Yiasoumis, who heads a committee representing the relatives.
“As far as the plane that crashed is concerned, it was a flying coffin that killed 121 souls,” he added.
To the families and friends of those who perished aboard the Boeing 737, the Transport Ministry is, by association, also responsible for the tragedy.
Yesterday’s deliberations before the committee of inquiry served to fuel speculation that Helios and Civil Aviation were in cahoots, in the sense the two jointly tried to sweep under the rug glaring safety omissions.
In this climate of recriminations and raging passions, every bit of information that comes out has tended to be hyped up and blown out of proportion, and this even before the release of the final report into what caused the crash.
Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006
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At least we now know what happened to the co-pilot's diary; this from today's Cyprus Mail online:
Late pilot’s son accuses Helios
By Elias Hazou
THERE was more tension yesterday at Nicosia’s International Conference Centre, the venue of the hearings into last August’s air disaster.
The highlight of the day was the testimony of Ioannis Charalambous, son of Pambos Charalambous, co-pilot aboard the downed plane.
Charalambous submitted to the committee of inquiry his father’s diary, in which the deceased pilot voiced grave concerns about the airline.
At one point, he had jotted down: “If all the things I know were to come out, the airline would surely close.”
Charalambous told the committee how his father would often share these misgivings and complaints with his colleagues.
He said his father was so frustrated he began seeking employment elsewhere, for example with a Hong Kong-based airline.
In his notes, Pambos Charalambous had referred in detail to an inbound flight from Tel Aviv (August 2004), when a series of technical glitches occurred aboard the plane.
Tempers flared in the room as the victims’ relatives heard what seemed to be recurring problems with Helios’ planes that were never addressed.
The lawyer for Helios Airways, Demetris Araouzos, suggested that the late pilot’s worries were exaggerated – that Charalambous tended to hype things up out of sour grapes.
Araouzos mentioned, for example, how Charalambous had once been turned down for a job with Helios before actually being hired.
He next questioned the witness’ credibility, wondering why Charalambous flew with Helios just two weeks after the accident.
“Was this trip some kind of reward for the very company you are now accusing?” Araouzos challenged.
“I had just lost my father. I wasn’t in a position to hold anyone responsible. I went [with Helios] for sentimental reasons,” offered Charalambous.
Earlier, Sofia Savvidou, an administrative officer at the Transport Ministry, told the committee of steps taken since the accident to upgrade Civil Aviation, such as the hiring of five extra airplane inspectors.
The last witness of the day was Georgios Michaelides, head of Helios’ Flying Personnel Department. He said that 15 aircrew had resigned from the company since last August’s disaster, but did not have details on these people when asked by the committee.
Michaelides will resume his testimony today.
Last week the committee heard from a former Civil Aviation official and Helios staff. The hearings got under way even as the probe into the causes of the crash has yet to be released.
Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006
Late pilot’s son accuses Helios
By Elias Hazou
THERE was more tension yesterday at Nicosia’s International Conference Centre, the venue of the hearings into last August’s air disaster.
The highlight of the day was the testimony of Ioannis Charalambous, son of Pambos Charalambous, co-pilot aboard the downed plane.
Charalambous submitted to the committee of inquiry his father’s diary, in which the deceased pilot voiced grave concerns about the airline.
At one point, he had jotted down: “If all the things I know were to come out, the airline would surely close.”
Charalambous told the committee how his father would often share these misgivings and complaints with his colleagues.
He said his father was so frustrated he began seeking employment elsewhere, for example with a Hong Kong-based airline.
In his notes, Pambos Charalambous had referred in detail to an inbound flight from Tel Aviv (August 2004), when a series of technical glitches occurred aboard the plane.
Tempers flared in the room as the victims’ relatives heard what seemed to be recurring problems with Helios’ planes that were never addressed.
The lawyer for Helios Airways, Demetris Araouzos, suggested that the late pilot’s worries were exaggerated – that Charalambous tended to hype things up out of sour grapes.
Araouzos mentioned, for example, how Charalambous had once been turned down for a job with Helios before actually being hired.
He next questioned the witness’ credibility, wondering why Charalambous flew with Helios just two weeks after the accident.
“Was this trip some kind of reward for the very company you are now accusing?” Araouzos challenged.
“I had just lost my father. I wasn’t in a position to hold anyone responsible. I went [with Helios] for sentimental reasons,” offered Charalambous.
Earlier, Sofia Savvidou, an administrative officer at the Transport Ministry, told the committee of steps taken since the accident to upgrade Civil Aviation, such as the hiring of five extra airplane inspectors.
The last witness of the day was Georgios Michaelides, head of Helios’ Flying Personnel Department. He said that 15 aircrew had resigned from the company since last August’s disaster, but did not have details on these people when asked by the committee.
Michaelides will resume his testimony today.
Last week the committee heard from a former Civil Aviation official and Helios staff. The hearings got under way even as the probe into the causes of the crash has yet to be released.
Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006
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A/P automated ALT re-clearance
As I wrote one year ago this incident has been an insult to the aviation industry research to the safety.
We all know the danger and the benefits of the high altitude flying and oxygen is there to supply the people during those 20-25 minutes more than enough time necessary to descend 30,000 feet.
Dual oxygen system is fitted on our aircraft to secure the crew segregation with a separate Oxygen supply (if you test properly, as you should, the mask before departure to be sure that the system in operative)
How come that an FMS/Autopilot system that is able to perform an auto land is unable to detect abnormal cabin ALT over and extended logical time? How come we do not have CAB ALT able to deploy PASS OXY at 14,000 automatically that is unable to set a different alarm if the clime continues? That is what I call and insult to this technology design.
How simple to design a software that will “re-clear” the autopilot to descend to safe ALT or to prevent a further climb. This is what I hope to read in the tech magazine or aviation publication. All those unnecessary deaths will be better remembered as contribute of the Aeronautical science.
I am truly amazed and surprised to read that after Golfer Payne and the Cyprus disaster still airplane can’t recover from a dual crew incapacitation.
We all know the danger and the benefits of the high altitude flying and oxygen is there to supply the people during those 20-25 minutes more than enough time necessary to descend 30,000 feet.
Dual oxygen system is fitted on our aircraft to secure the crew segregation with a separate Oxygen supply (if you test properly, as you should, the mask before departure to be sure that the system in operative)
How come that an FMS/Autopilot system that is able to perform an auto land is unable to detect abnormal cabin ALT over and extended logical time? How come we do not have CAB ALT able to deploy PASS OXY at 14,000 automatically that is unable to set a different alarm if the clime continues? That is what I call and insult to this technology design.
How simple to design a software that will “re-clear” the autopilot to descend to safe ALT or to prevent a further climb. This is what I hope to read in the tech magazine or aviation publication. All those unnecessary deaths will be better remembered as contribute of the Aeronautical science.
I am truly amazed and surprised to read that after Golfer Payne and the Cyprus disaster still airplane can’t recover from a dual crew incapacitation.
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Testimony from the Cypriot investigation continues, with the following recap of yesterday's proceedings (from Cyprus Mail online):
‘These people are going to kill us’
By Elias Hazou
A HOST of flight attendants paraded yesterday before the Helios committee of inquiry, some telling harrowing stories of their experiences with the airline, others saying that all was well.
Former stewardess Louiza Polemitou testified that she and her colleagues had a sense of dread whenever their flight came up.
“We flew with out heart in our mouth,” she told the committee.
The crew was particularly concerned about the plane named Olympia, which crashed last August in Grammatikos, outside Athens, killing all 121 onboard.
According to Polemitou, there were frequent instances of ice accumulating on the rear door hatch. And often, the temperature on the plane was not regulated – it was either too cold or too hot.
Once, on an inbound flight from Warsaw, the late co-pilot Pambos Charalambous, who died in the subsequent disaster, got out of his seat and headed to the back of the plane to check.
“After looking at the ice on the hatch, he turned to me and said ominously, ‘These people are going to kill us’,” Polemitou testified.
The aviator was understood to be referring to the company.
Polemitou then recounted what her fianc? Zacharias Herodotou – also a flight attendant at the time – told her about another flight on August 13, 2005, just a day before the tragedy.
It was a Larnaca to Heathrow journey and while on the ground Herodotou noticed a strong smell on board. He asked a mechanic to check it out, and the mechanic found nothing at fault, giving the green light for takeoff.
The mechanic surmised that the smell came from burnt food. But Herodotou had a sneaking suspicion that it was burnt cables.
Polemitou went on to complain of the staff’s treatment by Helios. On the same day the accident happened, she was travelling aboard another plane headed to Scotland. The airline had failed to notify her family about her status, resulting in her relatives frantically trying to reach her on the phone.
“When they finally got through to me, they were beside themselves with worry. They told me what had just happened. I was shocked. I sat down and wept on the plane,” she said.
“I’m ashamed and embarrassed for having worked in this company.”
In response to a question from the committee, Polemitou said that all flight attendants knew the pin-code giving access to the cockpit. This was company policy.
There is a great deal of speculation why flight attendant Andreas Prodromou, the man believed to have tried to fly the doomed plane towards the end, took so long to enter the cockpit.
The hearings continued with the testimony of senior flight attendant Ermis Christodoulou, still employed with Helios. He said that on three flights he had felt nauseous, but other than that nothing out of the ordinary.
Christodoulou had a more subdued take on the situation, saying that the problems occurring on Helios flights were common to all airlines in the world.
But he also said he often heard a whistling sound coming from the plane’s hatch.
Marios Hardjiotis, lawyer for the victims’ relatives, asked Christodoulou whether, in his view, the whistling had anything to do with the crash.
“It’s likely,” offered Christodoulou.
For her part, flight attendant Sofia Raptopoulou said she never experienced problems during flights. She resigned from the company for “psychological reasons”.
Committee chairman Panayiotis Kallis, a former Supreme Court judge, then read out a document stating that 56 flight attendants testified to police about air conditioning problems on the plane, while 35 made no mention of that or any other major problems.
Giorgos Michaelides, head of the Flying Personnel Department at Helios, testified that senior flight attendant Alexia Gerolemou was unpopular with her colleagues, who accused her of “inappropriate behaviour”.
But he added Gerolemou was probably the only flight attendant who bothered to submit memos about flight safety.
For example, she once filed a report about an engineer who was drunk while on duty. In another case, she spoke of certain flight attendants who did not have the necessary knowledge of flight safety issues.
In response to a question from the committee chairman, Michaelides denied that Gerolemou was something of a black sheep in the company because she spoke her mind.
Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006
‘These people are going to kill us’
By Elias Hazou
A HOST of flight attendants paraded yesterday before the Helios committee of inquiry, some telling harrowing stories of their experiences with the airline, others saying that all was well.
Former stewardess Louiza Polemitou testified that she and her colleagues had a sense of dread whenever their flight came up.
“We flew with out heart in our mouth,” she told the committee.
The crew was particularly concerned about the plane named Olympia, which crashed last August in Grammatikos, outside Athens, killing all 121 onboard.
According to Polemitou, there were frequent instances of ice accumulating on the rear door hatch. And often, the temperature on the plane was not regulated – it was either too cold or too hot.
Once, on an inbound flight from Warsaw, the late co-pilot Pambos Charalambous, who died in the subsequent disaster, got out of his seat and headed to the back of the plane to check.
“After looking at the ice on the hatch, he turned to me and said ominously, ‘These people are going to kill us’,” Polemitou testified.
The aviator was understood to be referring to the company.
Polemitou then recounted what her fianc? Zacharias Herodotou – also a flight attendant at the time – told her about another flight on August 13, 2005, just a day before the tragedy.
It was a Larnaca to Heathrow journey and while on the ground Herodotou noticed a strong smell on board. He asked a mechanic to check it out, and the mechanic found nothing at fault, giving the green light for takeoff.
The mechanic surmised that the smell came from burnt food. But Herodotou had a sneaking suspicion that it was burnt cables.
Polemitou went on to complain of the staff’s treatment by Helios. On the same day the accident happened, she was travelling aboard another plane headed to Scotland. The airline had failed to notify her family about her status, resulting in her relatives frantically trying to reach her on the phone.
“When they finally got through to me, they were beside themselves with worry. They told me what had just happened. I was shocked. I sat down and wept on the plane,” she said.
“I’m ashamed and embarrassed for having worked in this company.”
In response to a question from the committee, Polemitou said that all flight attendants knew the pin-code giving access to the cockpit. This was company policy.
There is a great deal of speculation why flight attendant Andreas Prodromou, the man believed to have tried to fly the doomed plane towards the end, took so long to enter the cockpit.
The hearings continued with the testimony of senior flight attendant Ermis Christodoulou, still employed with Helios. He said that on three flights he had felt nauseous, but other than that nothing out of the ordinary.
Christodoulou had a more subdued take on the situation, saying that the problems occurring on Helios flights were common to all airlines in the world.
But he also said he often heard a whistling sound coming from the plane’s hatch.
Marios Hardjiotis, lawyer for the victims’ relatives, asked Christodoulou whether, in his view, the whistling had anything to do with the crash.
“It’s likely,” offered Christodoulou.
For her part, flight attendant Sofia Raptopoulou said she never experienced problems during flights. She resigned from the company for “psychological reasons”.
Committee chairman Panayiotis Kallis, a former Supreme Court judge, then read out a document stating that 56 flight attendants testified to police about air conditioning problems on the plane, while 35 made no mention of that or any other major problems.
Giorgos Michaelides, head of the Flying Personnel Department at Helios, testified that senior flight attendant Alexia Gerolemou was unpopular with her colleagues, who accused her of “inappropriate behaviour”.
But he added Gerolemou was probably the only flight attendant who bothered to submit memos about flight safety.
For example, she once filed a report about an engineer who was drunk while on duty. In another case, she spoke of certain flight attendants who did not have the necessary knowledge of flight safety issues.
In response to a question from the committee chairman, Michaelides denied that Gerolemou was something of a black sheep in the company because she spoke her mind.
Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006
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Helios pilot testifies during the Cypriot inquiry [Cyprus Mail online edition of 7 September]:
‘Pilots wasted time contacting ground’
By Elias Hazou
THE TWO men flying the Olympia shoulder a great deal of the blame for last August’s crash that killed 121 people, a pilot told the Helios committee of inquiry yesterday.
Captain Robert Lascelles, still employed with ajet – the successor airline to Helios – said the pilots of flight ZU522 wasted valuable time in troubleshooting and contacting ground engineers while their plane rapidly lost pressure.
“The first action they should have taken was put on their oxygen masks. It’s also important that you try to control the depressurisation. You need to shut the airflow valve, then switch the decompression system to manual. That way a pilot can control the airflow. Also, you must lower the plane and drop the oxygen masks in the passenger cabin.”
According to Lascelles, the time of useful consciousness (TUC) at 35,000 feet is 12 to 15 seconds. Pilots therefore need to act quickly and bring the aircraft down to 10,000 feet as soon as possible.
TUC is the amount of time an individual is able to perform flying duties efficiently in an environment of inadequate oxygen supply.
In Lascelles’ opinion, instead of contacting the ground, captain Hans-Jurgen Mertin should have automatically gone through the above procedures.
“It’s unusual that they did what they did. Perhaps it was because they were at a high altitide and were feeling the effects of hypoxia,” he said.
“All pilots are trained for a disastrous event at high altitude. If they had done what I just mentioned, the outcome would have been different.”
Lascelles said that in the aviation industry all Boeing 737s are widely known or rumoured to have decompression problems. At the same time though, pilots are specially trained to cope with such hitches.
He cited a personal experience, during an inbound flight fromWarsaw. Lascelles faced a depressurisation problem, but went through the standard steps and landed safely.
Asked by committee chairman Panayiotis Kallis whether he had called engineers for assistance, the aviator replied in the negative.
“The first thing that happens during decompression at a high altitude is that you have intense pain in the ears, frost and moisture on the plane. Simultaneously, the ‘horn’ will sound.”
Lascelles dismissed speculation that an engineer had left the decompression switch on manual before takeoff.
If that were the case, he said, the passengers would have felt unbearable pain in the ears as soon as the engines throttled.
This scenario was therefore an impossibility.
Lascelles informed the committee that there are three types of decompression: explosive, fast and slow. Explosive decompression is the most dangerous, and pilots must react to it “in a split second”.
He was next quizzed about the late captain Mertin, of whom much has been reported in the media.
Lascelles said he had known Mertin while working together with another airline. Mertin was fired at some point for not complying with company protocol.
Apparently the German did not mend his wayward ways after joining Helios.
“They called him in to talk about certain problems and compliance with procedures, but they gave him a last chance. I believe he tried. They told him, ‘one more mistake and you’re out’,” said Lascelles.
He never flew with Mertin at Helios, since both were captains. However, other co-pilots – including Pambos Charalambous – were concerned with doubling up with him.
The next witness of the day was Alexia Gerolemou, formerly a senior flight attendant with Helios Airways.
Gerolemou insisted that recurrent problems in technical checks, staff training and organization were not addressed.
She said that the airline would often leave it to the last minute to fix technical glitches on planes.
The committee also heard yesterday from Christos Neocleous, a lawyer for Libra Holidays Group, owners of the airline.
Neocleous, who played an integral part in the company’s controversial name-change to ajet, rebutted suggestions the airline was cutting costs that affected safety.
Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006
‘Pilots wasted time contacting ground’
By Elias Hazou
THE TWO men flying the Olympia shoulder a great deal of the blame for last August’s crash that killed 121 people, a pilot told the Helios committee of inquiry yesterday.
Captain Robert Lascelles, still employed with ajet – the successor airline to Helios – said the pilots of flight ZU522 wasted valuable time in troubleshooting and contacting ground engineers while their plane rapidly lost pressure.
“The first action they should have taken was put on their oxygen masks. It’s also important that you try to control the depressurisation. You need to shut the airflow valve, then switch the decompression system to manual. That way a pilot can control the airflow. Also, you must lower the plane and drop the oxygen masks in the passenger cabin.”
According to Lascelles, the time of useful consciousness (TUC) at 35,000 feet is 12 to 15 seconds. Pilots therefore need to act quickly and bring the aircraft down to 10,000 feet as soon as possible.
TUC is the amount of time an individual is able to perform flying duties efficiently in an environment of inadequate oxygen supply.
In Lascelles’ opinion, instead of contacting the ground, captain Hans-Jurgen Mertin should have automatically gone through the above procedures.
“It’s unusual that they did what they did. Perhaps it was because they were at a high altitide and were feeling the effects of hypoxia,” he said.
“All pilots are trained for a disastrous event at high altitude. If they had done what I just mentioned, the outcome would have been different.”
Lascelles said that in the aviation industry all Boeing 737s are widely known or rumoured to have decompression problems. At the same time though, pilots are specially trained to cope with such hitches.
He cited a personal experience, during an inbound flight fromWarsaw. Lascelles faced a depressurisation problem, but went through the standard steps and landed safely.
Asked by committee chairman Panayiotis Kallis whether he had called engineers for assistance, the aviator replied in the negative.
“The first thing that happens during decompression at a high altitude is that you have intense pain in the ears, frost and moisture on the plane. Simultaneously, the ‘horn’ will sound.”
Lascelles dismissed speculation that an engineer had left the decompression switch on manual before takeoff.
If that were the case, he said, the passengers would have felt unbearable pain in the ears as soon as the engines throttled.
This scenario was therefore an impossibility.
Lascelles informed the committee that there are three types of decompression: explosive, fast and slow. Explosive decompression is the most dangerous, and pilots must react to it “in a split second”.
He was next quizzed about the late captain Mertin, of whom much has been reported in the media.
Lascelles said he had known Mertin while working together with another airline. Mertin was fired at some point for not complying with company protocol.
Apparently the German did not mend his wayward ways after joining Helios.
“They called him in to talk about certain problems and compliance with procedures, but they gave him a last chance. I believe he tried. They told him, ‘one more mistake and you’re out’,” said Lascelles.
He never flew with Mertin at Helios, since both were captains. However, other co-pilots – including Pambos Charalambous – were concerned with doubling up with him.
The next witness of the day was Alexia Gerolemou, formerly a senior flight attendant with Helios Airways.
Gerolemou insisted that recurrent problems in technical checks, staff training and organization were not addressed.
She said that the airline would often leave it to the last minute to fix technical glitches on planes.
The committee also heard yesterday from Christos Neocleous, a lawyer for Libra Holidays Group, owners of the airline.
Neocleous, who played an integral part in the company’s controversial name-change to ajet, rebutted suggestions the airline was cutting costs that affected safety.
Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006
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“The first thing that happens during decompression at a high altitude is that you have intense pain in the ears, frost and moisture on the plane. Simultaneously, the ‘horn’ will sound.”
Lascelles dismissed speculation that an engineer had left the decompression switch on manual before takeoff.
If that were the case, he said, the passengers would have felt unbearable pain in the ears as soon as the engines throttled.
Lascelles dismissed speculation that an engineer had left the decompression switch on manual before takeoff.
If that were the case, he said, the passengers would have felt unbearable pain in the ears as soon as the engines throttled.
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I don't think this guy Lascelles knows what he's talking about. If you start the engines, taxi and take off with the Pr mode selector to manual and the outflow valve to, say, half open, how would that cause pain to the passengers??
The outflow valve is normally fully open and closes gradually to almost fully closed position during take off roll.
The outflow valve is normally fully open and closes gradually to almost fully closed position during take off roll.
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Relieved about the above reactions! I'm just a piece of SLF following this accident with amateur interest but when I read the bit about how throttling up the engines with the outflow valve would cause the passengers (and presumably the crew as well) unbearable pain I thought "Eh? I obviously know less about this than I thought I did!"
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and closes gradually to almost fully closed position during take off roll.
I would expect some discomfort climbing at 3000ft/min unpressurised.
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Does this happen on the 737 with manual mode selected?
I would expect some discomfort climbing at 3000ft/min unpressurised.
I would expect some discomfort climbing at 3000ft/min unpressurised.
It happens with Pr control mode set to Auto which is the normal setting. If its on manual the outflow valve stays where it was when manual was selected (unless of course it's moved manualy).
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Think about it LNAV! The Greek investgators have stated that the outflow valve was left in manual, 14.6 degrees open. What will happen after engine start and the packs are put to the Auto postion? I'll tell you what will happen...Greek report out the window and big egg on face!
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Continuation of pilot's testimony, plus a few extra bits from the Cyprus Mail online of 8 September:
‘Don’t blame the plane or the co-pilot’
By Constantine Markides
HELIOS airline captain Robert Lascelles yesterday said he believed the blame for the August 14, 2005 Helios crash that killed all 121 passengers and crew on board lay primarily not with the co-pilot, whom he characterised as a “professional”, nor with the actual craft, which he claimed faced no unusual problems, but rather with the captain.
Lascelles, still employed with ajet – the successor airline to Helios – yesterday continued to answer questions posed by the investigative committee and lawyers of the victims’ families.
On Wednesday, captain Robert Lascelles had said that while the plane was rapidly depressurising, the pilots had wasted valuable time troubleshooting and contacting ground engineers.
“The first action they should have taken was put on their oxygen masks,” he said. “It’s also important that you try to control the depressurisation. You need to shut the airflow valve, then switch the decompression system to manual. That way a pilot can control the airflow. Also, you must lower the plane and drop the oxygen masks in the passenger cabin.”
But according to state radio, Lascelles yesterday limited his criticism to Hans-Jurgen Mertin, the German captain of flight ZU522. Lascelles said Mertin was known for his tendency to take unilateral action and may have treated co-pilot Pambos Charlamabous as a steward, ignoring any of his suggestions to deal with the situation differently.
Lascelles had worked together with Mertin at another airline. Mertin was fired at some point for not complying with company protocol but apparently did not mend his wayward ways after joining Helios.
“They called him in to talk about certain problems and compliance with procedures, but they gave him a last chance,” Lascelles said. “I believe he tried. They told him, ‘one more mistake and you’re out’.”
Lascelles never flew with Mertin at Helios, as both were captains. However, other co-pilots, including Charalambous, were concerned with doubling up with him.
Lascelles had only flattering words for Charalambous, calling him a “professional” and “very experienced”.
The British pilot did testify that the airline company pressured personnel to work long hours and imposed financial penalties on staff who called in sick and did not show up to work – although he noted that such penalties were shelved under the new ajet terms of employment.
But he also stated that the upkeep of the craft was “extremely good” and rejected claims that the changes in temperature on the Boeing in question or the fact that there was ice found on the craft door demonstrated its flight unworthiness.
Lascelles said that heating systems in older Boeing 737s are not very good or easily controlled – although he said this was not true of the new line of Boeings – and that technical deficiencies are to be expected on older aircraft.
Former Helios air stewardess Despina Amajouranou, who also testified yesterday, flew 11 times on the Boeing in question. She quit her job because, in her words, she did not want to risk her life to fill someone else’s pocket.
Amajouranou claimed that on August 9, 2005, five days before the fateful crash, the temperature of the Boeing 737’s cabin was very cold and, feeling dizzy, she had to cover herself with a blanket.
She also said that she smelled petrol during another flight and expressed the view that craft problems were not addressed due to their economic cost.
Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006
‘Don’t blame the plane or the co-pilot’
By Constantine Markides
HELIOS airline captain Robert Lascelles yesterday said he believed the blame for the August 14, 2005 Helios crash that killed all 121 passengers and crew on board lay primarily not with the co-pilot, whom he characterised as a “professional”, nor with the actual craft, which he claimed faced no unusual problems, but rather with the captain.
Lascelles, still employed with ajet – the successor airline to Helios – yesterday continued to answer questions posed by the investigative committee and lawyers of the victims’ families.
On Wednesday, captain Robert Lascelles had said that while the plane was rapidly depressurising, the pilots had wasted valuable time troubleshooting and contacting ground engineers.
“The first action they should have taken was put on their oxygen masks,” he said. “It’s also important that you try to control the depressurisation. You need to shut the airflow valve, then switch the decompression system to manual. That way a pilot can control the airflow. Also, you must lower the plane and drop the oxygen masks in the passenger cabin.”
But according to state radio, Lascelles yesterday limited his criticism to Hans-Jurgen Mertin, the German captain of flight ZU522. Lascelles said Mertin was known for his tendency to take unilateral action and may have treated co-pilot Pambos Charlamabous as a steward, ignoring any of his suggestions to deal with the situation differently.
Lascelles had worked together with Mertin at another airline. Mertin was fired at some point for not complying with company protocol but apparently did not mend his wayward ways after joining Helios.
“They called him in to talk about certain problems and compliance with procedures, but they gave him a last chance,” Lascelles said. “I believe he tried. They told him, ‘one more mistake and you’re out’.”
Lascelles never flew with Mertin at Helios, as both were captains. However, other co-pilots, including Charalambous, were concerned with doubling up with him.
Lascelles had only flattering words for Charalambous, calling him a “professional” and “very experienced”.
The British pilot did testify that the airline company pressured personnel to work long hours and imposed financial penalties on staff who called in sick and did not show up to work – although he noted that such penalties were shelved under the new ajet terms of employment.
But he also stated that the upkeep of the craft was “extremely good” and rejected claims that the changes in temperature on the Boeing in question or the fact that there was ice found on the craft door demonstrated its flight unworthiness.
Lascelles said that heating systems in older Boeing 737s are not very good or easily controlled – although he said this was not true of the new line of Boeings – and that technical deficiencies are to be expected on older aircraft.
Former Helios air stewardess Despina Amajouranou, who also testified yesterday, flew 11 times on the Boeing in question. She quit her job because, in her words, she did not want to risk her life to fill someone else’s pocket.
Amajouranou claimed that on August 9, 2005, five days before the fateful crash, the temperature of the Boeing 737’s cabin was very cold and, feeling dizzy, she had to cover herself with a blanket.
She also said that she smelled petrol during another flight and expressed the view that craft problems were not addressed due to their economic cost.
Copyright © Cyprus Mail 2006
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I watched the reconstruction on TV and have read carefully this thread. Unless I have missed something blindingly obvious. The Greek AF F-16 pilots made clear reference to the passengers wearing o2 masks in flight and rescuers mentioned many of the deceased were still wearing them on the ground. Why do not flight crew masks drop down in the same manner, thus providing an unmistakable visual clue that there is a problem.
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David
Be lucky
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TAD - this was the second thread on this accident. The first one was closed and is at http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthr...hreadid=185849
You need, unfortunately, to read all of that to answer your question.
- and to get the whole picture.
You need, unfortunately, to read all of that to answer your question.
- and to get the whole picture.
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Lascelles informed the committee that there are three types of decompression: explosive, fast and slow. Explosive decompression is the most dangerous, and pilots must react to it “in a split second”.
Lascelles said Mertin was known for his tendency to take unilateral action and may have treated co-pilot Pambos Charlamabous as a steward, ignoring any of his suggestions to deal with the situation differently.
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Rananim, I totally agree with you. I don't think the copilot ever realized what was happening. In fact I am sure of it. Who would know that the aircraft is not pressurizing and not press the ALT HOLD button??!
I even believe that the copilot just flew the aircraft and took over the ATC without being much involved with what the captain was doing, i.e., talking to the Engineer and trying to pull the Take off config warning cb.
I even believe that the copilot just flew the aircraft and took over the ATC without being much involved with what the captain was doing, i.e., talking to the Engineer and trying to pull the Take off config warning cb.
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BOAC
I made reference to automatic drop down masks for pilots somewhere in the previous thread, many months ago.
Perhaps you could remind us all of the exact reason as to why they are not used in the critical area of the cockpit?
Many thanks.
I made reference to automatic drop down masks for pilots somewhere in the previous thread, many months ago.
Perhaps you could remind us all of the exact reason as to why they are not used in the critical area of the cockpit?
Many thanks.