ATR down near Palermo (Merged)
'nough said
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The aircraft used to be G-BXBV according to a-net so I guess that correlates - is it mandatory to change those devices if an aircraft changes operator?
ZbV
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12345-1234-A and 12354-1234-A... Look similar.
We had RMI indicator part number off by 1 digit and the thing insisted showing 180 deg off. Turned out that the unit was modified to a new standard and was not compatible with the rest of the setup. I took days to find out what was wrong.
Not suprising that this could happen.
JJ
We had RMI indicator part number off by 1 digit and the thing insisted showing 180 deg off. Turned out that the unit was modified to a new standard and was not compatible with the rest of the setup. I took days to find out what was wrong.
Not suprising that this could happen.
JJ
"The INTRODUCER"
ATR 72 accident:
“[EASA] should consider the possibility to change the fuel-system certification regulation for public transport aircraft, in order to require that the fuel low-level warnings be independent from the fuel-gauging systems.”
Virgin Atlantic G-VATL incident:
"UK AAIB Safety Recommendation 2005-37:
Airbus should review the logic of the low fuel level warnings on affected Airbus A340 aircraft so that the FDC low fuel level discrete parameter always triggers a low fuel level warning, regardless of the condition of the other fuel control systems."
The independence of fuel low state warnings and main fuel quantity control, display and monitoring systems would certainly seem to be a prudent design requirement.
“[EASA] should consider the possibility to change the fuel-system certification regulation for public transport aircraft, in order to require that the fuel low-level warnings be independent from the fuel-gauging systems.”
Virgin Atlantic G-VATL incident:
"UK AAIB Safety Recommendation 2005-37:
Airbus should review the logic of the low fuel level warnings on affected Airbus A340 aircraft so that the FDC low fuel level discrete parameter always triggers a low fuel level warning, regardless of the condition of the other fuel control systems."
The independence of fuel low state warnings and main fuel quantity control, display and monitoring systems would certainly seem to be a prudent design requirement.
Last edited by BEagle; 21st Dec 2005 at 15:36.
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Murphy's Law in action again.
I was an engineer for the now defunct Gill Airways, who operated a mixed fleet of ATR 42s and 72s. We were aware the fuel indicators on the two types looked near identical but were not. It would have been better had the connectors on the rear had different pin positioning on the bayonets to prevent mishap. Recommendation B of the ANSV. Completely feasible.
However a simple post fit check on the quantities in the tanks compared to the gauges could and should have been done. It would have revealed this enormous discrepancy. It would seem this was not performed.
Incidentally G-BXBV was (is?) an ATR42, therefore could not have been the accident aircraft in a reregistered guise.
I was an engineer for the now defunct Gill Airways, who operated a mixed fleet of ATR 42s and 72s. We were aware the fuel indicators on the two types looked near identical but were not. It would have been better had the connectors on the rear had different pin positioning on the bayonets to prevent mishap. Recommendation B of the ANSV. Completely feasible.
However a simple post fit check on the quantities in the tanks compared to the gauges could and should have been done. It would have revealed this enormous discrepancy. It would seem this was not performed.
Incidentally G-BXBV was (is?) an ATR42, therefore could not have been the accident aircraft in a reregistered guise.
