Aircrew Fatigue
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Aircrew Fatigue
The UK CAA has published a report reviewing "a programme of work related to the sleep and wakefulness of the airline pilot" carried out on its behalf by the QinetiQ Centre for Human Sciences (CHS) and its predecessor organisations - DERA, DRA and the RAF Institute of Aviation Medicine.
The results of the research have been used to develop and validate the 'SAFE' (System for Aircrew Fatigue Evaluation) model.
Link: Aircrew Fatigue
It's a pdf file so you may need Adobe Reader to open it - free downloads are widely available on the net.
Tudor Owen
The results of the research have been used to develop and validate the 'SAFE' (System for Aircrew Fatigue Evaluation) model.
Link: Aircrew Fatigue
It's a pdf file so you may need Adobe Reader to open it - free downloads are widely available on the net.
Tudor Owen
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You are not alone in EK !
In another quarter of the world there are similar flights across the Pacific with similar layover patterns. Or how about 2 sectors (via ANC) or even 3 Westbound. LAX-SFO-ANC-Orient
In another quarter of the world there are similar flights across the Pacific with similar layover patterns. Or how about 2 sectors (via ANC) or even 3 Westbound. LAX-SFO-ANC-Orient
Grandpa Aerotart
Flying Lawyer,
Interesting topic this....The great difficulty is for crew, especially, to differentiate between fatigue and just tired...especially when you're very ******* tired
While I, in no way, condone, nor would like to fly, EK rosters (I have mates who are and they are not happy campers) the issue becomes further confused when emotions get in the way of deciding that difference between fatigued and tired.
Certainly tiring flights like that quoted above flown often would lead to long term fatigue...and their (EK's) charming habit of DXB-MEL (24 hrs off) AKL (24 hrs off) MEL (24 hrs off)-DXB....followed by a few days at home then DXB-JFK (<24 hrs off) JFK-DXB, followed by 2 days off then J'burg, min rest DXB, 2 days off then Bombay return and on etc, seems gauranteed to shorten your temper, marriage and life.
I started reading the attached pdf and then quite frankly lost interest....the reason being is I have participated in a similar thing with CASA. They, in concert with Uni of SA, came up with FMS (Fatigue Management System) much along the lines of SAFE.
The FMS's biggest failing, and I suspects SAFE's as well, is they don't make allowance for 'life'.
They assume you are either 'doing work' which has a fatigue score or not 'doing work' which doesn't. Of course in their lovely perfect world, which exists only in a Univercity Lab thesis, we would be reporting all 'work done' which would include running around paying bills, mowing the lawn, arguing with the wife, kids, contractor, working out in the gym, playing touch football, going for a jog, crap sleep because you're jet lagged, crap sleep because it's daytime when you're trying to sleep, crap sleep because the new baby is sick, etc etc etc and on ad nauseum.
You can imagine the reaction from the company when you tell them a marginal rostered flight (a duty period has a fatigue score) cannot be crewed by your good self because your last 2 days 'off' had a fatigue score which when added to that which they would like to impose on you exceeds that max allowed fatigue score.
The theory is of course that you must (it's yours and the comapnies responsibility) enter into the computer software that calculates your fatigue score EVERYTHING that causes fatigue....of course you do...otherwise the computer spits out rubbish
I think you, being an undoubtely clever chap, can probably work out why we get a little cynical when CASA, CAA or whomever come up with their cute little systems to fix perceived 'safety issues'.
The answers to the issues are of course unnacceptable to airline management....that's why Flight Time Limitations as espoused in documents like CAP371 are used as targets on not limitations. I am sure the chaps who penned CAP 371 could not envisage B777, 744 and A340-600s with their attendant 2 crew cockpits in 1975.
I would suggest true answers to the fatigue issues would create a true aircrew shortage and impact the 'bottom line' so horrendously that the airlines would revolt...so instead various regulatory authorities trot out their cute ideas which go nowhere....we are still using CAP 371, CAO 48 30-40 years after they became law.
Chuck.
Interesting topic this....The great difficulty is for crew, especially, to differentiate between fatigue and just tired...especially when you're very ******* tired
While I, in no way, condone, nor would like to fly, EK rosters (I have mates who are and they are not happy campers) the issue becomes further confused when emotions get in the way of deciding that difference between fatigued and tired.
Certainly tiring flights like that quoted above flown often would lead to long term fatigue...and their (EK's) charming habit of DXB-MEL (24 hrs off) AKL (24 hrs off) MEL (24 hrs off)-DXB....followed by a few days at home then DXB-JFK (<24 hrs off) JFK-DXB, followed by 2 days off then J'burg, min rest DXB, 2 days off then Bombay return and on etc, seems gauranteed to shorten your temper, marriage and life.
I started reading the attached pdf and then quite frankly lost interest....the reason being is I have participated in a similar thing with CASA. They, in concert with Uni of SA, came up with FMS (Fatigue Management System) much along the lines of SAFE.
The FMS's biggest failing, and I suspects SAFE's as well, is they don't make allowance for 'life'.
They assume you are either 'doing work' which has a fatigue score or not 'doing work' which doesn't. Of course in their lovely perfect world, which exists only in a Univercity Lab thesis, we would be reporting all 'work done' which would include running around paying bills, mowing the lawn, arguing with the wife, kids, contractor, working out in the gym, playing touch football, going for a jog, crap sleep because you're jet lagged, crap sleep because it's daytime when you're trying to sleep, crap sleep because the new baby is sick, etc etc etc and on ad nauseum.
You can imagine the reaction from the company when you tell them a marginal rostered flight (a duty period has a fatigue score) cannot be crewed by your good self because your last 2 days 'off' had a fatigue score which when added to that which they would like to impose on you exceeds that max allowed fatigue score.
The theory is of course that you must (it's yours and the comapnies responsibility) enter into the computer software that calculates your fatigue score EVERYTHING that causes fatigue....of course you do...otherwise the computer spits out rubbish
I think you, being an undoubtely clever chap, can probably work out why we get a little cynical when CASA, CAA or whomever come up with their cute little systems to fix perceived 'safety issues'.
The answers to the issues are of course unnacceptable to airline management....that's why Flight Time Limitations as espoused in documents like CAP371 are used as targets on not limitations. I am sure the chaps who penned CAP 371 could not envisage B777, 744 and A340-600s with their attendant 2 crew cockpits in 1975.
I would suggest true answers to the fatigue issues would create a true aircrew shortage and impact the 'bottom line' so horrendously that the airlines would revolt...so instead various regulatory authorities trot out their cute ideas which go nowhere....we are still using CAP 371, CAO 48 30-40 years after they became law.
Chuck.
Last edited by Chimbu chuckles; 1st Nov 2005 at 07:51.
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Fatigue
The value of SAFE and similar systems is very questionable. Before becoming a professional pilot I spent a lot of time running around the North German plain preparing for WW3. Practice combat operations required us to operate without rest resulting in high peace time accident rates - weapons mishandled, drivers ran off roads/into other vehicles etc. The Army (UK) did research and then came to the conclusion that 5 hours 'rest' in 24hrs was required (this includes HGV and armoured vehicle drivers on public roads). We were required to fill in 'eat/sleep cards' to record just that, as well as any time we were not on duty. Officers were to ensure that drivers had 5 hours sleep in any 24hr period. Off duty time included cleaning kit and the dozens of other things that keep a soldier awake. A soldier was to be considered sleeping whenever he was not 'on duty' or eating (15/30 mins for each meal). The five hours was acrued in tiny blocks throughout the day, sometimes in blocks of as little as fifteen minutes.
12 days into a big exercise I can recall being in the middle of a convoy eventualy stopped by police on an autobahn where most of the drivers were asleep at the wheel. For three hours we wrecked the countryside, took the corners of houses, even straying into contraflow road works crushing the oversized traffic bollards in use and causing understandable fear in the oncoming civil traffic. By the time the police stopped the convoy the destruction was enormous. But everyone was rested and benefited from 5 hours 'sleep' in accordance with the regs.
As has been suggested in this thread, studies in clinical conditions produce clinical results that dont always match conditions in the field. Minimum rest is rarely adaquate and should never be the 'normal' rostered rest period. Minimum rest means minimum recovery of fatigue, not a rested pilot. There are a lot of threads that show just how tired some pilots are even though they have had 'minimum rest'.
Andy.
12 days into a big exercise I can recall being in the middle of a convoy eventualy stopped by police on an autobahn where most of the drivers were asleep at the wheel. For three hours we wrecked the countryside, took the corners of houses, even straying into contraflow road works crushing the oversized traffic bollards in use and causing understandable fear in the oncoming civil traffic. By the time the police stopped the convoy the destruction was enormous. But everyone was rested and benefited from 5 hours 'sleep' in accordance with the regs.
As has been suggested in this thread, studies in clinical conditions produce clinical results that dont always match conditions in the field. Minimum rest is rarely adaquate and should never be the 'normal' rostered rest period. Minimum rest means minimum recovery of fatigue, not a rested pilot. There are a lot of threads that show just how tired some pilots are even though they have had 'minimum rest'.
Andy.
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Isn't there a requirement (not sure where) that not more than 10 % of the flights should exceed the block time ?
Anyone care to confirm this ?
Rest in the real world is a far cry from some of the very optimistic and "feel good" FM programs that are floating around right now.
Anyone care to confirm this ?
Rest in the real world is a far cry from some of the very optimistic and "feel good" FM programs that are floating around right now.
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I have just spent most of my second day off of two asleep. I was delayed on a trip last week and had an early the day after I got back. I was fatigued due to the delay in the trip and went to ask if I could be knocked off the the early so that I could get some sleep.
I was told it was within limits and that we had to compete with the low costs and that if I went running into management every time I was tired then we wouldn't get anywhere. I was then told the manager incharge "really knew how I felt". The upshot is that my roster in the past few days has been very fatigueing. So much so that when I went to turn the temp up in the flightdeck one my last flight, I turned it down (twice) and thought there must be a problem with the aircraft when it didn't get warmer. It took me 30 mins to realise what I had done.
Now I don't complain easily and I am convinced that if I had had the early duty at home insted of work, I could have caught up on sleep. Going sick wasn't an option unfortunately as we are now monitored for sickness and given the manager didn't understand at the outset, he was unlikely to understand if I had gone sick.
I was told it was within limits and that we had to compete with the low costs and that if I went running into management every time I was tired then we wouldn't get anywhere. I was then told the manager incharge "really knew how I felt". The upshot is that my roster in the past few days has been very fatigueing. So much so that when I went to turn the temp up in the flightdeck one my last flight, I turned it down (twice) and thought there must be a problem with the aircraft when it didn't get warmer. It took me 30 mins to realise what I had done.
Now I don't complain easily and I am convinced that if I had had the early duty at home insted of work, I could have caught up on sleep. Going sick wasn't an option unfortunately as we are now monitored for sickness and given the manager didn't understand at the outset, he was unlikely to understand if I had gone sick.
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Chuck
You raise a valid point. I have little knowlegde of these surveys, but I do believe the regulations are way outdated, simply because of my rosters and associated fatigue.
I started a thread a while back demise of professional pilots profession. This was one of my major concerns, and reading through the threads even since then, many other airlines pilots are voicing their concerns. The 30 year old regs are well outdated, yet nothing seems to change, and even worse airlines are rostering their crew MONTHLY right up to the maximums, rather than using them as a maximum when they are REALLY stuck due unforseen resignations, they also IGNORE the recommendations of time off between rostered slip patterns, giving only 1-2 days to recover rather than the recommended 3-5 days. Why publish recommendations knowing only a handful of legacy carriers will honor them, while the large majority of airlines ignore them. pointless.
They also seem to believe that if you get several hours off before a flight, even though you have been working succesive all night flights in different timezones you can simply sleep whenever you wish.
I havnt been able to do this since i was an infant.
Its called jet lag, and its not only passengers that can suffer from it.
When will someone carry out a realistic fatigue survey for the 21st century. Taking into consideration 2 pilot crews (no flight engineers anymore) and longer sector and duty times.
there have been surveys conducted whos results indicate that flying tired or fatigued has the same effect as flying under the influence of alcohol. yet the only rule change in the last 30 years appears to be the change of the alcohol rule from 8 hours to 12 hours. realistically those who would have in the past consumed a reasonable amount of alcohol finishing above the required 8 hours off will take little notice of the 12 hour rule. yet those who consumed only a small amount would not have been impaired when reporting for duty. I believe the level allowable now is so small, fatigue of crew is a far more potential hazard, yet the authorities have done nothing to address this.
You may be correct, the alcohol rule does not affect the airlines, only the crew, yet the fatigue issue would affect the airlines costs, yet greatly improve the crews and airlines safety.
So who pockets are the authorities in.
If you answer that we can see nothing will be done to improve the situation.
It seems the authorities of the world are a bit like many royal families. Plenty of publicity, but basically no real authority.
I started a thread a while back demise of professional pilots profession. This was one of my major concerns, and reading through the threads even since then, many other airlines pilots are voicing their concerns. The 30 year old regs are well outdated, yet nothing seems to change, and even worse airlines are rostering their crew MONTHLY right up to the maximums, rather than using them as a maximum when they are REALLY stuck due unforseen resignations, they also IGNORE the recommendations of time off between rostered slip patterns, giving only 1-2 days to recover rather than the recommended 3-5 days. Why publish recommendations knowing only a handful of legacy carriers will honor them, while the large majority of airlines ignore them. pointless.
They also seem to believe that if you get several hours off before a flight, even though you have been working succesive all night flights in different timezones you can simply sleep whenever you wish.
I havnt been able to do this since i was an infant.
Its called jet lag, and its not only passengers that can suffer from it.
When will someone carry out a realistic fatigue survey for the 21st century. Taking into consideration 2 pilot crews (no flight engineers anymore) and longer sector and duty times.
there have been surveys conducted whos results indicate that flying tired or fatigued has the same effect as flying under the influence of alcohol. yet the only rule change in the last 30 years appears to be the change of the alcohol rule from 8 hours to 12 hours. realistically those who would have in the past consumed a reasonable amount of alcohol finishing above the required 8 hours off will take little notice of the 12 hour rule. yet those who consumed only a small amount would not have been impaired when reporting for duty. I believe the level allowable now is so small, fatigue of crew is a far more potential hazard, yet the authorities have done nothing to address this.
You may be correct, the alcohol rule does not affect the airlines, only the crew, yet the fatigue issue would affect the airlines costs, yet greatly improve the crews and airlines safety.
So who pockets are the authorities in.
If you answer that we can see nothing will be done to improve the situation.
It seems the authorities of the world are a bit like many royal families. Plenty of publicity, but basically no real authority.
Last edited by TDF380; 5th Nov 2005 at 11:36.
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"I was fatigued due to the delay in the trip and went to ask if I could be knocked off the the early so that I could get some sleep."
"The upshot is that my roster in the past few days has been very fatigueing. So much so that when I went to turn the temp up in the flightdeck one my last flight, I turned it down (twice) and thought there must be a problem with the aircraft when it didn't get warmer. It took me 30 mins to realise what I had done."
Doesn't this just explain why the rules haven't changed?
Pilot admits he is fatigued. Pilot continues with rostered duties.
a) you are not legal if flying fatigued.
b) you knew you were fatigued before the duty; did you not realise what a liability you were? I would not want to be flying with you if the above is true.
So...we are our own worst enemy in this one. If crew called in fatigued EVERY time they were fatigued then the CAA could not ignore the huge safety issue that would ensue.
I have been fatigued once or twice and I HAVE called in, not to tell the company I was sick, but to tell them I was fatigued. And why. Yes, I had to spend some time explaining myself to management, but if everyone stood up to be counted rather than complaining about it being unsafe to fly fatigued, then a) less incidents would happen and b) the rules would have to be changed.
I understand that there are some airlines out there who could sack or demote you for doing this - this should be reported to the CAA as if the rules were followed and you called in fatigued then it is a safety issue if you are then demoted or sacked.
Its like saying "I knew I was drunk, but I didn't want to report it to the company because I would lose my job, so I thought I would fly anyway".
Now how many people would be sympathetic?
"The upshot is that my roster in the past few days has been very fatigueing. So much so that when I went to turn the temp up in the flightdeck one my last flight, I turned it down (twice) and thought there must be a problem with the aircraft when it didn't get warmer. It took me 30 mins to realise what I had done."
Doesn't this just explain why the rules haven't changed?
Pilot admits he is fatigued. Pilot continues with rostered duties.
a) you are not legal if flying fatigued.
b) you knew you were fatigued before the duty; did you not realise what a liability you were? I would not want to be flying with you if the above is true.
So...we are our own worst enemy in this one. If crew called in fatigued EVERY time they were fatigued then the CAA could not ignore the huge safety issue that would ensue.
I have been fatigued once or twice and I HAVE called in, not to tell the company I was sick, but to tell them I was fatigued. And why. Yes, I had to spend some time explaining myself to management, but if everyone stood up to be counted rather than complaining about it being unsafe to fly fatigued, then a) less incidents would happen and b) the rules would have to be changed.
I understand that there are some airlines out there who could sack or demote you for doing this - this should be reported to the CAA as if the rules were followed and you called in fatigued then it is a safety issue if you are then demoted or sacked.
Its like saying "I knew I was drunk, but I didn't want to report it to the company because I would lose my job, so I thought I would fly anyway".
Now how many people would be sympathetic?
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Airbus Girl, please acquaint yourself with the"Ryanair view on fatigue" thread,and you might understand the reluctance of many of us to call fatigued.I agree if you work for a less draconian company than RYR you are indeed your own worst enemy if you fly whilst fatigued ,here, in happy low-cost heaven, it is called keeping your job;sad but unfortunately that is how it is.
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Interesting views all.
To capitalise on the last points, if pilots are represented by a strong and coherent union (or collectively and professionally organised as a group) the FR instance of 'summary demotions' would not and could not happen.
Get wise folks.
If you are fatigued, do not fly. If the company questions your judgement or decision, go to your union who will happily involve the Authority where necessary.
To capitalise on the last points, if pilots are represented by a strong and coherent union (or collectively and professionally organised as a group) the FR instance of 'summary demotions' would not and could not happen.
Get wise folks.
If you are fatigued, do not fly. If the company questions your judgement or decision, go to your union who will happily involve the Authority where necessary.
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Oh if it was that simple!
Having been on the recieving end of supremely dodgy rostering practices and then seeing the lack of response from the regulators when this was brought to their attention, I wouldn't hold out too much hope of too much changing.
This is probably the biggest and potentially most dangerous issue in the industry at the moment. We are our own worst enemies, since we all want to get the job done, so occasionally we go out of our ways to keep the schedules on track, after all, isn't that the job of a professional pilot?
It's a pity that management see this and then treat it as "normal" and then accuse you of trying to sabotage the company when you are unwilling to go into discretion everyday.
Fatigue is cumulative and devasting on your long term health, I certainly know of one ex-colleague who is no longer with us, who's exceedingly premature death was caused by the cumulative effects that this most glamourous of careers has on the human body.
Poor rostering practices are not just an inconvienience, but a serious problem, probably as damaging long term as boozing or smoking. It's funny how those are unacceptable in the modern airline world since getting rid of them doesn't cost money, but getting good practices and more crew..........
Cynical... Me? Never.
Having been on the recieving end of supremely dodgy rostering practices and then seeing the lack of response from the regulators when this was brought to their attention, I wouldn't hold out too much hope of too much changing.
This is probably the biggest and potentially most dangerous issue in the industry at the moment. We are our own worst enemies, since we all want to get the job done, so occasionally we go out of our ways to keep the schedules on track, after all, isn't that the job of a professional pilot?
It's a pity that management see this and then treat it as "normal" and then accuse you of trying to sabotage the company when you are unwilling to go into discretion everyday.
Fatigue is cumulative and devasting on your long term health, I certainly know of one ex-colleague who is no longer with us, who's exceedingly premature death was caused by the cumulative effects that this most glamourous of careers has on the human body.
Poor rostering practices are not just an inconvienience, but a serious problem, probably as damaging long term as boozing or smoking. It's funny how those are unacceptable in the modern airline world since getting rid of them doesn't cost money, but getting good practices and more crew..........
Cynical... Me? Never.
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Say Again S l o w l y, I so agree with your post.......
My companies protocol (yes not an agreement) states:
Discretion should be looked upon favourably by the Crew.
In other words Discretion is expected.....
I know standing firm might get you into the ****. But I rather have my head up high and take the blame then having to account for hundreds of lives lost!
My companies protocol (yes not an agreement) states:
Discretion should be looked upon favourably by the Crew.
In other words Discretion is expected.....
I know standing firm might get you into the ****. But I rather have my head up high and take the blame then having to account for hundreds of lives lost!
Paxing All Over The World
Shaka
Indeed but, if you are one of the hundreds dead, then you can get blamed for 'pilot error', not for being fatigued. Statistically, this must have already happened.
But I rather have my head up high and take the blame then having to account for hundreds of lives lost!
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What it all boils down to is that insufficient accidents have been attributed to fatigue. So why, one can hear the authorities ask, take any action?
"Pilot error" seems far more in favour as a label to stick on incidents. That get-out allows the authorities to ignore the real problems and bend to the will of the operators.
Anything for an nice comfy, easy life in Gatwick (working 9.30 to 4.30 with an hour for lunch in the multiple choice, decadently stocked, subsidised restaurant) ...........
"Pilot error" seems far more in favour as a label to stick on incidents. That get-out allows the authorities to ignore the real problems and bend to the will of the operators.
Anything for an nice comfy, easy life in Gatwick (working 9.30 to 4.30 with an hour for lunch in the multiple choice, decadently stocked, subsidised restaurant) ...........
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PAX Speaking
How many of us in the back (non-working) part of the 'plane would really bitch at the extra cost of a few extra aircrew (drivers, cabin crew) to be sure that they are fully alert when an emergency occurs?
How much would that really put on our tickets?
Hear me airline mangement, some posters are completely anonymous, but we - your paying pax - can work out many of the airlines involved (I don't fly QR, for several reasons)
Even a pax knows the efect that "jetag" has, and I schedule my business (and pleasure) to try to avoid pushing the envelope. I'd really like to know that the guy driving the damned aircraft isn't doing that!
Yeah - I "take the Michael" on pilot's monthly working hours - but I'm joking - I have driven the sims and even in them I have been scared. We need a fully relaxed and awake guy at the front of myaircraft! (and Cabin Crew who aren't half asleep due to "imaginative" rostering)
why can't we have Martin Baker on passenger seats?
How many of us in the back (non-working) part of the 'plane would really bitch at the extra cost of a few extra aircrew (drivers, cabin crew) to be sure that they are fully alert when an emergency occurs?
How much would that really put on our tickets?
Hear me airline mangement, some posters are completely anonymous, but we - your paying pax - can work out many of the airlines involved (I don't fly QR, for several reasons)
Even a pax knows the efect that "jetag" has, and I schedule my business (and pleasure) to try to avoid pushing the envelope. I'd really like to know that the guy driving the damned aircraft isn't doing that!
Yeah - I "take the Michael" on pilot's monthly working hours - but I'm joking - I have driven the sims and even in them I have been scared. We need a fully relaxed and awake guy at the front of myaircraft! (and Cabin Crew who aren't half asleep due to "imaginative" rostering)
why can't we have Martin Baker on passenger seats?
With the greatest of respect, "the Problem" is that some companies appear to outwardly comply with rules, but internally they reward rule breakers and punish those who follow the rules.
If you give in and break the rules, you are effectively assuming complete responsibility for what happens next, and the company rightly will claim it has no liability for your accident. After all, you broke the rules didn't you?
You might like to consider the aftermath of an industrial accident that killed a lot of people. The proximate cause was poor working practices, training and systems of work.
The company involved immediately blamed the dead (and one surviving) plant operators for the accident. It took a Royal Commission to get at the truth.
Just Google "Longford Gas Plant Victoria" and read about decades of cost cutting, high workloads and a ruthless drive for profits that lead up to the fatal mistake.
Then there is the report about Regulation and enforcement here.
http://www.ieaust.org.au/policy/res/...on-failure.doc
It\'s too long to post. Selective quotes:
The nexus between regulation enforcement and catastrophic engineering failures
by Athol Yates, Senior Policy Analyst, Institution of Engineers Australia
ABSTRACT
The deaths caused by the 1999 Turkish earthquake, 2001 Indian earthquake, the 1997 Canberra hospital implosion and the 1998 Esso Longford gas plant explosion all have one thing in common. Good regulations existed but they were not followed nor enforced.
Over the last 2 decades, the trends of de-regulation and self-conformance have effected most engineering activities. These trends have the potential to reduce costs, increase innovation and benefit the nation. But they also may lead to a decline in design quality, a failure to apply relevant codes and an increase in safety risks for the community.
The enforcement of engineering standards is a critical factor in ensuring that the reforms actually benefit society. This paper examines the evidence of the development and enforcement of engineering regulation, and finds that there is much to be concerned about.
About the author
Athol Yates, MA (Public Policy), BEng, Grad Dip Soviet Studies, is the Senior Policy Analyst at the Institution of Engineers. He has been a guidebook writer, journalist and engineer before joining the IEAust in 1996. He undertakes government lobbying and research to promote the interests of the engineering profession. His recent publications include Government as an informed buyer, The future of engineers in the public sector and Risk allocation in major WA projects. He project managed the 2001 Australian Infrastructure Report Card.
He is undertaking a PhD at the Australian National University on Government as an informed regulator of engineering, telecommunication and transport activities.
A common element to all these tragedies is a failure to enforce the existing regulations.
These examples are not unique. They are just the most tragic examples of regulatory enforcement failures. Any regulation system can suffer the same fate. Any can degenerate from effective to ineffectual without enforcement.
So the question is “Why were regulations not enforced?”. The question is simple but the answer is complex. There are a number of reasons of which the more important are:
1. consensual neglect
2. regulatory overload
3. cutting corners
4. inadequate resources for enforcement
5. penalties are little known
6. inappropriate enforcement mechanism
1 Consensual neglect
This occurs when companies know that the regulations are out of date, inappropriate or conflicting, and consequently, don’t follow them. The regulators are also aware of this and know that enforcing them will make them look silly. So both sides agree not to follow nor enforce them, and not say anything about it.
2 Regulatory overload
This occurs when companies are not meeting the relevant regulations because they are unaware of a recent change or what regulations apply. In a regulatory overload situation, the company is simply submerged in a confusing miasma of regulations, guidelines and codes of practice.
3 Cutting corners
This occurs when companies take a little short-cut here and there, which in themselves have little effect. But when these are all added up, the outcome can be fatally compromised. Nearly always, there is no deliberate decision to avoid meeting regulatory intent. They just occur because of incremental drift.
If the customer becomes a “dumb buyer”, the contractor may be more tempted to cut a few corners. These short-cuts are mostly related to quality. Examples are less detailing, lower quality materials and reduced sub-contractor inspection. Rarely are the short-cuts outside the legal interpretation of contracts or intended fraud.
Cut-throat competition also increases the pressure for injudicious corner cutting. This is a particular problem for the construction industry where lowest upfront cost is a major factor in tender awarding. It is aggravated by the “dumbing down of buyers”. Often a reputation for quality work and best practice is only valuable for getting onto the tender panel. After that, cost seems to be the major determinate. If the pressure to reduce cost and time becomes significant, then the temptation to not undertake the “should” clauses in guidelines may be too great. Another temptation may be to redefine the level of effort put into activities which use the adjective of “commensurate” or “appropriate”. For example, a risk assessment involving a day of work by a para-professional may fulfil the guideline requirement just as well as a week long assessment by a multi-disciplinary expert team. However, the outcome will invariably be completely different.
4 Inadequate resources for enforcement
Another reason for a lack of enforcement is that the regulator does not have the capability to actually enforce the regime. This capability may not be available because the regulator has insufficient skilled people, inadequate financial resources, ineffective powers, or an inappropriate detection strategy.
A typical response from government when the regulatory system shifts from prescriptive regulation to self-regulation is to reduce staff. This is justified on the basis that as certain work is no longer needed, such as sending inspectors to companies to identify breaches of prescriptive rules, neither are the staff. But when new functions are identified, such as sending inspectors to sites to ensure employers are providing a safe workplace and issuing prohibition or improvement notices, instead of increasing staff numbers, the tired mantra of doing more with less is trotted out.
5 Penalties are little known
People will not do what is expected of them unless incorrect behaviour is punished and is seen to be punished. This means that prosecutions for failing to comply actually have to occur and be seen to occur. Most prosecutions occur in the legal system with a suit for negligence or breach of contract, rather than being taken by governments for breaches of Acts, regulation, codes etc.
6 Inappropriate enforcement regime
Appropriate behaviour will only occur if the enforcement mechanism chosen by the people who developed the system is appropriate.
This is where the issue gets sticky ... talking of safety........
Many of these depend on market forces to regulate behaviour.
Market forces are appropriate if both buyers and sellers are informed and can weigh up the costs and benefits of different price and service offerings. However, in the case of buying a building which is structural appropriate for a particularly earthquake zone, I would have trouble believing most buyers would know what questions to ask.
Being an uninformed buyer undermines the power of market forces to produce appropriate behaviour. The greater the ignorance, the less impact market forces can have. Perception of risks is used by most customers to determine what their informed status should be for each purchase. Given that we are all poor at rating risks we have no experience with, we are all particularly uninformed when it comes to evaluating low probability but high consequence events. Consequently we undervalue those solutions which offer best value for money for these events, while overvaluing others that do not offer such value for money.
Another limitation of the ability of market forces to produce appropriate behaviour is caused by the so-called moral hazard problem. Moral hazards exists when a particular set of incentives unintentionally provides motivation for people to do things that are not optimal for them or others.
A requirement for market forces to be effective in producing appropriate behaviour is that the market actually punish bad behaviour and reward good behaviour. The following is an example of this not occurring. If customers do not know about an earthquake code or don’t understand the benefits to the customer or community of following it, then there will be no market preference for designers and builders to follow it. An even worse outcome occurs if there is a cost advantage by not following the code. The result is that companies do not follow the code. And if a company does, then the market will penalise it for doing so.
A critical element for the success of any approach is that practitioners must actively participate in it. If engineers believe that the system is not working, they are the ones with the greatest chance of changing it. Relying on government to see an impending disaster is to wait for Godot.
Don\'t believe the clap-trap about regulation stifling business. Just like financial regulation and fair trading rules, sound building codes create prosperity, not endanger it. They can turn a disaster into a minor disruption.
If you give in and break the rules, you are effectively assuming complete responsibility for what happens next, and the company rightly will claim it has no liability for your accident. After all, you broke the rules didn't you?
You might like to consider the aftermath of an industrial accident that killed a lot of people. The proximate cause was poor working practices, training and systems of work.
The company involved immediately blamed the dead (and one surviving) plant operators for the accident. It took a Royal Commission to get at the truth.
Just Google "Longford Gas Plant Victoria" and read about decades of cost cutting, high workloads and a ruthless drive for profits that lead up to the fatal mistake.
Then there is the report about Regulation and enforcement here.
http://www.ieaust.org.au/policy/res/...on-failure.doc
It\'s too long to post. Selective quotes:
The nexus between regulation enforcement and catastrophic engineering failures
by Athol Yates, Senior Policy Analyst, Institution of Engineers Australia
ABSTRACT
The deaths caused by the 1999 Turkish earthquake, 2001 Indian earthquake, the 1997 Canberra hospital implosion and the 1998 Esso Longford gas plant explosion all have one thing in common. Good regulations existed but they were not followed nor enforced.
Over the last 2 decades, the trends of de-regulation and self-conformance have effected most engineering activities. These trends have the potential to reduce costs, increase innovation and benefit the nation. But they also may lead to a decline in design quality, a failure to apply relevant codes and an increase in safety risks for the community.
The enforcement of engineering standards is a critical factor in ensuring that the reforms actually benefit society. This paper examines the evidence of the development and enforcement of engineering regulation, and finds that there is much to be concerned about.
About the author
Athol Yates, MA (Public Policy), BEng, Grad Dip Soviet Studies, is the Senior Policy Analyst at the Institution of Engineers. He has been a guidebook writer, journalist and engineer before joining the IEAust in 1996. He undertakes government lobbying and research to promote the interests of the engineering profession. His recent publications include Government as an informed buyer, The future of engineers in the public sector and Risk allocation in major WA projects. He project managed the 2001 Australian Infrastructure Report Card.
He is undertaking a PhD at the Australian National University on Government as an informed regulator of engineering, telecommunication and transport activities.
A common element to all these tragedies is a failure to enforce the existing regulations.
These examples are not unique. They are just the most tragic examples of regulatory enforcement failures. Any regulation system can suffer the same fate. Any can degenerate from effective to ineffectual without enforcement.
So the question is “Why were regulations not enforced?”. The question is simple but the answer is complex. There are a number of reasons of which the more important are:
1. consensual neglect
2. regulatory overload
3. cutting corners
4. inadequate resources for enforcement
5. penalties are little known
6. inappropriate enforcement mechanism
1 Consensual neglect
This occurs when companies know that the regulations are out of date, inappropriate or conflicting, and consequently, don’t follow them. The regulators are also aware of this and know that enforcing them will make them look silly. So both sides agree not to follow nor enforce them, and not say anything about it.
2 Regulatory overload
This occurs when companies are not meeting the relevant regulations because they are unaware of a recent change or what regulations apply. In a regulatory overload situation, the company is simply submerged in a confusing miasma of regulations, guidelines and codes of practice.
3 Cutting corners
This occurs when companies take a little short-cut here and there, which in themselves have little effect. But when these are all added up, the outcome can be fatally compromised. Nearly always, there is no deliberate decision to avoid meeting regulatory intent. They just occur because of incremental drift.
If the customer becomes a “dumb buyer”, the contractor may be more tempted to cut a few corners. These short-cuts are mostly related to quality. Examples are less detailing, lower quality materials and reduced sub-contractor inspection. Rarely are the short-cuts outside the legal interpretation of contracts or intended fraud.
Cut-throat competition also increases the pressure for injudicious corner cutting. This is a particular problem for the construction industry where lowest upfront cost is a major factor in tender awarding. It is aggravated by the “dumbing down of buyers”. Often a reputation for quality work and best practice is only valuable for getting onto the tender panel. After that, cost seems to be the major determinate. If the pressure to reduce cost and time becomes significant, then the temptation to not undertake the “should” clauses in guidelines may be too great. Another temptation may be to redefine the level of effort put into activities which use the adjective of “commensurate” or “appropriate”. For example, a risk assessment involving a day of work by a para-professional may fulfil the guideline requirement just as well as a week long assessment by a multi-disciplinary expert team. However, the outcome will invariably be completely different.
4 Inadequate resources for enforcement
Another reason for a lack of enforcement is that the regulator does not have the capability to actually enforce the regime. This capability may not be available because the regulator has insufficient skilled people, inadequate financial resources, ineffective powers, or an inappropriate detection strategy.
A typical response from government when the regulatory system shifts from prescriptive regulation to self-regulation is to reduce staff. This is justified on the basis that as certain work is no longer needed, such as sending inspectors to companies to identify breaches of prescriptive rules, neither are the staff. But when new functions are identified, such as sending inspectors to sites to ensure employers are providing a safe workplace and issuing prohibition or improvement notices, instead of increasing staff numbers, the tired mantra of doing more with less is trotted out.
5 Penalties are little known
People will not do what is expected of them unless incorrect behaviour is punished and is seen to be punished. This means that prosecutions for failing to comply actually have to occur and be seen to occur. Most prosecutions occur in the legal system with a suit for negligence or breach of contract, rather than being taken by governments for breaches of Acts, regulation, codes etc.
6 Inappropriate enforcement regime
Appropriate behaviour will only occur if the enforcement mechanism chosen by the people who developed the system is appropriate.
This is where the issue gets sticky ... talking of safety........
Many of these depend on market forces to regulate behaviour.
Market forces are appropriate if both buyers and sellers are informed and can weigh up the costs and benefits of different price and service offerings. However, in the case of buying a building which is structural appropriate for a particularly earthquake zone, I would have trouble believing most buyers would know what questions to ask.
Being an uninformed buyer undermines the power of market forces to produce appropriate behaviour. The greater the ignorance, the less impact market forces can have. Perception of risks is used by most customers to determine what their informed status should be for each purchase. Given that we are all poor at rating risks we have no experience with, we are all particularly uninformed when it comes to evaluating low probability but high consequence events. Consequently we undervalue those solutions which offer best value for money for these events, while overvaluing others that do not offer such value for money.
Another limitation of the ability of market forces to produce appropriate behaviour is caused by the so-called moral hazard problem. Moral hazards exists when a particular set of incentives unintentionally provides motivation for people to do things that are not optimal for them or others.
A requirement for market forces to be effective in producing appropriate behaviour is that the market actually punish bad behaviour and reward good behaviour. The following is an example of this not occurring. If customers do not know about an earthquake code or don’t understand the benefits to the customer or community of following it, then there will be no market preference for designers and builders to follow it. An even worse outcome occurs if there is a cost advantage by not following the code. The result is that companies do not follow the code. And if a company does, then the market will penalise it for doing so.
A critical element for the success of any approach is that practitioners must actively participate in it. If engineers believe that the system is not working, they are the ones with the greatest chance of changing it. Relying on government to see an impending disaster is to wait for Godot.
Don\'t believe the clap-trap about regulation stifling business. Just like financial regulation and fair trading rules, sound building codes create prosperity, not endanger it. They can turn a disaster into a minor disruption.
Last edited by Sunfish; 10th Nov 2005 at 20:18.
Paxing All Over The World
Sunfish that is brilliant. Never before have I seen the decline of western industry and society placed in such clear words. Many thanks for posting and I have saved the file for later.
This aligns directly (if memory serves) with the causes of the massive power outage in the NE USA on August 14th 2003 (in which I was caught). Because everything was now 'self-regulatory' no one needed to ensure that the power supply COULD meet the demand. Currently, the UK is predicted to have a major shortfall of generating power this winter for similar reasons of (so called) benign neglect.
Over the last 2 decades, the trends of de-regulation and self-conformance have effected most engineering activities. These trends have the potential to reduce costs, increase innovation and benefit the nation. But they also may lead to a decline in design quality, a failure to apply relevant codes and an increase in safety risks for the community.
Ex Sim Guy: this might not be the situation over where you work (Britain, western Europe?), but the larger US airlines claim that they have little or no ticket pricing power-even with the huge increases in fuel prices.
As several are now under Chapter 11 protection, there is even less chance that extra expenses will be added for an extra crewmember. Chapter 11 protection applies to all businesses here, not just airlines, as is often suggested on Pprune. And most US airlines who have entered Chapter 11 failed, either during or after the sad process. And so this is US government protection? The historical facts show the contrary. Much of this happened before many of the "new pilot generation" of "400-hour-wonder button-pushers" were ready to waddle away from Kindergarten.
One of our crewmembers lived in Hamburg. Regarding recent profits at some European airlines, he said that, contrary to some claims on Pprune, when anyone on this website or elsewhere claims that there are no government subsides or tax breaks given to airlines over there, that is a lie. Jet fuel (refined kerosine) can not be cheaper than in the US, unless something is "rigged" in certain airlines' favor, possibly corporate taxes (?).
As several are now under Chapter 11 protection, there is even less chance that extra expenses will be added for an extra crewmember. Chapter 11 protection applies to all businesses here, not just airlines, as is often suggested on Pprune. And most US airlines who have entered Chapter 11 failed, either during or after the sad process. And so this is US government protection? The historical facts show the contrary. Much of this happened before many of the "new pilot generation" of "400-hour-wonder button-pushers" were ready to waddle away from Kindergarten.
One of our crewmembers lived in Hamburg. Regarding recent profits at some European airlines, he said that, contrary to some claims on Pprune, when anyone on this website or elsewhere claims that there are no government subsides or tax breaks given to airlines over there, that is a lie. Jet fuel (refined kerosine) can not be cheaper than in the US, unless something is "rigged" in certain airlines' favor, possibly corporate taxes (?).
Last edited by Ignition Override; 11th Nov 2005 at 04:27.
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Good stuff, Sunfish.
You missed one, which applies in this case.
7 Too many huge loopholes and/or ambiguities.
Who needs "incremental" when the authorities allow "big chunks"!
You missed one, which applies in this case.
7 Too many huge loopholes and/or ambiguities.
Who needs "incremental" when the authorities allow "big chunks"!