GB Incident this morning
VectorLine,
I'm not sure supposition and hazarding guesses gives me much confidence if things go wrong.
We used to be shown a video from a sim check showing pilots actions in the event of an uncontained engine fire after departure from Heathrow (westerlies). As they are turned downwind the FO asks the Capt if he really wants to take a burning aircraft over central London.
'If ATC are happy with it then yes' was the answer.
We recently had an aircraft lose one engine,ask for a divert to Heathrow and subsequently say they had trouble with the other 3 engines-to the degree that they didn't think they could climb away from a missed approach. There was reason to believe that it was carrying hazardous cargo. Should that have been asked to divert elsewhere?
We (ATC) always accept the Captain's decision at face value. God forbid but if the emergency did end up as a smoking hole in the ground, I don't think "the decision rests with the commander" would provide much defence in a court of law or from the headline writers looking for someone to blame.
Although that is not be used to aircraft in emergency (MAYDAY)
And I would hazard a guess that the answer ....would be the commander of the aircraft I suppose.
We used to be shown a video from a sim check showing pilots actions in the event of an uncontained engine fire after departure from Heathrow (westerlies). As they are turned downwind the FO asks the Capt if he really wants to take a burning aircraft over central London.
'If ATC are happy with it then yes' was the answer.
We recently had an aircraft lose one engine,ask for a divert to Heathrow and subsequently say they had trouble with the other 3 engines-to the degree that they didn't think they could climb away from a missed approach. There was reason to believe that it was carrying hazardous cargo. Should that have been asked to divert elsewhere?
We (ATC) always accept the Captain's decision at face value. God forbid but if the emergency did end up as a smoking hole in the ground, I don't think "the decision rests with the commander" would provide much defence in a court of law or from the headline writers looking for someone to blame.
There was (and probably still is) a procedure for the Airport Authority to request, via ATC, commanders of aircraft with technical problems(s) to consider diverting elsewhere. But, of course, that decision rests with the commander.
I recall an incident going back a few years now where a DC10F, which had suffered an uncontained engine failure on departure from Shannon (I think) was vectored over London into EGLL.
According to the report, an emergency was declared over Western UK, he was offered Brize as nearest suitable, but continued to EGLL at Capt's request.
Believe there was some structural damage.
According to the report, an emergency was declared over Western UK, he was offered Brize as nearest suitable, but continued to EGLL at Capt's request.
Believe there was some structural damage.
"The INTRODUCER"
This Air Transport Intelligence article tells the story:
Crippled DC-10's London overflight worries AAIB
David Morrow, London (06Sep01, 15:57 GMT, 491 words)
UK accident investigators are urging the country’s CAA to take further steps to reduce the chance of air traffic controllers’ routing crippled aircraft over densely populated areas during an emergency.
The move follows an emergency landing at London Heathrow by a Gemini Air Cargo McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30F after it suffered a serious birdstrike from a heron in its left-hand General Electric CF6 engine shortly after departing from Shannon International Airport in Ireland.
Controllers routed the aircraft over central London after the crew rejected a suggestion to divert to RAF Brize Norton following the 1 October 2000 incident.
The impact from the bird was so severe that large components from the General Electric CF6 engine’s nacelle fell off and damaged the inboard aileron and flap. The crew shut the engine down and informed controllers of its intention to divert to London or Brussels, having decided that returning to Shannon would be unwise because of poor weather there.
During the exchanges with air traffic control the pilot requested a runway at least 10,000ft (3,050m) in length. While acknowledging that he gave this figure in an attempt to keep matters simple, the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) says that the landing distance required was considerably less.
“In requesting such criteria he reduced considerably the number of possible airports available,” says the investigators’ report.
Although it accepts that the pilot should have the final decision on where to divert, the AAIB states that the crew should have been informed that an approach to London would mean flying in from the east, taking the damaged aircraft over central London.
“Air traffic control advised the crew that RAF Brize Norton was a potential alternative diversion to Heathrow,” says the report. “But the information was provided more in the context of another airfield capable of providing 10,000ft of runway and suitable weather conditions rather than as an alternate to prevent overflying built-up areas.
“Neither the commander [of the aircraft] nor his crew were familiar with London Heathrow or the surrounding area. If air traffic control had advised the crew that the approach to [Heathrow’s] runway 27 would be over densely populated areas the commander would at least have been aware of the potential hazard and might have reconsidered his choice of diversion airport.”
The AAIB notes that in a similar incident at Los Angeles the previous year, large parts of an identical engine fell onto a beach after a KLM Boeing 747-300 suffered a birdstrike involving a western gull.
The CAA has previously amended its Manual of Air Traffic Services following a May 1993 AAIB recommendation, stating that avoidance of densely-populated areas should be a primary consideration when routing aircraft in an emergency.
But as a result of the incident the AAIB is recommending that the manual’s section on handling aircraft emergencies should be updated to include instructions specifically telling controllers to inform pilots during an emergency if an intended route takes the aircraft over heavily populated regions.
Source: Air Transport Intelligence news
Crippled DC-10's London overflight worries AAIB
David Morrow, London (06Sep01, 15:57 GMT, 491 words)
UK accident investigators are urging the country’s CAA to take further steps to reduce the chance of air traffic controllers’ routing crippled aircraft over densely populated areas during an emergency.
The move follows an emergency landing at London Heathrow by a Gemini Air Cargo McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30F after it suffered a serious birdstrike from a heron in its left-hand General Electric CF6 engine shortly after departing from Shannon International Airport in Ireland.
Controllers routed the aircraft over central London after the crew rejected a suggestion to divert to RAF Brize Norton following the 1 October 2000 incident.
The impact from the bird was so severe that large components from the General Electric CF6 engine’s nacelle fell off and damaged the inboard aileron and flap. The crew shut the engine down and informed controllers of its intention to divert to London or Brussels, having decided that returning to Shannon would be unwise because of poor weather there.
During the exchanges with air traffic control the pilot requested a runway at least 10,000ft (3,050m) in length. While acknowledging that he gave this figure in an attempt to keep matters simple, the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) says that the landing distance required was considerably less.
“In requesting such criteria he reduced considerably the number of possible airports available,” says the investigators’ report.
Although it accepts that the pilot should have the final decision on where to divert, the AAIB states that the crew should have been informed that an approach to London would mean flying in from the east, taking the damaged aircraft over central London.
“Air traffic control advised the crew that RAF Brize Norton was a potential alternative diversion to Heathrow,” says the report. “But the information was provided more in the context of another airfield capable of providing 10,000ft of runway and suitable weather conditions rather than as an alternate to prevent overflying built-up areas.
“Neither the commander [of the aircraft] nor his crew were familiar with London Heathrow or the surrounding area. If air traffic control had advised the crew that the approach to [Heathrow’s] runway 27 would be over densely populated areas the commander would at least have been aware of the potential hazard and might have reconsidered his choice of diversion airport.”
The AAIB notes that in a similar incident at Los Angeles the previous year, large parts of an identical engine fell onto a beach after a KLM Boeing 747-300 suffered a birdstrike involving a western gull.
The CAA has previously amended its Manual of Air Traffic Services following a May 1993 AAIB recommendation, stating that avoidance of densely-populated areas should be a primary consideration when routing aircraft in an emergency.
But as a result of the incident the AAIB is recommending that the manual’s section on handling aircraft emergencies should be updated to include instructions specifically telling controllers to inform pilots during an emergency if an intended route takes the aircraft over heavily populated regions.
Source: Air Transport Intelligence news
